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Preface.
The majority of commentators on the early writings of Marx agree that
a theory of man can be found in these texts. 1

Moreover, there is general

agreement that Marx' theory of man is developed through polemics with his
philosophical predecessors, and is especially influenced by his encounters
with Feuerbach and Hegel. 2

But beyond this point there seems to be slight

agreement among the commentators.

Since the notion of man in Marx' early

texts is set forth in a polemical context, it is difficult to ascertain
1

Cf. For example Adam Schaff, "Marxism and the Philosophy of Mari,"
in Socialist Humanism, edited by Erich Fromm (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965), p. 142. Also Adam Schaff's Marxism and the
Human Individual, translated by 0. Wojtasiewick, edited by
Robert Cohen, (New York: McGraw Hill Inc., 1970), p. 9.
Other concurring authors include Roger Garaudy, Karl Marx: The
Evolution of his Thought, translated by Nan Apotheker, (New
York: International Publishers Co. Inc., 1967), p. 53; Erich
Fromm, Marx' Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961), p. v; Sartre, Search For a Method, translated by
Hazel Barnes, (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. xxxiv-xxxv;
Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 85; Nathan
Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, (Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1965), p. 46; Pierre Bigo, Marxisme
et Humanisme, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954),
pp. 137-141.
The major dissenting opinion is offered by Louis Althousser, who
in his Pour Marx argues that any hints of a notion of man in
Marx' manuscripts represent a "Feuerbachian" phase of Marx'
development, and are not genuinely "Mar;ician." Althousser's
arguments will be considered in the second chapter of my thesis.
2

Cf. especially Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy,
pp. 42-45, in which it is argued that Marx' concept of 'praxis,'
the central concept in his theory of Man, is developed by Marx
in the face of Hegel's notion of Spirit.
ii
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just what this notion is, and what its place is within the compass of
Marx' thought.

For the same reason, it is also difficult to determine

precisely how Marx' theory of man is influenced by his predecessors,
Feuerbach and Hegel.

But it is important to determine clearly the rela-

tion of Marx to Feuerbach and Hegel.

For Marx' notion of man is develope

through his polemics with these of his predecessors.

Consequently a clea

understanding of the relation of Marx' thought to the thought of Feuerbac
and Hegel is of critical significance in obtaining·a distinct understanding of Marx' theory of man.
In this thesis, I shall argue that the basic content of Marx' theory
of man can be derived from a textual analysis of Marx' early manuscripts,
particularly the "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. 113

This theor

functions for Marx as a criterion or norm, entitling him to comment on
other topics, such as the nature of productive alienation, and the
condition of the wage laborer.

Further, I shall argue that the most

fundamental concepts of Marx' 'normative' 4 theory of man have a close
3

Supporting references will also be made to selected of Marx'
subsequent works; The German Ideology, The Poverty of Philosophy, Class
Struggles in France, The Grundrisse of 1857-1858, The Contribution to a
Critique of Political Economy, and Capital. These references will have a
obvious bearing on the problem of continuity in Marx' writings.

4
In refering to Marx' theory of man as 'normative,' I intend a reference to the terms 'criterion' and 'norm' as used above. A normative
theory which operates as a criterion for making judgments on topics not
directly discussed within the ~ody of the theory itself.
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affinity with certain aspects of the thought of Hegel.
that Marx is "an Hegelian."

I do not claim

Marx' studied Feuerbach seriously, and he is

sharply critical of Hegel at many points.

Nevertheless, I claim that it

is on certain portions of Hegel's thought that Marx profoundly models his
theory of man.
A schema of my argument runs as follows:

Chapter One develops the

content of Marx' theory of man through an analysis of the relevant texts,
principally though not exlusively the Manuscripts of

1844. 5

In this

chapter I argue that the three basic categories present in Marx' theory
of man are productive activity of praxis,

6

society, and consciousness.

Praxis is first of all productive activity requiring as its object
soemthing sensuous and external to the individual agent: nature.

But the

object of praxis is here understood as essentially a correlate of praxis.
Nature is the field or milieu of praxis, and thus needs to be understood
through its relation to praxis, rather than as a reality fully determined
in itself.

The result of praxis is 'objectification,' since the object

produced by praxis bears the marks of that agency which produced it.
'Objectification,' the embodiment of the details of praxis in an external
5
Cf. footnote three.
6

this term, for which productive activity or agency may be taken as
synonyms, will, as I indicate in this preface, receive progressive
definition through my first chapter.

v
product, is initially defined by Marx through a description of the
relation of praxis to nature.

But 'objectification' is also a concept

which Marx frequently employs in further analyses of the structure of
praxis itself.

It figures prominently in his explanation of the effect

of praxis on the experience of the agent, as one who is realized or
actualized as a definite agent through his productive activity.

Marx

shows how the agent himself is embodied in the product he produces, and
this is one of the two meanings of the concept of human 'self actualization' in Marx' theory of man.
The notion of objectification enables Marx to analyze praxis from the
point of view of its product.

But praxis in the texts of Marx is also

analyzed from the point of view of the agent.
comes into play.

Here the notion of "needs"

All praxis or productive activity is, Marx insists,

rooted in needs; it is in virtue of his experiencing his own needs that
the individual acts.

Needs require agency for their satisfaction in that,

as subjectively apprehended deficiencies or lacks within the individual,
they require for their satisfaction the individual's active relating of
himself to that which is other than and external to himself.

And since

the individual experiences definite needs, they are responsible for the
definite forms of action the individual performs to obtain satisfaction.
The human subject of praxis must be understood as the subject of two
sorts of needs: 'subsistence needs' and 'human needs.'

The former are

those which arise directly from the physiological structure of the
individual, and whose satisfaction is required for the organic
maintainence of the individual, e.g. hunger.

Such needs are common to

vi

all behaving organisms.

Human needs arise from more complex interrela-

tions between agent and environment, and they are essentially characterized as developmental.

Human needs develop from previous instances of

praxis, and they in turn bring about new sorts of praxis, and thus new and
more complex interrelations between individual and environment.

And

since the individual develops these needs through his own actions as a
productive agent, he further 'actualizes' or realizes himself as an agent.
Here the notion of 'self actualization' takes on an additional meaning.
This expanded sense of 'self actualization' also allows Marx to
characterize praxis as 'universal.'

Human productive activity roots it-

self in needs which develop dialectically through praxis itself.

Such~

activity then is not limited to those forms of behavior whose bases are
needs arising from the physiological structure of the individual;
distinctly human praxis is universal in scope.
Marx, then, understands praxis in terms of its relation to its object
through the concept of objectification, and through its relation to its
subject, through his notion of needs.

This analysis of praxis further

allows Marx to hold that the human agent 'appropriates' nature in two
senses.

The human agent 'appropriates' nature in that he transforms it on

the terms of his productive agency.

The result of this agency is a pro-

duct suitable for the satisfaction of needs.

But the praxis of the

individual must also be described as occuring in society, in a context of
social relations.

And 'society' itself is a second category basic to

Marx' theory of man.
Marx holps that society must be understood as a series of social

vii

relationships between subjects of praxis or productive agents, and
explains that such relationships are possible through praxis itself.
Praxis is objectified in its product.

This means that the agent himself

is externalized in the objective result of his activity, inasmuch as his
activity is radically his own, rooted in his own needs.

The product is

appropriable by the agent for the satisfaction of his own needs.

But

since the result of praxis is an external product, it is appropriable
also by other individuals, towards the satisfaction of their relevantly
similar needs.

In thus appropriating the results of productive agency,

individuals relate themselves both to a product and to the producer himself, since the product here is a result of some feature of the individual producer himself, viz., his own agency.

Marx' point is that it is

through my productive agency that I externalize myself, thus rendering
relationships between myself and others, social relationships, possible.
Consequently social relationships are most fundamentally relationships
between productive agents.
For Marx the relationship between praxis and society is more complex
than this conclusion might seem to suggest.

For just as society is to be

understood in terms of praxis, actual praxis is in turn essentially
conditioned for Marx by the social context in which it occurs.
originates in needs and is directed at nature.

Praxis

But nature is here to be

understood as the correlate of praxis, including social praxis.

The

"material" upon which praxis is excercised is nature as already determined by social production.

-

And thus the possibilities which this

"material" present to the individual productive agent are themselves
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conditioned by his social milieu.
of productive relations.

Moreover, society for Marx is a system

As a system society controls the definite

productive options available to the individual.
These two general descriptions of society show that for Marx praxis
is in principle social.

'Society' is thus a category which plays an

essential role in Marx' theory of man.

All praxis results in the

externalization of the individual, and thus renders him in principle
accessable to social relations.

And praxis, both in its definite options

and "materials" depends upon the social context in which it occurs.

The

concepts of society and praxis are, then, to be understood in terms of
each other.

Just as praxis explains the possibility and the fundamental

character of social relationships for Marx, so society explains the
details of productive agency in their definite actuality.
This view of society implies two further points of importance for
Marx' "social" theory of man.

One is the idea of 'totalization.'

As a

system of productive relations, society in principle offers us a pluralit)
of options for productive activity.

This makes it possible for the

individual to act in diverse ways towards the satisfaction of diverse
sorts of human needs.

Thus the agent may achieve self actualization as

an agent 'totally' rather than partially: society accounts for the real
possibility of multi-directional rather than uni-directional or reified
praxis,
Second, society also accounts for the possibility of the agent's
being determined as an 'object' as well as a 'subject.'

The agent is

determined as a 'subject' through his realization of himself as an agent

ix

in definite productive acts and through the development of new needs
within his experience as a result of such acts.

The agent is determined

as an 'object' through his being the object of the productive activities
of others.

This is possible only in a context of social relations.

The

determination of the agent as an 'object' is essential in order that man
as agent be considered 'natural' in Marx' sense of that term.
Consciousness is the third broad category of Marx' theory of man.
In his theory, consciousness is integrated with praxis and society.

Marx

first of all holds that consciousness as a feature of individual experience is a feature or moment of human praxis.

Consciousness is 'produced'

by praxis, inasmuch as consciousness is a relationship between the
individual and his environment determined by the more fundamental relationship which the individual enjoys with his environment as an agent.
But Marx also argues that consciousness is an essential feature of human
praxis, in that only given this can the developmental character of human
needs be explained.

Further, consciousness as an indispensible feature

of human praxis, albeit social praxis, must be distinguished from
consciousness as ideology.

It is the former treatment of consciousness

which Marx' theory of man involves.
In addition to developing praxis, society, and consciousness as the
primative categories of his theory of man, Marx also holds in the
Manuscripts and elsewhere that these categories are interrelated in a
fashion such that praxis is the most fundamental of the three.

Some

reasons for this position are suggested throughout chapter one, and at
the conclusion of this chapter I explicitly sketch an argument for this

x

claim.

But the argument which Marx himself takes to justify this positioTI

can, I feel, best be seen only through a consideration of Marx' relation
to Hegel.

Therefore I postpone this argument until the fourth chapter.

A brief remark about my proceedure in chapter one may be made here.
I take the positions and arguments outlined above to constitute the basic
)

structure of Marx' theory of man.
of Marx' early writings.

I base my claim on a textual analysis

Whenever it is necessary to develop an argument

that is implicit rather than explicit in Marx' texts, my test for the
acceptability of such an argument is twofold.

I offer no development of

an implicit argument unless that argument is both consistent with
positions held in Marx' theory of man other than the one which the
argument supports, and consistent with other explicit arguments developed
in Marx' theory and discoverable in the texts.

And I cite no position in

my exposition of Marx' theory of man that is merely implicit in Marx'
texts.
My second chapter attempts to confront the claim that Marx' theory of
man is fundamentally identical with the humanism of Feuerbach.
Althousser has defended this claim.

Louis

For Althousser, Marx' writings at

least through 1844 are based on theories of man, .theories which through
1843 depend on Kant and Fichte, and through 1844 on Feuerbach.

The Paris

Manuscripts most particularly repeat, Althousser claims, Feuerbach's theory of man as a connnunal being, although Marx develops this theory through
his own terminology, and uses it in his own evaluation of contemporary
society.

-

Beginning from 1845, Althousser claims, Marx' texts manifest a shift

xi.
towards those aims which are his mature goals, and this shift involves
Marx' rejection of the theoretical validity of 'humanisms,' 'theories of
man,' particularly that Feuerbachian humanism which had governed his
intellectual minority.

Marx came to hold that any theory of man must

describe a transhistorical human nature, thus contradicting his thesis
that man is the "ensemble" of his social relations, with society
understood here as the subject of the historical process.

And he held

further that any theory of man is an ideology, a representation of the
operative reality of, and particularly the class structure of, actual
society.

As such no theory of man may legitimately function in a theory

of history, and of society as the subject of history.

Marx' mature theor

must be viewed as 'anti-humanistic.'
My second chapter deals with the first feature of Althousser's claim
concerning Marx' theory of man in the Manuscripts of 1844.

This text

lends some plausibility to Althousser's interpretation, for Marx praises
Feuerbach therein for having achieved three corrections of Hegel,
relevant to a theory of man.

Feuerbach had corrected Hegel in showing

that the individual must be described through the totality of his
determinations, rather than simply through'those pertaining to him as a
self conscious subject.

He had defended this statement by refuting

Hegel's employment of the dialectical method in relation to sense
consciousness.

And he had insisted that, of those determinations which

must be located descriptively and argumentatively in a theory of human
nature, one essential determination is the communal dimmension of

-

individual experience.
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I argue, however, that in spite of these points of agreement with
Feuerpach, Marx' theory of man as it is presented in the Paris Manuscripts
and elaborated in the "Theses on Feuerbach" and The German Ideology is
critically opposed to Feuerbach Theory, on at least four counts.
First, Marx rejects Feuerbach's doctrine of nature.

For Feuerbach,

nature presents itself in experience as immediate and wholly self
contained, i.e. self determined.

Nature is that which of itself contains

its determinations within itself, and delivers these determinations to
the subject.

But for Marx this understanding of nature will not do, both

because it renders nature as the correlate of productive activity
theoretically inexplicable, and because it renders a genuine theoretical
account of productive activity impossible.

This criticism of Feuerbach's

concept of nature, made explicit in the "Theses on Feuerbach," is based
on those portions of the Paris Manuscripts in which Marx' theory of man
is discoverable.
Marx also criticizes Feuerbach's doctrine of consciousness, particularly sense consciousness.

For Feuerbach, the sensible object is again

self contained in its determinations, and in relation to this object the
sensory subject is fundamentally passive, although it is necessary that
his sensations be 'refined' through imagination and thinking.
for Marx, will not do.

This also,

In describing the sense object as internally

determined and the sensory subject as passive, Feuerbach is unable to
offer an account of this object as itself determined through praxis,
or of consciousness itself as a feature of praxis.
these points in his theory of man.

Marx insists upon
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Feuerbach's descriptions of the social. dimensions of individual
experience, and of society itself, are also critically viewed by Marx.
Feuerbach comprehends social relations on the model of interpersonal,
"I-Thou" relationships, through which the finite individual achieves
the satisfaction of his desire to realize within his ·m..m experience the
infinite predicates of the human species: reason, will, love.

But for

Marx the comprehension of social relations and of society on this model is
inadequate.

This is because, first, this description forces Feuerbach to

discuss needs too abstractly.

Second, this model of society renders

Feuerbach theoretically incapable of describing social relations as
systems of relationships between productive agents.

And finally, the

logic of Feuerbach's comprehension of society forces that comprehension
to be one of society as trans-historical, rather than of

societ~

as a

subject of the historical process.
The above criticisms of Feuerbach are finally related to similar
criticisms which Marx levels against Prudhon.

Both Feuerbach and Prudhon,

Marx claims, develop theories of human nature which are trans-historical
in that they define human nature through certain attributes and needs
occuring above and beyond the historical process.

But to do this is to

misconceive the nature and function of a valid theory of man.

Such a

theory is one which describes and accounts for those structural features
of human nature which render possible the historical process itself, and
human self actualization through history.

Such a theory of man may be

entitled trans-historical, but not in the sense in which that term would
be attributed to the 'humanisms' of Feuerbach and Prudhon.

xiv
I develop these points concerning the relation of Marx' theory of man
to Feuerbach through an analysis of the arguments discoverable in Marx'
texts, I take my second chapter to refute Althousser's interpretation of
that theory.

Marx' theory of man must be linderstood not as a contentual

repetition of Feuerbachian anthropology, but as developed in critical
opposition to it.
The third and fourth chapters are a continuation of the attempt to
determine the relation of Marx' theory of man to the thinking of his
predecessors, this time in relation to Hegel.
Chapter three contains an analysis of those texts in which Hegel
develops categories utilized in Marx' theory of man.

In his Philosophy of

Spirit Hegel argues that consciousness must be understood in relation to
embodied consciousness, and thus shows that a work such as the
Phenomenology of Spirit can present categories relevant to a theory of
man.

But the development of such categories themselves occurs in the

Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right.
selected texts from the Phenomenology.

I consider first

Hegel argues that, given the

relationship between the self conscious subject and the object of his own
experience, and the desire arising for the self conscious subject out of
this relationship, the subject must realize himself as an agent.

And he

proceeds to develop a notion of agency through concepts which, although
located in a different framework from Marx', are nevertheless identical
to those employed by Marx to describe praxis.

Agency, arising from desire

is directed at the transformation of the subject's material environment.
Such agency as "work" is objectified in the environment as its pt'aduct.
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This results both in the partial satisfaction of the agent's desire, and
his necessary emergence within an intersubjective milieu.

And the activ-

ity of the individual subject also effects that subject's 'self-actualization.'
Arguments in support of these claims are culled principally from
Hegel's "Introduction" to the Phenomenology, and from the transitional
text from "Consciousness" to "Self-Consciousness."

Hegel develops these

notions in a section of the Phenomenology entitled "Society as a Community
of Animals,"

There Hegel argues that the individual subject can not be

accounted for as an agent through the possession of an "original nature,"
the possession of fixed and intrinsically determined interests and needs.
Agency itself is further described through the concepts of 'objectification' and 'self actualization.'

And Hegel argues that the individual who

achieves self-actualization through his activity must be understood as a
member of a society of agents.
These themes are further developed and refined in the Philosophy of
Right.

In his analysis of will as embodied in property in the Philosophy

of Right, Hegel argues that this external embodiment is necessary for the
individual subject of will, and that the active appropriation of property
brings this individual into necessary relations with others, social
relations, however primitive.

Further arguments in the Philosophy of

Right show that, for Hegel, the individual subject of will must be
comprehended both as an agent and as a social agent.
an agent in virtue of privately experienced needs.

The individual is
His work effects both

the satisfaction of and the multiplication of such needs.

But the details

-

xvi
of his work are conditioned by the labor of his society. He is dependent
for the satisfaction of his own needs on the work of others, and they
upon his work. And the needs which he experiences as his own, and thus as
his self, are socially derived.
But Marx• anthropology is not simply inspired by Hegel. It includes
a critical argument against Hegel's description of the individual as a
self consciousness subject. For Marx, Hegel is, given his theory of the
self conscious subject, unable to further describe the individual as an
agent, with theoretical adequacy. But a theory of man which describes
the human individual most fundamentally as an agent, is adequately able
to further describe this individual as a self conscious subject. I
exhibit this argument in my fourth chapter. It is crucial to Marx•
theory of man in that, for Marx, it supports his position that praxis is
the most fundamental category in that theory.
Finally, in my fifth chapter, I show that Marx• theory of man plays
a

11

normative 11 role in his larger theoretical schema. It does this by

providing Marx with principles whereby he can comprehend human history
as the process of human 'self actualization,' and with norms with which
he may evaluate given socio-historical phenomena. I treat the latter
briefly in my fifth chapter, by indicating the relationships between
Marx' theory of man and his analyses of social alienation, and of the
condition of the wage laborer in capitalist society.

-

Chapter One
Marx' Theory of Man
Adam Schaff, a major theoretician and proponent of Marxist humanism,
has stated that, " ... the central problem of socialism and Marx' social ism

of~

socialism,

in particular - is the problem of man, with its

essential aspect of creating conditions for man's happiness and full
development."

1

In fact, the theory of man is, for Schaff, of such

importance that he is willing to assert that,
the cradle of Marxism."
writings

2

11

...

a philosophy of man was

In this chapter I shall examine the early

of Marx, especially the "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of

1844, 11 for the purpose of showing the theory of man which they contain.
It should not be surprising that Marx' anthropology is principly
found in a text whose subject matter he announces as "political economy,''
and in which themes such as,
... the state, Jaw, morals, civil life, etc., are
toutched upon only insofar as political economy
itself, ex professo, deals with ·these subjects.3

1

Adam Schaff, "Marxism and the Philosophy of Man," in Socialist
Humanism, ed. Erich Fromm, (New York: Anchor, 1966), p. 141.
2

Ibid., p. 142. Schaff's arguments in this essay are reminiscent of
Lionel] Rubinoff, The Pornography of Power, (New York: Ballantine, 1969),
pp. 15-90, in which any theory of society, Rubinoff argues, is founded
upon a theory of man.
3
Karl Marx, "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts (1844) ," in Writings
2.f. the Young Marx 2!!. Philosophy and Society, ed. Loyd Easton and Kurt
Guddat, (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), p. 284. Marx-Engels,
Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and V. Adoratski,
I
(Moscow: The Marx-Engels Institute, 1927-1932), Abteilung 1, Band 3, p,333·
(This edition of the works of Marx-Engels will be subsequently refered
to as~).

I

-

-1-

-2For, a s Pierre Bigot observes, "economics" does not mean to Marx what it
does for many contemporary social scientists, namely, the attempt to study
empirically and in a value free context the economic operations of
society.

4

On

the contrary, for the Marx of the Paris Manuscripts economici

involves both a critique of capitalism and a critique of the devaluation
of labor which capitalism essentially involves, especially insofar as this
devaluation is a result of private property, the defining institution of
capitalism.

5

But the critique Marx makes is grounded on a general theory

4
Cf. Pierre Bigot, Marxisme et Humanisme, (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1954), pp. 2-3.
5

Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 288-289,
287-288; MEGA, 1, 3, p. 82, p. 81. That this is a defining feature of
Marx' understanding of political economy, is clear from the texts. He
objects to any merely empirical or positivistic interpretation of politica:
economy. "It acknowledges as a fact or event what it should deduce,
namely, the necessary relation between two· things, for example, between
division of labor and exchange. In such a manner theology explains the
origin of evil by the fall of man. That is, it asserts as a fact in the
form of history what it should explain." In particular, for Marx, econ(!)mics as ordinarily understood accepts private property as a given, rather
than attempting to explain private property as an historical economic
occurence. "Political economy proceeds from the fact of private property.
It does not seek to explain private property. It grasps the actual,
material process of private property in abstract general formulae which
it then takes as laws. It does not seek to comprehend these laws ••• "
Political economy in the ordinary sense, then, is deficient for Marx to
the extent that it analyzes private property as a datum, rather than
attempting to comprehend it critically in its relations to other features
of the economic system. Marx' version of private property will, he insists ,
undertake this critical comprehension.

-3-

of productive agency or praxis, a theory of reference to which statements
regarding the devaluation of labor may be validated.

6

And the theory of

praxis which grounds the critique of political economy in the Paris
Manuscripts constitutes the heart of Marx' theory of man.
To be sure, the theory of praxis which Marx holds cannot be adequatel)
grasped apart from its relations to the concepts of society and consciousness.

In fact, reference to these concepts is necessary for a more

complete theoretical description of praxis itself.

Still, I want to claim

that "society" and "consciousness" are concepts best defined in terms of
their relation to praxis.

I shall show how each of these concepts is

present in the Paris Manuscripts, and how society and consciousness are
related to praxis, according to Marx.
6

Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 288,
p. 291; MEGA, 1, 3, p. 82, p. 85. This requirement arises from Marx' sense
of "political economy," and is central to the consideration of this
chapter. Political economy involves a critique of capitalism. As such it
involves an analysis of private property and a critique " ••• of value with
the devaluation of man ••• " as resulting from capitalism. But in order to
achieve this, political economy must also offer a theory of value, as
~ell as a theory of labor, in general terms.
The first is necessary
because some notion of value is required to stand as a criterion, in order
that the relation of value and product as it obtains in capitalism can be
criticized. And again, some general theory of labor is required as a norm
for the critique of labor and its devaluation within capitalism. Thus for
"political economy" to do the task which Marx sets for it, both a concept
of value and a general theory of labor are required. In the last analysis
these requirements are met for Marx by the same theory. Value in an
economic sense resides in the product. But the product for Marx is
essentially only 11 • • • the resume of activity, of production." Therefore,
the theory which explicitates the process of productive action at the
same time provides the criterion in terms of which the value of the product
in a capitalist setting can't be critically comprehended.

-
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.!:

Ma rx' Concept
- of Praxis
Marx' first inroads towards a theory of praxis

7

in the manuscripts arE

made through a discussion of the relation of man as agent to nature, under
the general heading of "objectification."

The initial and most basic

requirement for praxis to occur, Marx tells us, is the presence of an
external, natural environment for the agent to act upon.

"The worker can

make nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world.

It is

the material wherein his labor realizes itself, wherein it is active, out
of which and by means of which it produces. 118

Praxis, labor, requires an

environment other than and external to the agent, upon which labor can be
performed, and it requires an environment which is maleable, which can be
shaped and transformed by labor.

The ideas of externality and maleability

provide a first meaning of nature in Marx' manuscripts.

9

And the point he

wishes to make here is that, given nature as a sine qua non for praxis,

man as agent is essentially related to that which is both external to him,
. and is a context for his productive behavior.
7
A definition of 'praxis' appropriate to the texts of Marx can be
given only after an analysis of the argtnnents in Marx concerning this concept. As a general rule, 'praxis,' 'productive activity,' and frequently
'labor' may be taken as synonyms.
8
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," .. in Easton and Guddat, p. 290; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 84.
9

This meaning will be extended in Marx' discussion of nature as man's

I

i

I

i

L
!

. body."
- "inorganic

-

-5Marx's emphasis at this point, however, involves more than the assertion that man is related essentially to his external, natural environment.

For, as Marx states repeatedly at this point in the manuscripts,

the relation he is discussing is one of agency.

It is man as a practical

agent who for Marx requires a relation to that which is sensuous, external,
and maleable.

And therefore it is the nature of human agency in its es-

sential relation to nature which Marx needs to clarify at this stage of

. 10
his ana1 ysis.
Marx commences his analysis of praxis under the general heading of
a theory of "objectification."

To begin with objectification itself is

discussed in terms of labor as externalization.

The agent, Marx holds,

" ••• appropriates the external world and sensuous nature through his lalbor.1111
~ironment

Insofar as praxis occurs in a natural environment, then that enis in some sense taken in hand by the agent, constituted as

lbeing in an essential relation to him, made into his own.

The sense in

which this occurs for Marx, however, is a very specific sense.

Nature,

lthe "external world;" of praxis, is appropriated through agency because
the result of labor is a product, and the product itself is for Marx in
"'
lOThere is a problem here, as it seems that Marx is claiming not
~imply that man entertains a relationship to mature through labor, but
!that Man's most fundamental relation to nature is had through labor, praxis
tather than, for instance, through perception, or through aesthetic or
~onceptual consciousness.
Consequently Marx needs to provide arguments
~n support of this claim. But he can provide such arguments only after he
has clarified the structure of praxis, and when some defendable meaning
[or praxis has been established.

11
Marx, Easton and Guddat, p. 291; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 85.

-
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-6iessence, " ••• the resume of activity, of production."12
The point which Marx wishes to mainta.in here is of basic importance
to his general theory of praxis, and must be explicitated in some detail.
If it is the case that by praxis man "appropriates" nature, and if this
is the case because the product, the result of praxis, is a "resume" of
the act of production, then what is the nature of this "resume," and how
[does this lead to an "appropriation" of the natural world by labor?
It is difficult to see from Marx' texts how he answers these
questions.
~erms

~rom
~s

In part this

dif~iculty

stems from his ·convoluted use of

in the beginning portions of the manuscripts, and in p art it arises
the fact that Marx' discussion of praxis as appropriation in general

done simultaneously with a discussion of alienated labor.

~lose

However,

analysis ofa key paragraph can aid in clearing his terminology,

and in showing the distinction between the two levels of discussion which
~rx

carries on around the concept of praxis.
Towards the beginning of the section of the manuscripts entitled

'Alienated Labor," Marx asserts that, under the system of production described by ordinary political economy, labor becomes reified and devalued,
ln that it is viewed as an item to be bought and sold, an inert item in
the market place.

"Labor not only produces commodities.

It also pro-

duces itself and the worker as a commodity, and indeed in the same

12Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 291;

-

~EGA,

Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 85.

-

-7proportion as it produces commodities in general. 1113

Then, he goes on

to argue that,
This fact simply indicates that the object which labor
produces, its product, stands opposed to it as an alien
thing, as a power independent of the producer. The
product of labor is labor embodied and made objective in
a thing. It is the objectification of labor. The
realization of labor is its objectification. In the
viewpoint of political economy the realization of labor
appears as the diminution of the worker, the objectification
as the loss of and subservience to the object, and the
appror.riation as alienation [Entfremdung], as externalization
[Enta<lsserung],14
The problem of this text lies in the meaning of the terms "objectification" and "realization" as applied to labor, and the relation of these
terms to "alien thing," "diminution," "alienation," and "externalization."
It appears on the surf ace that the former two terms are equated by Marx
with the latter, in a general critique of labor under capitalism.

Put

another way, it at first appears that Marx is doing no more in this

13Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 82-83.
14Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83. "Dies Faktum druckt weiter nichts aus als: Der
Gegenstant, den der Arbeit produziert, ihr Produkt, tritt ihr als ein
fremdes Wesen, als ein van dem Produzenten unabhangage Macht gegenuber.
Das Produkt der Arbeit ist die Arbeit, die soch in einem Gegenstant
fixiert, sachlich gemacht hat, es ist die Vergegenstandlichung der
Arbeit. Die Verwirklichung der Arbeit ist ihre Vergegenstandlichung.
Diese Verwiklichung der Arbeit erscheint in dem national okonomischen
Zustand als Entwirklichung des Arbeiters, die Vergegenstandlichung als
Verlust und Knechtschaft des Gegenstandes, die Aneigung als Entfrerndung,
als Entausserung."

-

-8paragraph than offering the beginnings of_ his theory of alienated labor.
He seems to say that, insofar as the product of labor is an "alien thing,'
i.e., a "power independent of the producer" under capitalism, then labor
is "made objective" in a product; thus labor's "realization" in the product is at the same time "the diminution of the worker."

There seems then

to be one level of discussion involved in this paragraph, a critical discussion of labor under capitalism as "alienated," in which the terms noted
above are roughly equivalent. 15
But when one delves through the terminological confusions which
plague this text, a second impression arises.

This becomes apparent if

one isolates the last two sentences of the above cited paragraph from the
body of the text.

Marx here first asserts that, "The realization of

labor is its objectification.

1116

In this sentence Marx equates "objecti-

fication," not with alienation, but with that process through which labor

15

This impression is reinforced further in the texts, in Marx'
employment of the terms 'object' and 'objectification.' For example,
in''Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3,
p. 83, Marx goes on to refer to the result of capitalist production as
an " ••• alien object ••• " (fremden Gegenstant), and at p. 290; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 84, Marx shows two senses in which the worker,
" ••• becomes a slave to his objects ••• " (wird der Arbeiter also ein Knecht
seines Gegenstandes). These usages seem to point to a semantic equivalence between 'object' and 'alienated object' even though, at this point
in the Manuscripts, alienation has been defined only in its most general
form as involving the product " ••• as a power independent of its producer."
16
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289;
~' Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83 ••

-9in general "is realized," is made actual.
manner in which

He then goes on to describe the

this process of labor's being made actual appears "In

the viewpoint of political economy ••••

.. 11

Now political economy, in its ordinary and deficient sense, begins
for Marx by accepting the premises operative in existing relations of
production: private ownership and the ensuing competition of commodities
18
Only with this clearly in mind can we appreciate t e
in the marketplace.
sense of Marx' next assertion.

For he goes on to say that it is from the

perspective of existing (capitalistic) relations of production, and from
the viewpoint of the science which accepts these relations as its basic
premises, that "this realization of labor," the process through which
labor is made actual, "appears as the diminution of the worker, the objectification as the loss of and subservience to the object....

1119

In

other words, Marx is here making critical comments concerning the economic realities of capitalism, but in addition, he is at least laying
down terms -- "objectification" and "realization" -- which he takes to

17Ibid.
18

~'

cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 288;
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 81.
19

Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83. Note here too that inthis last phrase the notions
of loss and subservience in relation to the object of labor are contrasted to, not equated with, 'objectification.'

-
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be applicable in a more general theory of praxis.
This impress ion is reinforced if one ·reads a 1 ittle further on in
the text. Continuing his comments on labor from the "viewpoint of
political economy," Marx goes on to say that,
So much does the realization of labor appear as diminution
that the worker is diminished to the point of starvation.
So much does objectification appear as loss of the object
that the worker is robbed of the m~st essential objects
not only of 1 ife but also of work. O
Given what Marx has contended in the passage just examined, one can
clearly see the distinction. here between the notion of labor "real ized 11
and "objectified," and the

11

diminution 11 of labor as a result of its

occuring in a context characterized by private property and competition.
Marx, then, describes and analyzes praxis as involving an

11

appro-

priation" of nature on two levels: on a general level, under the heading
of "objectification'' and on a more specific and critical level·, under
the headings of "diminution" and ''al ienation. 11 This distinction must be
justified by the texts if one wishes to argue, as

t

do, that Marx des-

cribes the relation between man and nature as "appropriation," i.e., as
essentially a relationship of agency, and in turn describes the structure
of this agency through the concept of "objectification." Only if Marx 1
arguments concerning

11

objectification11 are descriptive of praxis in

general, can it be shown that they relate for him to an overall feature of
the structure of agency. If his arguments concerning the concept of
11

objectification 11 related only to his descriptions of labor as alienated,

20 Marx, "Manuscripts of t844, 11 in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA,
Abt. 1 , Bd. 3, p. 83.

-

-11then these arguments could be with necessity applicable only to Marx'
critique of capitalism, not to his comments on the nature of agency overall.

But, as I have tried to show above, the texts do illustrate two

levels of discourse in relation to the notion of praxis, and do point to a
discussion of praxis in general as well as to a critique of labor as
alienated.
With this distinction seen, the question posed above can be reformulated.

What is

the structure of praxis in general, such that praxis

requires the p::iesence

of an external natural context for its realization?

Put otherwise, what for Marx is the meaning of "objectification" insofar
as this concept describes praxis as an "appropriation" of nature?
Lobkowicz offers an interesting analysis of "objectification" in a
section of his Theory and Practice devoted to Marx, an analysis which, I
believe, gets at the basic meaning of this concept.
Marx describes the essence of labor as Vergegenst~ntlichung,
objectification. Though he never explains what the expression "objectification" means, it is not overly difficult
to state its basic connotations. "Objectification" first
means externalization: man externalizes himself in labor in
that he makes of his inner life a form of exterior objects.
He confers his life on objects. However, this externalization must not be taken to be a translation of pre-existing
ideas into reality. Rather, the inner life conferred to outer
objects must be viewed as a potentiality which becomes actual
in and for man by becoming the form of a reality outside man.
Accordingly, "objectification" also connotes self actualization:
by externalizing his inner life through labor, man labors and
creates, in short, brings out of himself his human potentialities
schafft seine Gatterngskr~fte heraus.21

21Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, (Notre Dame:
of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 341-342.

-

University

-12Lobkowicz is correct in his indication that Marx' explicitation of the
meanings of "objectification" is indirect.

However, as he himself points

out, these meanings are discoverable in the texts.

First, objectifi-

cation entails the "externalization" of the activity of labor in the product.

The choice of terms here is unfortunate, for "externalization"

(EntaUsserung) typically has the meaning of alienation for Marx. 22 But
taken in a broader and non-technical fashion, the idea which Lobkowicz
wishes to establish holds good, even if his terminology falters.

Marx,

as we mentioned above, hold that " ••• the product is only the resume of
activity, of production. 1123

His point is that an object can be con-

sidered an object of labor only to the extent that it bears the stamp
of activity having been performed upon it.

Thus he would argue that, on

the one hand, the act of labor requires an external object, because
labor can only be conceived of as occurring if it is labor £!!. something
other than and external to itself.

On the other hand, the object of labor

the product, is not unchanged through the process of production.
the reverse is the case.

Quite

A thing is a product precisely because it has

been changed, transformed, through some activity of labor being performed upon it.

And the details of the transformation which occurs in

the product correspond to the details of the activity of labor performed
upon it.

-

When I am engaged in writing, my product is the written page.

22rt is clear that in the text which Lobkowicz himself at this point
refers to, that 'Entausserung~ is being used by Marx in this technical
sense.
23Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 291; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 85.

-13While I begin my activity with objects external to my self (e.g., paper
and ink), the result of my activity is a product to the extent that it
has been transformed through my labor, and transformed in a way that
bears the stamp of the specific details of that labor (in this case,
writing).

It is in this sense that the product is for Marx a summary

or "resume" of the activity of production.
The conclusion towards which Marx' argument points is that because
the product is a "resume" of productive activity, labor itself is, as
Lobkowicz puts it, externalized in the product.

The product of labor,

while being a result of the activity performed upon it, nonetheless
remains "external" to or other than that activity itself.

Since this is

the case, and since it is the case that the product perdures even after
the process of labor has terminated (since, for example, the written
page perdures as

my product even after my activity of writing has

terminated), then labor itself is rendered public and observable in the
enduring product.

This is so because the product is a thing trans-

formed according to the details of the activity of labor.

Thus the

activity of labor is rendered enduring and "external" to

itself in

the product.

It is in this sense too that Marx speaks of the "reali-

zation of labor" as "objectification. 1124

In being rendered enduring

and observable in the produce, labor is rendered actual in a way which
transcends the transient character of the activity itself.
This rendering public and external of praxis is one side of the
24Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA ,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 85.

-14concept of objectification.

Lobkowicz notes also a second side to this

concept: " •• ·~objectification also connotes self actualization: by externalizing his

inner life through labor, man labors and creates, in

short, brings out of himself his human potentialities, schafft seine
Gattungskrafte heraus. 1125

This comment indicates that praxis as ob-

jectification" effects the agent himself as well as the natural object.
Here objectification also entails a "realization," in the sense of
"self-actualization."
Marx gives what I take to be his clearest expression of this idea
in his "Excerpt Notes of 1844," notes written in the spring and sunnner
of that year, while undertaking the study of classical economic theories.
In a section of those notes entitled "Free Human Production," Marx
attempts to describe the structure of production in a non-alienated
condition.

The nature of non-alienated labor is such, he holds, that,
In my production I would have objectified my individuality
and its particularlity, and in the course of the activity
I would have enjoyed an individual life; in viewing the
object, I would have experienced the individual joy of
knowing my personality as an objective, sensuously perceptible, and indubitable power.26

The nature of production, of praxis in general, is such that the agent
as well as the product is in some sense "actualized" through the act of
production.

He is actualized, Marx tells us, at least in the sense that

251obkowicz, Theory and Practice, p. 342.
26Marx, "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 281;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 546.

-15his activity is rendered overt and enduring in a product, and, because
of~this,

recognizible for him.

Unfortunately, Marx does not supply an explicit argument in the
texts to establish this assertion.
cisely what he means to claim.

As a result, it is not clear pre-

Nor are the commentators on Marx of great

aid in supplying clarification of the notion of self actualization.
Lobkowicz connnents that Marx makes this assertion, but provides no analysis of its meaning.

Both Schaff 2 7 and Rotenstreich28 observe that self

actualization is a feature of Marx' basic notion of praxis, but then
move immediately to discussions of the relation of praxis and society.
Thus, they also fail to provide clarification of the idea of self actualization itself.

..

·

But it is possible to adduce an argument in support of the claim
tpat objectification results in the self actualization of the agent, an
argument, I think, which is both consistent with other statements which
Marx makes about praxis, and which captures his mind on this point.
In discussing the product as the objectified "resume" of the
activity of production, Marx consistently relates the notions of "realization" or actualization, "objectification," and enduring recognizability.

2 7Adam Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual, trans. O.
Wojasiewicz, ed. R. S. Cohen, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), p.70,

28 Nathen Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx~ Philosophy,
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Co., 1965), p. 38.

~··

-16The act of labor is realized, made actual, in that it is embodied in a
product which. captures and summarizes the details of the activity of
which it,

the product, is the result.

And because the actualization

of labor involves its being embodied in a product, i.e., an enduring
object, then labor itself achieves an enduring recognizability in this
object.

29
Now it can be argued, and I think consistently with Marx' texts

at this point, that the identification of these notions holds for Marx'
doctrine of the effect of labor on tjle agent, as well as for his doctrine of the effect of labor on the product.
endurance and recognizability.

First, since my labor· results in a

product, it is embodied in an enduring object.
labor is myself, or an aspect of myself.
e~bodied

The key notions here are

At the same time my

But for some process to be

in an enduring object is for Marx, as we have just seen, the

"actualization" of that process.

Thus because my labor results in an

enduring object, that aspect of myself which is my activity is "actualized" in the product.

Here, then, actualization means embodiment in

an enduring object, and praxis, because it results in a product, implies
29 To return to the example used above, the result and realization
of my activity of writing is the written page. Since the written page
endures beyond the termination of my activity and at the same time is
the'~esume'of of that activity, my labor becomes recognizable in its
result. In this sense Marx has already identified the actualization or
realization of labor, its "objectification" or embodiment in a product,
with its being recognizable through the product.

-17the "self actualization" of the agent.
Second, objectification entails self actualization by reason of
the recognizability of labor in the .product.
~

To say that the product is

product means that I can recognize myself in the result of my ac-

tivity, that is, I can recognize that the labor which is summarized in
the product is mine.

And moreover,___! can recognize my activity in a

different and fuller way when it is sununarized in a result than I can
30
during the process of activity itself.
My activity is a feature of
myself.

And thus in recognizing my activity in the product, I recognize

a feature of myself as embodied in the product.

I take this to be the

import of Marx' statement that, " ••• in viewing the object I would have
experienced the individual joy of knowing my personality as an objective,
sensuously perceptible, and indubitable power. 31
These arguments establish a twofold meaning for self actualization
in this context: the embodiment of the agent's labor in a product, and
the resulting ability of that agent to recognize his labor in the product.

The arguments are consistent, I believe, with Marx' use of the

notions of "realization," "objectification," and "recognizability,"
and consistent also with the assertion concerning the "objectification"
30To return to our paradigm case, as I examine the written page
which is the product of my act of writing, I can recognize the details
of my activity, evaluate its strength and weakness, and observe its
structure, in a way fuller than that possible during the process of writing itself.
31Marx, "Excerpt-Notes," in Easton and Guddat, p. 281; ~'

Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 546.

-18of the individual through labor, which Marx makes in the "Excerpt-Notes."
In the light of the idea of praxis as "objectification," the
question of Marx' meaning of praxis as the "appropriation" of nature can
now be answered.

Labor or praxis requires the presence of an external,

"natural" environment

as a condition of its occurrence. But the basic

feature of labor's relation to this natural context is appropriation,
since the result of labor in nature is a product which is defined as an
object modified according to the terms of the process of labor performed
upon it.

32

Put briefly, labor transforms nature, and this transformation

occurs on labor's own terms.

The result of praxis is not nature un-

changed, but nature "appropriated," transformed through labor, and
emergent as a result describable through those of its details which
"realize" and embody the labor process.

Thus of Marx, the basis of the

relation of praxis to nature is "appropriation."
Marx' development of the notion or praxis as the appropriation of
nature leads him to a discussion of two further concepts, by means of
which he tries to develop his theory of praxis and render it more concrete
These are the concepts of "needs," and the idea of human praxis as "universa!."

As with the notion of objectification, "needs" is taken by

32It is interesting to note that the same relation of labor,
product, and nature is noted by Marx in Capital, ed. Frederich Engels,
~rans. s. Moore and E. Aveling, (New York:
International Publishers,
1967), Vol. 1, pp. 42-43, under the heading of the product in its 'use
value.' See Marx-Engels, Werke, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1961-1971),
Vol. 23, p. 57. (This edition of the works of Marx-Engels will be subsequently referred to as MEW.)

-
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Marx to be a concept descriptive of both the agent as the source of
praxis, and the product as its result.
The idea of needs as a universal characteristic of praxis is used
by Marx in the Paris Manuscripts to elucidate further his notion of the
relationship between man and nature.

33.

He writes:

Immediately, man is a natural being. As a I iving natural
being he is, ~one aspect, endowed with the natural
~acities and vital powers of an active natural being.
These capacities exist in hiM as tendencies and capabilities,
as drives. In another aspect as a natural, Jiving, sentient
and objective being man is a suffering, cpnditioned, and
limited creature 1.ike an animal or plant~ The objects of
his drives , that is to say, exist outside him as independent,
yet they are objects of his need, essential and indispensable
to the exercise and confirmation of his essential capacities.34
In this text Marx is making three claims concerning the relation
of man and nature. Each of these claims is made in terms of the governing
concept of "needs." The rel at ion of man to nature, forst of al I, is not
simply an

11

abstract 11 or merely formal relation. In all individual cases,

rather, this relation has a particular content, a particular series of
cribable features. And this is the case because

11

de•~

needs 11 form the context

in which particular relations between man and his natural environment
occur. 'n particular cases man relates to nature because of certain needs
for whose satisfaction a natural context is required:e.g., subsistence
needs such as hunger, thirst, or the

requireni~nt

of shelter. He selects

from his environment those items capable of satisfying these needs. And
his relations to nature are founded in his relations to these items.
33

-

Cf. a I so Ibid.

34 • Marx, II Manuscripts
•
o f 1844 , 11 in Easton an d Gu dd at, p. 325; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. t 60.

--

-20Thus, Marx argues, man's relations to nature are concrete and particular,
and are such irt virtue of the needs which form the context of these relations.
Thus man relates concretely to nature in virtue of needs.

But in

addition the structure of this relation is such that, again, man's relation is to something external to and in some sense independent of him.
Man " ... is a suffering, conditioned, and limited creature like an animal
or plant.

The objects of his drives, that is to say exist outside him

as independent. 1135

The externality of nature is emphasized by Marx, here

in the sense that what man aims at in attempting to satisfy his needs is
a natural, i.e., external item.

It is in this sense that man is "a

suffering, conditioned, and limited creature," and that nature is "independent" of its relation to man.

.The implied premise, as I takei.t, is

that the satisfaction of all needs requires an aim and direction towards
something external and independent.

A need is precisely some lack whose

satisfaction cannot be attained by the subject of the need's relation
to himself, but whose satisfaction requires a relation to a real other,
here nature for Marx.

Thus needs indicate that man's relation to an

external nature is notonly concrete, but also necessary.
But third, man's necessary relation to nature in virtue of needs
is not simply a relation to anindependent and external other.

In the

second part of the sentence cited above, Marx offers an additional comment

35
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-21on this relation.

"The objects of his drives, that is to say, exist

outside him as independent, yet they are objects of his need, essential
and indispensable to the exercise of his essential capacities. 11 36

In

other words, external natural items are not simply independent of man.
They are also items in relation to man, objects for him.

A thing in

nature may subsist simply as that item in an independent state.
an object of a need it is no longer simply independent.

But as

It stands in

relation to the subject, as well as being independent of or external to
that subject.

Thus, in virtue of needs, nature is not simply "inde-

pendent," just as man is not simply "a suffering, conditioned, and
limited creature ••• "

Rather, nature is also an "object" for man, a

setting of items which are in relation to man, just as man is also "endowed with the natural capacities and vital powers of an active natural

·-

~
,,37
b it::.1.ng.

A sunnnary of this idea is offered by Henri Lefebvre, who substitutes the term "passion" for Marx' term "drive," as man's self
direction towards external nature

!~_response

to his needs.

Natural man as such is passive. Inasmuch as he feels this
passivity, that is, the thrust of his desire together with
the impotence of that desire, he becomes passionate.
"Passion," says Marx, "is an essential force in the man
tended towards his object." ••• And yet passion itself must
only be the basis and starting point of power. Power no
longer depends on the object, it dominates and contains

36Ibid.
37rbid.

-22!its object: the objectivity of nature is no longer
anything more than its limit and its end.38
Up to this point, what Marx has claimed is that "needs" indicate
the concrete and necessary qualities of the relationship of man and
nature, as well as qualities of independence and dependence as aspects
of that relation.

Marx, however, does not stop here.

The development

of Marx' thought proceeds in two complementary directions: an explicit
relating of the concept of needs to praxis, and a distinction between
two sorts of needs.
Lefebvre, in the citation above, suggests a conceptual relation
between Marx' concept of needs

an~

his general notion of praxis.

In

Lefebvre's formulation, that "passion" or drive which has its basis
in need is converted into "power" in the agent who, through his agency,
overcomes the pure externality of

na~ure,

relating natural items to

himself as objects suitable for the satisfaction of his needs,
"appropriating'' nature to his needs through praxis.

Lefebvre' s point

is that, just as needs govern the concrete relations between man and
nature, again, "man" for Marx must here be taken to signify "man as
agent."

It is through agency or praxis that those concrete relations

between man and nature are established whereby needs are satisfied.
Thus needs must be understood in relation to praxis, for their location
in Marx' thought to be more precisely determined.
Marx' texts, themselves, suggest that Lefebvre's reading of the

38

(London:

Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, trans. John Sturrock,
Johnathan Cape Ltd., 1968), p. 117.

-23of the relation of needs and praxis is accurate.

As shown above, Marx

refers to "vital powers" and "drives" as that through which man attains
a relation to nature such that needs can be satisfied, and man himself
is referred to in this context as "an active natural being."

The

satisfying of any need involves, as a minimum, man's directing himself
towards some external natural item, his constituting of himself as in
relation to this item, and his taking of this item for his use.
self-directing and taking involve agency or praxis.
"needs,"

This

For Marx, then,

are inexorably connected with praxis and conversely, all praxis,

since this involves as its sine qua

.!!2.!'!_

a relation of the agent to nature,

is governed by needs.
The concept which I take Marx to have in mind here, although he
assumes it rather than stating it explicitly, is again the concept of
objectification,

Just as the product is a summary of the details of the

process of its production, the object of need is a summary of need as
resident in its subject, in the sense that the object possesses some
qualities through which it can satisfy the subject's need.

An object

of need is as such "produced" by an agent, at least insofar as an agent
directs himself to an object relevant to his need and takes it up for his
own use.

Needs are satisfied through praxis, and needs in turn govern

the specific details of praxis in its relation to nature, and as a result,
determine the qualities of the product, which "resume" the process
through which the product was produced.
The relation of needs to praxis is further developed by Marx
........_

through a distinction between two sorts of needs.

Up to this point the

r
-24relation of needs to praxis has been limited to just one sort of needs,
namely, needs directly defined in terms of natural necessities.

A more

complete analysis of therelation of needs to praxis requires that we
take into account a second major class of needs, namely, developing
needs.
On the one hand, some needs arise simply from the structure of the
organism which is their subject, and must be satisfied for the life pro-·

cesses of the organism to be sustained.

Hunger is an example of such a

need which Marx uses in the Manuscripts.

"Hunger is a natural need; it

requires nature and an object outside itself to be satisfied and quieted.
Hunger is the objective need of a body for an object existing outside
itself, indispensable to its integration and the expression of its
nature. 1139

Such a need has the basic characteristics of needs outlined

above: an item external to, the subject of the need is required for its
satisfaction; this item is constituted as an object in relation to the
subject's need; the object is thus not simply external to and independent
of the subject, for the object is an object answering to the subject's
40
.
.
. an agent capabl e o f using
nee d i nso f ar as t h e sub Ject
is
t h e o b.Ject.
Further, this sort of need is characterized as one of organic subsistence.

Its satisfaction relates simply to the maintainence of

39 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 325-326;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 161.
40

cf. Ibid.

-25biological life processes.

In a primitive sense, such need can be satis-

field simply. by "taking" for use relevant items from the natural environAt another point in tle manuscripts, Marx identifies the processes

ment.

whereby such needs are satisfied as, " ••• animal functions - eating,
drinking, and procreating, 11 41 implying that he might entitle the needs
towards which such functions are geared as "animal needs."

Indeed he

does assert several paragraphs later that, " ••• the animal produces only
what is immediately necessary for itself or its young •••• The animal produces under the domination of inunediate physical need •••• 11 42

Note that

"production" is the term used here, but that production geared towards
the needs of biological subsistence is referred to by Marx as the production of the "animal."

To this-Marx contrasts man as agent, who,

" ••• produces free of physical need, and only genuinely so in freedom
from such need. 1143

A distinction is drawn then between two sorts of

needs, those involved with anithose free of biological requirements for
subsistence, and a corresponding distinction between two sorts of "production," that of the "animal" and that of man, relative to these two

41Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 292; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 86.
42Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88.
43

Ibid.

r
-26two classes of needs.
Despite. the fact that Marx contrasts "animal" and human production,
his chief interest in making this distinction is not to elucidate
philosophical distinctions between human and animal life.

Rather Marx

uses these distinctions heuristically, as a device in terms of which to
distinguish classes of needs, and to draw out the implicatons of this
distinction for a developed

doctrin~

of human praxis.

To see the import

of this distinction for Marx' doctrine of praxis, it will be helpful to
introduce reference to another assertion Marx makes on this theme:
The animal's product belongs immediately to its physical
body while man is free when he confronts his product. The
animal builds only according to the standard and need of
the species to which it belongs while man knows how to
produce according to the standard of any species and at
all times knows how to apply an intrinsic standard to the
object.44

·-

In this passage Marx brings out the point that in contrast to
animal production, human praxis involves "universality. 11 4 5

We need now

to see how this distinctively human kind of productivity affects the
meaning of human praxis.
That needs govern the particular details of human praxis is a
premise which Marx takes as already established.

But in distinguishing

4

~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88.
45cf. for example, Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and
Guddat, p. 294; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. "Conscious life activity
distinguishes man immediately from the life activity of the animal."

r
-27needs geared towards and needs free from the requirements of organic
subsistence: Marx suggests an argument to the effect that needs are
not fixed for man, but are developed, and developed in terms of their
dialectical relation to praxis itself.

The basic proposition upon

which Marx rests this argument is the assertion that human praxis involve
more than simply the satisfaction of those needs under whose egis it
initially occurs.

This is one of the points to Marx' assertion that the

"production" of the "animal," produces in a one sided way while man produces universally. 11 46

The labor of the animal does accomplish no more

than the satisfaction of those needs which immediately govern it: those
of the subsistence of the individual organism and, in terms of procreation, the survival of the species.
sense.

It is a "one sided" labor in this

In human praxis, however, the result is more complex.

To substantiate this claim Marx must of fer some further distinction
between "human" praxis and simple (animal) behavior in nature.
a distinction is offered by him in The German Ideology.
asserts that man "begins to distinguish

And such

There, Marx

himself from the animal the

moment he begins to produce his means of subsistence, a step !equired
by his physical organization.

By producing food, man indirectly pro-

duces his material life itself. 11 47

The "labor" of the "animal" involves

simply the taking up of items from the natural environment, or the

4 7Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, The German Ideology, trans.
R. Pascal, (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 7; MEGA, Abt.
1, Bd. 3, p. 10.

-28utilization of aspects of lis own organism (e.g., sexual aspects).
Human praxis however, Marx asserts, involves labor in a more accurate
sense of the term: to wit, it involves production.

It involves the

active modification of aspects of the (at least) natural environment so
that out of this praxis a new object arises, capable of satisfying a
need.

Primitive agriculture is an example of such production on the

level of subsistence needs.

And the meaning of this is that, through

human production, nature is "transformed," with this term bearing the
meaning given it above in the discussion of objectification.
At this point, two features of the theory of objectification outlined above need to be recalled, and related to Marx' argument on the
relation of human praxis and needs.

For Marx, production as objectificati<

involves the transformation of the context of labor, since the result is
an object which (as

product) "resumes" the activity of production; and

it involves the actualization of the agent, since he is realized as one
who has produced this product.

The result of praxis is transformative

both for the agent and the object.

Through praxis, then, a more fully

"developed" (or 'actualized") agent exists in the face of a more fully
"developed" (or"realized") environment.
Now given the relation of praxis and needs which Marx has already
argued, it can be further claimed that the product, as "resume" of the
productive activity, is one capable of satisfying that need which conditioned the agency.

The agent, then, is actualized as capable of

achieving satisfaction from his product.

--

But since the agent is both

1

--

-29capable of achieving satisfaction and confronts a newly modified environment in relation to which he has to some extent actualized himself in
some respect, he is further capable of responding to his environment with
new needs.

As a paradigm case, let us say that I begin the study of a

philosopher with a need, for instance the need to learn something about
Hegel.

I undertake this study, and its result may be an essay on some

feature of Hegel's philosophical doctrine.

Now on the one hand, this

essay is my product, it "resumes" the activity of my study.

As my pro-

duct, it constitutes an aspect of my environment which is new, and which
is a modification of myenvironment as it previously occurred.

And it

satisfies a need of mine: through its production I have learned something
of Hegel's philosophical doctrine.

But further, it is now the case that,

because both my environment and myself have been realized through this
~iece

of productive behaviqr, I am now capable of responding to that

environment with new needs: e.g., the need to learn more about Hegel, or
to study Hegel in relation to some other philosophers, Husserl or Kant.
And the ground of the possibility of this new need for me is precisely
that productive behavior whereby a prior need was satisfied.
It is in a sense exhibited by this sort of example that Marx pictures the relation between human praxis and needs.

Because the result

of praxis is both an actualized agent and a transformed environment, the
agent is capable of developing new needs with which to relate to a
~elevantly

new environment.

Thus it is the case both that human praxis

~s conditioned by needs, and that new needs are the result of praxis,

-

r
.

r
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that new needs are elicited in man as agent through a dialectical relationship of needs and praxis.

As

Rotenstreich puts this conclusion,

"Production has two main aspects: it creates both the wants and the means
..,

for the provision of goods. 1148

Marx' discussion of praxis as "objectification," is then in his own
eyes rotmded out only when the relation of praxis and needs is elucidated.
The point of distinguishing needs botmd to and needs free from biological subsistence requirements is to show that, in

~elation

to praxis,

human needs are not fixed in a specific pattern, but that they develop
and become more complex.

This is not to say that, in behaving so as to

fulfill needs of the former sort, man behaves "inhumanly" for Marx.

But

it is to say that the restriction of human needs to a fixed pattern of
biological necessity is for him "one-sided."

"To be sure,

drinking, and procreation are genuine human ftmctions.

eat~ng,

In abstraction,

however, and separated from the remaining sphere of human activities
and turned into final and sole ends, they are animal ftmctions. 11 49
This discussion of needs and praxis suggest two further points which
move Marx closer to the interpretation of human praxis as an indication
of man as

a "species

being" (Gattungswesen).

These conclusions involve

assertions concerning the "universality" of human praxis, and a further
refinement of the notion of "self-actualization."
In a text'cited above, Marx, in describing the "one-sided"

48Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, pp. 34-35.
49Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 292; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 86.
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-31production of the "animal" (i.e., production restricted to subsistence
needs), and in contrasting this to human praxis, asserts that, "The
animal builds only according to the standard and need of the species to
which it belongs while man knows how to produce according to the standard
.
o f any species
•••• ..so

I have argued that, for Marx, "one-sided" labor

denotes labor tied to needs of a fixed biological necessity, in distinction from human praxis, dialectically related to developed series of
needs.

But the text shows a further implication of this distinction.
Insofar as animal "labor" in nature is bound by fixed needs, the

details of its behavior are also fixed, as are the items in its environment
to which its behavior will relate.

Further, because such behavior does

not;: "produce" its "means of subsistence, 1151 the natural environment is
not, in Marx' sense of the term, "transfonned" by such behavior.
havior is limited and is not praxis in the true sense of the term.

Such beAc-

cording to Marx, these limits are biological ones, those of the species:
"The animal builds only according to the standard and need of the species
to which it belongs •••• " 52

The environment in which the animal behaves

50Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. , 3, p. 88.
51Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 7; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd.
3, p. 10.
52

Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88

-32is "species spec ifi c. 1153
For Marx, human praxis has another character.
lectically through praxis.

New need;develop dia-

And simultaneously through praxis the environ-

ment is transformed, and thus new possibilities are elicited from the
environment.

Marx' contention, then, is that man, in acting from an on-

going development of needs and towards a developing environment, is in
principle capable of acting out praxis in the context of any environmental
setting.

Marx expresses this by asserting that man, '" ••• knows how to pro-

duce according to the standard of any species, and at all times knows how
to produce according to the standard of the object. 11 54 Since human praxis
is not fixed by biological needs, and thus not fixed to a specifically
structured natural environment, it is in principle possible for human
production to occur within any context and to transform any context. 55

53

Cf. Peter Be~r and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Realitv, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 47. My use of the term
"species specific" is derived from the definition which Berger and Lucklmann give to that term. Species specific, " ••• refers to the biologically
fixed character of their (animals) relation to the environment, even if
geographical variation is introduced. In this sense, all non-human animals, as species and as individuals, live in closed worlds whose structures are pre-determined by the biological equipment of the several anilm.al species."

IAbt.

54
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA,
1, Bd. 3, p. 88.
55

Cf. Berger and Luckmann, pp. 47-48. These authors express this
idea through the statement that, " ••• man's relationship to his environment
is characterized by world openness. Not only has man succeeded in establishing himself over the greater part of the earth's surface, his relation
to the surrounding environment is everywhere very imperfectly structured
by his own biological constitution ••• the human organism manifests an immense plasticity in its response to the environmental forces at work on
it."

-
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Human praxis, then, is "universal," capable of "transforming" all
portions of the natural environment rather than being "species specific."
And this is the case for two reasons: because human praxis does tranform
nature rather than leaving it as it is, thus eliciting from nature new
possibilities for praxis; and because praxis enables man to actively
relate to his environment through an on-going series of new needs.
Allied to this is afurther comment which Marx makes about praxis
as involving the "self-actualization" of the agent.
claims transforms

Human praxis, he

theagent as well as the environment; through his pro-

56
ductive activity the human subject develops new and more complex needs.
Now under the heading of "objectification," Marx argued that praxis result
in the self actualization of the agent, that is, through praxis the agent
is actualized as one who has performed a specific piece of productive
behavior.

But given his further discussion of needs, "self-actualization"

now takes on a wider meaning.

It is also the case that new needs are

developed through agency, and that the means to satisfy these needs is
also produced, through the (at least partial) transformation of a prior
environment.

If the reality of agency includes both needs, which ground

the details of productive behavior, and an environment within which production towards the satisfaction of such needs can effectively occur,
then it can be said that the reality of agency itself, and thus of the

56 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88.
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-34agent, is ' 1self-actualized " by praxis. 57
In general, then, praxis for Marx actualizes the agent, or the agent
achieves "self-actualization" through praxis.

"Self-actualization"

through praxis now means: a) that the agent is actualized as one who has
performed a specific act of production; b) that the agent is actualized
as the subject of

new needs as a result of his prior act of production;

58 h
. act o f pro d uction,
.
c ) t h at, as a resu1 t o f h is
t e agent encounters a
transformed environment in which his action can satisfy these new needs.
Lefebvre

summarizes these point in this way:
By acting man modifies Nature, both around and within him.
He creates his own nature by acting on Nature. He transforms himself in nature and transforms Nature in himself.
By shaping it to his own requirements he modifies himself
in his own activity and creates fresh requirements for
himself. He forms himself and grasps himself as a power
by creating objects or "products." He progresses by
resolving in action the problems posed by his own action.59

5 7This point may be illustrated by returning to an example used
above. My reality as an agent who (a) needs to learn more about Hegel,
and (b) faces an environment in which effective study towards this result can occur, arises from a prior act from which both this need and this
environment have been elicited. Thus a prior instance of praxis has "actualized" me as tlis potential agent, i.e., as one with definite needs,
and an environment which can be acted upon to satisfy them, in this new
situation.
58
Marx will further argue that praxis actualizes 'man' as such, rather
than simply man as agent. But in order to bring out this point, we shall
have first to consider Marx' arguments for the claim that praxis is basic
to human reality.
591efebvre, Dialectical Materialism, p. 118.

-

-35This discussion of needs in relation to praxis 60 is crucial to
Marx' theory of man.

For one thing, he uses the discussion in his po-

lemic against the use of a concept of human nature in Prudhon's version
·0

f political economy.

Marx~

account of the relation of needs to praxis

would thus seem to be a critical factor in distinguishing an appropriate
from an improper use of a theory of human nature.

This is a point to

which I shall return when I consider the function of a theory of man in
Marx' thought.

(See below, Chapter two,

~1?·

197ff.• )

A second reason for the critical importance of Marx' account of
the relation of needs to praxis is that it is intimately involved in

60cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 239;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 87. The points of the above discussion, involving the ideas that human praxis is "universal" rather than "species
specific," and that praxis involves the "self-actualization" of the agent,
is summed up by Marx through his referring to nature as man's "inorganic
body." "The universality of man appears in practice in the universality
which makes the whole of nature his inorganic body: 1) as a direct means
to life; 2) as the matter, object, and instrument of his life activity."
Body is that through which the individual has life, that which develops
as individual life processes develop, and that through the development
of which the individual himself is realized. Just so the relation of
praxis and nature to the agent. Nature is the agent's " ••• inorganic
body ••• insofar as it is not the human body." But it is that through
which the agent lives, since agency or praxis, as seen above, requires na~;
ture as a sine qua !lQ!!.• Again, nature, or the external, maleable context
within which praxis occurs, develops or is transformed as a result of its
being the scene of iraxis. And through this development, the agent himself experiences "self actualization," becomes the subject of new needs
and a new environment within which they can be satisfied through productive behavior. Thus, "Nature is the inorganic body of man •••• Man lives
by nature. This means that nature is his body with which he must remain
in perpetual process in order not to die."

-
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his attempt to show that man is a "species being" (Gattungswesen).

It

is to this argument tlat I shall now turn.
Marx' discussion of man as a "species being" occurs initially as a
portion of his general discussion of alienation, in the section of the
p aris manuscripts entitled "Alienated Labor."

Here he lists man's

alienation from his "species being" as a result of his being alienated
from his product and from his activity of production, under the capita.
61
list re1 at i ons o f pro d uction.

The meaning of "species being" at this

stage of Marx' analysis seems to involve first a summary of those
specifically human characteristics which he has already listed in his
62
general theory of praxis.
The argument here is that, insofar as man is
alienated from his product and his activity of production, he is alienated from that which specifically characterizes him as man.

In elabo-

rating this assertion, Marx both sunnnarizes his discussion of praxis up
to this point, and points out those characteristics which specifically
constitute man as man.
Man is specifically characterized through his essential relation to
nature, a relation

grounded in praxis.

63

Furthermore, the structure of

61

cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 293; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 86~ "We have now to derive a third aspect of alienated I
labor from the two previous ones."
62

.
Cf. Gaston Fessard, "Is Marx' Thought Relevant to the Christian?
A Catholic View," in Ma:rx and the Western World, ed. Lobkowicz (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 344-345, footnote 18,
for agreement with this anlaysis.
6

~rx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 293; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, -. 87.

-37this relation, or the structure of praxis as the ground of this relation
is such that man is not a "species specific" organism, but rather "unii n h'is pro d uction.
•
64

versa! II

Such production involves objectification

as a basic characteristic, and the on-going development of needs
through a dialectical relation of needs and praxis. 65

And finally,

Marx takes the praxis which specifically characterizes man to involve
66
consciousness and freedom,
topics I shall consider later in this
chapter.

67

64 cf. Ibid.
65cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 89.
66

cf. Ibid.

6 7cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 293;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 87. There is in Marx' first statement of the
doctrine of "Gattungswesen" a note not only a differentiation, but also
of recognition by the agent of this differentiation. This is seen in
Marx' assertion that, "Man is a species being (Gattungswesen) ••• in that
as present and living species he considers himself to be a universal and
consequently free being." The argument which Marx implies here seems to
fall into two stages. First, that which fundamentally distinguishes the
human agent from other sorts of organisms related to nature is that man's
agency or praxis involves "universality." This in tum is accounted for
through the notion of needs as developing dialectically in relation to
praxis. Because praxis brings about the satisfaction of those needs
which ground it, as well as the production of new needs which in turn can
grotmd new forms of praxis, man is capable -Of utilizing all of his natural environment, rather than simply a limited portion of that environment '
as the material of his labor. Thus he is distinct in not being "species
specific." But further, this distinctness is not simply a fact of the
structure of human praxis. It is also a fact which is recognized by the
agent. The universality of human praxis does not simply occur as an ele-1
ment of agency. It is experienced by the agent, in the sense that it is
recognized by him, in that " ••• he considers himself to be a universal andl
consequently free being." This recognition, Marx seems to assert, is an
essential moment of the structure of human praxis itself. The distinctness of human praxis does not consist in the fact that man's production
is universal, and that he then recognizes this distinction. Rather, man

-38But Marx does not here further elaborate these ways of characterizing distinctively human praxis.

Instead, he develops another rami-

f ication of the notion of the dialectic of needs as the f oWldation of his
concept of "GattWlgswesen."

In the process, he advances a thesis con-

cerning the essentially social character of praxis and of the agent.
Here I shall follow Marx' lead, dealing first with his notion of the
social character of agency, and then returning to the question of consciousness.
II.

Marx' Concept of Society
Marx' assertions concerning the social nature of human praxis are

of comparable importance to his assertions concerning the relation of man
to nature.

He tells us that to speak of human existence in its true sense

68
is to speak of social existence, . that the relation between man and
nature is described abstractly to the extent that it is not recognized as
.
69
occurring in society;
that, " ••• the essence of man ••• " is " ••• the ensemble of social relationships. 1170

But while Marx seems to assign basic

is specifically distinct in virtue of the Wliversality of his production,
a feature of which is this recognition. Thus tied into the notion of species being is a hint of a doctrine of consciousness for Marx, and of a
doctrine of the relationship of consciousness to praxis.
68

Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 304305; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 11469cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of.1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 115.
70
Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 525.

-39importance to the social character of praxis in the Paris Manuscripts
and other texts, the exact place of these assertions in Marx' overall
argument is not immediately evident, a difficulty resulting partly from
the polemical character of the texts themselves. 71
Nor do the commentators on Marx greatly clarify this point.
Lobkowicz traces the historical background of Marx' ideas on the sociality of praxis through Strauss, Feuerbach, and Hess, but fails, I think,

~o elucidate the structure of Marx' own arguments on the question. 72
Adam Schaff does a slightly better job in emphasizing the importance of
the concept of sociality:fbr Marx' understanding of praxis, but in doing
this Schaff underplays the arguments whereby Marx elucidates this concept. 73

Perhaps Calvez offers the best explanation of social alienation,

but his account is somewhat unsatisfactory in that he fails to consider
the positive arguments which Marx might utilize to found his discussion
of alienation.74

Still, even an initial reading of Marx' texts and the

commentaries makes clear two points: Marx wishes to relate his discussion

71

The section of the Paris Manuscripts entitled "Private Property
and Communism" contains some of Marx' baldest assertions concerning the
social structure of human praxis. However, they are set in the context
of Marx' polemics against forms of socialism which he takes to be deficient. Because of this, the clarity of argument is often wanting.
72

Cf. Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, pp. 389-392.

73cf. Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual, pp. 82-91.
74cf. Calvez, La Pensee de Karl Marx (Paris:
1965), pp. 222-238.

Editions de Seuil,

-40of society to his

discussion of nature, praxis, and human needs;7 5

and he wishes to hold that his discussion of society is in some sense a
completion of these other themes. 76
Although Marx' polemical style tends to confuse the issue here,
it still seems possible to isolate the basic contentions which Marx
wishes to assert concerning the social character of human praxis, and
the (at least implicit) arguments which he utilizes in support of these
claims.

I would hold that in the Paris Manuscripts and in later stages

of Marx' writings, five basic propositions are asserted and argued concerning the social character of praxis.

First, Marx argues that society,

or social relations between agents, is rendered possible through human
praxis as thus far described.

The details of this argument seem to rest

on two ideas developed above: viz., that praxis transforms the environ~
ment so as to render it the context of new possibilities, and that the
product of praxis involves the relation of agency and nature (the "material" of agency) in such a fashion that the resulting product is the
"externalization" of that agency which is its source.
These ideas are clearly involved in Marx' account of objectification
But the argument he uses to relate these concepts to the concept of society
is implicit rather than explicit in the text.

.It may be formulated as

75
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 115.
76
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 304; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 114.

-41follows.

As

shown above, acts of production and their resulting products

do more than simply satisfy needs.

They also give rise to new needs, and

to environments which are capable of sustaining praxis towards the satisfaction of these new needs.

Now the result of praxis is a product, that

the product is a modification, and this modification is a modification of
an environment, (or''nature") i.e., of something other than and external
to the agent.

The product is always "external1177 to the agent in some

relevant sense, and the product itself is the modification of the environment or nature.

But as external, the product is also "objective" in the

78
.
.
.
sense o f being
publ.ic, ob servabl e, open to inspection.

And b ecause

of its externality, it is possible that the product occuzsin relation not
only to the producer, but also in relation to some other agent.

This

means that the product, in virtue of its externality to its producer, can
be appropriated by some other agent, can acquire a "use value" 79 for some
other agent to whom it is present.

Therefore the product as such intro-

duces a new possibility into the environment of an agent, viz •• the

77cf. Supra, Marx' initial discussion of the relation of productive
activity to 'nature.'
781 take this to be a typical meaning of 'objective' in the texts of
Marx. Marx takes the 'object' to be that which is both related as a product to the productive agent, and at the same time that which is external
to that agent and therefore public.
79

--

This use of 'use value' is perfectly consistent with the first exposition given of that term by Marx in Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1,
P. 36; MEW, vol. 23, p. 50. There Marx tells us that, "The utility of a
thing makes its use value. But this utility is not a thing of air. Being
limited by the physical properties of a commodity, it has no existence apar
~rom that commodity. A commodity such as iron, corn, a diamond, is there~ore, so far as it is a material thing, a use value, something useful. His
Point here is that the product, as involving definite physical p~operties,

r
-42possibility that the result of his agency may be taken up by someone other
than himself.
That the product introduces this new possibility into the environment
of the agent is the first step of Marx' argument towards the conclusion
that society is
praxis.

rendered possible by the character of the product of

Marx' argument requires also a second step,

This second step

involves the reiteration of the concept of the product as "resume" of the
activity of production.
As seen above, an item is a product precisely because it is an item

transformed through some process of agency.

And because of this trans-

formation, the product itself contains the details of that activity of
production of which it is the result, albeit that the finished product
contains these details as other than and external to the process of production.

But, as seen above in the discussion of self-actualization more

is involved here than simply the relation of production (or agency) and
product.

For the activity from which a product results is the activity

of an agent, and therefore it is the agent's own activity, his own "self,"
that is objectively resumed in the completed product.

As Marx puts it in

the "Excerpt Notes" of 1844, "In my production I would have objectified
my individuality in its particularity,"

80

that is to say, the product

which is the result of my agency objectifies the details of a process whicl
is capable of being appropriated by persons other than its producer, to
the extent that those properties may satisfy needs of these others as well
as needs of the producer himself. Thus the product is a 'commodity' as
an item susceptible to exchange. And it is clearly a general notion of ex
change that Marx is working towards in this argument.

---

Abt.8£~B~! 3~x~;rgE 6 ~otes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 2~1; MEGA,
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is my own, and thus objectifies a feature of myself.
This idea has significant implications for Marx' initial concept
of the relation of praxis and society, when linked with the first step
of his argument.

The product introduces into the environment of its

producer the possibility that his product may be taken up for use by
someone other than himself.

But the product does not stand, as a simple

item does, in a neutral relation to its producer.

Rather, and by defi-

nition, the product is the result of the producer's agency, and is thus
the objectification of an aspect of his own self.

And thus, when some-

one other than its producer takes up a product for his own needs, he also
is taking up more than a simply neutral item.

He is taking up an object

in which a fundamental feature of its identity, the details of his agency,
is "resumed."
The implication of this statement is of key importance for Marx'
argument, and it is the following.

If the product of one agent is taken

up for use by another, it must be the case that this product relates in
its definite composition to some needs of this other, because for Marx all
use is use towards the satisfaction of a need, in the broadest sense of
this latter term.

But then, on the one hand, the production of a product

by one agent and its appropriation by another entails a similarity of
needs shared between them, and on the other hand, the product itself in
being produced and appropriated is the objectification of this similarity
of needs.

The similarity of needs, as Marx sees it, forms the context

of the possibility of social

inte~action

'

between the two, and the form in

r
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If the product of one agent is taken

up for use by another, it must be the case that this product relates in
its definite composition to some needs of this other, because for Marx all
use is use towards the satisfaction of a need, in the broadest sense of
this latter term.

But then, on the one hand, the production of a product

by one agent and its appropriation by another entails a similarity of
needs shared between them, and on the other hand, the product itself in
being produced and appropriated is the objectification of this similarity
of needs.

The similarity of needs, as Marx sees it, forms the context

of the possibility of social interaction between the two, and the form in

-44which this interaction occurs is agency, !espectively the production of
and the appropriation of a product.

Again as Marx states it in the

"Excerpt Notes" of 1844, "In your satisfaction and your use of my product
I would have had the direct and conscious satisfaction that my work
satisfied a human need, that it objectified human nature, and that it
created an object appropriate to the need of.another human being. 1181
Thus, for Marx, social relations are to be initially and fundamentally understood in terms of praxis, in that such relations are rendered
possible by the character of the product of praxis.

To appreciate the

full force of this conclusion, however, we must see how Marx is led by
it to the second of his propositions concerning the relation of praxis
and society, to wit, that details of acts of praxis are conditioned by
actual social relations.
We face a difficulty in examining this second proposition similar to
a difficulty noticed in connection with the first proposition on the

relation of praxis and society.

It is a contention which Marx seems to

assert rather than to defend by argument.

Marx states that, "society it-

h
se lf pro duces man as man.... .,82 ·He asserts tat
man as agent is i n some
sense "produced" by the social context in which he is situated, just as
he asserts above that social contexts themselves find their f oundatton in
I

agency, in being rendered possible by agency.
81

And in the famous sixth

Ibid.

82
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Eastcm and Guddat, p. 305; ~'
Abt. 1, Bd/ 3, p. 116.

r
-45thesis on Feuerbach, Marx goes so far as to hold that, " ••• the essence
of man is no abstraction inhering in each single individual.

In actu-

ality it is the ensemble of social relationships. 118 3
To understand these statements of Marx, we must first recognize that
he is here discussing again the social dimensions of praxis.
themselves are a clear indication of this.

The texts

In the first text cited above,

the full clause reads, "As society itself produces man as man, so it is
produced by him. 1184

The reference of the second part of this statement

is at least that assertion which has been argued above, viz., that the
structure of praxis involves those conditions which render social relations possible.

Society "is produced" by man in being made possible

through the structure of human agency itself. But if praxis is the subject matter of the second portion of this statement, it is reasonable
to assume that it is the subject of the first portion also.

Moreover,

Marx typically refers to agency in stating that man is in some sense a
"product of his social context.11 85

In these statements, Marx seems to

be asserting then that it is man the agent that society "produces."

8~rx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA, Abt
1, Bd. 5, p. 535.
8

~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, Abt.'.
1, Bd. 3, p. 116.
85 For example, in a text immediately preceeding the one cited above,
Marx asserts that, given the overcoming of private property, a society
would occur in which man would affirmatively produce both himself and
other men. He would do this, however, through his productive activity,
and other men would be 'produced' by him through their activity of
appropriating the object of his labor. Thus in asserting that society
'produces' man Marx is stating that the details of praxis are conditioned

-46Or, he seems to assert that agency, praxis, is in some way "produced" by
society.
Marx makes these statements in the Manuscripts of 1844, in a section
in which his prime purpose is the comparison of his. theory of socialism
to other theories which he considers less radical and therefore less
satisfactory than his own.

Because this comparison is his first purpose,

he does not spend his energy to provide a clear argument for the claim tha
the details of productive activity are conditioned by actual social relations.

And of course the absence of argument makes it difficult to

ascertain just what this assertion means.

Moreover, the commentators are

by no means in agreement on this point. Schaff, e.g., takes Marx' statements to the effect that man is "produced" by society to mean that the
individual's consciousness of himself is conditioned by the social matrix
in which he is located.

Society produces man by providing the context

from which the individual's self-understanding is derived:
••• if human attitudes, opinions, evaluations, etc., are a
historical product of mutual interaction between base and
superstructure ••• then the general psychological structure
of men under given conditions depends on the patterns of
social relations, particularly in the sphere of production.
These relations are the bases of his consciousness -- they
create it, although this creative process is an extremely
complicated one. What philosophers call "human nature" or the
"essence of man" is thus reduced to the status of a product -or a function -- of social relations.86

by the social setting in which praxis occurs.
'produces' is, for Marx, the agent.
86

The 'man' that society

Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual, p. 65.

-47Marx does indeed wish to maintain something of this sort concerning
the question of the relation of society and consciousness, although as we
shall see his doctrine on this point is more complex than Schaff's statements might imply.

And it is doubtless true that this idea of the re-

lation of society and self understanding is something of what Marx means
in asserting that "society produces man."

He states in the German

Ideolol!v, e.g., that "Consciousness is ••• from the very beginning a social
product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. 11 87

But while this

notion of the relation of consciousness to society is an aspect of Marx'
assertion that "society produces man," I would argue that it is not the
fundamental sense of this assertion, and that the other statements which
~arx

makes on the general question of the relation of society and con-

sciousness suggest that it has another meaning, and one that is logically
!more basic.
Society for Marx means a system or systems of production of useful
items, in which (either cooperatively or competitively), persons interact
through reciprocal appropriation of and exchange of social products.
Marx himself argues, in the German Ideology, that the theory of
production or praxis, he has stated, results in an understanding of society
'The production of life," he asserts, "both of one's own in labor and of
fresh life in procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one
hand as a natural, on the other hand as a social relationshp."88

We have

8 7Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 19; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5
o. 20.
D,

19

88
. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 18; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5
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-48seen both that production of any sort requires nature as a condition,
and that praxis engenders the possibility of social relations.

Marx, in

this text goes on to develop from this a notion of society in the sense
discussed above.
By social we understand the cooperation of several
individuals, no matter under what conditions; in what
manner and to what end. It follows from this that a
certain mode of production, or industrial stage is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or
social stage, and that this mode of co-operation is
itself a "productive force." Further, that the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines
the nature of society, hence the "history of humanity"
must always be studied and treated in relation to the
history of industry and exchange.89
Society for Marx, then, given its foundation in production, becomes for
Marx a system or series of systems of interacting (i.e., cooperation as
above) productive activities, geared towards "industry" (i.e., productive
acts) and "exchange" (i.e., the reciprocal appropriation of the products
of its members).
It is this understanding of society which is the key premise for the
argument I am advancing here, to wit, that just as society is engendered
by praxis, it also specified and controls the sorts of acts of praxis that
are available to its members.

Marx, in the text cited above, explains

that because society involves the interaction of agents in terms of production and reciprocal appropriation (i.e., exchange), and because the
repetition of such acts results in a certain stylization thereof, a "certain mode of cooperation" which Marx himself entitles the "social stage,"

r
t

-49society itself becomes a "productive force," i.e., the systematization
and organization of specific acts of production of various kinds occurring within it.
~

Society facilitates, renders more efficient and more

fruitful, these latter sorts of acts.
But as the systematization of kinds of production occurring within
it, society affects more than simply their efficiency and utility.
Society also offers these kinds of production -- whatever they may be in
a given social system -- as viable alternatives for its members in their
own practical engagements.

Or, society as that "force" which organizes

and systematizes sorts of production occurring within it, at theSillle
time renders these sorts of production and the relations occurring between them available to its members.

But this means that society con-

ditions and to some extent determines the sorts of production or praxis
-------

occurring within it, just as society itself is engendered by praxis.
And this means that the sorts of interactive relations occurring between
persons in a given social system depends upon and are conditioned by the
structure of the society itself as a "productive force," i.e., as the

. 90
.
systemat i zat i on o f sorts o f pro d uct i on occurring
wi t h.in it.
Thus conceived, the "structure of society" determines the sorts of

90

......

Cf. G. V. Plekhanov, Essays in the History of Materialism, trans.
Ralph Fox (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967), pp. 214-215. As Plekhanov
puts this point, " ••• the means of production just ·as inevitably determine the mutual relations of men in the process of production, as the
armament of an army determines its whole organization, all the mutual relations of the men of which it consists.
But the mutual relations of
men in the process of production in their turn determine the whole
structure of society •

-50productive behavior available to its memb~rs. 91

For Marx, just as man

as agent and society are mutually productive of each other, so society

9lcf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305, 306;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 116, 117. See also, Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, trans, E. J. Hobsbwam (New York: International Publishers, 1965), pp. 80-81; Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen
Okonomie (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 384. That this is what Marx
intends to argue in asserting that, " •.• as society itself produces man
as man, so it is produced by him," can be seen from further comments which
Marx himself makes in the Paris Manuscripts and in the Grundrisse of
1857-58. In the first of these texts, Marx notes that, "To be avoided
above all is establishing 'society' once again as'an abstraction over
against the individual. The indidivual is the social being. The expression of his life, even if it does not appear immediately in the form
of a communal expression carried out together with others, is therefore
an expression and assertion of social life." The point of this statement is twofold, co-incident with the note from Plekhanov cited above, and
the inference derived from it. First, society is not to be taken as an
entity apart from its members. Rather, it is the system of productive
activities and relations of these activities which its members enjoy.
But second, society is the system of these activities and relations. As
a system it offers them as viable alternatives to its members.· As a result the productive activity of an individual, even if seemingly private,
is nonetheless " ••• an expression ••• and assertion of social life ••• " i.e.,
because it is an activity rendered available to the individual by the
society within which he is located.
This view of the relationship of individual praxis and society is
reinforced in the section of the Grundrisse of 1857-58 entitled "PreCapitalist Economic Formations." There, in describing the relation of
the productive individual to society in primitive communal systems, he
notes first that, in a stable social system, individual productive behavior effects a "reproduction" of those forms and relations of praxis
offered as viable alternatives to the individual by society. In such
societies, " ••• the economic object is the production of use values ••• ,"
and this behavior yields, " .•• the reproduction of the individual in certai
definite relationships to his community, of which it (sic. the community)
forms the basis ••• " The wording of this text is of major inportance. The
production of items bearing "use values" involves an activity through
which the agent acts out his role as a producer within the broader system
of productive relations which is his society. This is the meaning of
Marx' phrase, " ••• the reproduction of the individual in certain definite
relationships to his community." But he goes on to say that the society
itself, (i.e., the community)· is the ''basis" of the relationship which the
individual has to it, the basis of his role within the larger productive

-51changes man (through the offering of new and broader productive options)
as man changes society (through the development of new modes of production which result necessarily in social change).

With the caveat

that the relation between man as agent and society is conceived of by
Marx as dynamic as well as stable, 92 we may claim to have shown two propositions of major importance in Marx' account of the relation of praxis
system. And society here is such a basis because society, as the organization of productive acts occurring within it, provides this role
as an option for the individual member. Thus again "society produces
man as man," i.e., society provides options for productive behavior
through which the individual may act out his role in the social system,
just as society finds its source in the activity of production, i.e.·'
just as "society is produced by man."
92 cf. Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, Hobsbwam, pp. 92-93;
Grundrisse, pp. 393-394. See also Marx' "Preface" to A Contribution to
the Critique of Political Economy, in Karl Marx and Frederich Engels,
Selected Works in One Volume (New York: International Publishers, 1969) ,11,
pp. 182-183; MEW, vol. 13, p. 9. In order to avoid the impression that I
Marx' understanding of society is static at this point, another idea
1\
from the same section of the Grundrisse cited above may be briefly noted,/
1
to wit, that as modes of production within a social system develop, thesej
may lead to new productive forms, and new needs on the part of the pro- I
ducer, thus outstripping those systematized relat:tons of production which
society as a "force" has constituted. And this development would in turn
require a re-organization of society itself, as a result of which society'!
would offer new and expanded options to its members. Marx in this sect::im
of the Grundrisse uses the example of the growing complexity of agricultural forms of production, enabling a community to produce new and
I
more varied forms of agricultural products without expanding its territorial boundaries. Such advance in turn would lead to the re-formulation of social relations of production, and thus to a society offering
,
its members more varied agricultural options. This example is consistentl
with the general formulation of the process of social change which Marx h1
offers in his famous "Preface" to A Contribution to the Critique of Po- II
litical Economy of 1859. He states that, "At a certain stage of their
II
development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict
with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal expression of the same thing - with property relations within which they
have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive
forces these relations turn into fetters. Then begins an epoch of social

I

I

I

'I

-52and society.
human praxis.

First, society is rendered possible by the structure of
Second, society specifies the details of praxis, through

controlling the productive options available to its members.
A third principal assertion concerning the relation of society and
praxis arises out ofthese two propositions.

This is the claim that all

praxis is in some sense social; in other words, that nothing occurs which
might accurately be described as a purely private act.
The young Marx gives at least two indication$ that this is a claim
he wishes to make, one in the 1844 Manuscripts, and one in the sixth
thesis on Feuerbach.

93

First, in the Manuscripts, Marx discusses an ex-

ample of the activity of scientific thinking.

It may seem that as a

scientist my speculative behavior is purely private, that I withdraw from
my community to formulate hypotheses concerning the nature of my subject
matter, and to work out criteria by which these hypotheses might be tested.
But, "Not only is the material of my activity - such as the language in
which the thinker is active - given to me as a social product, but

my~

revolution. With change in the economic function, the entire immense
superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed."

93

Cf. Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, ed. and trans.
The University Press, 1970), p. 79; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 1, Hb., p. 496. A third indication may be found in Marx' Critique of j
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in which Marx speaks of " ••• the commonwealth
(das Gemeinwesen), the communal being (<las konnnunistische Wesen) within
~hich the individual exists •••• " Avineri, The Social and Political Thought
of Karl Marx, p. 35, interprets Marx' choice of terms here as an indication of his belief, " ••• that man and society should not be antagonistically conceived ••• ," or that the being of the individual is always social,
a "kommunistische Wesen." If this is so, then it follows that all agency
~s also social in some relevant sense, or that there is no such occurrence
as a totally private act.

J. O'Malley (Cambridge:

-53experience is socialactivity; what I make from myself I make for society,
conscious of my nature as social.

1194

The implication Marx appears to

draw from this example is that no act, however private and individual it
may seem, occurs without the social context, and more strongly, that the
social context is a necessary condition for the occurrence of even the
most seemingly private act.
Second, in the sixth thesis on Feuerbach, Marx states that Feuerbach's critique of religion errs in its tendence " ••• to abstract from the
historical process and to establish religious feeling as something self
contained, and to presuppose an abstract - isolated individua1. 1195

The

clear implication of this statement is that one could only examine religion as a "self-contained" rather than an historically-socially conditbned phenomenon, if one presupposed an asocial, "isolated individual"
as the bearer of religious feelings and beliefs, and that this is an
error because all individuality and agency somehow involve their occurring
in the context of society.

As I understand these texts and what they imply, Marx' intention
here is to draw upon the arguments already seen on the relation of praxis
and society to support this third proposition, as well as to show, by this
proposition, that deep significance of the two claims we have already discussed.

Note first that in his statement concerning the social character

of scientific activity, Marx states that, " ••• what I make from myself, I

94Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 116.

--

95
Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and G.uddat, p. 402; MEGA, Abt.
1, Bd. 5, p. 535.

-54make for society, conscious of my nature as social."

Now excluding the

question of consciousness here, Marx is in this statement clearly harkening back to the point that praxis is such that through its resulting
product another might have access to the agent (producer), and the agent
access to the other (appropriator).

The point here is that for Marx, even

the most seemingly private actions share in this structure.

My seemingly

private act of scientific investigation results, if brought to term, in a
product, e.g., a written report of the process and conclusions of my research, which is available for public inspection and appropriation.

Thus

even this seemingly private act is in principle social.
Further, actions of this seemingly private variety draw upon the
strucutre which society organizes as structures for productive acts occurring within it, either through the utilization of materials which are
socially provided, or through the adoption of procedures which are socially constituted, or both.

As Marx notes, if I am engaged in scientific

""esearch, the " ••• material of my activity ••• " is " ••• language ••• given to
ne as a soc i a 1 pro d uct....

,.96

That is to say, in performing this sort of

speculative behavior, one of necessity utilizes a socially constructed
material, and through his action participates in the society in which he
97
[s located.

96Marx insists on the social origin of language in several texts othe
1
than this cited from the 1844 Manuscripts. I consider this point further I
in the section of this chapter devoted to a discussion of society, praxis, ·
and consciousness.
97
The person performing scientific activity utilizes paradigmatic
models to guide the formation of his experiments, definite laboratorytechniques, instruments for measuring and recording the data of his

-55These examples provide Marx with illusfrations of the general point
which I take him to be making, namely, that no action or instance of

9

is thoroughly "private" and that no individual acts in a thoroughly
~
98
private fashion.

experimentation, all of which are social ir. origin, at least in terms of
the conununity of scientists of which he is a member. In other words, in
his activity he adopts procedures and utilizes instruments which are
socially derived. In this respect also his behavior is far from private;
it shares in the structure of the society in which he is located.
98

Similar sorts of statements could be made concerning religious behavior as a so-called "private" form of action, as Marx indicates in the
sixth thesis on Feuerbach. Religious action seems at first glance to involve a private relation between the individual and some object which he
considers divine and therefore worshipful. But upon examination one notes
that this sort of action, if brought to term, does result in some kinds of
products (e.g., rituals and rites) which render it accessible to observation and appropriation by others - in a word, social. Again, religious
behavior participates in the society in which worshipers are located,
through its belonging to those forms of action which the society in general constitutes as appropriate for worship. Additionally, cf. Geo.
Kline, "Hegel and the Marxist-Leninist Critique of Religion," in Darrel E.
Christensen (ed.), Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion, The Wofford
Symposium (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1970), p. 195. Professor Kline
correctly notes that Marx' concept of religion involves an "Absterbenstheorie," that, "In Marx, religion stirbt ab, dies out, or whithers away;
it negates itself, although the 'self elimination of religion' may be interpreted as 'elimination by the objective movement of history."' For
Marx, religion is an " ••• historically transient phenomenon, inextricably
bound up with the socio-economic system of capitalist (and pre-capitalist)
exploitation, and doomed to 'whither away' with the approach of a nonexploitative, classless economic system." But the point here is that
through 'pre-historical' social development religion is for Marx precisely an, ·experience which is 'inextricably' related to the various social
contexts in which it occurs. Thus for Marx religious behavior is in no
meaningful sense of the term a private act of the individual.

-

-56is important to see the role which this assertion plays in
Marx' general argument.

As I read the texts, Marx is not attempting to

construct some new argument through which he might deduce this assertion
as a conclusion.

Rather, he is utilizing the assertion that no act is

thoroughly private, as implied by the examples of scientific and religious
praxis, to indicate a further, and to him more profound, dimension of
the claims previously discussed concerning the relation of society and
praxis.
notion

This more profound dimension of Marx' arglllllents involves the
that praxis and society are mutually implicative.

No action is

a private action because all praxis, given its structure and the nature
of its resulting product, opens the way towards a relation between the
agent and the other.

All action opens the possibility for interaction. ·

Conversely, all praxis qccurs in specified and describably forms, and
this specification is the result both of those needs which are the ground
of praxis for the individual agent, and of the society in which the agent
is located.

Society organizes the sorts of praxis which occur within it,

and thus constitutes certain forms of praxis as appropriate for the satisfaction of certain needs.

Or, the interactive context in which praxis

occurs conditions the character of that instance of praxis.
Society and praxis, then, are for Marx

integral components of a

single subject matter which Marx wishes to examine.

He does not claim

that praxis is the historical origin of society, which then goes on to
determine the character of praxis.

Rather, Marx would assert of the re-

lation of praxis and society the same statement which he makes concerning
his analysis of the dialectical division of satisfaction of needs,

-57production of new needs, and the origin of the family in the German
Ideology, to wit, that, "These .•• aspects of social activity are not of
course to be taken as ••• different stages, but just, as I have said, as
••• aspects or, to make it clear to the Germans ••• 'moments,' which have
existed simultaneously since the dawn of history and the first men, and
still assert themselves in history today. 1199
Society and praxis mutually and necessarily compliment each other
in Marx' analysis, and each in its turn accounts for certain properties
as belonging to the other.

Praxis accounts for the possibility of

society, and for society as being fundamentally a system of productive
relations among agents.

Society accounts for the organization of praxis

into definite and describably historical forms.

Thus the agent is neces-

sarily a social agent, and praxis is necessarily conditioned by the
social context in which it occurs.

Once we see this, we can also see

the full force of Marx" acsertion lhat_, "To be avoided above all is escablishirig 'society' once again as an abstraction over against the individual.

The individual.is the 'social being •••• The expression of his life

even if it does not appear innnediately in the form of a connnunal expression carried out together with others - is therefore an expression an
assertion of social life."lOO

99Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp. 17-18; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, pp. 18-19.
lO~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 117.
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=--58As a post-script to this idea, one may also see that, for Marx,
society provides the one and only environment in which certain· needs,
which for him are crucial cases of human needs, can arise for the individual.

Among these crucial cases are the needs of the individual for

love and friendship.

Roger Garaudy is quite correct in noting that,

given Marx' understanding of the broad social character of human relations, neither notions of love or hostility can be used by Marx as
concepts of the most fundamental sorts of relationships between persons,
in terms of which other sorts of relations can be critically examined.IO!
'~hese relations (i.e., love and hostility), are established between men

by the nature which encompasses them and which is their common work."

102

In other words, the structure of social agency itself provides norms
whereby various sorts of human relations can be critically examined, and
no specific relation can be used in itself as the conceptual foundation
of such a norm.

However, once this proviso is taken, Marx is willing to
103
point out, as Garaudy himself notes,
that love, (and I think friend. li cation
. ),
s hi p by imp

104

. 11y
are cases o f h uman re 1at i ons t h at are er i tica

101
Cf. Roger Garaudy, Perspectives de !'Homme (Paris:
Universitaire de France, 1969), p. 206.

102

Ibid.

Presses

My translation.

103
Cf. Ibid., p. 265.
104
Cf. John Macmurray, The Self as Agent (London: Farber and Farber
Ltd., 1953), p. 15. When Macl{lurray asserts in this volume that, "All
meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action
is for the sake of friendship," I take him to be making two assertions
with both of which Marx would agree thoroughly. That Marx incl1nes

\
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-59important.

For example, Marx asserts of the relation of love between

man and woman that, "From this relationship one can thus judge the entire level of man's development •••• It ••• indicates the extent to which
man's natural behavior has become human or the extent to which his human
existence has become a natural essence for him, the extent to which his
human nature h as b ecome nature for him.

,,105

Now the factor to be noted here is that, for Marx, the development
of a need beyond that of biological subsistence requires for Marx, among
other conditions, the presence of some relevant characteristic in the
environment that may elicit that need as a need for the agent.

This has

already been noted above, in showing that, for Marx, initial modifications
of an environment provide the environment with
give rise to new needs in the agent.

those features which

An environment then which would

give rise to the needs for love and friendship must be one which involves
relevant features of interpersonality, i.e., one in which some real interaction between personal agents occurs.

.Such an environment is, by

towards the second, which is our question for the moment, can be seen in
a text already cited from the "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in which Marx discusses the ideal of the relationship between the agent as producer and
the personal other as appropriator of the product. There Marx states that
my basic satisfaction in the other's appropriation of my product is my
knowledge that I have "created an object appropriate to the need of
another hilman being." (Easton and Guddat, p. 281, MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3,
P• 546). The point here is that Marx describes as~ideal a relation in
which my satisfaction is derived from the need of the other in virtue of
an object which I have produced relevant to that need. And the notion of
friendship as a fundamental and critical human relationship seems derivable from this idea of Marx.
105

--

Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 303; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 133. This passage, widely used as an indication of
Marx' "humanism" indicates at least that for Marx the love relationship is
one of crucial importance.

r
-60definition, society.

Thus society is the necessary for the emergence of

106

such crucial cases of human needs as friendship and love. .

Up to this point, then, we have considered three propositions of
central importance to Marx' view of the relation of society and praxis:
a) that society is rendered possible in virtue of the structure of praxis;
b) that society in turn organizes the sorts of praxis occurring within it,
and thus conditions the sorts of praxis available to its members; and c)
that no act, or instance or praxis, is in a litera+ sense of the term a
"private" act; or that all praxis. is in some sense social.

I take these

three propositions, and the arguments supporting them, to be the kernel of
his doctrine concerning the relation of praxis and society.

In addition

to these, however, two other propositions concerning the relation of
society and the agent need to be taken into account.

I want now to con-

sider them.
The first of these propositions concerns Marx' concept of "totali~ation,"

and may be stated as follows: in society there is a "division of

106
Marx argues against Prudhon that all human needs are social, and
thus historically variable. His point is that since all human needs are
pistorically variable, then no such need can be posited as historically or
~ulturally universal.
But it seems that Marx contradicts himself here on
~wo grounds.
First, in discussing friendship and love as crucial human
Peeds, he seems to posit these needs as universally present to human agency
~Otherwise, why would the alienation of man from other men which Marx dis- I
usses in the 1844 Manuscripts be a case of alienation at all?) Second,
i
n positing society as the necessary environment for the eliciting of these
leeds Marx seems to further posit the need for society as an historically
Jniversal need of the agent. Is this not a contradiction of Marx' conention that all human needs are historically variable?

-61labor," an extension of the varieties of praxis, opening the possibility
. 107 o f t h e agent.
for t h e tota li zation
One of Marx' more notorious statements concerning "totalization"
occurs in the German Ideology, in a discussion on the effects of "division
of labor," in the pejorative sense of that term.

There Marx tells us that

klivision of labor effects a social condition in which, "man's

O';m

deed be-

comes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being coatrolled by him.

For as soon as labor is distributed each man has a par-

ticular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from
which he cannot escape.

He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a

critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose the means
11108
. live l"h
of h is
1 oo d ••••
~ition

Division of labor here denotes a social con-

in which forms of labor are "distributed" variously among members

of the social system, and a condition in which each of these members is
~arced,
~he
~ith

for reasons of subsistence, to perform his own form of labor to

exclusion of all other forms.

Marx contrasts this state of affairs

that of communist society:
••• while in communist society, where nobody has one
· exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomphished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the
general production and thus makes it possible for me to

107
Of course, for this proposition to be fully intelligible,
'totalization" must be defined, a definition of this term will be worked
~ut through an examination of the argument which Marx uses to support this
llssertion. It will be seen that the term "division of labor" can be used iIJ
wo senses for Marx.

-
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Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 22; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, p. 22.
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-62do one thing today and another tomorrow,
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear
evening, criticize after dinner, just as
without 59er becoming hunter, fisherman,
critic. 1
.

to hunt in
cattle in the
I have a mind,
shepherd, or

It is in this highly utopian statement that Marx sets forth
totalization as an ideal goal for man in communist society.

However, the

utopian elements of Marx' assertion can be taken as metaphorical in the
context of the argument of the German Ideology.

110

The true sense of

this statement can be seen in Marx' contrast of the condition of the
agent in a society pejoratively characterized by division of labor, and
that of the agent in "communist

society~"

And that contrast involves at

least this: that the agent as member of a society characterized by "division of labot" is limited in terms of the forms of productive activity
available to him, and thus limited in the sorts of needs which he may
satisfy through his action; while the agent as member of a social system
in which labor is not so "distributed" is free to undertake a variety of
forms of productive actions towards the satisfaction of a variety of
disparate needs.

Productive activites in this context may assume direc-

tion toward disparate ends such as organic subsistence (agriculture and

109
Ibid.

110

Cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 26; MEGA, Abt. 1
Bd. 3, p. 25, Marx himself would certainly wish that the "utopian' ele- 1
ments of this statement be interpreted metaphorically. In a later passag11
of The German Ideology, in which Marx is attempting to establish communism as a science, he states that, "Communism is not for us a stable
state which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will ha.ve to
adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the
present state of things. The conditions for this movement result from
the premisses now in existence."

I
I

-63husbandry), recreation, and philosophical criticism. Totalization for
Marx, then, involves the ability of the agent to act fruitfully in a
variety of fashions towards the satisfaction of disparate needs.
This understanding of totalization in Marx is reiterated by Marek
Fritzhand, "What did Marx intend when he proclaimed the ideal of a 'total'
man?" Fritzhand asks.

"First, he meant the overcoming of the 'fractional

zation,' 'fragmentation,' and 'functionalization' of modern man caused by
111
the institution of private property and the social division of labor."
And Fritzhand goes on from this to state something of what he takes to be
the positive content of Marx' concept of totalization.
The "total" man is a complete man, whose self realization
knows no bounds. He is a human individual not separated
by private property from the world of culture and civilization. The totality of that human being consists in his
"possession" of that total world-possession understood here
as the fullest possible share in the creation and enjoyment
of the goods of civilization and culture.112
This interpretation is consistent with the understanding of totalization
offered above.

Totalization as a possibility for the agent is contrasted

here to-the condition of the agent in a society in which labor is "distributed" or "divided."

Further, totalization is noted as a feature of

"self-realization" or self actualization, i.e., the satisfaction of needs
through agency and the production of new needs.
"self realization"

And in speaking of a

which "knows no bounds," and individual enjoying

"possession of that total world," Fritzhand indicates the capacity of the
111
Marek Fritzhand, "Marx' Ideal of Man," in Socialist Humanism, ed.
Erich Fromm, p. 174.
112
Ibid.

-64agent to perform varieties of forms of praxis towards the satisfaction
of disparate needs.
One difficulty with these statements, however, has to do with their
consistency with Marx' refusal to postulate utopian ideals for communist
society, or for the condition of the individual within such society.
Fritzhand refers to Marx' concept of "totalization" in the above text as
an "ideal," and indeed Marx' own rhetoric in the text from the German
Ideology seems to indicate that he is positing an ideal of utopian
character.

But in the German Ideology itself Marx argues that, "Com-

munism is not for us a stable state which is to be established, an ideal
to which reality will have to adjust itself.

We call communism the real

movement which abolishes the present state of things.

The conditions of

..

.
this movement result from premises
now in existence.. .. 113

In oth er words,

the concept of totalization, as a postulate describing the condition of
the individual in communist society, must have its foundation in those
premises which describe society in general, and the relation of individual
praxis and society.

In other words, the concept of totalization must be

in some sense derivable from these assertions concerning the relation of
society and praxis which have already been seen.
The concept of totalization can be derived from Marx' analysis of
the fundamental relation of praxis and society in two ways.

The first of

these takes its source from the premise that society organizes the forms
of praxis occurring within it; the second from the premise that praxis

--

113
Marx-Engels, op. cit., loc. cit.

-65itself implies the possibility of social relations.
Marx' first argument justifying the concept of totalization begins with the premise that, as a system of organization of praxis,
society necessarily organizes and involves a plurality of diverse sorts
of activities, and of diverse sorts of subjectively located needs corresponding to these activities.

Initially praxis aims at the satis-

faction of those needs relating to biological subsistence, " ••• before
everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing, and many
other things.

The first historical act is thus the production of the

means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life

itself.~ 14

Even at this level of praxis, a limited range of diverse actions and
needs occur as can be seen by Marx' enumeration of the several items
requisite for the sustinence of the human organism.

And thus the

society which organizes praxis even on a primitive level organizes a
limited plurality of disparate activities.
But a more crucial recognition of the idea that society organizes
praxis in terms of disparate forms of action is had when one remembers
that, for Marx, a result of the satisfaction of biological or "first
level" needs is that "new needs are made."

115

The agent and the en-

vironment are, in virtue of that action which satisfies subsistence
needs,

modified (or in Marx' terminology "actualized) such that the

114

Marx-Engels, The German Idelogy, Pascal, P• 16; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, p. 17.
115
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 17; MEGA. Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, p. 18.

-66agent is now capable of being the subject of needs of a more complex
sophisticated variety, and the environment is capable of sustaining
action towards the satisfaction of these new needs.

Such new needs and

forms of action may include the production of tools and techniques which
render more efficient existing means for the satisfaction of subsistence
needs, the development of new means towards the satisfaction of subsistence need,

116

the formation of rites and rituals occurring in re-

lation to the productive activities of a society, lending these activities and aesthetic (and religious) significance,

117

and the formation

of creative means for the utilization and enjoyment of leisure time.
Now the development of new needs and forms of action such as these
does not obliterate those needs and actions which relate to subsistence
within a society.

On the contrary, needs relating to and actions aimed

at subsistence of necessity remain a

part of the productive composition

of the social system, only now they are integrated with new needs and
forms of action of a more complex and sophisticated variety.

According

to Marx, as a system of organization of praxis, society for Marx organize
and integrates both those forms of action which relate to subsistence,
and those which relate to more developed and sophisticated needs produced

116
For example, the development of an agricultural mode of production out of a society previously geared to hunting and gathering. Another example of this point is the historical development of land distribution and utilization within agricultural societies, which Marx point
out in the section of the Grundrisse entitled "Pre-capitalist-Economic
Formations," Hobsbwam, pp. 68-80; Grundrisse, pp. 375-384.

117
Fritzhand, op. cit., loc. cit., p. 174. points out that for

-67as a result of the satisfaction of subsistence needs.

And thus the forms

of action which the social system organizes can be seen to be a plurality of activities of a more widely disparate character.
The idea of society as necessarily relating and integrating a
plurality of disparate forms of action can also be justified by Marx in
terms of his assertion that, along with the development of more complex
forms of action within the social system, there occurs the development
of specific forms of social relatbns between persons.

These developing

relations facilitate the performance of productive activity, and must in
turn be systematized by the society as a whole.

The first and foremost

example of such relations is the family.
The third circumstance which, from the very first, enters
into historical development, is the men, who daily remake
their own life, begin to make other men to propagate their
kind: the relation between man and wife, parents and children: the Family. The family which to begin with is the
only social relationship, becomes later, when increased
needs create new social relationships and the increased
population new needs, a subordinate one ••• and then must be
treated and analyzed according to the existing empirical
data.118
The point which Marx wishes to make here is that the development of
new needs and forms of action resulting from the satisfaction of the
requirements of subsistence involves more than simply the appearance of

Marx the 'total man' is one who " ••• does not distinguish between work and
enjoyment." One interesting way of understanding this is to see that
I
work can be ritualized in a fashion so as to attain aesthetic signifiI
cance. This notion, which might be involved in an attempt to do history I
from a Marxian perspective, is verifiable at least with regard to primitive and feudal societies.

118
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 17; MEGA,
- , Abt. 2,
Bd. 5
• 18.

-68·new sorts of activities which might ordinarily, and for Marx much too
narrowly, be entitled "productive forms of action."

In addition to the

growing complexity of needs and actions there also emerges definite forms
of social relations within which production occurs.

These forms of

social relations are, for Marx, products, in that they are the results
of agency, albeit that agency here takes the form of interaction with
other agents.

Such relations provide contexts for unique forms of ac-

tion$, and for the satisfaction of definite needs.

And again, such re-

lations, while they seem to be synonymous with society itself -- i.e.,
a system of interactive relations within which productive agency is organized -- are also factors which are developed and systematized by the
larger society within which they occur.

119

Through this analysis Marx establishes that society is necessarily
a context in which a plurality of disparate forms of action are available
to its members.

These forms of action, or praxis, include activities

aimed at the satisfaction of subsistence requirements, aesthetic, recreational, or indeed intellectual forms of action rooted in needs which
developed as the results of the satisfaction of subsistence needs, and
activities appropriate to characteristically interpersonal settings, such
as the family.

119

Cf. Ibid. Marx clearly points this out with regard to the
family, in stating that, "The family which to begin with is the only
social relationship, becomes later, when increased needs create new
social relationships, a subordinate one ••• and then must be treated and
analyzed according to the existing empirical data •••• " That is to say,
given the historical development of societies, the family can only accurately be understood through an examination of its relations. to other
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-69Given this analysis, Marx can justify the idea of "totalization"
as follows.

Since society organizes praxis in this fashion, it offers

to its members as individual agents the possibility of engaging a
variety of activities, towards the satisfaction of distinct needs of
which the agent is subject.

Further more, since society is the necessary

environment within which the agent exists, and since society is a context within which disparate forms of action are possible, society constitutes the agent as subject of various and distinct needs, correlative
to the distinct sorts of ac.tivities which it renders available to the
agent.

The premise to be kept in mind here is that needs arise for an

agent from two sources:

from the individual's own action, and satis-

faction of prior needs; and from the environment within which action
occurs.

It is the environment as source of needs that is at issue here.

As composed of a variety of available forms of action, society renders
the agent the subject of a variety of needs which the various forms of
action possible in his social milieu are capable of satisfying.

Thus

the individual agent, as member of society, is in principle capable of
engaging in various sorts of activities, towards the satisfaction of disparate needs which are his own.
Thus the possibility of totalization as defined above is, for
Marx founded in the general structure of society, and the relation of
society and praxis.

"Total man" is not an ideal postulate descriptive

of the condition of the individual in a utopian conununist society, but
a state of affairs which society renders in principle possible for its
features of the social system, because it is from these relations that th
famil derives its ch9_r ·

-70members, albeit that some "pre-historical" societies simultaneously offer
this possibility to their members and deny it to them through an enforced
"division of labor."

Interestingly enough in this connection, Fritzhand

notes that Marx objects to only one sense of division of labor, that
sense in which forms of labor are severally distributed to persons in an
enforced fashion, such that persons are capable of significantly engaging
in one form of action, exclusive of others.
Marx was aware of the need for a division of labor and of
it significance for the development of mankind. He was not
against a voluntary division of labor which would do justice
to the desires, inclinations, talents, and individuality of
htunan beings. He disapproved only of a compulsory division
of labor which condemns people to work in the same treadmill,
doing the same things and performing the same functions all
their lives. This division of labor has "assumed a life of
its own." It has alienated itself from human beings, constrained their powers, limited their lives and their possibilities of choice.120
Marx, then, approves of a social division of labor in which the agent acts
in keeping with volition, and in terms of which he is capable of performing various compatible sorts of activities towards the satisfaction
of the several distinct needs which he possesses.

He approves of a con-

dition whose possibility is founded in the general structure of society
itself, in which the individual, as Marx metaphorically puts it, "Hunt in
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize
a ft er di nner •••• 11121

120
Fritzhand, op. cit., loc. cit., p. 174.

121
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 22; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, p. 22.
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-71This interpretation of "total man" is one generally held by the
commentators on Marx' texts.

And it is undoubtedly the major significanc

which Marx attaches to the concept.

I would claim, however, that a

second aspect of the concept of totalization is suggested by Marx in his
discussion of division of labor.

In a text already cited, Marx states

that one result of a "division of labor" pejoratively taken is that,
"man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves
him instead of being control~ed by him. 11122

Marx's idea here is that,

as a member of a society in which forms of labor are distributed in a
compulsory and exclusive fashion, the agent is unable to recognize his
action as the result of his own choice.

He recognizes his action as

imposed upon him, and thus as a phenomenon opposed to him rather than
being of his own authorship.
comments:

And Fritzhand echoes this idea when he

"This division of labor has 'assumed a life of its own.'

It

has alienated itself from human beings, constrained their powers, limited
their lives and their possibilities of choice. 11123

If the agent's own

activity is recognized by him as imposed rather than as embodying his
own volition, if they seem opposed to him rather than being of his own
authorship, then such activity has, from the point of view of the agent,
"assumed a life of its own."

And one result of this is that society,

which is indeed made possible by praxis and is itself the product of
interactions among agents, comes to be recognized as a reality apart

122
Ibid.

123

Fritzhand, op. cit., loc. cit., p. 174.

-72from and opposed to the agent as individual, both because it is here
a product of activities which already seem opposed to him, and because
it is that force which "distributes" forms of action according to a
124
formula of the "division of labor."
One may infer that for Marx the concept of totalization includes
the agent's capacity to recognize his own activity and his society as

124

Cf. Berger and Luck.mann, op. cit., p. 89. The topic under discussion here is well sunnnarized by Berger and Luckmann under the heading
"reification." "Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if j
they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms.
I
Another way of saying this is that reification is the apprehension of the i'.I
products of human activity as if they were something else than human products - such as facts of nature: cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine I
will. Reification implies further that man is capable of forgetting his [
own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic be1
tween ~an the producer, and his products, is lost to consciousness. The
reified world is, by definition, a dehumanized world. It is experienced
by man as a strange facticity, an opus alienum over which he has no control.i rather than as the opus proprium of his own activity." For
r~asons given above, Marx would hold that one result of the division of
labor, i.e., the social condition which inhibits the realization of "total!
man" in practice, is reification as described by Berger. This reification·
extends to two fronts: one apprehends both his own activity and the
society in which he is located as, in Berger's terminology, "opera aliena,
rather than as being of his own authorship, as "opera propria" of his own
action. But on the other hand, and appearances to the contrary, one's
own actions as well as the society in which he is located are respectively of his own authorship and product of his interactions. The overcoming of division of labor as that condition which inhibits the actualization of "total man," would also mean the overcoming of the agent's
apparent and reified apprehension of his own activities and of his social
world.

-73of his own authorship, in virtue of the overcoming of that division of
labor which renders this recognition impossible.

The concept of totali-

zation, then, includes both the capacity to act in a variety of significant fashions towards the satisfaction of disparate needs, and the cap acity to recognize his own actions and his social world as being of his
125
own authorship.
Both these aspects of totalization are founded in
the general explanation of the relation of society and praxis Marx provides, and both are actualized through the .overcoming of "division of labor" in its pejorative sense.

The latter is expressed by Marx in his

dictum that, "The individual and generic life of man are not dis.tinct,
however much -- and necessarily so

~

the mode of existence of individual

life is either a more particular or more general mode of generic life, or
generic life a more particular or universal mode of individual life. 11126
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Cf. Gajo Petrovic, "Marx' Theory of Alienation," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 1962-63, 23 (2), p. 421. Also cf. Petrovic,
Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967),
pp. 144-145. In these essays, Petrovic argues that the crucial forms of
alienation for the Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts are the alienation of the
self from its own actions, and the alienation of the self from society.
Both of these forms of alienation, I would argue, are forms which Marx
discusses as arising from 'division of labor' and both are overcome in
the actualization of the 'total man.'

I!j
I
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Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, " in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 117. Cf. Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, p. 148,
p. 150, pp. 161-162. It is interesting to note the Henri Lefebvre treatment of totalization in Dialectical Materialism dicusses the concept exelusively in terms of the relation of man to nature. He correctly notes 1
that for Marx, man, i.e., the human agent, exists in a necessary relation j
to the non-human other, nature, as the context of his activity. (p. 148) II
1
Through this relation, man, "produces himself through his activity ••• "
(p. 148) and produces as the result of his activity on nature, " ••• a
world, an organized experience •• .'' (p. 150) an environment which is

I!
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consideration of totalization has been an examination of one

of two propositions through which Marx explicates the relation of the

organized through the labor of the agent and satisfies his needs. Now
for Lefebvre, to produce a "world" in this sense is to overcome the otherness and externali ty of nature, to "humanize nature," (p. 150) , to
realize nature as a source of human self-satisfaction. And, Lefebvre
argues, it is man as so realizing nature whom Marx entitles "total man.""
The total man is both the subject and object of the Becoming. He is the
living subject who is opposed to the object and who surmounts this opposition. He is the subject who is broken up into partial activities
and scattered determinations and who surmounts this dispersion. He is the
subject of action, as well as its final object, its product even if it
does seem to produce external products." (pp. 161-162) I would suggest
that, while Lefebvre's comments are accurate with regard to Marx' concepts of praxis and self actualization, they are inaccurate because they
are too broad in scope to his concept of totalization. Lefebvre offers
a passing nod to "total man" as an agent capable of engaging in a variety
of activites towards the satisfaction of disparate needs, but he does not
seem to see this as essential meaning to totalization, which, I suggest,
Marx clearly does. Further, Lefebvre does not include in the concept
of totalization the agent's apprehension of his own actions and of his
social world as being of his own authorship, a significance which the
concept does have for Marx. Finally, Lefebvre argues that the condition
of totalization is rooted in the relationship of the agent to nature.
But the sense of Marx' statements on the question seem clearly to indicate that this condition is founded rather in the relation of the agent
to society, and that it is the general structure of society which renders
totalization a state of affairs which is in principle possible. For
Marx, I think, to assert that totalization is rooted in the relation of
the agent to nature would be too abstract an assertion, for it is only
the structure of society, and the mediation of the agent's relation to
nature by society, which renders totalization possible. And it is only
an explanation of totalization in terms of a description of social
structures which can show the former to be more than a mere utopian
ideal, and thus a concept inadmissable within the framework of communism
as a "science."

-75agent to society, beyond the three propositions which I take to form the
kernel of his doctrine of the relation of society and praxis.

A second

important implication of this basic theory suggested in the 1844
Manuscripts is that society provides a structure in which the agent is
an object as well as a subject, thus further determining the content of
his subjectivity.
I take this claim to explain the sense of Marx' assertion in the
1844 Manuscripts that, "A being which is not itself an object for a third
being has no being for its object, that is, is not related objectively,
its being is not objective, 1112 7 a thought which Marx completes by remarking that, "An unobjective being is a nonentity."

128

This assertion of Marx occurs in the section of the 1844 Manuscripts
entitled "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General," in
a passage offering extended critical analysis of Hegel's doctrine of
consciousness, self-consciousness, objectivity, and the relation of consciousness to its object.

A thorough exposition of Marx' arguments in

this passage will be offered in my fourth chapter, in which I will suggest
that it is in terms of these arguments against Hegel that Marx explains
and defends his concept of the fundamentality of praxis.

For the moment,

this passage needs to be examined only to the extent that it reveals an
argument in support of the claim that society provides a structure in
which the agent is an object as well as a subject.
127
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 326; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 161.
128
Ibid.

. -76In order to clearly analyze this argument, brief comment must be
made as to the meanings which Marx assigns to the terms "subject" and
129
"object."
First, it is worth recalling that for Marx a requirement
for the occurrence of all agency is a real relation between the agent and
some external, maleable environment, "Nature," in Marx' sense of the term.
Marx expresses this idea a few lines above the text in the Manuscripts
now under study by stating that, "A being which does not have its nature
outside itself is not a natural one and has no part in the system of
nature. 11130

His meaning here, regarding the agent, is that the structure

of praxis necessarily relates the agent to something outside himself,
something in w)iich his labor is "externalized," and in which the details
of his action are "resumed," i.e., the product.

It is thus that the

agent has a part in 'the system of nature."
Correspondingly, nature too has its being "outside of itself": it

129

Cf. Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, ed. O'Malley,
pp. 23-24; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 1, Hb. 1, p. 426. That the meanings of
"subject" and "object" are derived meanings is clear from this and other
texts. In the passage referred to here, Marx asserts, in the contexts of
an argument against Hegel, that "Subjectivity is characteristic of subjects, and personality a characteristic of person. Instead of considering
them to be predicates of their subjects, Hegel makes the predicates independent and then lets them be subsequently and mysteriously converted into
subjects." Now the import of this passage is that, if subjectivity is a
'characteristic' of something else, then its meaning can only be determined through an examination of its real relation to that of which it is
a determination. And mutatis mudandis, Marx would argue similarly concern
ing the concept of the object. We shall see that, for Marx, both subjectivity and objectivity are differentiations occurring within and determinations of agency, and that they can only be understood accurately if
they are examined as such determinations.
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Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 326; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 161.

-77is essentially related to the agent as that material upon which.he can
exercise praxis, transforming items into products capable of satisfying
needs which are his own.

Marx adds that, "A being which has no object

outside itself is not objective. 11131
Now initially to speak of an "object" in this context is to speak
of some item in nature which is external to the agent.

But since the

theme of this discussion is agency, praxis, the object may be defined as
that in nature which, though external to the agent, is capable of being
the material of his labor, of being transformed through his action, and
thus coming into an essential relation to him.

To be an object, then,

is to be an item capable of being determined through the action of
another, and thereby of coming into a relation with that other.

The term

"objective" in the above sentence is used in a sense already seen as
characteristic of Marx, to indicate the "public" features of the object.
An item is objective in that it is "external" with regard to the agent:

an item which is available for observation, inspection, and in principle
appropriation by someone other than the agent who has "transformed" it
through his praxis.

The product for Marx is by definition "objective" in

this sense.
With this seen, the meaning of "subjective" for Marx can also be
determined.

The subject is intitially one who has an "object outside

itself," is essentially related to something other than itself.
this relation is one of agency.
131

Ibid.

But again

Just as the object is that which is

-78capable of being transformed and determined through agency, so the subject is one capable of effecting that transformation and determination.
Since all agency is rooted in needs and exercised towards the satisfaction of needs, the subject is further the possessor of needs in which
the responsibility for specific forms of agency is founded.

The subject,

then, is one who is a possessor of needs which he is capable of satisfying through action, thus being essentially related to nature as his
"other."

The specific "nature" of the subject is determined by the de-

tails of those needs which he possesses, and the forms of action through
which he effects their satisfaction.

132

As an agent, he is a being which

again has, "its nature outside itself," is a "part of the system of
nature. 11133
The 1.lllderstanding of the meanings of "subject" and "object" in
Marx allow the analysis of his argument concerning a further·relation of
society and the agent to proceed.

The subject or agent forms a real

part of the "system of nature," in that he is really and essentially related to items in nature, "objects."

But this implies, first, that as a

part of nature the subject is "obejctive": his actions as well as the results of his actions are in principle public and observable.

It also im-

plies that, as an "objective" feature of the natural world, the subject
himself is capable of receiving a further determination in that he is
132
This latter is essentially the case in that it is through actio
that the agent achieves 'self actualization.'
133

Ibid.

-19capable of being the "object" of the activity of another.

In other words

the structure of the agent qua "objective" is determinable both as "subject," as one possessing needs and able to effect their satisfaction
through action, and as "object," i.e., as an item upon
,. which another agen
can act towards the satisfaction of his own needs.
This, as I see it, is the meaning of Marx' statement in this
context that, "A being which is not itself an object for a third being
has no being for its object, that is, is not related objectively, its
being is not objective." 134

A necessary feature of the "objectivity"

of the agent is its ability to be determined both as subject and as object, its ability both to satisfy need through action, and to be that
upon which another acts towards the satisfaction of his needs.
sums up the idea in discussing this feature of the agent.

Lefebvre

"Since he has

other beings for his object, this man is an object for other beings.

He

is at once a subject and an object which are opposed and yet inseparable:
a material subject, objectively given in his organism and elementary
biological consciousness, and thus containing a relation with other being
who are, for him, the objects of his desire, but, in themselves, subjects
a material object for these other beings.

The fact that he is thus an

object exposes natural man to the desires and aggressions of other living
beings. 11135
134
Marx, op. cit., loc. cit.
135
Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, p. 116.

-80Consequently, for Marx, a structural feature of agency that the
agent be determinable both as subject and object in the above described
senses of these terms, and it is only in virtue of the latter determination that the "objectivity" of the agent can be located in some interactive and productive milieu with other agents, and allows him to attain
real relations with them.

Society is by definition such a milieu, and

the agent is necessarily socially located.

As necessarily located in an

interactive context composed of other agents, the subject finds himself
in an environment in which he may be determined as an object, acted upon
towards the satisfaction of the needs of others.
of two fashions.

This can occur in eithez

It may be seen that the result of the agent's praxis,

product, is appropriated for use by another.

hi~

In this case, the praxis

of the agent and its result are treated by others as objects upon which
to exercise their action.

Here the producer may anticipate appropriation

of his product by others and this anticipation may in part determine the
details of his agency.

And he may, in Marx' language, experience sat is-

faction in his work, in that it has "satisfied a human need, that it objectified human nature, that it created an object appropriate to the need
of another human b e i ng. 11136

On the other hand, the agent may be the ob-

ject of actions rooted in needs of a more properly personal sort, such as

136
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Marx, "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 281,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 546.

-81friendship or love.

137

Such relations may obtain between two or several

agents, in situations of interaction in which the two or several agents
are mutually the subjects of their own actions and the objects of the
actions of others.

In either case, it is necessary that the agent be

located in an interactive milieu, and this condition is fulfilled by the
agent's being socially located.

Thus society renders the agent capable

of being determined as object as well as subject.
A remark must be added here with regard to Marx' statement that,

"An unobjective being is a nonentity. 1113 8 This statement immediately
follows Marx' assertion that a being which has an object must also be
itself also "an object for a third being ••• ," and immediately preceeds
his claim that an item which is not an object would occur in a state of
non-relation, privacy, solitude. 139

To the extent that Marx' statement

here is an explicitation of the structure of the agent in relation to
society, I take it to be simply a further elucidation of his comments and
arguments relative to the agent's public or "objective" character.

The

agent is in principle "objective" as a part of the "system of nature."
But in order that this objectivity be realized in practice as well as in
principle, the agent must be located in a context in which he and his products can be inspected and appropriated by others, or, in a context in
137

As noted above, p. 58, these sorts of needs are crucial cases
of human needs, for Marx. It is most appropriate, then, that he explain
how the agent is capable of being the object as well as the subject of
actions rooted in needs of this variety.
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Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 326; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 161.
139 Ibid.

-82which he may be determined as object as well as subject.

In other words,

objectivity can only actually occur for the agent if he is socially located, or that it is only in terms of the concept of society that objectivity as a characteristic of the agent makes sense.

Marx sums

this up in the manuscripts by stating that,"To be objective, natural,
sentient, and at the same time to have an object, nature, and sense outside oneself or to be oneself object, nature, and sense for a third per. one an d t h e same t h"ing. ,,140
son is

This concludes my analysis of Marx' views of the relation of soc:iety
and praxis.

To resume, I have analyzed five assertions, three of which

describe significant effects which Marx conceives society as having on
the agent.

These propositions are: a) that society is rendered possible

in virtue of the structure of praxis; b) that society in turn organizes
the sorts of praxis occurring within it, and thus conditions the sorts
of praxis available to its members; c) that no act, or instance of praxis
is in a literal sense of the term a thoroughly "private" act; d) that
society yields a "division of labor," an extension of the possibilities
of praxis, opening the possibility for the totalization of the agent;
and e) that society provides a structure in which the agent is determined
as an object as well as a subject.

I claimed at the beginning of this

chapter that the concepts of praxis, society, and consciousness are the
key concepts in terms of which Marx constructs a theory of man.

I turn

next to a consideration of Marx' concept of consciousness.
140

Ibid.
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Marx' Concept of Consciousness
Marx' writing on the critical question of human consciousness in

the 1844 Manuscripts and other texts suffers from being more of ten polemical than

argunentative.

He seems to be as much interested in de-

fending his position against such opponents as Hegel, 141 Feuerbach, 142
143
as he is in justifying his own position. Nevertheless,
and Stimer,
a close reading of the texts shows that a doctrine of consciousness is
of crucial importance to Marx' thought.

At one point in the 1844 Manu-

scripts, he asserts that, " ••• free conscious activity is the species
characteristic of man."

144

A little later he states that, "Conscious

life activity distinguishes man immediately from the life activity of the
animal.

Only thereby is he a species being.

Or rather, he is only a

conscious being - that is, his own life is an object for him - since he
145
is a species being."
Statements such as these show unquestionably that Marx' theory
of man involves a significant doctrine of consciousness.

Other texts mak

141
Cf. for example, that section of the Paris Manuscripts devote
to Marx' critique of Hegel.
142

Cf. for example, the first of the "Theses on Feuerbach," in
Easton and Guddat, p. 400-401; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 534.
143
Cf. for example, Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal,
p. 29; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 28.
144
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294;
~' Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88.
145

.ill&·

-84it equally plain that Marx wishes to integrate his doctrine of consciousness with the doctrines of praxis and society.

In the succeeding pages,

I shall maintain that, analogous to his theory of society, Marx' doctrine
of consciousness can be expressed in three propositions, which together
with their supporting arguments offer an overall schema of this doctrine.
These propositions are: a) that consciousness is an aspect or moment of
human praxis; b) that consciousness is an essential moment thereof; c)
that as praxis is conditioned by society, so consciousness is conditioned
by society.
To best understand the first of these proposidom we would do
well to recall Marx' general doctrine of praxis as outlined above, and
to riote again that, for Marx, it is through praxis that man attains his
fundamental relation with his environment, and that it is in virtue of
praxis that human self-actualization occurs.

Men, "begin to distinguish

themselves from animals ••• ," i.e., they begin to occur as men in the true
sense of the term, "as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsis·-.!.1
tence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization.

By

producing their physical subsistence, men are indirectly producing their
actual matieral 11•f e. .. 146

And he goes on to assert t h at since praxis is

the condition of theoccurrence of human experience, the identity of the
individual is his actions.
are. .. 14 7

"As individuals express their life, so they

In turn, while praxis requires nature as a con d ition o f i ts

146
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 7;
Bd. 5, p. 10.
147
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Ibid.
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Abt. 1,

-85occurrence, nature itself is to be understood as that environment which
is capable of being transformed through human agency, as that material
out of which products can be produced.

Nature is man's "inorganic body;

1) as a direct means of life, and 2)as the matter, object, and instrument of his life activity. 11148

Because praxis is the fundamental category

in terms of which man, his relation to his environment, and that environment itself are to be understood, Livergood is correct in commenting
that, "Reality, for Marx must be viewed as the redirective activity of
human beings in relation to 'the changing conditions in external reality.
Both the object and the subject are continually active; human history may
be seen as the process in which the changes in material reality create
new needs which in turn bring about human transformations of material
reality. 11149
If both the reality of the external environment and man himself
are to be understood in terms of praxis, it would seem to follow that
consciousness, as a feature of man, or as a feature of the occurrence of
human experience, must in a Marxian framework be understood in terms of
praxis.

Now in its primary sense consciousness for Marx means the aware150
.
ness of an externa1 ob Ject.
But, as Livergood points out, to speak of
148
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 293;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 1, p. 87.
149
N.D. Livergood, Activity in Marx' Philosophy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), p. 20
150
This is clear from', among other things, Marx' criticisms of
Hegel's doctrine of consciousness and its implications for a philosophical
understanding of the object of consciousness, in the 1844 Manus~ripts. Cf.
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-86the "real object" is to speak of that which is external to man and to
which he is essentially related as an agent.
"nature" out of which man produces a world.

It is to speak of that
Thus to say that

consciousnes~

is of an "object" in this sense of the term, is to say that, what in virtue of consciousness man is aware of and related to, is that which he is
already related to as agent.
Further, the "object" or "world" of which man is conscious, receives its fundamental determinations through praxis.
1 y in
. h uman experience.
.
151
.
occur i mme d iate

Nature does not

Rather, Nature or the external

environment occurs as mediated by praxis, as that environment which man

I

for example Easton and Guddat, p. 320; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 155-156,
Marx writes that "The human quality of nature, of nature produced through ,,
history and of man's products appears in their being products of abstract
spirit and hence phases of mind, thought entities, The Phenomenology is
II1
thus concealed and mystifying criticism •••• " Marx' point here is that,
~iven Hegel's refusal to re~ognize consciousness as a feature of praxis,
be is unable to describe the object of consciousness as anything more than I
~n intelligible content, a concept, rather than a 'real' (read sensuous)
, K>bject. But even in this context Marx implicitly admits that Hegel does
~ecognize that it is necessary and fundamental to consciousness that it
be awareness of an object. Indeed Marx' criticism of Hegel here, which
will be analyzed in more detail in the fourth chapter, is that Hegel does
recognize this, but is unable to offer an adequate philosophical account
IOf it.
151

Cf. the first of Marx' "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and
Guddat, p. 400; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 533. "The chief defect of all
previous materialism (including Feuerbach's) is that the object, actuality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object of per~eption (Anschauung), not as sensuous human activity, Practice (Praxis),
not subjectively." This question epitomizes from the point of view of
the question of perceptual consciousness Marx' doctrine of the relationship between the agent and his environment, object, or "Nature." The
object is, for Marx, always given to man as the object of praxis, as that
~hich receives its fundamental determinations in virtue of praxis.
Thus
the object does not occur in human experience immediately, but rather
occurs as mediated through agency,
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-87"humanizes.''

152

The environment occurs always as a correlate of the

agent, and moreover of the socially located agent.
ditions and enhances the quality of his agency.

153

Society both conThus that which con-

sciousness is conscious of is more primitively mediated by and determined
by agency.

This is to repeat the claim that the object of consciousness

is more fundamentally the object of an agent.
From this it is a short step to the proposition that consciousness
is a moment or aspect of human praxis.

Marx' position here is that to

speak of consciousness is to speak of the subject's awareness of an object.
But both the subject and object :are in a more fundamental sense constitute<
and determined by -- Marx would say "produced" by -- praxis.

Therefore

consciousness is related to praxis in such a fashion that praxis holds
primacy over consciousness in the relation between subject (agent) and
object.

The argument may be developed through the introduction of two

headings under which Marx discusses consciousness as a moment or aspect
of praxis.
First, Marx asserts in a passage discussingthe result of praxis as
"the objectification of his (man's) species life," that man "produces himself not only intellectually, as in consciousness, but also actively in a
real sense and sees himself in a world he made. 11154
152

This assertion

Cf. Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, p. 150.

153
This of course inplies a relation between society and consciousness; a relation I will examine in the discussion which follows.
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Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295;
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!MEGA, Abtl. 1, Bd. 3, p. 89.

-88involves a double edged intent.

On the one hand, Marx is reiterating the

familiar theme of objectification, that praxis results in an objective
product which resumes the details of the agency of which it is the result, and that man thus actualizes himself as well as the "world."

But

on the other hand, a crucial feature of the idea of "self-actualization"
is noted here.

For in this text Marx is asserting that, while the

production of consciousness is not the only feature of self actualization,
and not even the most basic feature thereof, it is. nonetheless a feature
thereof.

In other words, Marx here asserts that consciousness is related

to praxis in that consciousness is actualized or "produced" through praxis
and that praxis is responsible for the self actualization of the individual in general.
An argument supporting this assertion may be formulated in the

following manner.

Self actualization may be understood as the actualiza-

tion of the agent's ability to enjoy productive and complex relations with
his environment above and beyond those relations which fulfill subsistence
155
needs.
Actions geared towards the fulfillment of subsistence requirements are indeed "human" forms of praxis, but are so when and only when
they are integrated with actions, which are rooted in needs of a more
complex variety, needs which develop as a result of prior satisfactions
of the former sorts of requirements.
Such actions certainly involve at least the production of "means
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Cf. for example, Marx, "Manuscripts of i'844," in Easton and
Guddat, p. 292; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 86.

of subsistence.
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-89Even at the most primitive level they are geared

towards the production of an environment, rather than the simple taking
of what is offered in Nature.

Indeed, a mere taking does not for Marx

constitute an occurrence of human experience.

The constitution of human

experience requires the occurrence of relations to an environment more co
plex than those barely required to maintain the organism.

The crucial

point to be noted here is that through such relations to the environment,
new needs are "produced" or actualized through the satisfaction of subsistence requirements. 157
Now consciousness is a relation between subject and environment
more complex than that required to maintain the bare subsistence of the
organism, more complex than is required for the mere taking of sustaining
items from nature.

This is the case even for the limited awareness re-

quired to relate items in nature in terms of use, that required for the
production of instruments or tools.

Even this limited form of conscious-

ness involves a more than instinctual awareness of the qualities which
given items possess,and the ability to relate them each to the other.
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Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 7; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, p. 10.
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Cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 16; MEGA, Abt.
1, Bd. 5, p. 18. In an assertion previously noted, Marx states that with I
regard to the satisfaction of subsistence needs, " ••• as soon as a need is I
satisfied (which implies the action of satisfying and the acquisition of I
an instrument), nevneeds are made, and this production of new needs is th~
first historical act." The import of this assertion is that it is only
!
in virtue of the satisfaction of subsistence needs that more complex needs'
are had by the agent, and thus that more complex relations of praxis become possible between agent and environment.

-90But if so, and if relations between agent and environment more complex
than those required for bare subsistence are "produced" as a result of
forms of behavior which satisfy subsistence needs, then it follows that
consciousness as a relation between agent and environment is a relation
"produced" as a result of such forms of behavior.

And if it is such forms

of behavior or praxis which account for all senses of self actualization i
the agent, then it is the case that consciousness is actualized or "produced" through that factor which is responsible for self-actualization in
general, and that consciousness is related to praxis in virtue of the
former's being made possible by the latter.
A dual caveat must be issued here with regard to the notion of the
"production" of consciousness resulting from the satisfaction of subsistence needs.

Marx does not, and can not, mean that consciousness is

"produced" in the same way that an objective product is produced.

I do

not "make" consciousness in the same way that I'fnake" a house, by transforming the qualities and relations of externally given items so that
they fulfill a need of mine.

Rather, Marx is speaking of the "production"

of consciousness in the same way in which he speaks of the production of
new needs

158

as qualities subjectively possessed by the agent.

To speak of the production of a need for Marx is to speak of the
developed ability of an agent to relate to his environment in a fashion
IDlOre complex and sophisticated than was previously possible, as well as the
tendency on the part of the agent to achieve this relation: needs are

158
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-91"natural capacities and vital powers of an active natural being. 11159
Analogously, to speak of the "production" of consciousness is to speak
of achieved ability of the agent, given certain inherent psychological
. i es, 160 to re 1 ate to the environment in a fashion more comp 1ex
capacit

than that required for the simple taking of items from nature.

Marx

is not speaking naively of the "production" of consciousness as one would
in ordinary language speak of the "production" of an object.

Rather,

he means to indicate the developed ability of the subject to relate in
a certain fashion to his environment, resultant upon definite forms of
action.
One must, I think, avoid reading the idea of a temporal sequence
into Marx' discussion of the relation of consciousness and praxis at this
point in his exposition.

Marx is not asserting that an organism takes

sustaining items from nature and then begins to produce the means of its
own subsistence and then acquires new needs through which new and more
complex relations of agency with its environment are subjectively founded,
and then, realize a relationship of consciousness with its environment.
In spite of the language of priority and posteriority employed above,
159
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844,"
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160.

in Easton and Guddat, p. 325;

160
Marx would no doubt assent to the idea that the ability to achieve conscious relations with the environment would in part depend on
the organism's possession of a certain inherent and complex physiological
structure. But given that, he would still insist that the achievement
of the capacity, here consciousness, made possible by that structure must
occur in terms of active or behavioral relations between agent and environment.

·-92this is not at all Marx' meaning.
He is rather attempting to understand the occurrence of human experience as a complex phenomenon in which a variety of factors must be
distinguished, related to each other, and explained.

Among these are

praxis, which must be described in both its individual and social dimensions, the environment or nature, needs which subjectively ground
actions, developed and more complicated needs resultant upon successful
instances of agency, and consciousness as a relation between subject and
environment.

Now within this schema of categories praxis is the most

theoretically basic to Marx, both because it provides for accurate description of the others, and because it provides the foundation for an
account of the others.

But this implies no notion of temporal sequence.

It implies instead that the occurrence of human experience can only be
properly understood through an accurate understanding of the dialectical
interrelationships of these categories as they there appear.

Indeed

praxis itself in a Marxian scheme can only be understood through an
analysis of how it involves and is dialectically interrelated with nature,
needs, society, and consciousness.
Given these two qualifications, then, one can state that for Marx,
consciousness is actualized or "produced" through praxis.

But Marx'

discussion of the relation of consciousness and praxis may be further
~xpanded under a second heading. This heading involves the thesis that

consciousness is itself a form of action, and one intrinsically related
to all other forms of agency which can be validly entitled instances of
human praxis.

---

This thesis can also be formulated as follows:

that

-93consciousness is not a feature alien to the occurrence of human praxis,
but a feature thereof implied by the structure of praxis as Marx describes
it.

To speak of praxis is among other things to speak of a process

of agency whereby modifications are introduced into an environment.
This is the case even at the most rudimentary level of production, that

.

relating to the production of "means of subsistence."
rudimentary sort of production

162
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Now even this

is sufficiently complex to be iden-

tified as human praxis and distinguished from animal behavior.

But some

conditions are required in order for this basic transformation of the
environment to occur.

For one thing the agent must entertain some con-

scious awareness of the qualities possessed by items discovered in the
environment, as well as the purpose he wishes to achieve through production, and the way in which discovered items may be related to each
other, and transformed in order to achieve that

purpose.

Otherwise all

successful actions upon the environment would represent merely a haphazard series of chance instances, and there would be nothing to distinguish productive agency from a simple "taking" of items.

Furthermore,

in order that such productive agency be a sustained rather than a chance
series of intermittent events, the agent must possess consciousness of
his actions and their results as well as of his purpose.

He must be ca-

pable of learning which forms of action on the environment are successful
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•94given certain ends in view, and which fonns do not succeed.
This implies that consciousness for Marx is itself a kind of
activity, a relation between subject and environment in virtue of
which the subject deals with the environment.

Basic conscious events

occur at rudimentary levels of praxis; such events are acts of a subject whereby he relates to his environment and such relations of
consciousness between subject and environment are part of the total
process which Marx entitles praxis.

"Knowledge, for Marx, is that

activity of man whereby he comes into interaction with the world and
understands it so as to transform it •••• Knowledge is an active process
of apprehension which is necessarily linked to transformation of reality •••• Knowledge (for Marx) is not material transformation of realityt
Knowledge, however, is necessarily related to such transformation. 11163
On

the other hand, the structure of praxis itself implies the occurt-

ence of consciousness as an essential feature.

In order that the pro-

cess which Marx entitles praxis be thoroughly described, or that the
possibility of praxis be accounted for, consciousness must be located
as an intrinsic feature of this process.

But this is simply to say

that upon thorough analysis the structure of praxis as Marx initially
describes it reveals that consciousness to be indispensable as aspect
of this process.

And finally, Marx' description of consciousness in

relation to praxis shows that, for him and at this stage of his analysis
163
Livergood, Op. cit., p. 22.

-95consciousness does not occur as a process whose goal is contained within
itself.

"There is no complete cognition which is knowledge for know164
ledge's sake."
Rather, an occurrence of cognition or consciousness is
completed or brought to term through the completion of the instance of

praxis of which it is a feature.

This is the case because consciousness

is both a definite sort of relation, one of awareness, between subject
and environment and an aspect of a more basic relation between the subject and his environment, the process of agency.

Because of the latter,

the relation between subject and environment which is constituted through
consciousness is only completed when that instance of agency of which it
is a feature is also brought to term.
That consciousness is a feature of agency implied by the structure of human praxis itself can, then, be seen from Marx' description
of praxis on even its most rudimentary level.

This idea is expanded by

Marx in his discussions of more sophisticated forms of praxis.

In the

1844 Manuscripts, Marx holds that,
The animal produces under the domination of immediate
physical need while man produces free of physical need
and only genuinely so in freedom from such need. The
animal only produces itself while man reproduces the
whole of nature ••• the animal builds only according to
the standard and need of the species to which it belongs, while man knows how to produce according to the
standard of any species and at all times knows how to
apply an intrinsic standard to the object.165

164
165
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Marx, "Manuscript·s of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 294-

295; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88.
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-96Marx' argument here begins with the often repeated premise that
the satisfaction of subsistence needs results in the production of new
needs, which ground the individual's ability to engage in new and more
complex forms of agency.

This of course means that the individual as

agent' is now capable of relating to his environment in a broader fashion
than before, and that the transformations which he is capable of introducing into the environment are of a wider range and scope.

But again,

for this sort of agency to occur, certain conditions must be present as
features of the structure of agency itself.

First, the agent must be

aware of the nature of his newly developed need.

Otherwise his actions

towards the satisfaction of this need would be merely random, and would
not represent agency in a true sense of the term.

He must know what the

details of his need are, in order to know how to act for its satisfaction.
Second, the agent must be aware of the nature of his more modified environment, in order to be able to introduce further transformations in
it.

Marx is arguing here that the taking of sustaining items from the

envir~nment

requires nothing more than an iIIllllediate biological inter-

action between organism and environment indicating the suitability of the
item.

But in order to transform the environment, the agent must know

how to engage in this transformation.

That is to say, the agent must be

aware of the characteristics of objects which he encounters, as well as
the potentialities of objects, in virtue of their characteristics, for spe
cific sorts of transformation.

To satisfy a need of a more complex variet'

the agent must know what that need is, and he must know the details of his
environment, in order to know how that environment or objects c6ntained

-97therein may be manipulated and transformed towards the satisfaction of his
need.
Marx expresses this in the above text through the statement that,
" ••• man knows how to produce according to the standard of any species and
at all times knows how to apply an intrinsic standard to the object."

166

To say that man is able to act "according to the standard of any species"
is to say that man's needs, the subject's grounds of all action, are not
limited to those resident in his specific organic structure as requirements for the maintenance of that structure.

To say that human action

implies knowing "at all, times how to apply an intrinsic standard to the
object" is to say that action above and beyond that rooted in sustenance
needs requires that the agent be aware of the nature of the object is to
say

~hat

the agent be aware of the nature of the object upon which he is

acting, and in virtue of this awareness be able to apply to that object a
!cognitive "standard" appropriate to the characteristics of the object,
~nabling

him to form that object into a new product capable of satisfying

the need which is the subjective ground of his agency.
Given the above, it is clear that, for Marx, the very structure of
~uman

praxis implies the presence of consciousness as a factor occurring

~ithin

that process, as well as implying that consciousness is not some167
~hing which comes about independent of agency.
And this concludes Marx'
166
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Cf. Macmurray, The Self as Agent, pp. 54-55. Here and elsewhere
n this work Macmurray offers an argument that Marx would wholeheartedly
!ccept, to the effect that any philosophical theory which posits ,the

-98arguments towards the proposition that consciousness is an aspect or
moment of human praxis.

Consciousness as awareness of the object has

been shown to be dependent upon that more fundamental determination that
the object receives through agency.

And consciousness has been shown to

be, in a certain sense of the term, a "product" of praxis, as well as an
occurrence implied by the vert structure of praxis itself.
.L

An accurate

relationship between consciousness and its object as a relationship complete in itself and self contained, is then unable to make sense of the
phenomenon of h uman agency·, i.e. , is unable, to show that agency is nece
sarily related to the occurrence of consciousness. On the other hand, a
philosophical theory which posits agency as the fundamental relationship
between self and environment can make sense of the occurrence of consciou •
ness. In the text referred to here, Macmurray argues that, "Knowledge is I
the determination of an object, but that determination is theoretical.
If the object can be determined by thought, by a judgment which may be
true or false, then it must already be determinate. If it were not determinate, then no judgment of ours could be either true or false. Action, however, is the determination of something not in theory, but in
actual fact. To act is to make something other than it would have been
had we not determined it." Now if the relation between consciousness and
its object were the primary relation between subject and environment, the
the object would be perforce understood as fully determinate in itself,
requiring only to be comphrehended through thought, to be determined
through a concept adequate to the object itself. In this schema, no
agency is required to explain the occurrence of consciousness, or to
augment or further determine the object. Therefore no necessary relation
can be shown between consciousness and agency, and thus no adequate sense
can be made of agency from the perspective of this sort of theory. However, to describe action as the more basic relation between subject and
enviornment allows one to describe the object as indeterminate, or as
partially determinate. One may then argue, as Marx does, that some
occurrence of consciousness is necessary as a feature of that agency which
further determines the object. Thus from this theoretical perspective,
the occurrence of consciousness and the theory itself then seems prefer- ·
able as more inclusive, Marx himself argues in this fashion, but the details of his argument are developed only in his consideration of Hegel's
doctrine of the relationship of the object to consciousness and to action
respectively. Our reflections on this argument must be postponed to the
fourth chapter in which the broader nature of Marx' arguments against
Hegel will be treated.

J

-99swnmary is offered by Rotenstreich of the relation between praxis, reality (or "existence" in his terminology), and consciousness:
Existence is the product of the process that man has made,
This existence is reality not strange to man, and not even
strange to consciousness. Consciousness is part of the
practice that creates it. Existence, the product of practice, determines consciousness; this means that consciousness
is not cut off from existence and is not bound to an independent realm. Consciousness is only a part of existence,
determined by its totality. The relationship between consciousness and existence is similar to the relationship between the part and the whole. But since consciousness is a
part of existence and from its nature an element alien to
it and since the whole determines its part, consciousness
combined in the whole determines the consciousness that is
a part of the whole.168
To be avoided in this discussion is the view that while consciousness is
an aspect of praxis, it is an aspect which occurs only at the initiation
of an instance of praxis, the idea that agency involves a conceptual
terminus a quo which then is translated into real production resulting in
the product, an actual terminus ad quern, if production be successful,
corresponds to the conceptual initiation of the process.

Marx' under-

standing is rather that of a constant interrelationship between consciousness and production in all stages of the process of praxis.

Since any

engagement in production requires some awareness of how this is to be
done, such awareness must be present throughout the several moments of
that process through which a product is realized.

And correspondingly,

insofar as a process of production can itself be an "object" for consciousness, then consciousness itself progressively acquires a more precise and detailed awareness of its object as this object is"realized";

-
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Rotensteich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, p. 50 •. Cf. also
Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, p. 71.

-100this is one way in which consciousness is "produced" by praxis. 169
The above analyses may seem to argue for the second as well as the
first of the propositions listed above as outlining Marx' theory of consciousness; they seem to show that consciousness is both an aspect or
moment of human praxis, and an essential moment thereof.

For if con-

sciousness is implied by the very structure of Marx' description of
praxis, then to say that praxis can occur in a non-conscious fashion
a~contraditction.

would be

In that case by definition consciousness would

be an essential condition or factor which must be present if praxis is to
occur.

But the import of the above analyses is to show that, while there

is an intrinsic relation between consciousness and praxis, praxis holds
primacy in that relationship.

Consciousness is dependent

for the object of which it is aware.

upon praxis

Consciousness is "produced" by

praxis, in that it involves a relation between subject and environment
which is brought about and developed through the more ftmdamental factor
of agency.

And to assert that consciousness is an aspect or feature of

human praxis is to assert precisely that consciousness is a feature of
something else, rather than a relation of subject and object which is independent and complete in itself.

In considering the second proposition

listed above, I would like to consider one argument·. which I take to be
implicit in the text of the 1844 manuscripts and crucial in demonstrating
the essential relationship of consciousness to praxis: an argument· which
shows that only if consciousness is considered as essential to praxis

169
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Cf. Macmurray, The Self as ~ent, p. 82, Marx would agree with
Macmurray's statement that,'lt'Acting' and 'thinking' then are, irr abstract
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can an account be given of the developmental character of human needs.
It is axiomatic for Marx that human praxis involves the developmental character of needs, that praxis is the sort of agency in which,
' f action o f certain nee ds,
upon t he satis

11

new needs are made ••• 11170

To consider this then in relation to the question of consciousness, I
wish to retulllto a text of the 1844 manuscripts already seen, in which
Marx asserts that,
The animal produces under the domination of immediate
physical need, while man produces free of physical need
and only genuinely so in freedom from such need. The
animal only produces itself while man reproduces the whole
of nature •••• The animal builds only according to the standard and need of the species to which it belongs while man
knows how to produce according to the standard of any species
and at all times knows how to apply an intrinsic standard to
the object.171
Marx is here asserting that man is not "species specific" in relation as agent to his environment.

And he is asserting this idea in t

terms of his understanding of the nature of human needs.

But what is the

condition under which a need can develop and what is the condition under
which a developed need can be a ground for action?

First, a need can

conception, exclusive contraries. In actuality they are the ideal limits
of personal experience; and 'acting' is the positive, while 'thinking'
j
is the negative limit." And he would go on to add that, in Macmurray's
terminology, this positive limit itself implies the occurrence of its
negative, and that the latter is produced and developed by the former.

I
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Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA,
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-102only develop as a result of some previous modification of an environment.
Only under this condition, a) is a prior need satisfied, and b) does the
agent stand in relation to a new environment which can elicit a new need
in him.

But to speak of medication of an existing environment is for

!Marx to speak of production, and this in turn is to speak of a form of
agency which includes consciousness.
~ironment,

For in order to transform an en-

one must know how to bring about that rransformation.

Thus

to speak of a developed need at all is to speak of a need developing out
bf a form of agency which includes consciousness.

But further, something

must be said of the conditions under which a developed need can be a
ground for action.
~o

For one thing, the agent must stand in some relation

the modified environment such thatthis environment can be the source

pf a new need.
~eed

Further, the agent must stand in some relation to this new

itself as it is subjectively located, i.e., he must stand in some

elation to this new need as a need of his own.

Finally, the agent must

btand again in some relation to his environment such that through his acion the new need can, all other conditions being equal, be satisfied.
Now I would suggest that each of these conditions can be met only if
he agent has consciousness.

If, for example, the environment is to be

onsidered as that which stimulates behavior relative to a subsistence need
then it need only present to an organism some item which will trigger a
biological, "species specific" response.

And in this case the relation

of organism to environment need only be "species specific," need only inVolve an instinctual behavioral response to the presence of some sustaining item.

But in order to present a stimulus relative to a developed

-103need, the environment must present not a given item but a possibility,
i.e., it must present itself as a context in which some fruitful manipulation and production can be undertaken. In turn, the subject must
be capable of relating to its environment so as to envision possibilities in it, i.e., must be able to relate to the environment not as it
is simply given, but as it potentially could be.

To be able to relate

to an environment in this fashion, it is necessary that the agent be
able to relate objects to each other in an ideal fashion.

And this

ability is by definition a (function) of consciousness, i.e., a (functionr
of a subject insofar as he is aware of his environment.

Thus in order

to elicit some developed need in a subject, the environment must be related to a subject which is a conscious subject.

Only such a subject is

capable of responding to possibilities as well as givens in an environment.172
Further, the relation of the subject to the developed need as a
need of its own must be considered.

Here again the relation differs

from that of the simple organic subject to its own subsistence needs.

In

the latter case, because the need is only a subsistence need, its subject need only be an organism, a unified structure capable of biological
responses.

172

A subsistence need is by definition built into the specific
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Cf.Marcuse, Reason and Revolutions (Boston: Beacon, 1960), p.vi •
In his preface to the work, "A Note on Dialectic," Marcuse notes that the!
concept of dialectical consciousness in general involves an understanding!
of consciousness in general as involving, " ••• the power of negative
I
thinking," the power of overcoming the facticity of an environment in
terms of possibility of value. Marx would agree with this understanding
of consciousnes, and add a) that such consciousness is necessarily the
consciousness of an agent, and b) that only in virtue of consciousness

I

- -104structure of an organism.

Thus the organism as such can relate to such

a need in a simple instinctual fashion.

It can simply behave as it will

behave, given its own biological nature.

But a developed need is by

definition not built into the specific structure of an organism.

It is

a need in virtue of which the subject acts not only in such a fashion as
to produce "what is immediately necessary for itself and its young," but
a need in virtue of which, "man produces universally. 11173

But insofar

as a need is something developed, it cannot be a need to which its subject relates as a simple organism; it cannot relate to such a need instinctually as a specific feature of its biological makeup.

If so, then

something other than instinctual relation between a developed need and
the subject in which it is located is required.

But this can only be a

relation in which the subject realizes or is aware of a developed need
as a need of its own.

If a subject is to relate to a need which is not

organically determined, then it must do so in terms of some feature
through which it can transcend its own species structure.
ness can account for such a transcendence.

Only conscious-

Only consciousness can ac-

count for the relation of a subject to its own developed, non species
specific needs.
Finally and briefly, in order to stand 1n some relation to an environment in terms of which he may fruitfully act towards the satisfaction

can such a relationship of negativity between subject and environment be
explained.
173
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of a developed need, a subject must be able to act productively in that
environiuent.

A developed need, as above and beyond subsistence needs,

cannot be satisfied merely by taking items from an environment, but only
by production.

But productive activity involves the presence of a sub-

ject for whom consciousness occurs, an agent capable of praxis in Marx'
full sense of that term.

Thus the subject must stand in a conscious

relation to his environment, in order to act towards the satisfaction of
a developed need.
This import of these arguments is that consciousness is crucial to
Marx' idea of developed needs.

Only if the subject of such needs is a

conscious subject can we explain those relations between subject and environment and subject and self which must be explained if sense is to be
made out of the notion of developed needs.

But the idea of developed

needs is itself crucial to Marx' description of human praxis.

It is only

in virtue of the idea of developed needs that Marx is able to explain how
human agency, as opposed to animal behavior, "produces universally, 11174
how it "reproduces the whole of nature. 11175

So if the idea of developed

needs is necessary to explain human praxis, and if the occurrence of consciousness is necessary in order to account for developed needs, then the
occurrence of consciousness is a necessary and essential feature of human
praxis, and a complete description and explanation of human praxis must
include consciousness as an indispensable feature.
The assumptions underlying Marx' doctrine of consciousness can be
174
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-106fully understood only when seen in this light.

Consciousness is related

to praxis both in terms of dependence and of essentiality.

Consciousness

is dependent upon praxis for the fundamental determinations of the objects of which it is aware and for its own "production."
subject is always an agent.

The conscious

But at the same time consciousness is an

essential feature of praxis, a feature which must occur if praxis is to
\

occur, a necessary feature of the agent as agent, and of any adequate
description of human agency.

And, I would submit, only an account of

consciousness which insists upon both these points is faithful to the
texts of Marx.
Some further discussion, however, is necessary to provide an
account which Marx would feel is both theoretically adequate and sufficiently concrete.

Connection must be drawn between society and the

occurrence of consciousness in human experience.

I have claimed that

Marx' general description of praxis is only explicitated in adequate
theoretical detail through arguments which illustrate the relation of
praxis and society.

Analogously, a discussion of consciousness which

brings out the relation of consciousness and praxis without any significant reference to society would be in Marx' eyes an abstract, onesided account.

The very sense and meaning of what I have claimed con-

cerning the relation of consciousness and praxis invites some discussion
of the relation of consciousness and society.
To bring out the connection between consciousness and society, let
us recall some of the principle contentions already defended concerning

-
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the relation between society and praxis.

These function in the main as

the premises for Marx' further arguments on the relation of society
and consciousness.

We have already shown that society functions to

organize and condition the details of praxis, the concerted actions of
its members, and that all praxis is in some sense social.

From these

premises, Marx can construct an argument for the additional claim that
consciousness, as well as praxis, is in the concrete structured and
conditioned by society.
As already seen, Marx' assertion that, " ••• as society itself

produces~ as~' so it is produced by him, 11176 indicates a relationship of reciprocity between praxis and society.

Man "produces" society,

that is to say, social relations are rendered possible through the
structure of praxis, and "society" itself is understood by Marx, in its
most basic sense as a system of productive

rel~tions

between agents.

Correspondingly, " ••• society itself produces man as man •••• " that is,
precisley as a system of relations, society regulates and conditbns the
forms of praxis that are available to its members; it determines the
character of the various productive roles available to its members.

Ar-

guments for these assertions have been seen. And their import for Marx'
doctrine of consciousness can be seen through the formulation of a further argument.
The relation between consciousness and praxis is such that conscious
ness must be understood as a necessary ingredient of praxis, or, that the
176
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 116.
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subject of praxis must be understood as a conscious subject.

In order

that behavior be productive action, praxis as opposed to "animal" behavior, and in order that needs be developed within the individual agent
rather than organically static, praxis must be understood as including
consciousness as a moment of itself.

But, praxis or productive action

for Marx is not isolated action, not that of the isolated individual.
Rather, praxis is organized and systematized by the very social relations
which it engenders.

But then consciousness, as a feature or "moment"

of those social relations, must likewise be organized and structured by
society.
Marx expresses this idea under three headings, senation, language,
and theoretical thinking,thereby lending concreteness to his claim.
Sense consciousness, first, is understood to be immediate awareness of
some datum in the external environment, some item of nature.
item of nature for Marx is not to be understood simply.
objects occur in human experience.
mined by praxis.

But an

Rather, natural

As objects of praxis, and as deter-

And he understands consciousness to be instrumental

in relation to praxis.

Thus, the object is, in the words of the first

thesis on Feuerbach, to be considered both "in the form of object or
perception (Anschauug) ••• ," and as object of "sensuous hmnan activity,
177
practice (Praxis) ••• ," and the former is for Marx derived from the
latter. 11178

And moreover, praxis
. i s, as h as b een seen, organ i ze d i n i ts

177
Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 400; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd •. 5, p. 533.
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actual occurrence by society.

But if sensory consciousness is dependent

for its object upon praxis, and if the possibilities of praxis are
organized and defined by society, then the object of sensory consciousness, and thus sensory consciousness itself, is conditioned by society.
The data available to sense consciousness are socially conditioned.
As Marx states in the German Ideology, the "sensuous world ••• " available
to the individual is 'hot a thing given direct from all eternity, ever

.
179
the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society ••• "
Just as Marx argues that consciousness in its most rudimentary form,
sensation, is socially conditioned, so he argues that it is similarly
conditioned in its more developed forms.

The arguments offered here

center first around the nature of language.

In the German Ideology,

Marx first asserts that thought is a phenomenon inconceivable apart from
language.
being

"From the start the 'spirit' is afflicted with the curse of

~burdened'

with matter, which here makes its . ,appearance in the

form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short of language." 180

Marx

J. H. Nicholas ,..'Jr., ed., Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
1969), p. 48. In a footnote to a discussion of the Master-Slave dialect~
in the Phenomeno1y of Spirit, Kojeve notes that, "According to Hegel,
·
Concept (Begreff) and Understanding (Verstand) are born of the slave's
work, whereas sensual Knowledge (sinnlich Gewissheit) is an irreducible
given. But one could try to deduce all human understanding from work."
Marx in the first of his "Theses on Feuerbach" is clearly attempting to
argue along the lines indicated by Kojeve here.

179Marx-Engels, The German Ideologi, Pascal, p. 35; MEGA, Abt. 1, B
5, p. 32.
180
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal; p. 19; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, pp. 19-20.
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offers no explicit justification of this statement, but an implicit
justification seems to reside in a following statement, in which Janguage is described

as"~

.. practical consciousness, as it exists for

other men, and for that reason
181
II
personally as well

is really beginning to exist for me

His reasoning seems to be as follows. That of which a subject is
aware must enjoy some measure of external ity from him in order to
possess that definite embodiment which an object of awareness must have.
And of course, one's owh thought, to be such, must be something of which
one is aware, must "exist personally for me. 11 Now language is in principle external to the conscious subject, at least in that it may be
produced by him for pub I ic inspection. But then language also lends
thought that concrete embodiment through which it may be cognitively
182
ap·) rehended.
Thus thought is conceivable, Marx asserts, only with its I inguistic
embodiment. But language, as the necessary condition of the
occurrence of rational consciousness, is, Marx goes on to argue,
at once a human action and a human product. Both as act and product it
is only conceivable as rooted in a need:

11

•••

language, like

181 Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 19; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd.5, p. 20. 11 . . . die Sprache ist das praktische, auch fur andere
Menchen existerende, also auch fur mich selbst erst existierende
wirkl iche Bewusstsein ... 11
182

Language should be taken here in its broadest sense, to mean
any concrete symbolization of cognitive content, including for example
mathematical symbolization.

--
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consciousness, only arises
with other men. 11183

·from

the need, the necessity, of intercourse

It is out of the necessity of sharing at least basic

184 h
di ate environment
.
. i c b e h avior
.
.
.
in f ormation
as to t h e imrne
t at l'inguist
originates.

Thus.language necessarily originates in a social setting.

And further, language

is ·conditioned

in the details of its origin and em-

ployment by the concrete demands and exigencies of the social setting
within which linguistic behavior occurs.

But this means that language

itself, and rational consciousness whose occurrence is made possible
by and is simultaneous with language, is conditioned by the social context within which the conscious individual is present as a language
bearer.

185
Finally, Marx, argues that theoretical scientific activity is

socially conditioned, and this argument is exhibited in a text already
cited in the 1844 Manuscripts.

He states that, "My general consciousness

is only the theoretical form of that whose living form is the real community, the social essence •••• "
appearances private.

Scientific thinking, for example, is to a 1

But first, it is a form of activity undertaken

through the use of socially provided materials.

Language is one of its

183
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 19;
Bd. 5, p. 20.
184
185

~,

Abt. 1,

Ibid.

Cf. also that section of Marx' Grundrisse, translated by
Hobsbwarn as Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, p. 88; Grundrisse, p. 390 ..
"Language as the product of an individual is an absurdity •.• Language is jut
as much itself the product of a comrnunity, as in another respect it is
the existence of the community: it is, as it were, the communal being
s eakin f
"

c~!==============================ft===

~

-112-

instruments: " ••• the material of my activity -- such as the language
.
~86
in which the thinker is active -- given to me as a social product •••
In that theoretical, scientific thinking occurs through the utilization
of socially determined materials, it is in its details a socially conditioned activity.

Moreover, for Marx theoretical thinking involves

a response to the demands of the social milieu, and thus is conditioned
by the claracter of those demands.

This seems to be the import of his

remark that, insofar as theoretical thinking involves a kind of production.,, " •• ~what I make from myself I make for society, conscious of my
nature as social," and that, "Consequently the activity of my general
consciousness is thus, as activity, my theoretical existence as a social
being.

187

No~explicit

assertions.

argument is offered by Marx to support these

He might appeal to the notion that all activity results from

a need, that the need for theoretical thinking is rooted in social exigencies requiring theory in order that they be handled, and that the details of theoretical behavior are thus conditioned by the concrete
character of the social need eliciting such behavior.

This would be at _

least be consistent with his frequent condemnations of pure theory, e.g.,
metaphysics, as ideology.

188

186
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 119.
187
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 117.
188
Cf. for example, Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp.45, MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, pp. 8-9. This notion will also appear-in Marx'

-113In addition to these assertions

con~erning

the nature of conscious-

ness, and the arguments offered for them, it is well known that Marx
frequently advances .two additional.claims concerning the relationship
of consciousness and society: that consciousness occurs at large in
society in the form of two theories expressing a rationale for social
institutions, and that such rationales may become ideologies when
functioning in society to legitimize class domination.
propositions play key roles in certain of Marx'

189

c~itical

That these
arguments, par-

ticularly those concerning capitalist society, there is no doubt.

But

I would argue, their relevance is to the sociological premises implicit

criticisms of a theory of human nature of the type advanced by Prudhon.
Also cf. Callewaert, "Les manuscripts economico-philosophique de Karl
Marx," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 1951, 49 (3), p. 390.
189

Cf. O'Neill, "Alienation, Class Struggle, and Marxian AntiPolitics," The Review of Metaphysics, 1963-64, 17 (67), p. 468, where it
is argued that these propositions are separate for Marx. "It is clear
that the externalization of human behavior into ideologies, social
instuments, material products, is a necessary condition of the phenomenon
of e~rangement, i.e., men treated, say, as means, rather than the end
of such cultural products. It is not necessary that the phenomenon of
externalization be accompanied by estrangement." Textual evidence for
this is found, among other places, in Marx' Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, ed., and trans. O'Malley, p. 10 and p. 26; MEGA, Abt., 1,
Bd. 1, Hb. 1, p. 409 and p. 430. See also Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1966),
p. 157, for an exposition of the latter proposition in the context of
commenatary on The German IdeologY-·
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in Marx' work, rather than directly to the theory of human nature.

These

statements describe the ways in which societies explain and legitimize
existing institutional structure9, and thus indicate Marx' conception of
the role of theory as operative in society at large.

They are thus dis-

tinct from porpositions descriptive of and arguments concerning consciousness as a feature of human nature properly taken, and the necessary role
and function of consciousness in the experience of the individual.

That

the text of Marx reveal propositions and arguments concerning this latter
theme, I take the above expositions to have shown.

Arid it shows as

well, I hope, that Marx argues that consciousness is a necessary feature
of human nature.

Albeit that consciousness is derived from praxis, it

must, Marx holds, be understood as a feature thereof if praxis is to
be distinguishable from mere random behavior, in Marx' terminology, from
"animal" behavior.

In making this claim Marx at least moves beyond a

sociological critique of consciousness which focuses exclusively on the
operational role of concepts within society at large.

* * * * * * * * * * * *
The propositions which Marx asserts and argues for around the
topics of praxis, society, and consciousness are, in my understanding,
the basis of Marx' theory of human nature.

These propositions may now

be summarized.
1)

Concerning praxis:
a) Praxis requires external nature for its occurrence.
b) Praxis, human productive activity, yields a transformation

r
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of the natural environment upon which it is exercised.
c)

The result of praxis resumes or objectifies the details
of that activity of which it is the product.

d)

Praxis is universally rooted in subjectively apprehended
needs.

e)

The satisfaction of needs through praxis yields the
production of new needs.

f)
2)

The human agent is thus "self-actualizing."

Concerning praxis and society:
a)

Society, or social relations between agents, is rendered
possible through the structure of praxis.

b)

Society, in turn, conditions the details of actual praxis.

c)

Agency as praxis is only possible within a social context.

d)

Social relations provide for the diversification of possibilities for praxis through "division of labor."

e)

Social relations enable the individual to be determined
as an object as well as a subject.

3)

Concerning consciousness:
a)

Consciousness is a feature or moment of human praxis.

b)

Consciousness is an essential feature of the structure of
h\Ullan praxis.

c)

As praxis is conditioned by society, so consciousness is
conditioned by society.

The above exposition shows, I hope, that these propositions are consisten
with each other, that the arguments offered are also so consistent, and
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that the procedure of those arguments and their interrelations cause
the propositions to relate to each other in the form of a consistent
unity of doctrine.
But from this analysis a number of crucial questions arise.
First, how does the theory of man fare in the face of Marx' specific
attacks on the notion of a theory of human nature, especially those
attacks which he directs against Prudhon?
second question:

And allied to this is a

What of those scholars, most particularly Althousser,

who argue that any theory of human nature discoverable in Marx' early
texts belongs to a "Feuerbachian'phase of Marx' development, a phase
which was later rejected by Marx the scientific communist, and therefore
is not a genuinely "Marxian" theory?
in the next chapter.

I shall discuss these questions

In that chapter I will take up the question as to

whether and how far the theory of man which I have attributed to the
early Marx is "Feuerbachian" and also discuss the critical role of this
theory in Marx' attacks on Prudhon.
Thirdly, and most crucially, what is the relation of the above
outlined theory of Marx' to Hegel?

Marx' texts suggest that this

relation is a strong one, but its details are far from immediately clear.
I shall deal with this question in the third and fourth chapters of this
text, arguing:

a) that given the content of his theory of human nature,

Marx must be understood as rejecting Feuerbach and returning to Hegel to
derive the key categories of his analysis; and b) that Marx at the same
time, within the context of his theory, provides a critique of the Hegelian doctrine of the relation of consciousness and action that is crit:ica.l
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to Marx' theory of human nature, but that this critique can only in the
most attenuated sense be talen as a "Feuerbachian" criticism of Hegel.
And, I will hold that only when these points are developed can a proper
understanding of Marx' theory of human nature be distinctly grasped.
Finally, some remark should be made here concerning the role of
praxis as a category in Marx' theory of man.
mark must be provisional.

At this point, such a re-

For it is only in the context of his criti-

cism of Hegel on the question of the relation of action and consciousness, that Marx develops an argument in support of the fundamental
categorial role of praxis that he might consider decisive.

Still, I can

give a tentative sketch of this argument.
Praxis, society, and consciousness are the three basic categories
contained in Marx' theory of man, and the
stood in terms of the former.

latter two are to be under-

It is in virtue of praxis that social

relations are understood as possible for Marx.

Analogously, it is

through praxis that consciousness is "produced;" in the sense in which
that term is used in the relevant sections above.
To hold with Marx that praxis is a more fundamental category than
society and consciousness, is to hold that these latter can only be
accurately comprehended if they are comprehended on their relation to
praxis.

If 'x' is necessarily understood through 'y', than 'y' cna be

said to be more fundamental than 'x.'

If consciousness and society are

understood through praxis, then it can be argued that praxis may be taken
as the fundamental category through which a description of the structures
of human experience is to be developed, and through which a theory of

r
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human nature is to be elucidated.
But the above argument is at best provisional, and is unsatisfactory
as it stands, particularly with respect to
of consciousness to praxis.

the~question

of the relation

We have seen Marx' attempt to argue that

praxis "produces" consciousnes, that the occurrence of consciousness
arises from praxis, that concrete praxis determines the details of the
actual occurrence of consciousness.

And we have also observed that, for

Marx, consciousness is an essential moment or

fea~ure

of the occurrence

of praxis, that praxis can only be praxis if it includes consciousness
as a feature of itself.

Now if the occurrence of 'x' is necessary in

order that 'y' be 'y,' then might not one argue that 'x' is categorially
more fundamental than 'y'?
In the light of this sort of objection, my sketch of an

a~gument

in support of the claim that praxis is the fundamental category of
Marx' theory of human nature can only be considered a preliminary sketch.
It does indicate the line of argument which Marx will use in dealing with
this question.

But Marx offers his basic argument in support of the

claim that praxis is the fundamental category of an adequate theory of
human nature, an argument he thinks is decisive, only in his explicit
critique of Hegel in the Manuscripts of 1844.

--

Chapter Two
Ma.rx 1 Critigue of Feuerbach
A critical problem in determining the content of Marx• theory of man
is that of the relation of Marx to Feuerbach. And the problem is twofold.
First, the texts in which Marx• theory of human nature is developed,
principally the Paris Manuscripts, were written during a period in which
Marx• thinking was significantly influenced by his reading of Feuerbach.
It would seem, then, that knowledge of the details of that influence
might be essential to an accurate awareness of the theory of man discoverable in those texts. But second, some commentators have held that these
very texts should be discounted as representing truly
because of their

11

11

marxian 11 arguments

Feuerbachian 11 leanings. Louis Althusser has defended

this position particularly regarding the question of Marx'anthropology.

l·

Althusser•s Interpretation of Marx 1 Theory of Man
In his Pour Marx, Althusser classifies the texts of Marx, including

those edited and published by Engels, under four headings:
1) 1840-1844 Youthful Works
2) 1845

Transitional Works (de la coupure)

1
cf. for example D. C. Hodges, "The Young Marx, a Re-appraisal, 11
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1966-67 27 (2), p. 216. The
Paris, Manuscripts are here refered to as 11 • • • materials from Marx• own
wastebasket, 11 a consignment which Hodges feels ought to be permanent.

-
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1

-1.203)

1845-1857 Maturational works

4)

1857-1883 Mature works

2

And of the first period, important for us because of the Paris manuscripts
Althusser further comments that, "The period of Marx' youthful works
(k840-1845), that is to say, of his ideological works, may itself be
subdivided in two periods:

a) the rationalist-liberal period of the

articles of the Reinische Zeibung (up to 1842), b) the communal-rationalis
period of the years 1842 to 1845.

As I briefly point out in my essay on

'Marxism and Humanism', the works of the first period are based on a
Kantian-Fichtean problematic the writings of the second period are based,
on the other hand, on the anthropoligcal problematic of Feuerbach." 3
Althusser goes on in the essay referred to above to amplify this
commentary on the writings of the young Marx.
The first stage is dominated by a rationalist-liberal
humanism, resembling more Kant and Fichte than Hegel.
As Marx combatted censorship, feudal Rhenish laws, and
Prussian despotism, he founded his political combat
theorietically, and based the theory of history which
underlay this combat on a philosophy of man. History
is only intelligible in virtue of the essence of man
which is freedom and reason. Freedom: this is the '
essence of man as weight is the essence of body. Man
is given over to freedom, his very being ••• Reason:
man is only free as rational. Human freedom is neither
caprice, nor the determinism of interest but, as

2
Louis Althusser, Pour Marx, (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1969)
2
' p. 7.
Thi s an d subsequent translations from Althusser's text are my own.
3Ibid.
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Kant and Fichte would have it, autonomy, obedience to
the interior law of reason.4
Marx' political articles for the Rheinische Zeitung, then are
exercises in "cTiticisni" as Bauer and other of the young Hegelians
understood that term: an exercise "which measures individual existence
against essence, particular actuality against the Idea. 115

And for the Man

of this period, that critical norm against which existing social realities
are measured is a theory of the "essence" of man in which freedom and
reason are the key concepts.

From these concepts, the Marx of the

Rheinische Zeitung was able to "deduce" his criticisms of existing social
and political structures, as well as of contradictory theoretical positions
of Prussian censorship, or of the legal theories of Hugo and Savigny.

6

But through such criticism Marx came to understand the very existence

4
Ibid., p. 230.
5
Marx, "Notes to the Doctoral Dissertation," in Easton and Guddat,
~ritings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, (New York: Doubleday
~nchor, 1967), pp. 61-62.
6

Cf. Marx' articles, "Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship
Instruction," and "The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of
Law," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 67-92, pp. 96-105; MEGA, 1, 1, 1, pp. 153173.
--

--
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I

was now not derived from Kant or Fichte, but was that of Feuerbach.
The second stage (42-45) is dominated by a new form of
humanism, the "communal" humanism of Feuerbach. The
rational state has remained deaf to reason: the Prussian
state has not reformed .•• the abuses of the state are
no longer conceived as aberations of the state in
relation to its essence, but a real contradiction
between its essence (reason) and its existence
(irrationality). Feuerbachian humanism allows one to
think precisely this contradiction, by shpwing in
irrationality the alienation of reason, and in this
alienation the history of man, that is, his realization. 8
Marx is able to perform a radical critique of the state, then, because he
is able to conceive the state as the alienation of man's nature, in
Feuerbachian terms.

He, for example, critically describes the state in hii

article "On the Jewish Question," through the statement that, "Where the
political state has achieved its full development, man leads a double life
I.

a heavenly and an earthly life, not only in thought or consciousness, but
in actuality.

In the political community he regards himself as a communal

7Althusser might have cited here, in support of his position, a text
from Marx' essay "On the Jewish Question." Cf. Easton and Guddat, p. 255;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 1, Hb. 1, p. 584. "By its nature the perfected politica~
state is man's species life in opposition to his material life ••• Where thej
political state has achieved its full development, man leads a double life~
a heavenly and an earthly life, not only in thought or consciousness but
in actuality. In the political community he regards himself as a communal_
being; but in civil society he acts as a private individual, treats other
men as means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers."

I
I

8A1thusser, Pour Marx, p. 231.
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men as means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers. 119

And he is

able to make this critical assertion precisely because of his option for
the Feuerbachian theory of the essence of man as communal, the attitude
that, "The single man for himself possesses the essence of man neither in
himself as a moral being nor in himself as a thinking being.

The essence

of man is contained only in the conuntmity and unity of man with man.

1110

It is in virtue of the state's being the imaginary rather than the actual
embodiment of man's communal being that his existence as a "citizen" is
an alienated existence, and that his existence in civil society is such
that he "becomes the plaything of alien powers."

11

This dependence on Feuerbach for his basic problematic and for the
concepts through which that problematic is elucidated is, Althusser
further insists, clearly present in the Marx of the 1844 manuscripts.
Indeed in this text Marx was beginning to deal broadly with issues that
are recognizably those of political economy.

12

But first, Marx is not

occupied in this text with political economy as such, and is not
performing the critique of political economy that characterized his
maturity.

Rather, he is in the Paris manuscripts occupied with a

9

Marx, "On the Jewish Question," Easton and Guddat, p. 225; MEGA, Abt.
1, Bd. 1, Hb. 1, p. 584.
10

Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, trans. Vogel,
(Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1966), p. 71; Feuerbach,
Sammtliche Werke, ed. W. Bolin and F. Jodl, (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns
Verlag, 1903-1911), vol. 2, p. 318.
llcf. Althusser, op. cit., p. 67.

-

12cf. Ibid., p. 157.
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discussion. of certain political economic ramifications, "in certain
effects of a political economy, or certain economic conditions of social
.
1113
conflicts.
Second, that concept which is at the foundation of the argument of
the manuscripts, the concept of alienated labor, is ultimately rooted in
a Feuerbachian humanism, for certain conditions of labor may yield
"alienated labor" precisely because they alienate man from his essence,
conceived in Feuerbachian terms.

14

The Marx of the manuscripts had

passed beyond Feuerbach's terminology, and had moved beyond Feuerbach in
a critical application of his anthropology to questions other than
religious.
nonetheless.

But this central concern remained Feuerbach's anthropology
As Althusser puts it, " ••• Feuerbach's anthropology could

become the problematic not only of religion (The Essence of Christianity),
but also of politics ("The Jewish Question," the Manuscripts of 1843),
even of history and of economy (the Manuscripts of 1844), without ceasing,
in all essentials, to remain an anthropoligical problematic, even though
Feuerbach's language had itself been abandoned and overcome. 1115
It is in 1845 that Althusser locates Marx' break with his
Feuerbachian sources, and his initial development of a doctrine of society
!::hat is "Marxian" in the mature and genuine sense of the term.
ijevelopment has for Althusser three characteristics.

13 Ibid.

cf. ~.,

14
15

-

p. 158.

Ibid., p. 65.

This

The first involves

r
;
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. li sm. 16
Marx' development of the basic conepts o f h istorica
it is the latter two that are of importance here.

They are:

But

the "Radical

critique of the theoretical pretensions of all philosophical.humanism"
and the "Definition of all humanism as ideology. 1117

These two development:,

as described by Althusser, may be reported on briefly.
Involved first in Marx' critique of philosophical humanism, his
critique of any attempt at a theory of human nature, is his realization
that any such attempt demands the assertion of two propositions:
" ••• first that there ixists a universal essence of man; second, that this
essence is the attribute of 'individuals taken as isolated' who are its
real subjects.

1118

Regarding the first of these propositions, Althusser

further comments that, "For the essence of man to be a universal
attribute, it is necessary that, in effect, its concrete subjects exist
as absolute givens ••• 1119

If there be an essence or nature of man, then

any individual man must be a priori determined by that essence, in spite
of any relationships or conditions which might otherwise empirically
condition his experience.

And this leads to the second of the two

statements asserted above, which Althusser comments on by stating that,
"For these empirical individuals to be men, it is necessary that they
individually bear with themselves the totality of the essence of man ••• "20

16
cf. Ibid., p. 233.
17

Ibid.

18Ibid., p. 234.
19 Ibid.
20ibid.

r

,

-126This position would allow one to assert that an individual is
essentially determined as a man in a condition of isolation.

It would

thus allow for two fallacies against which the mature Marx constantly
inveighs.

First, it allows for the assumption that the capacities and

needs of the individual may be deduced from his "essence," the latter
being determinable in an a priori fashio, for, " ••• the myth of the
economic man, that is the individual having defined faculties and defined
nee d s ••• 1121

In the arguments of the Poverty of Philosophy which Marx

levels against Prudhon, he makes it quite clear that this is a position
which he opposes.
Second, this position allows for the notion that man can be
adequately understood as an isolated individual.

But that this is

~onsidered by Marx falacious can be clearly seen in Marx' assertion, in
~he Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, that " ••• the essence of man is no

~bstraction inhering in each single individual.
,..he ensemble of social relationships." 22

In its actuality it is

This is an assertion which Marx

~eld throughout his maturity, and represents his decisive break with any
~ttempt to do a theory of human nature, in the sense in which that term
~ust

be understood.
Coupled with this recognition of the necessary fallacies in any

ttempt to deprive a theory of human nature was, Althusser further insists,
arx' identification of any humanism as ideology.

Ideology is described

21 Ibid.

-

22
ht

Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 402; ~'
1

Bn

c;

"
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-127by Althusser as "a system (possessing its proper logic and rigor) of
representations (in various cases images, myths, ideas or concepts)
endowed with an existence and an historical role at the heart of a
given society. 1123

Ideology is a necessary feature of any society; its

appearance may be expected within the context of any social system, 24
class or classless.

In terms of its function, Althusser discusses

ideology as the overall expression of socially necessary learning:
" ••• ideology (as a system of common representations) is indispensible to
all society for educating men, for transforming them and for putting
them in the condition to respond to the exigencies of their existential
situation. 112 5

But more important is Althusser's discussion of the

location of ideology as such within society.

As a system of common representations, ideology expresses the lived
relations of persons to their social context, as those lived relations
are had in imagination, or, as those relations are lived imaginatively.
"In ideology, men express, in effect, not their relations to the condition:
of their existence, but the appearance (facon) in terms of which they live
their relation to the conditions of their existence:

that which at one

and the same time supposes real relation and 'lived,' 'imagined'
relation.

1126

In other words, ideology expresses the relation of persons

23
Althusser, OE· cit., p. 238.
24Cf. Ibid., pp. 238-239.
25

~.,

p. 242.

2 6Ibid., p. 240.

-128to the details of their social setting, as that relation is apprehended
imaginatively, as, for example, the bourgeoisie of capitalist society
apprehend their relation to the details of society to be such as to
maximize individual freedom and opportunity.

Of itself, ideology is

neither necessarily accurate nor inaccurate presentation of reality,
precisely because it is an image (or better, a system of images or
representations) through which reality is apprehended and acted upon,
through which, as Althusser puts it, relations to the details of actual
social situations are "lived."
But that ideology can, and indeed for Marx has been up to his time
an illusory representation of reality, is apparent.

This has been

possible precisely because ideology has not been recognized for what
it is; a system of imagined representations of lived reality, rather tha
the truth thereof.

And it is here, Althusser reports, that Marx' attack

on hmnanism is to be found.
Within the history of class societies, various systematized
representations of the nature of man (i.e., ideologies) have arisen.
representations, when arising from the dominant class in society, have
led to the exploitation of other classes. But because of the nature of
ideology itself, and because of its being taken for truth, such
ideologies, as long as the societies remained stable,

27

legitimized

the behavior of the dominant class, and rendered the situation of
exploited classes tolerable, even necessary or fruitful, in their own

27That is to say, in Marx' language, as long as the relations of
production remained congruent with the forces of production.
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-129vision thereof.

Althusser comments on this phenomenon in terms of the

humanisitc ideology of the bourgeoisie.

"When the 'rising class,'

the bourgeoisie, developed through the course of the 18th century a
humanist ideology of equality, freedom, and reason, it gave to this claim
of its own the form of universality, as if through this it wished to
enroll in its ranks, by st.aping them towards this end, the very men
whom it liberated only to exploit. 1128
The point which Althusser wishes to make in this discussion is that,
for Marx, humanism has historically functioned as ideology, and ideology
has been simply the imaginatively developed self understanding of a
society or portion of society, reflecting the economic details of the
given social system from which it develops, but taken as truth rather
than as reflection.

Precisely because ideology is a reflection of given

societies, it cannot validly function as a theory which will undertake a
critical examination of the nature and development of social history.
Nor can any theory of human nature function as such a theory.

For

as a theory of the "essence" of man, it must take human reality and the
details of human experience to be simply given rather than historically
developed.

Now Marx' mature aim was the construction of a theory which

would expose the structures of historical development, based on the idea
that the subjects of such development are given societies.

29

Such a

theory would enable him to critically examine capitalist society, as well

28A1thusser, op. cit., p. 241.
29 Cf. Ibid., p. 238.

-130as point out proper directions for the practical, active overcoming of
this social system.

Clearly because of the above, a humanism will not

do as such a theory; Marx' discovery of this inadequacy was indeed the
beginning of his formulation of his mature goal.
•
•
1y ca11e d a
doctr1ne
may b e 1egit1mate

II

And thus Marx' mature

• 1 anti• h uman1sm,
•
II
t h eoret1ca

30

one which replaces prior modes of theorizing with, "an historicaldialectical materialism, that is to say with a theory of the different
specific levels of human action (economic action, political action,
ideological action, scientific action) in their own articulations, based
on the specific articulations of the unity of human society. 1131
Humanism, then, and attempts at theories of human nature are theoretical
attempts whose value is denied by the mature Marx.
The interpretation of Marx offered by Althusser raises two questions
one of which is especially critical for my argument.

First, there is

the question of the continuity of the texts of the "young" and the
"mature" Marx.

On Althusser's terms, Marx' later texts represent a

crucial shift from the ideas embodied in those written through 1844. 32
Second, the question of the content of those earlier texts must itself
be raised.

And, again on Althusser's terms, their content must be viewed

as a humanism whose most significant expression is through and through

JOibid., p. 236.
31Ibid., pp. 235-236.

32r shall not take up the question of continuity directly in this
thesis. However, the arguments of this and the following chapters will,
I think, have significant bearing on that question.

-131Feuerbachian.

One concludes then that the content of the theory of

human nature which Marx expresses in the Paris Manuscripts is for all
intents and purposes identical to Feuerbach's theory of man, that the
former can be understood most fruitfully in terms of the latter, and
that Marx' act of elucidating a theory of man in the Manuscripts of
1844 essentially involved an act of borrowing and assimilating into his
own terminology a theory of Feuerbach's.
I shall devote the body of this chapter to arguing that this is not
the case.

Textual analysis of certain works which Althusser classifies

as "youthful" works of Marx, particularly the Paris Manuscripts, reveals
a theory of man definitely continuous with that implied in certain texts
which Althusser would classify as "transitional," e.g., the Theses of
Feuerbach.

This is to deny, first, that the later Marx represents a

definite break with the earlier around the question of theory of man.
And it is secondly to argue that, even in the Manuscripts of 1844, Marx
defined his theory of man most significantly in terms of opposition to
rather than agreement with Feuerbach.

Thus Marx' divergence from

Feuerbach must be understood if the content of his theory of man is to
be properly elucidated.

Additionally, Marx attacks Feuerbach, in a

manner similar to his confrontation with Prudhon, on the question of
the theoretical function of a theory of human nature.

His arguments

on this theme will also be briefly sketched in this chapter.
II

Marx and Feuerbach's Critique of Hegel
It must first be noted that Marx' attitude towards Feuerbach as

expressed in the Paris Manuscripts is far from unequivocal.

Indeed, he

-132introduces the Manuscript entitled "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and
Philosophy in General," by pointing out those Feuerbachian criticisms
of Hegel which he takes to be both accurate and significant.

Feuerbach,

for Marx, "is the only one who has a serious and critical relation to
Hegel; a dialectic, who has made genuine discoveries in this field,
and who above all is the true conqueror of the old philosophy. 1133

And

Marx goes on to list those Feuerbachian criticisms of Hegel which he
takes to be crucial under three headings.
Feuerbach's great achievement is: (1) proof that philosophy
is nothing more than religion brought to and developed in
reflection, and thus is equally to be condemned as another
form and mode of the alienation of man's nature;
(2) the establishment of true materialism and real science
by making the social relationship of "man to man" the
ft.m.damental principle of his theory;
(3) opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims
to be the absolute positive, the self-subsistent
positive positively grounded on itself.34

As Marx t.m.derstands this statement, the "great achievement" of Feuerbach
here is a direct overcoming of Hegel.

And that overcoming involves

essentially a change in attitude as to the nature of philosophy itself,
particularly in relation to its subject matter.

3 3Marx, "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts (1844)," in Easton and
Guddat, p. 316; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 151. Marx is here opposing
Feuerbach's noti-;;n-Qf and analysis of Hegel's dialectical method to thos
analyses offered by others of the Young Hegelians, e.g., Bauer, for whom
dialectical negation is equivalent to 'criticism' as the motive force
of the development of self consciousness. On this point cf. McLellan,
The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 59-63.
34Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 316-317;
~' Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152.
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''

For Feuerbach, religion concretely involves the details of human
self-understanding, but with those details imaginatively projected and
so understood as belonging to a being other than (or alien from) man,
rather than man himself:

35

" ••• religion is man's earliest and also

indirect form of self-knowledge. 1136

But speculative philosophy, i.e.,

Hegelian philosophy, has retained something of this "religious" form
of human self-understanding.

For just as religion involves man's

alienating through imaginative projection the predicates of his own
nature from himself, speculative, Hegelian philosophy projects those
predicates descriptive of the concrete individual into one single feature
of the human individual, self-consciousness, and then treats that feature
as an absolute.
Marx might, at this point in the Manuscripts, have referred to a
text in Feuerbach's Principles of the Philosophy of the Future 37 in
which the latter explicitly attacks Hegel in the terms to which Marx
35cf. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. Geo. Eliot
(New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 12; Feuerbach, Sllinmtliche Werke,
vol. 6, p. 15. " ••• the object of any subject is nothing else than the
subject's own nature taken objectively. Such as are men's thoughts and
dispositions, such is his God; so much worth as a man has, so much and
no more is his God. Consciousness of God is self consciousness;
knowledge of God is self Knowledge."
36 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 13; Sarnmtliche
Werke, vol. 6, p. 15.
37cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, pp. 315-316;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 151. It is clear, one may note in passing, that
the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future is a dominant text which
Marx has in mind in commenting on Feuerbach, in the Paris Manuscripts.
In those Manuscripts Marx, in discussing the superiority of Feuerbach
over other young Hegelian cr{tics of Hegel, principally Bruno Bauer,
writes: "But now that Feuerbach in his "Theses" appearing in the
Anekdota and more fully in his (Principles of the) Philosophy pf the

-134refers.

In number 23 of that work, Feuerbach writes that, "Hegelian

philosophy is reversed idealism; it is theological idealism ••• It placed
the essence of the ego apart from the ego, separated from the ego, and
objectified as substance, as God.

But, by doing that, it expressed

again indirectly and reversely the divinity of the I. .. 1138

Hegel

"divinizes" the "I", or, self consciousness through examining selfconsciousness as if there were contained therein all determinations
which might properly be taken as "human."

And Feuerbach's correction

of this lies in his realization that the hwnan individual must be
examined through the totality of his determinations, rather than those
f rom se lf consciousness
.
. 1y. 39
.
der i ving
exc1 usive

In Feuerbach's words,

"Man distinguishes himself from the animals not only by thinking.
whole being, rather, constitutes his distinction from the animals."

His
40

This realization of Feuerbach's, that human nature must be
examined in its concrete totality rather than simply through a
description of self consciousness, is both itself a correction of Hegel

Future has destroyed the inner principle of the old dialectic and
philosophy, the school of criticism which was unable to do this in
itself but has seen it done has proclaimed itself pure, decisive,
absolute, and entirely clear within itself."
38

Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, Vogel, p.
36; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 279.

39we shall see in chapter four, however, that Marx' ultimate rational
for accepting this criticism is not a "Feuerbachian' one, but one that
is rooted in his own confrontation with the Hegelian doctrine of
self-consciousness.
40Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel p. 69; S!immtliche Werke, vol. 2, p.
315.

-135and leads to a second such correction, " ••• the establishment of true
materialism and real science by making the social relationship of 'man
to man, the fundamental principle of the theory ••• 1141
In that Feuerbach had realized the necessity of a concrete
description of human nature, he opened the way for an examination of one
such determination that is both concrete and flllldamental:
determination as social.

man's

And moreover, Feuerbach had insisted on the

essential character of this determination of human nature, even in the
first pages of The Essence of Christianity.

There, he begins a

description of the nature of human consciousness by asserting that,
"Consciousness in the strictest sense is present only in a being to whom
his species, his essential nature, is an object of thought. 1142

Human

consciousness is such that the individual is aware of himself both as a
discrete individual, and as an individual embodiment of human nature.
And Feuerbach goes on immediately to assert that, in virtue of this
characteristic of human consciousness, "Man is himself at once I and
thou; he can put himself in the place of another, for this reason, that
to him his species, his essential nature, and not merely his
individuality, is an object of thought. 1143

In that human consciousness

entails "species consciousness," the individual is capable of
apprehending the experience of another self as well as that of his own

4

~rx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 316; MEGA, Abt.
1, Bd. 3, p. 152.
42

Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. l; SMnnntliche Werke,p. 1
43Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 3; Sammtliche Werke,
2.

-136self, of putting "himself in the place of another," of experiencing
intersubjectivity.

And in that "species consciousness" is essential to

the human individual, intersubjectivity is also essential.

As McLellan

comments:
The fundamental unity of mankind that the idea of a species
presupposes arises from the fact that men are not selfsuff icient creatures; they have very different qualities, so
it is only together that they can form the "perfect" man. For
Feuerbach all knowledge comes to man as a member of the human
species and when man acts as a member of the human species his
action is qualitatively different. His fellow human beings
make him conscious of himself as a man, they form his consciousness, and even the criterion of truth. 11 44
Marx would agree with McLellan's gloss of Feuerbach's notion of man as
essentially intersubjective or social, and consider this point a lasting
contribution of Feuerbach's to the concrete analysis of human nature.
Finally, and as a consequence of the above, Feuerbach offers for
Marx a third and necessary corrective to Hegel, and now a methodological
corrective, that of "opposing to the negation of the negation, which
claims to be the absolute positive, the self-subsistent positive
positively grounded on itself. 1145
Marx offers a clue to this initially complex statement by stating
immediately after it in the text that it indicates the manner in which

44 Mc~ellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, p. 92, McLellan's last
comment is a gloss on article 58 of the Principles of the Philosophy of

the Future, Vogel, p. 71; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 318. "Truth
is only the totality of human life and of the human essence."

4~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 317; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152.
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certainty ••• 1146

And his point seems to involve Feuerbach's specific

critique of Hegel's application of the dialectical method to the question
of "sense certainty."

As Feuerbach reads Hegel, the question of the

first chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit is that of an initial
conception of the relationship between thought and being.

Consciousness,

at the most primitive level at which it can be analyzed, takes as its
object simply, "the immediate ••• what is, 1147 that which is given as an
innnediate sense datum to consciousness.

And moreover, consciousness

takes this immediate object to offer "the richest kind of knowledge ••• 1148
But the structure of its own experience leads consciousness to recognize
that, on the one hand, this attitude implies a radical distinction
between itself and its object, between thought and being, and that on the
other hand this notion of a radical distinction between thought and being
will not do because, on its terms, the object can be apprehended simply
as immediate, whereas the object itself is apprehended by consciousness
in a richer and more manifold condition, as is show by its, the objects'
being named.

In virtue of the objects being named, being described

through language, its content must be apprehended as including
universality as well as particular immediacy.

"It is as a universal,

46 Ibid.
47

G.W.F. Hegei, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. Baillie, (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 149. G.W.F. Hegel, PhYnomenologie des
Geistes, ed. Hoffmeister, (Ha~burg: Felix Meiner, 1952), p. 79.
4 8Ibid.

r
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But then the object

of consciousness, being, must be understood as not simply distinct
from consciousness and as such being necessarily mediated thereby.
But it is here that Feuerbach offers his objection to Hegel.

And

that objection yields the realization that Hegel's dialectical examinatio
of sense certainty involves his "reformulating the differences between
thought and being as a difference between knowing and the known ••• 1150
For Feuerbach, to speak of the object as fundamentally mediated by
knowing consciousness is to describe the object of conscious knowing, but
not the object of sensation.

It is rather to abstract from the latter.

For on its own terms, sense consciousness does recognize the distinction
of its object from itself, and its own necessary dependence on its
object.

"Were Hegel really to enter the experience of sensuous

consciousness and to shift the emphasis of the Ph~nomenologie away from
the logic of the phenomena, he would have to acknowledge that sense
certainty in no way refutes itself by virtue of being thought and
expresse d ••• 1151

Rather, thought and language are expressions of the

richness of the content delivered in sensation.
This is not to assert that raw sensation delivers of itself the
total richness of content accessable to the subject.

49

II

Feuerbach is aware

•

Ibid., p. 152; Phanomenolog1e, p. 82.

SOLowith, "Mediation and Immediacy in Marx, Hegel, and Feuerbach," in
Steinkraus (ed.) New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy, (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), p. 132.

51 Ibid., p. 134.

-139that, "Immediate sensuous intuition is, on the contrary, subordinated to
imagination and representation," that, "The true sensuous intuition first
makes visible what is invisible to the uneducated eye. 1152

Imagination

and the response of feeling5 3 unveil the richness of the content
delivered in sense intuition for Feuerbach, but precisely because of this
they are themselves culminating features of the experience of sense
consciousness.

And this is to maintain the position of the fundamental

nature of sense consciousness for the individual subject, as well as the
distinction between thought and being which can be recognized as integral
to the experience of sense consciousness, if the latter is examined on
its own terms.

Thus sensation, and its integral features, are for

Feuerbach necessary and basic to the experience of the subject, and not
to be understood as overcome through a dialectical "negation of the
negation."
Marx takes this criticism of Hegel to be a crucial one because it
corrects the latter precisely at that point which limited him to finding
"only the abstract, logical, speculative expression of the movement of
history, not the actual history of man as a given subject. ••

1154

Because

52 Ibid., p. 136.
53

cf. Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 52; stfuuntliche Werke, vol. 2,
p. 297. "The new philosophy regards and considers being as it is for us,
not only as thinking but also as existing being; thus it regards being
as an object of being, as an object of itself. Being as an object of
being - and only this being is being and deserves the name of being is the being of the senses, perception; feeling, and love. Being is
thus a secret of perception, feeling, and love."
5

~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 317; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 3, pp. 152-153.
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Hegel, in virtue of his speculative employment of the dialectical method,
was unable to consider on their own terms the sensuous relations of the
individual to his environment, both natural, and social, he was unable to
offer a total and accurate description of the nature of individual
experience, but rather only one of the experiences of the self-conscious
individual.

Feuerbach, in overcoming Hegel's dialectical description of

sense experience by insisting that the latter be examined on its own
terms, points the way to a more adequate and more total description of
those determinations which constitute the nature of the individual as
such.
To this point, it has been seen that Marx in the Paris Manuscripts
affirms three Feuerbachian crticisms of Hegel, directly relating to the
formulation of a theory of human nature.

Feuerbach had corrected Hegel

in showing that the individual must be described through the totality of
his determinations, rather than simply those which pertain to him as a
self-conscious subject.

He had defended this statement by refuting

Hegel's employment of the dialectical method in relation to sense
consciousness, "sense certainty."

And he had insisted that, of those

concrete determinations which must be located descriptively and
argumentatively in a theory of human nature, one such determination, and
an essential one, is the communality or sociality of the individual.
Given simply these statements, one might readtly suspect that Althusser's
reading of the Manuscripts of 1844 is correct, that Marx develops therein
a "humanism" that is in its cpntents essentially Feuerbachian.

--

But it is at this point that I would suggest that such a reading

r
-141-

of the Manuscripts of itself will not do, and will not do because its
very partiality renders it inadequate.

Certainly on the above points Mar

considers Feuerbach's correctives on Hegel to be crucial in defining and
formulating his own theory of human nature.

Their implications will be

further developed when a consideration of Marx' own criticisms of Hegel's
doctrine of self consciousness, in relation to the question of agency, is
offered in a later chapter.

However, the question now at hand is, what

is the relation of Marx' fuller theory of human nature to his understanding of Feuerbach, given his acceptance of the above positions?

I shall

argue that Marx supposes his own theory to be, in certain crucial and
fundamental features, opposed to Feuerbach, that he is correct in this
supposition, and that he formulates his theory of man overtly within the
context of this opposition.

This can be seen by showing that certain

criticisms of Feuerbach offered in the "Theses on Feuerbach" are
thoroughly consistent with the content of the theory of man which
underlies the Manuscripts of 1844.

It will thus be shown by implication

that Althusser'is incorrect in reading these texts as representative of
distinct periods of Marx' development.

Marx' criticisms of Feuerbach

relevant to this discussion revolve around the themes of the relationship
between praxis and nature, between nature and consciousaess of the social
character of the individual (man as a communal being), and of the
function and possibilities of a theory of human nature.
III

Marx' Critique of Feuerbach's Notion of Nature
The theme of the relation between praxis and nature is the first of

the above noted topics which Marx himself treats, and he does this in the
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first of his often cited "Theses of Feuerbach."

There, Marx notes that,

"The chief defect of all previous materiaiism (including Feuerbach' s) is
that the object, actuality, sensuousness is conceived only in the form of
the object or perception (Anschaung), but not as sensuous human activity,
.
(P raxis
. ) , not sub.Jective
. l y. 11 54a
prac t ice

And he follows up this asser-

tion with the further statement that, "Feuerbach wants sensuous objects
actually different from thought objects," but he does not comprehend
human activity itself as objective. 1155

Certain implications of these

statements concerning Marx'. attitude on the relation of nature and
consciousness will be later seen, but now, what points concerning the
relation of nature, "the object," is Marx implying here, and why do these
points lead him to a posture on Feuerbach which is critical?

Particular!

what does Marx mean by asserting that "the object" or nature has a
"subjective" side, and that human praxis has an "objective" side?
Responses to these questions may be offered by comparing Marx'
acceptance of Feuerbach's criticisms of Hegel with Marx' own elucidation
of the concept of nature in the Manuscripts of 1844.

In the content of

the first, as has been seen, Marx views Feuerbach as correct in
distinguishing the question of the relation of thought and being from tha
of the relation of knowledge and its object, 56 and in recovering through
this distinction an understanding of nature, and by implication of the
54aMarx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 400; ~,
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 533.
55 Ibid.
56cf. texts previously cited from L~with's article, in which this
distinction made by Feuerbach is described.

-143relation of the human individual to nature, that is more adequate than
that available to Hegel.

But at the same time, Feuerbach's own

understanding of nature must for Marx be subjected to critical analysis
and correction.

Because as Marx reads Feuerbach, and I suggest that

this is a correct reading, nature in its originary occurrence for the
sensory subject is experienced in an immediate condition, as that which
of itself exists, contains its determinations within itself, and delivers
these determinations to the sensuous subject.
Feuerbach's statement that "The real in its reality or taken as real
is the real as an object of the senses; it is the sensuous,"
be taken in two senses.

57 needs to

First, it means that the subject's primary

access to reality is had through sensation, with the essential proviso
noted above that the data of reality be revealed and made visible by
imagination and feeling as themselves aspects of sense experience.

The

second, this statement also means that the object of sensation is "the
real," is that which can most accurately and originally be entitled
"being." "The real" then is for Feuerbach that self contained immediate
datum which is the object of sensation, 58 or nature as, "in the sum of

57 Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 51; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 2, p.
296.
58 cf. J. E. Barnhart, "Anthropological Nature in Feuerbach and Marx,"
Philosophy Today, 1967 (11) 414, p. 268, for an opposing interpretation
of the question of nature as the object of sensation in Feuerbach.
Barnhart argues that as object of sensation, nature is 'mediated' by
the snesory subject. "Sensuousness or matter serves as the basis of
man's consciousness of 'personality'. But man is more than 'personality'
and as a part of man matter has no reality apart from the human species.
In perceiving his material base, man is simply knowing himself."

---
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himself as other than human. 1159
Nature is in this sense for Feuerbach, that which man, "experiences
directly and sensuously as the ground and substance of his life, 1160 and
it is capable of functioning as and of being experienced as such a ground
precisely in virtue of its being fundamentally real in itself and as such
distinct from the human subject.

Feuerbach might argue that it is only

in virtue of nature's being self contained in its determinations distinct
from the human subject, primarily real in itself, that it is capable of
being that to which the human subject relates sensuously, that from which
he is capable of drawing ever enriched data through the multi-faceted
act of sensation.
But it is here that Marx levels an initial critical comment on

Barnhart supports this interpretation by citing Feuerbach's statement in
The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 12; (SHmmtliche Werke, vol. 6, p.
15), that, " ••• the object of any subject is nothing else that the
subject's own nature taken objectively," Barnhart is of course correct
in holding that for Feuerbach 'matter' or 'nature' is " ••• the basis of
man's consciousness .•• " but he errs in holding that Feuerbach moves from
this to the conclusion that nature is therefore mediated by human
(sensory) consciousness. For Feuerbach, as seen above in the text, this
would be to translate the distinction of thought and being into the
distinction of knower and known. Rather, for Feuerbach, nature is man's
own nature 'taken objectively' in the sense that human nature requires
that the individual subject be related to aa object that is distinct from
itself, and that contains its determinations within itself.
59Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion, trans. Ralph Manheim
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 90; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 8,
p. 113.
60 rbid.
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The latter insists on describing nature as self contained

reality.

And this description, is taken to be one that is in principle

complete.

As complete, however, this description leaves no room for a

theoretical consideration of nature as the material base of human praxis.
Stated more formally, if nature is self-contained reality, then there is
no need to hold that nature is also that which stands in relation to the
human subject as agent, or as that which relates itself to the agent as
capable of receiving determinations through and as the result of human
productive activity.

And Marx' assertion here is that nature must be so

described if the phenomenon of productive activity is itself to be given
. 1 account. 61
a t h eoretica
The terminology of the first thesis of Feuerbach expresses this idea
through asserting that nature must be conceived "subjectively. 11 62

That is

to say, nature must be conceived of as that which as such receives
determinations from the agent subject to which it stands in relation.

And

the prior chapter has shown that Marx also insists on such an understanding of nature in the Manuscripts of 1844.
is man's "inorganic body:

There Marx asserts that nature

(1) as a direct means to life, and (2) as the

61 rt will subsequently be argued that a concept of nature including
the idea that nature is as such determined by human agency is
necessary in Marx' eyes in order that a theory of man be functionally
valid. This will be seen in the context of a consideration of Marx'
remarks on Prudhon.
62Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 400; ~' Abt. 1
Bd. 5, p. 533.

r'
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The point there,

too, is that, in order to make sense out of the phenomenon of agency,
some theoretical description must be given of nature as that within
which actual agency, actual human praxis, is undertaken.

But this means

that a concept of nature must include the idea that nature is as such
fundamentally maleable, that which, in virtue of its own character,
presents itself as something capable of receiving determinations
resultant upon productive activity, and therefore that which is not of
itself self-contained, in the way Feuerbach would have it.

Because of

this, as shown above, the two concepts which most accurately describe
nature for Marx are externality and maleability.

This description,

however, is one which Marx recognizes as distinct from Feuerbach's in
the "Theses," and which is included in the 1844 Manuscripts.

On at least

this point, then, Althusser's statement that the Marx of 1844 is an out
and out Feuerbachian will not do.
The above, however, treats a comparison of Marx and Feuerbach on the
theme of the relation of nature and action only by a description of the
first of these terms.

Marx implies in the First Thesis on Feuerbach that

critical comparison might be made on the second term as well.

He

initiates such a comparison through stating that Feuerbach "does not
•
•
lf as ob Jective.
•
• • II 64
compreh en d h uman act i vity
itse

63Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, 11 Easton and Guddat, p. 293; ~A, Abt.
1, Bd. 3, p. 87.
64Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 400; MEGA, Abt.
1, Bd. 5, p. 534.
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possible within the natural environment?

At best, Marx might reply, the

action of taking given items from the environmental setting.

To be sure,

this is not to imply precisely the same sort of "taking" which Marx
notes as the proper characteristic of "animal" behavior in the Paris
Manuscripts, but the analogy is a strong one.

Feuerbach insists in a

fashion similar to Marx that, "Man is ••• a universal being ••• wherever a
sense is elevated above the limits of particularity and its bondage to
needs, it is elevated to an independent and theoretical significance and
. i ty; universa
.
1 sense i s understand1ng;
.
.
1 sensation,
.
. d • " 65
universa
min
d1gn
Because sensation is for man integrated with consciousness,

66

albeit

that sensation is basic to any form of consciousness, then sensuous
awareness, and possible actions consequent upon sense awareness, are for
man not limited to those founded upon organically inbuilt instincts.

Man

is capable of acting to use his invironment for purposes developed
through imagination and theoretical thinking.

But given Feuerbach's

description of nature, can action for him mean more than use?

Marx seems

to think not, and here again critically differentiates himself from
Feuerpach.

Rotenstreich comments intelligently on this point:

65Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 69; S~mmtliche Werke, vol. 2, pp.
315-316.
66cf. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, pp. 1-2;
Sammtliche Werke, vol. 6, pp.· 1-2. One must remember here that, for
Feuerbach, human consciousness is 'species consciousness,' and that in
virtue of this scientific knowledge is possible for man.

r
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acquisition of pleasure, or with utility; it is egoisticutilitarian action. A somewhat pointed question arises:
Is such acquisition an action at all? Marx apparently
thought that it was not an action, that it did not create
objects; it derived pleasure from given objects insofar
as it derived benefit from them. The action that Marx set
foremost in his theory was not an action of use and exploitation of goods or objects of the surrounding world;
it was rather a creative action, a spontaneous actioni
even though it was limited to the area of the senses. 0 7
The key feature of Rotenstreich's comment here seems to me to be his
highlighting of Marx' equation of action and creativity.

It has been

shown above that the Marx of the Paris Manuscripts insists on describing
human activity as human productive activity, as praxis, and that for him
a key feature of praxis is objectification, activity resulting in a
product which, "is only the resume of activity, of production. 1168

The

product of human activity on its side "resumes" or contains within
itself and manifests the details of that activity of which it is the
result.

And it is its being related to such a product that, in part,

defines human activity itself.
productive or creative.

But then human activity is for Marx

It is responsible for the determinations of

its result.
This equation of human activity with productivity and creativity is
the meaning of Marx' assertion that human action must be understood
"objectively," and it defines his criticism of Feuerbach on this point.
Activity must be seen as "in the material wherein his labor realizes

67Nathan Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1965), p. 36.
6

~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 291; ~' Abt.

-149itself, wherein it is active, out of which and by means of which it
pro d uces. 1169

Thus activity must be understood as essentially related

to its object in the sense that the object involved the determinations
which it possesses as a result of the activity from which it results,
that activity is embodied in its produced object, or that activity is
"objective."

For the same reason, nature is "subjective," is in its

concrete details determined by the agent, the subject of action, and
embodies certain details of that subject, to wit his action itself.

Just

as in politics, so in the theory of agency and of human nature, what Marx
desires is a theory that is "radical," that is to say one which will
"grasp things by the root."

70

And in terms of a theory of praxis or

agency, this means a theory which will describe and account for the
productive creativity which Marx takes to be at the basis of the structurE
of praxis.
It can be seen then that, in the "Theses on Feuerbach," Marx levels
critical comments on Feuerbach's understanding of the relation of action
and nature, and on his understanding of each of the terms in that relatior
as well as that the foundation for this critical comment is discoverable
in the 1844 Manuscripts.

One may legitimately infer, then, that those

aspects of Marx' theory of man in the Paris Manuscripts which involve
discussion of the relation of agency and nature, and the meaning of those

69Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 290; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 84.

-

70
Marx, "Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introductic
Easton and Guddat, p. 257; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 1, Hb. 1, p. 614.

~,"
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aspects of Marx' theory of man which may be validly entitled Feuerbachian.
In addition to this, one may argue that Marx also levels criticism in
the theses against Feuerbach's doctrine of the relation of nature and
consciousness, particularly sense consciousness, and that the foundation
of this criticism is also contained in the Paris Manuscripts.
IV

Marx' Critique of Feuerbach's Doctrine of Sense Consciousness
The briefest statement of Marx' criticism of Feuerbach on this

theme is the fifth of the "Theses on Feuerbach":

"Feuerbach, not

satisfied with abstract thinking, wants perception; but he does not
comprehend sensuousness as practical, human sensuous activity. 1171
statement seems susceptible to two interpretations.

This

One, indicated by

Rotenstreich, reads this statement as a methodological criticism of
Feuerbach.

Feuerbach attempts but does not reach a consideration of that

which is actually and materially real, human praxis as mediated by
society.

Thus for example, Feuerbach analyzes religion as "Religious

self-alienation, the duplication of the world into a religious world
and secular world, 1172 but does not go on to analyze the details of the
secular base, of soceity, which induce the phenomenon of religious
consciousness.

Marx himself does go on to do such analysis, and thus

achieves a more radical critique of such phenomena as religion than that

71Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 401; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 534.
72 Ibid.
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of which Feuerbach is capable. 73
One may read the Fifth Thesis in this fashion, but it seems that for
Marx to assert this implies another assertion concerning the nature of
perception as well:

that Feuerbach fails to grasp "Human sensuous

activity" because he fails to comprehend "perception" itself in an
adequate fashion.
thesis.

Implications of this were seen already in the first

Now Marx explicates these around the questions of sensation and

consciousness.
Feuerbach's discussions of the nature and role of sense perception
occur in two contexts, that of the function of sense perception itself as
the basis of individually realized knowledge, as well as within a
discussion of perception as affected by community.

The latter context

will be illustrated below, in an exposition of Marx' attitudes towards
Feuerbach's notion of community in general.

The texts seem to indicate

that it is only within a discussion of comm-nity that the nature of
perception can be completely described for Feuerbach.

But he nonetheless

does make a number of assertions about perception itself, abstracting
from the broader context, which are germane to the present analysis.
First, and indeed implied by the above exposition of the meaning of
"nature" for Feuerbach, he insists that the basis of all knowledge is
awareness of the content of real, separate, and given objects delivered
in sensation.

"The determinations that afford real knowledge are always

only those that determine the object by the object itself, namely, by

73cf. Rotenstreich, Op. cit., p. 68-69.
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Feuerbach insists that it is in

awareness of concrete determinations of given objects that all valid
knowledge is based, and he contrasts this basis to the general
determinations of objects offered by metaphysics, which cannot function
as the basis of knowledge in that they "determine no object because they
extend to all objects without distinction. 1175

Thus he indicates that he

is, as Marx comments, "not satisfied with abstract thinking~ 6 but insists
~

on recovering a notion of the source of knowledge in the concrete
determinations of the immediate given.
Feuerbach proceeds from this point to make several assertions
concerning sense perception itself, and the perceiving subject.

In that

the awareness of concrete given data constitutes the foundation of knowledge, and in that this awareness is had through sensation, then sensation
is in principle, 7 7 the clearest form of knowledge available to the
knowing subject:

" ••• only the sensuous is as clear as daylight; all

doubt and dispute cease only where sensation begins.

The secret of

innnediate knowledge is sensation." 78
74Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 66; sHmmtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 312
75rbid.

7~arx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 401; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 534.
77

Feuerbach will qualify this assertion by going on to describe two
sorts of imagination, primative and refined.
78Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 55; sMmmtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 301
Here again Feuerbach opposes the clarity which he takes to be in principle
available to sense knowledge,·to the supposed clarity of the intuition
of ideas, e.g., Cartesian intuition, indicating the accuracy of Marx'
comment.

-153And reflection on the experience of sense perception yields statements
describing further the semsory subject himself.

That which is realized

by the subject in sense awareness is data in the literal sense of that
term:

something given.

Therefore the sense subject realizes himself in

the experience of sensation as not a pure subject; i.e., not exclusively
active, 79 but as passive as well, as one who receives the given through
sensation.

Feuerbach expresses this through stating that "In the

activity of the senses ••• ! let the object be what I myself am--a real and
self actualizing being.
subject. 118

Only sense and perception give me something as

° For a thing to be a subject in this context is for it to be

in some sense active.

And in the experience of sensation, the object

realized is related to the sense subject in something of an active
fashion:

it delivers the data realized by the sense subject, is the

source of that data which the individual subject receives.
Sensation involves an experience in which the subject is "given"
something, and in

whic~

he is to that extent passive.

The concrete

details of the experience of the sense subject reveal this to him, and
reveals as well the separateness of object from subject in sensation.
For example, "Pain is a loud protest against the identification of the

79cf. Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 40; Sanmltliche Werke, vol. 2,
p. 284. "In thought, I am an absolute subject, I accept everything
only as my object or predicate, that is, as object or predicate of a
thinking self; I am intollerant."
80 Ibid.

r
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And indeed

the very experience of concrete objects itself is, when accurately
described, a demonstration of this separateness of the object from the
sense subject:

"only where I am transformed from an 'I' into a 'thou'

where I am passive, does the conception of an activity existing apart
from me, that is, objectivity, arise.
an 'I' a 'non-I."'
acted upon.

82

But only through the senses is

The term "thou" here is used to indicate something

And the point is that .the very experience of perceptual

objects necessitates the conclusion that the subject is and must take
himself to be a "thou" in this sense, something acted upon, and, by
implication for Feuerbach, something acted upon by an item really
separate fromhimself.

Indeed it is only given this that an accurate

notion of the subject's consciousness of himself as an individual can be
hand.

For, "Man is given to himself only through the senses, he is an

object of himself only as an object of the senses. 1183

The individual, to

accurately and concretely comprehend himself, must comprehend that he is
receptive to data delivered from distinct sources, and that his basic
tmderstandings of his own reality are likewise delivered via sensation.
Finally, it must be noted that Feuerbach is not asserting a theory

81 Feuerbach, PrinciEles, Vogel,
P• 53; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 28 •
82 Feuerbach, PrinciEles, Vogel, p. 51; Sannntliche Werke, vol. 2,p. 296
83Feuerbach, PrinciEles, Vogel, p. 58; SHmmtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 30 •
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I

l

of sensation that is either crude or narrow.

For first, as already seen,

fcuerbach's uotion of sensation is a broad rather than a narrow one,
including i11msinative and affective aspects as well as "perceptual"
f catures in the strict sense of that term.

"Certain and innnediately

assured is only that which is an object of the senses, perception, and
feeling."8 4 And second, he does not hold that sensation in an unrefined
sense yields innnediate and clear knowledge.
"crude senses" from "refined senses. 1185

Feuerbach distinguishes

The former receives that data

which is immediately and apparently given.

It may be encumbered by the

association of data with spontaneously constructed and fantastic images. 8
Refined sensation is that which attains accurate awareness of the data of
sensation through analyzing it critically through responding to it
imaginatively and emotively, as well as intellectually. 87

The point is

that refined sensation is attained by the individual who utilizes the
several critical devices available to him, emotive, imaginative, and
intellectual, to interpret and thus attain awareness of the real content
of the data of sensation itself.

In this sense, the perceiving individua

is active, that is he acts on his sensations of the object, though not on
the object itself.

84
85

.,

Feu~rbach,

PrinciEles, Vogel, p. 55; Sannntliche Werke, vol. 2, p.300

Feu4'.!rbach, Princi12les, Vogel, p. 58; s•tliche Werke, vol. 2, p.304

86Fe1u.trb11ch,

Princi12les, Vogel, p. 60; Sannntliche Werke, vol. 2, P· 30

87 f(!1u.rh11ch,

Principles, Vogel, P· 58-60; Sannntliche Werke, vol. 2,

pp. 30 3~ 'j(I().
-
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"The task of philosophy and of science in general

consists, therefore, not in leading away from sensuous, that is, real,
objects, but rather in leading toward them, not in transforming objects
into ideas and conceptions, but rather in making visible, that is, in
objectifying, objects that are invisible to ordinary eyes. 1188
Feuerbach's doctrine of sense perception itself, then, includes
the following ideas.

Sense perception yields the most basic form of

awareness available to the conscious subject.

The experience of sense

perception reveals that the subject stands in a passive and receptive
relation to real and separate objects which deliver the data of sensation,
and experiences his own self awareness through the medium of sensation,
i.e., experiences himself as an object as well as a subject, a "thou" as
well as an "I."

But sensation must be taken to include imaginative and

emotional as well as strictly perceptual features through which the
individual acts on his sensations of the object.

And these former two

features, along with intellectual behavior, function to refine sense
awareness and to enable the subject to attain an enriched and accurate
consciousness of its delivered content.

Upon which of these statements

might the author of the "Paris Manuscripts" and the "Theses of Feuerbach"
desire to comment critically?
From remarks made earlier in this chapter, one must infer that Marx
!would not quarrel with Feuerbach's general effort to recover through
theoretical means an awareness of the basic character of the sensuous.

88
,~nf.

Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 60; Sammtliche Werke, vol.2, pp. 305-

-157Marx, like Feuerbach is "not satisfied with abstract thinking 1189 i.e.,
not satisfied with describing the individual simply as a self-conscious
subject, but requires a description of the totality of the determination
of the individual.

We have seen Marx praise Feuerbach on this very

point, as offering a materialism which indicates the manner in which "the
actual history of man as a given subject

1190

may be theoretically

comprehended and described in terms of the actual relation of the
individual to his concrete environment.

But Feuerbach goes on to describe

the basis of those actual relations as sense perception.

It is this

thesis that Marx attacks, and he attacks it by criticizing Feuerbach's
understanding of the perceptual object itself.
For Feuerbach the object of perception occurs as separate from the
perceiving subject, contains within itself its own determinations, and
offers itself to the perceiving subject as receptive.
Feuerbach can only make sense of the notion of the

This implies that

subject if the

subject is taken to be an object as well, an individual that is both activ
and receptive, an "I" and a "thou".

In this sense it can be said that

the subject requires or needs the object in order to be a subject, to be
what it is.

And it is the nature of the perceptual object itself which

'
defines the content of the need
which the subject has for it.

The object

is self existent and in terms of its determinations self contained; the

89 Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 401; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 534.
9

-

~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 317; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152.
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and self contained, in order to be a perceiving subject.
Feuerbach expand the notion of need beyond this?
that he cannot.

But can

Marx seems to realize

In attempting to describe the individual subject as a

"sensuous" subject, Feuerbach describes him as a perceiving subject.

And

the object which such a subject requires or needs is then precisely that
which Feuerbach describes.

But the description of this object is such

that it does not allow him to define the notion of need itself in an
adequate fashion.
For an accurate description of the individual in his relations to
his environment, Marx argues in the Manuscripts of 1844, the notion of
need must be defined in a sense at once more general and more concrete
than that available to Feuerbach, as some felt lack or deficiency within
the individual, capable of being satisfied through the individual's
relating himself to something other than and external to himself.

To

understand the individual concretely, Marx asserts in the Manuscripts,
is, "as seen above, to understand him, as a natural, living, sentient,
and objective being," as "a suffering, conditioned, and limited creature
like an animal or plant.

The objects of his drives, that is to say,

exist outside him as indpendent, yet they are objects of his need,
essential and indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his
essential capacities. 1191

"Need" must initially be understood as

describing that manifold of felt requirements which demand that the

91Marx, "Manuscripts of 1.844," Easton and Guddai:, p. 325; ~'
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160.

r
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And Feuerbach's narrower

und-rstanding of need as the need of the perceiving subject for the
perceptual object will not do simply because it seriously limits the
sense of the term to the extent that it cannot describe the totality of
its actual manifestations.

The serious difficulty with this limitation

is that, by holding that the individual requires the object as a perceptual object, Feuerbach implies for Marx that the individual subject must
be described as a perceiving subject.
II

But this is a retreat into

h" k"1ng... n 92 equa11y as 1na
• dequate as tat
h
doctri newh'1ch
a b stract tin

would describe the individual simply as a self-conscious subject.
Feuerbach does not want to hold to this exclusive and limited description,
he asserts that, "Indeed, even the stomach of man, which we view so
contemptuously, is not animal but human because it is a universal
being ••• 11 9 3 that the individual is constituted by the totality of his
relations to his environment.

But Marx' implication seems to be that

Feuerbach wants to but cannot hold this, given his description of the
nature of the perceptual object in relation to the perceiving subject.
This notion of need which Marx considers at once broader and more
concretely accurate than that available to Feuerbach leads Marx to
further statements concerning the nature of the relation of individual
to the external environment and the nature of the external environment
itself 'in that relation.

92Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 401; MEGA,
·Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 534.
93 Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 69; Sannntliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 31 •
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Need, as Marx takes the term, governs the manner in which the individual relates to his environment.

But this manner must be one through

which the individual is capable both of relating his need to the
environment itself, and of satisfying that need.

For Marx, this is to

assert that it is some manner in which the individual "appropriates the
external world and sensuous nature through his labor ••• " 94 or some
manner in which the individual relates to his environment as an agent,
through praxis.

In that the individual relates his needs to the

environment through practical agency, those needs are at once specified
(e.g., hunger as a need is specifically transformed into the need for
this or that food item available through action on the environment; the
need for friendship is transformed into the need for interaction with
this or that person) and the conditions for the possibility of their
satisfaction are constituted through the contents of the environment
being brought into relation to those needs. 95

But this is to reassert

the familiar theme that the external environment or nature is to be
understood as the material for and the context of agency.
Further, it has been shown that human productive agency or praxis is

94Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton, p. 290; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3,
p. 84.

95 cf. Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, trans. and ed. David McLellan, (New
York: HarpeE and Row, 1971), p. 26. Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der
Politischen Okonornie, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 14, in which text
Marx expresses the same idea in the economic language of production and
consumption. "Production creates the material as well as the external
object of consumption, consumption creates the want as the immediate
object, the purpose of production."

I
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in part defined for Marx through being governed by needs developed
beyond those subsistence needs. 96

But as Marx argues in the German

Ideology, such developed needs arise from the satisfaction of priorly
experienced needs,

97

and that prior satisfaction entails some activity

having been performed within the environment, and this in at least
minimal modification of the environment.

Indeed as also seen above,

it is the environment as modified through action which forms the objective
source which elicits the development of concrete and new needs in the
subject.

This however yields a second familiar assertion:

that the

actual and external environment to which man relates, nature in Marx'
sense of the term, is not self contained in its determinations, but
receives determinations as a result of human productive activity; or,
that nature as related to by man 98 is produced by him.

Translated into

Feuerbachian language, this statement would read that the object to which
the subject relates is actually external to him but not simply selfcontained in terms of its contents; rather it is an object or feature
of nature in virtue of its bring determined by the productive activity
of the subject.
As it stands, this may seem simply another argument in support of

Marx' criticism of Feuerbach's doctrine of nature itself in relation to
action.

-

But its implications for an understanding of the perceived object

9 6cf. for example Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, pp.
292-293; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 86-87.
97Marx, Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 3, p. 18.
98rhat Marx will ultimately accept no other sense of 'nature' is shown
by texts already cited from the Paris Manuscripts and the German Ideology.

--

-162perception itself, and consciousness more generally taken, are both
immedi-te and crucial. Perception is the most rudimentary and basic
manner in which the individual is aware of his environment. It is
tautologous, given this, to state that perception is perception of an
object. But the object perceived is a portion of the natural environment
to which the individual relates, and that natural environment is as such
determined through its being the object of productive activity. Thus the
object of perception itself, as a portion of the environment, is so
determined. Put differently, the experience of the perceiving subject is
determined by the object of perception, but that object itself is not
simply given in its content, but more fundamentally determined in its
content by the subject as an agent. 99 However Feuerbach incorrectly
asserts the contrary of this: that the expereince of the perceiving
subject is, in its content, determined by the content of the perceived
object taken in isolation, that is, as unaffected by the subject himself.
That "refined" sensation which makes " ••• visible objects which are
invisible to ordinary eyes ••• , 11160 is an activity of the perceiving

99.Marx would of course immediately insist here that the productive
activity determining the character of the natural environment, and thus
of the perceived object, must be understood as the productive activity
not simply of the agent taken in isolation, .but of the social whole
within which the individual is located.
100. Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, pp. 58 and 60; Sammtliche
•
Werke,
vol. 2, pp. 304 and 306.

-

-163subject, but an activity of that subject on his sensations, which in
turn ultimately depend for their content on the self contained object
of perception, in Feuerbach's understanding of perceptual experience.
This then is Marx' criticism of Feuerbach's doctrine of the
perceptual object and of perception itself: that the latter"· .. does not
comprehend sensuousness ... ," that is, does not comprehend the perceptual
101
object, " ... as practical, human sensuous activity •.. ,"
as in its own
reality not self contained, but as fundamentally determined by human
productive activity. In view of his correction of Feuerbach here, Marx
asserts not that the perceiving subject stands in a relation of
receptivity to his object, but that he stands in a more basic and active
relation to that object, as a practical agent. And if one were to argue
in a Marxian context the Feuerbachian premisse that all forms of
consciousness derive from and relate back to sense consciousness, then
one would have to argue with Marx the further assertion that all other
forms of consciousness are themselves had by a subject who relates to
that of which he is aware fundamentally as an agent. Marx would of
course insist here that the productive activity determining the character
of the natural environment, and thus of the perceived object, must be
understood as the productive activity not simply of the individual taken
in isolation, but of the social whole within which the individual is
situated. Praxis, as seen in the first chapter, is and for Marx must be
101

Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 401; MEGA,
Abt.1, Bd.8, p. 534.

-

-164understood as a social rather than an exclusively individual phenomenon.
But given this qualification, one may still assert that for Marx and
contrary to Feuerbach, the perceived object is still not itself essential!
given, but is, in a relevant sense of the term,

11

produced. 11

It appears then that on the theme of consciousness and its object,
significantly perceptual consciousness in relation to its object, as well
as on that of the significance of nature in relation to action, Marx
stands in a posture of opposition to rather than of agreement with
Feuerbach. This opposition is both noted in the "Theses on Feuerbach 11 and
based on arguments imp! icit in the Manuscripts of 1844. And the arguments
for both of these points of oppositton appear significantly in the theory
of human nature offered in those manuscripts. Just as Marx argues
concerning the relation of praxis and nature in that theory of man, he
argues also therein concerning the relation of praxis, consciousness
Including sense consciousness, and nature, Thus it seems that on both of
these themes Althusser's claim that the "humanism" of Marx' Manuscripts
is in its inspiration as well as its content
Y...:... The

~estion

11

Feuerbachian 11 will not hold

of Community and Society.

A third area of Althusser's claim however remains to be treated,
involving the

que~tion

of the unity or disparity of Marx and Feuerbach

on the assertion of the communal or social nature of man. And on this
point it at least initially seems that Althusser's interpretation of
Marx' theory of man in the Manuscripts might be given some creedence.
A1thusser asserts that in the period (1842-45) within which the
Manuscripts were written, Marx envisioned a theoretical humanism in which

-165man was understood as " ..• primarily a

1

Gemeinwesen,

1

a 'communal being,'

a being who only actualizes himself theoretically {science) and
practically (politics) in his universal human relations, relations with
other men rather than with object {external nature 'humanized' through
Jabor). 11 102 And he further states that this "communal" theory of human
nature is identical with

11

•••

the 'communal

1

humanism of Feuerbach."l03

Now there are certain textusl features of the Manuscripts of 1844 which
apparently lend weight to this interpretation.
It has

alread~

been shown that Marx in the Manuscripts places great

emphasis on the social nature of the individual as agent, and of man as
such. The

expression .•. 11 of the individual 's I ife, Marx states in
104
the Manuscripts, is 11 • • • an expression and assertion of social I ife. 11
11

•••

4

And indeed packed with Feuerbachian overtones is Marx' statement that,
" ... though man is therefore a particular individual - and precisely his
particularity makes him an individual, an actual individual communal bein
he is equal to the totality, the ideal totality, the subjective existence
. 105
of society explicitly thought and experienced."
Moreover, as has also
been seen, Marx in the Manuscripts lauds Feuerbach for the formulation of
102 Althusser,
"t
£P..:.. .£.!.......:...,
p. 232 .
103
Ibid.
104
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, 11 Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, Abt.1,
Bd. 3, p. 116.
l o5 Ibid. , p. 307; p. 1t7.

-166a materialism adequate to the description of the individual as actually
106
and fundamentally social.
Texts such as these have led Mclellan to
comment, concerning the influence of Feuerbach's doctrine of man as
communal in the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future in relation to
Marx' Manuscripts that, "It is ... in the Paris Manuscripts that Feuerbach
is supreme and his all pervasive influence cannot escape anyone who
107
carefully compares the respective texts,"
However, differing
interpretations are possible and have been offered. lobkowicz, for example,
who states generally concerning Feuerbach's influence on Marx that,
11 • • •

this influence would seem far Jess than is generally bel ieved, 11

108

insists that this comment is specifi-cally accurate concerning the theories
109
of man as communal and social as offered by the two.
An accurate determination of this question can only be the result of
some attempt to analyze Feuerbach's theory of the commune! nature of man
itself. The texts of Feuerbach, both the Essence of Christianity and the
Principles of the Philosophy of the Future readily allow this analysis,
and it is one that can be initially related to previous statements made
about Feuerbach's doctrine of sensation. For in the Principles of the
Philosophy of the Future, Feuerbach explicitly relates his statement that
sensation yields certainty, to the notion of man as communal. "The
l 06 Ib id. , p. 3 16; p. 15 2.
107
Mclellan, The Young Hegel ians and Karl Marx, p. 106.

108
109

lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, p. 251.
~

Cf. Lobkowicz, p. 360.'

-167-

certainty of the existence of other things apart from me,"he tells us,
"is mediated for me through the certainty of the existence of another
human being apart from me. That which I perceive alone I doubt; only that
which the other also perceives is certain."
to be that first, as noted above,

i~

110

Feuerbach's point here see

is sensation which delivers the most

basic and recognizable form of certitude, in virtue of the sensation's
itself being that which is capable of being apprehended immediately. But
second, as has also been seen, the data of sensation is, for Feuerbach,
not biven to the sense subject in a merely immediate fashion. Although th
object of sensation is for him finally a self contained and therefore
non-mediated object, it is nonetheless one whose content must be made
"visible" because it is "invisible to ordinary eyes.

11111

That is, it must

be rendered discernable through relevant affective and imaginative, as
well as intellectual, acts.

112

The occurence of affective and

imaginative responses relevant to specific sorts of sense data is
requisite in order that the sense data itself yield certitude to the
subject. But the import of Feuerbach's texts cited above is in this also
that the individual's ability to develop the affective and imaginative
capacities necessary to reveal the truth of sense data is not possible
apart from his membership in community. Feuerbach supports this assertion
by no argument at this stage of his analysis. But the assertion itself
110

111
112

•
• •Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 59; Sammtl
iche Werke, vol.2, p.304.

Ibid., p. 60; p. 306.
Cf. Ibid.

-168seems to be this. Sense data is capable of delivering true

.-

certitude, but only when interpreted affectively and emotionally. But
sense data can also only deliver recognized certitude to the individual
in community, not to the individual as isolated. Therefore, the
development of those affective and imaginative capacities necessary for
recognizable certitude
communal.

~s

possible only for the individual taken as

113

The general point of these statements is that, for Feuerbach, the
individual is not self contained, is not capable of developing those
capacities which as a human individual he needs to develop, in a conditio
of isolation. As noted above, the individual subject "needs" the
perceptual object in order to be

a

subject, in Feuerbach's sense of the

latter term. But now he is further asserting that community is necessary
i~

order that the subject adequately attain the object. Thus he is

asserting that community is necessary in order that the subject attain
that which he requires or "needs" to be a subject at a I 1, and to
be adequately able to "perceive" his experience.
Feuerbach's proceedure in developing these assertions involves his
departing from a discussion of the perceptual object, and a move towards
'

113 As noted, Feuerbach offers no argument in the Principles of the
Philosophy of the Future to support his assertions regarding 'sense
certitude' and community. Therefore, it is very difficult to ascertain
the content of those assertions. I shall argue that other and explicitly
defended positions of Feuerbach.exhibit consistency with the claim for
the content of the assertion which I have made.

-169discussing the nature of individual personal subjectivity in a more
general sense. But within this move he retains an intention of supporting
the assertion that the individuaJ·subject requires community to be an
individual subject at all.
An initial indication that this assertion might be justifiable is
given by Feuerbach in the first pages of the Essence of Christianity.
There, as seen ablve, Feuerbach argues that man's "species consciousness"
necessarily implies that man as an individual, " •.• is himself at once I
and Thou; he can put himself in place of another, ·for this reason, that
his species, his essential nature, and not merely his individuality, is
an object of thought."

114

In virtue of his "species consciousness," in

other wirds, the individual is capable of interpersonal or communal
relations. This at least Feuerbach wishes to assert in this text. But he
seems to wish to assert more than this as well.
To be an individual, "species consciousness" must be realized, or
some sense actually apprehended by the subject. But it is not only the
case that the individual is constituted through "species consciousness."
For, as noted above, all knowledge must in some way be derived from
sense experience. Now "species consciousness" involves the individual's
realization that "human nature" is a reality beyond that of the
114

Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 2; S~mmtl iche
Werke, vol.6, p:-2°.

--170singular discrete reality of the individual. 11 5 But given Feuerbach's
doctrine of the relation of all knowledge to sense experience, then the
individual is only capable of realizing "species consciousness" if he is
able to view the content of such consciousness, "human nature, 11 as actuall
transcending his own discrete individuality, in its exhibition in sense
experience.
This necessarily involves the individual's experiencing himself
as in relation to the concrete personal other. For it is the concrete
personal other who exhibits to the individual the phenomenon of "human
nature" transcending his, the individual's own, discrete singularity.
As seen above, "species consciousness" on the one hand renders the
experience of interpersonal ity or community possible for Feuerbach.

116

But on the other hand, it is the experience of interpersonality or
community which provides the individual with the concrete exhibition or
sensuous ground in virtue of which he can realize "species consciousness."
Thereofre, it is the experience of community which constitutes the
individual as a human individual.

o/ more

simply, for Feuerbach the

human individual must be, and must be understood as, communal.
115

Cf. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, El lot, p.2; Sammtl iche
Werke, vol.6, pp. 1-2. That Feuerbach intends this is clearly seen by
his identification of species consciousness as the necessary condition
for scientific knowledge, i.e., knowledge of classes rather than
knowledge of discrete singular items.
l16 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, El lot, p. 2; S~mmtliche
Werke, vol.6, p~,

-171Feuerbach develops this assertion of the necessary communality of
the individual through a number of texts in the Essence of Christianity
and the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future. He begins by
reasserting the necessity of species consciousness, or 11 humanity 11 as an
idea, being founded on concrete communal experience by comparing the felt
effect of idea and concrete experience: " .•. the idea of humanity

has

little power over the feelings, because humanity is only an abstraction;
and the reality which presents itself to us in distinction from
• d e o f separate, l 1m1te d 1n
. d"1v1 d ua 1s. 11117
. a bstract1on
.
.1s t hemu 1t1tu
this
0

0

•

The experience of concrete personal others is the individual's experience
of 11 humanity, 11 of human nature as transcending the 1 imits of his
singularity, and of its being embodied and realized in others as well as
himself. It is this experience of sensuous concreteness, Feuerbach
argues, which basically affects or has "power over the feelings" of the
individual, and the "idea of humanity," species consciousness, is itself
the accurate comprehension of community
in its sensuous concreteness .
......

118

Sensuous communal experience is had in an immediate way by the individual
in direct interpersonal experience, in what Feuerbach calls the direct

t

~·

experience of the /l-thou. 11

!.
r
!

ll7 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, .Eliot, p. 153; Sammtl iche
Werke, vol. 6, P:-185.
118

,

-

Cf. Ibid.; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 184. One may note here that,
dispite the above statements, it is not Feuerbach's intention to wholly
collapse the identity of the individual into that of the community.
Feuerbach states that the ancients sacrificed the individual to the
species, and that Christians sacrificed the species to the individual.
His language suggests his opposition to both 'sacrifices'.

-172Feuerbach amplifies this assertion by further stating that it is
only within the direct experience of communal interpersonality that the
individual distinguishes and differentiates himself as an individual. One
of his most overt statements of this idea involves a statement of the
relation of personality and sexuality. The individual must experience
himself sensuously, and thus must experience himself as a body.
120
.
.
persona l em bo d 1ment
o f course .1nvo l ves sexua l spec1"f"1cat1on.

119

And

From this point Feuerbach goes on to make three statements. First,
sexuality is not simply one property possessed by the individual among
others and indifferent to those others, but is a pervasive feature of
the reality of the personal individual. "The distinction of sex is not
superficial, or limited to certain parts of the body; it is an essential
121
one; it penetrates bone and marrow."
Second, it is within situations
of direct intimacy, such as sexual intimacy, that the individual's most
~

basic and concrete experiences of interpersonal ity or community are
had.

The thou between men and women has quite another sound than the
122
monotonous thou between friends."
One might generalize slightly
11

from this statement to say that, for Feuerbach, those experiences of
9 Ibid., p. 91; S~mmtl iche Werke, vol 6, p. 109.
120
Ibid., pp. 91-92; S~mmtl iche Werke, vol. 6, pp. 110-111.
121
Ibid., p. 92; Sammtl iche Werke, vol. 6, p. 111.
122
11

r
-173community necessary for the individual's realization of himself are as
such necessarily and most concretely had through experiences of direct
intimacy. But thirdly, Feuerbach goes on to assert that it is precisely
within such situations of direct intimacy, refering again to sexual
intimacy, that the individual differentiates himself from the other and
realizes himself as this individual, as unique. "There is no thou,
there is no _L; but the distinction between land thou, the fundamental
condition of all personality, of all consciousness, is only real, Jiving,
123
ardent, when felt as the distinction between man and woman. 11
Some concrete and immediate experience of interpersonality is
necessary for the individual in order that a sensuous ground for species
consciousness be had. But such experience is also required in order that
the individual be able to distinguish himself from others and realize his
P.ersonal uniqueness. The realization of such uniqueness involves one's
differentiating the characteristics and traits of his own personal self
from those of other selves. But this can only occur if other selves are
given within the experience of the individual. And for such experience to
be effectively significant for the individual, it must occur in the
contest of a relation which, in Feuerbach's words, is

11

•••

real, living,

ardent ... 11 such as, for example, the sexual relationship. It is in the
context of such a relationship that the individual most concretely
relates himself to and differentiates himself from the other, and

123 Ibid.

-174realizes himself as unique. Thus in this sense too community and
significant interpersonality comprise necessary experience for the
individual.
Developing this point, Feuerbach goes on to note that, in the act of
differentiating himself from the other, one feature which the individual
realizes concerning himself is his own limitation and imperfection.
Noting this involves Feuerbach's unifying certain comments made early in
the Essence of Christianity concerning human species consciousness with
other comments noted above concerning individual self-differentiation and
the synthesis of these comments in the statement that it is through
concrete community that the individual overcomes those limitations which
he notes as necessary features of himself.
Interpersonal experiences within which individual self-differentiati
occurs involve the individual's noting distinctions between himself and
others, and among other things distinctions of capacities and developed
abilities. Friendship is an example

~f

this. "Friendship can only exist

between the virtuous, as the ancients said. But it cannot be based on
perfect similarity; on the contrary, it requires diversity, for
friendship rests on a desire for self-completion. One friend obtains
through the other what he himself does not possess. The virtues of the
one atone for the failings of the other ••• If I cannot be myself perfect,
I yet at least love virtue, perfection, in others."

124.

u

•

124 A concrete

Ibid., pp. 156-57; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 189.

-175feature of individual self differentiation within interpersonal relations
like friendship, is the individual's noting his own limitations and
imperfections vis a vis the other. This recognition provides a motive fo
such relations, a

11 • • •

desire for self-completion." But Feuerbach seems

additionally to assert that this motive is a consistently operative
desire.
Feuerbach's rationale for this seemingly involves an appeal
to initial statements concerning human consciousness as adequately
present '' ... only in a being to whom hJs species, his essential nature,
125
is an object of thought."
For Feuerbach, man's consciousness of his
"essential nature" has a content, namely reason, will and tove.
"Reason, love, force of will, are perfections - the perfections of the
126
human being, nay, more, they are the absolute perfections of being. 11
These predicates must be taken as absolute or infinite perfections, in
that they must be taken as ends in themselves: "···it is impossible to
love, will, or think, without perceiving these activities to be
perfections - impossible to feel that one is a loving, willing, thinking
being without experiencing infinite joy therein .•. It is therefore
impossible to be conscious of a perfection as an 'imperfection,'
127
impossible to feel feeling 1 imited, to think thought l imited. 11
125

Ibid., p. 1,

S~mmtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 1,

12 6 Ibid., p. 3, Sammtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 3. Cf. Ibid., pp. 3-12,
S~mmtTTChe Werke, vol 6, pp. 3-13, in which Feuerbach expands in detail
on these ideas.
12 7 Ibid., p. 6; Sammtl iche Werke, vol. 6, p. 7.
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--

Feuerbach's last statement here is the critical one for our purposes.
In themselves, and as ends in themselves, reason, will, and love are taken
by the individual to be infinite perfections, and thus capable of
infinite expression. They are also taken by him to be perfections of
human nature, and thus of himself as an individual embodiment of human
nature. But at the same time the individual is not fully identical with
human nature or with his species, is not the full embodiment of those
perfections which are nonetheless his own. If the individual errs, as
Feuerbach insists he does, in making

11

•••

his own I imitations the

limitations of the species, 11 this is an error which arises from,

11

th~

mistake that he identifies himself immediately with the species, a
mistake which is intimately connected with the individual's Jove of ease,
sloth, vanity, and egoism. 11
hi~self,

128

Given, then, an accurate perception of

the individual must comprehend himself as characterized by

reason, will, and Jove, infinite perfections of the species whose reality
he individualizes, and at the same time as incapable within his own
individuality of realizing the infinity of these perfections.
In this comprehension is rooted the desire noted above. The
individual desires to realize infinite reason, will, and love, because
these are infinite perfections of his own nature. But he is unable to
achieve such realization on bis own terms, because as distinct from the
species, the individual is 1 imited and is thus unable to fully embody
128

--

~ .•

p. 6; Sammtl iche Werke, vol. 6, p. 7.

-177the species• perfections. The desire·noted above must then be a
structural and consistently operative desire for the individual.

129

But it is further one which can be related to by community as an
essential element of the experience ef the individual. Community yields
the concrete experience of the individual 1 s participation in the species.
And concrete communal interaction involves interaction with others who in
terms of their own developed abilities compensate for the deficiendies of
the individual, and he for theirs. Communal interaction and experience
then involves his experiencing a situation in which the perfections of
human oature are developed beyond his own limited development of them.
And thus actual community relates to and compensates the individual's
desire for a perfection that transcends his own 1 imitations.
Mclellan summs up this idea in the comment that, for Feuerbach,
11

T~e

fundamental unity of mankind that the idea of a species presupposes

arises from the fact that men are not self-sufficient creatures; they have
very different qualities, so it is only together that they can form the
130
'perfect' man. 11
Feuerbach himself states the idea in numerous ways,
beginning with the general statement that,
129

11

Hence intercourse

Cf. Ibid., p. 153; Sammtl iche Werke, vol. 6, p. t84. Feuerbach
argues that the consistency of the individual's desire to realize the
perfection of the species is the basis of the religious illusion. 11 Thus
the species is unlimited; the individual alone is 1 imited. But the sense
of I imitation is painful, and hence the individual sets himself free from
it by the contemplation of perfect Being; in this contemplation he
possesses what is otherwise wanting to him. 11
130
Mclellan, The Young Hegel ians ~Karl Marx, p. 92.

---

r
.

-178ameliorates and elevates; involuntarily and without disguise, man is
different in intercourse from what he is when alone.

11131

Feuerbach's

comment on friendship as such an 'elevation' has been seen. He discusses' sexual love in these terms, as that context in which the individual,
" ••• postulates the existence of another as a need of the heart, he
reckons another as part of his own being; he declares the life which he
has through love to be the truly human life, corresponding to the idea of
man, i. e., of the species."

132

Feuerbach even relates the idea of

connnunity as compensating the individual for his own felt sense of self

f

limitation to the community as historical. History offers limitless
possibilities for the overcoming of imperfections. And the individual, as
participating in historical connnunity, can envision these possibilities,
albeit vicariously. "My life is bound to a limited time, not so the life
of humanity; the history of mankind consists of nothing else than a
continuous and progressive conquest of limits ••• the future always unveils
the fact that the alleged limits of the species were only limits of
individuals.

11133

Thus i.n various ways community and interpersonality

relate to the individual's desire to realize the perfections of the
species, which are in themselves infinite.

I

The idea that reason. love, and will are perfections proper to the human
species, and as such infinite perfections, allows Feuerbach to ennunciate
131.

Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 156; Sammtliche
Werke, vol. 6, p. 188.
132.
Ibid.
133
• Ibid. ,pp. 152-153; Sfunmtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 184.

-179that, "Homo homini Deus est - This is the great practical principle;
this is the axis on which revolves the his·tory of the world.

11134

And in

that connnunity is that through which these perfections are realized
concretely as ends in themselves for the individual, then connnunity is
both essential to the individual, and is for him, in the only sense of th
word which Feuerbach will accept, "sacred." Feuerbach's model for
understanding community is and must be for him direct or interpersonal
"I-Thou" relations, because it is in such relations that the individual
.!

experiences both interaction and

self-diffe~entiation

in their fullest

sensuous innnediacy. But given that, he can confidently assert in
concluding the Essence of Christianity that, " ••• true social relations
are

sacred~

such."

136

And in concluding the Principles of the

Philosophy of the Future he is capable of applying the above ideas to the
topic of "thought," asserting that the individual's realization of
reason, as of any other hyman perfectionis possible only through
communal participation. "The true dialectic is not a monologue of a
solitary thinker himself; it is a dialogue between I and thou. 11137
From the above, then one can recognoze Feuerbach's emphasis on the
. connnunal nature of man, the individual as essentially communal or social.
Social relations are necessary for the individual to be an individual;

134.
135.

Ibid., p. 271; Sannntliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 326.

Cf. Ibid. This idea is illustrated by Feuerbach in his statement
immediately following the text cited above. " The relations of child and
parent, of husband and wife, of brother and friend - in general of man to
man - in short all the moral relationships are per ~ religious. Life as
a whole is, -in its essential; substantial relations, throughout of
a divine nature.
136. Ibid., p. 273;
vol. 6, p. 329.
137. Feuerbach
72· Sammtliche Werke vol.2

r
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they provide the context in which his imaginative and affective capacities
can be concretely developed; they constitute him as a human individual,
and enable him to achieve individual self awareness through actual self
differentiation; they relate to a desire which is structurally invovled i
the human individual as such. In language perilously close to that of at
least the young Marx, and thus in seeming substantiation of Althusser's
claim, Feuerbach asserts that, "The essence of man is contained only in
the community and unity of man with man...

11138

But at the same time one

might read the statement of Marx in the "Theses," that, "Feuerbach
resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the essence of
man is no abstraction inhering in each single individual. In its actualit
139
it is the ensemble of social relationships."
And the implication of th"
statement is that, for Marx, Feuerbach does not comprehend these social
relationships adequately.
One aspect of the above criticism involved Marx's attitude towards
Feuerbach's conception of the function of a theory of human nature. This
criticism will be considered subsequently in this chapter, along with
analogous statements made by Marx

agains~

P

Prudhon. But this implication

of the abvve statement from Marx' Theses" depends on a prior criticism
of Feuerbach's doctrine of the nature of social relations. And it is a
-·

criticism which, I shall argue, is both is both founded upon argumentativ
138.

~.,

p. 71; Sainmtliche Werke, vol.2, p. 319.

139. Marx, II Theses on Feuerbach, II Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA,
Abt. i. Bd. 5, p. 535

-181-

details present in the Paris Manuscripts, and is tied to another
statement made by Marx in the sixth Thesis, that Feuerbach is " ••• compelled 1) to abstract from the historical process and to establish
religious feeling as something self contained, and to presuppose an
abstract - isolated - human individua1.

11140

A hint as to why these cemments concerning social relationships and
history are linked together by Marx in the Sixth Thesis is offered by
Rotenstreich, in his commentary on that thesis. "The view that regards
society as a natural reality implies that it is a given reality; and if
society is viewed as an historical reality, the implication is that it is
141
capable of changing itself."
For history to occur, it is necessary that
142
the historical subject, society,
be capable of process and change. But
l 40. Ibid.
141.
142.

Rotenstreich, £E..• cit., p. 73.
1

There can be no doubt that, for Marx, society is the historical
subject, the subject of the historical process. Althusser, ££.• cit.,
p. 328, notes that, for the mature Marx, "The subjects of history are
given human societies." But the foundations of this statement are clearly
present in the Paris Manuscripts as well. For example, Marx there
frequently refers to 'communism' as the goal of history (cf. Easton and
Guddat, p. 314; MEGA Abt.l, Bd.3, p. 125), but the term 'communism' in
the Manuscripts refers to a system of social relations. Also, Marx assert
in the Paris Manuscripts (cf. Easton and Guddat, p. 314; MEGA, Abt.l,
Bd.3, p. 125), that, " ••• for socialist man, however, the ;ntire so called
world history is only the creation of man through human labor ane:r--the
development of nature for man ••• " As already seen, Marx also argues in
the Manuscripts that both the motive forces of man's self actualization
and his relations to nature involve praxis as conditioned in its actual I
details by society. Thus on these terms too, Marx must see society as thei
subject of the historical process, now identified with the p~ocess of
human self actualization.
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then a theoretical account of society, or of social relations, must be
one which includes a description of society as capable of undergoing
change, such that it can be the subject of the historical process.Otherwis•
the possibility of history itself is left unaccounted for. And
Rotenstreich states, Marx understands Feuerbach's doctrine of social
relationsas not yielding such a description in that the latter understands
society " ••• as a natural reality ••• "
To see Marx' criticism of Feuerbach here, two statements made above
about the latter's doctrine of society and community may be recalled. For
Feuerbach social relations provude those and only those experiences
through which the individual can be an individual, as the bases both of
the realization of "species consciousness" and of individual
discrimination. And for Feuerbach, social relations provide those
experiences through which the felt limitations of the individual can, in
one way, be overcome. This is for him to say at least that the individual
is necessarily social. But more, these characteristics for Feuerbach are
defining characteristics of society or community itself. Society for
Feuerbach is given in direct, experienced interpersonal or "I-Thou"
relations. The description of these relations and of their effects on
individual participants, is a description for him of the nature of society
itself, and its effects on its individual members. This description
involves the ideas: a) that social relations occur directly within and at
the basis of human experience; b) that such relations provide the basis
for the individual's realizati·on of the nature of his species; c) that
such relations provide the basis for personal individual differentiation;

-t83and d) that such relations relate to the individual's desire to overcome
imperfections which as an individual he necessarily possesses. But these
are descriptive statements about the nature of society which are in
principle ahistorical. They describe, in a Feuerbachian context, simply
features of direct interpersonal relations waich are indifferent to
history. But they are also descriptions of the essential nature of society
for Feuerbach. And if so, then society is described by him as essentially
ahistorical.
The point here is not that Feuerbach does not want to describe
society in relation to history. Indeed a text cited above indicates his
desire to do this. But Marx' question is, can Feuerbach succeed in this?
And his negative answer is based on the idea that Feuerbach describes the
essential features of social relationships through a series of statements
whose contents must be taken as unchanging contents. The direct innnediacy
of social or interpersonal relations, the function of such relations as
bases for species realization and individual self-differentiation, and
the role of such relationsas enabling the individual to overcome those
imperfections which he feels resident in himself as a mere individual,
are characteristics and functions which social relations can in principle
have or exercise in any historical context. But then to as·sert that
these are the essential characteristics and functions of social
relations is to assert that society is in its essential reality " ••• a
. ••• , ..143 or, essentially ahistorical. This forces
gi ven reality

143.

Rotenstreich, .££.· cit., p. 73.

-184Feuerbach both to " ••• abstract from the historical process ••• , 11144 to
leave history unaccounted for, and also to describe society inadequately,
in not describing it such that it can be viewed as the subject of history.
Marx indicates the correction he takes to overcome the difficulty of
Feuerbach's in the Eights Thesis, in asserting that, "All social life is
essentially practical."

145

To understand society as essentially founded

vpon "practical," i.e. active, relations, or productive relations, is to
describe society in such a way as to render it comprehensible as the
historical subject. 146 The details of practical or productive activity
can vary within societies. If social reality is comprehended as essential
involving such relations, then it is comprehended as that which can be
the subject of

histor~cal

change. The elucidationof such a doctrine of

society would then provide both an explanation of the possibility of
history, and a more adequate account of the nature of society itself.
144.

II
11
Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA Abt.1,
Bd. 5, p. 535.
145.
Ibid.Cf. Rotenstreich, £E.• cit., p. 80. Rotenstreich comments that
this statement epitomizes Marx' other assertions on practical, pooductive
activity in Theses One to Three, and Five.

146

• It is also, and this Marx takes to be cricial in this thesis, to
understand society as that which engenders ideological consciousness.
This Marx asserts in the remainder of the Eighth Thesis. Cf. Easton and
Guddat, p. 402; MEGA, Abt,l, Bd.5, p. 535. Marx states that, "All the
human mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational
solutinns in human practice and in the comprehensinn of this
practice." Thus the understanding of society which Marx offers here
enables him, for example, to perform a critique of religion in a way
unavailable to Feuerbach, because it provides him with a theoretical
model which pointsto an examination of the 'practical' social basis of
religiqn.

-185Marx' classic statement of social productive activity as the basis
of history and his description of the historical process itself, is found
in the "Preface" to his 1859 Critique of Political Economy. There he
speaks of "social production," distinguishes "forces of production" and
"relations of production,
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and describes the historical process as

governed by the former outstripping the latter.

148

But we have seen that

as early as 1845, Marx indicates in the "Theses on Feuerbach" at least the
desire to account for history be describing society as essentially
constituted by practical productive activity. And it can be shown that at
least this idea is resident in the Manuscripts of 1844 as well, and resides
hhere as a feature of Marx' theory of human nature.
Proof of this statement can be seen through reference back to my
first chapter, where I argue that, for the Marx of the Manuscripts, human
praxis engenders, and is the condition of the possibility of, social
~elations.

Especially important for this idea are the texts

whe~e

Marx

~sserts

that man "produces" society, and that, for the individual, " ••• the

~bject,

the immediate activity of his own individuality, is at the same

time his existence for other men, their existence for him.
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Beneath

147.

Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans.
S. Ryazanskaya, ed. M. Dobb, (New York: International Publishers, 1970),
pp. 20-21; MEW, vol. 13, pp. 8-9.

148

• Cf. Marx, Political Economy, ed. Dobb. pp. 20-21; MEW, vol 13, pp. 8-S
149.
Marx,"Manuscripts t>f 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, Abt.!.
Bd. 3, p. 115. The second of these statements is in context asserted by
Marx as a description of social relations within a context characterized
by the 9vercoming of provate property. That it is a description of social
relations in general can be seen by comparing it to Marx' analysis of the

-

-186these texts lie two assertions germane to the present topic.
One is the by now familiar assertion as to objectification as a
characteristic of praxis or productive activity. The product of activity
is, as we have seen Marx state, the "resume"

of productive activity,

150

the embodiment of the details of that activity of which it is a product
or result. As such, and given the assertion of the necessary relation
between activity and nature already laid down by Marx,

151

the product, as

both the result of the individual's activity and external to the
individual himself,

152

renders public the details of the individual's

agency, and renders the details of that activity as embodied in the
result available for inspection by and appropriation by others. In
addition, Marx also implies here that this objectifying or publicizing
of the individual through the result of this activity is necessary in
order that social relations occur at all. In order that one individual
interact with another, something about the former must be public (rather
alienation of man from his fellow man (cf. Easton and Guddat, p. 295;
MEGA, Abt.l, Bd. 3, p. 89. There, Marx argues that it is precisely
becuase the individual is alienated from his product and thereby from
himself, that he is alienated from his fellow man as well. And thus in
an alienated as well as a non-alienated social condition, it is the
product, or as Marx puts it here the "object" that mediates the
individual's existence with and his relations to others.

150

• Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 291;
Abt.l, Bd.3, p. 85.
l5l. Ibid., p. 290: MEGA, Abt.l; Bd. 3, P• 84.
152

• Ibid., p. 291, MEGA, Abt.l, Bd.3, P• 85.
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-187than purely private to him) so as to be accessable to the latter. Without
this condition's being met, social relations or interaction would be
impossible. And it is precisely the product of activity, as the
objectification of activity itself, which renders some feature of him, his
action itself, public in such a way as to make him a possible member of a
social relation. Moreover, it is also through the product of his activity
that the individual brings others into social relations with himself,
again by publicizing something of himself to wtiich they can relate. It is
because of this that Marx asserts that the individual's product of
activity t or

11

0bjeCt 11 aS the term iS nOW USed t iS

II••

.his existence for

.
11153 The point is tat,
h
f
other men ••• and their existence for him...
or
Marx here social relations must be understood as relations based on
productive activity. And this idea is emphasized by Marx in the "Excerpt
Notes of 1844" as well.

154

No claim is made here that the above coDDD.ents represnet Marx' full
doctrine of society and of the necessary relation of the individual and
society as that doctrine is exhibited in the 1844 Manuscripts, or that
the 1844 Manuscripts themselves exhibit Marx' full doctrine of society as
a system of productive activities, forces, and relations, or that the
Manuscripts contain Marx' developed notion of the relation between
society so understood and history. The first would require an exposition

153.

Ibid., p. 305; MEGA, Abt.i, Bd.3, p. 115.

154. Marx, "Excerpt Notes of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 281; MEGA,
Abt;l, Bd.3, p. 546=547.
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-188of Marx' dictum that, " ••• society itself produces man as man ••• 11155 that
social relations systematize, govern, and condition specific productive
activities undertaken within them, through the offering of an argument
similar to that developed in chapter one towards this conclusion. 156
Regarding the second, as early as the German Ideology, Marx offers some
fleshing out of the notion of society as a system of productive inter.
.
157.
relations.
And in the German Ideology, too, Marx develops his
doctrine of the relation between social. productive activity and history, 151
a doctrine whose mature and .developed explicitation is to be found in
texts such as the 1857-58 Grundrisse,

159

and most concisely in the

"Preface" to the Critique of Political Economy of 1859.
I wish to argue the much narrower thesis that Marx' criticism of
Feuerbach's doctrine of society as inadequate to an explanation of
history in that it does not compTehend society "practically," as founded
on practical productive relations, is, insofar as that criticism is
offered in the "Theses on Feuerbach," prefigured in the MaJ}uscripts of
1844. that Marx offers a rationale in support of that criticism in those
15 5• Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, Abt.!,
Bd.3, p. 116.
156.
Ibid., pp. 305-307; MEGA, Abt.1, Bd.3, pp. 115-118.
157 • Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 18; MEGA, Abt.!, Bdl.5,
P• 19.
158

• Cf. Ibid., pp. 16-19; MEGA, Abt.!. Bd.5, PP• 17-19.
159.
Cf. Marx,"Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, ed. and trans. E.J.
Hobsbwam, (New York: International Publishers, 1965), a translation of
a text from the Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomie, (Berlin:
Dietz Verlag, 1953), pp. 375-413, in which these ideas are developed.
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-189Manuscripts, and that the rationale he there offers is explicitly
related to his theory of human nature.
In the portion of the Manuscripts refered to here, Marx explicitly
objects to the Feuerbachian attitude which conceives social relations to
be given directly in the experience of the individual, in the form of
immediately had "I-thou" relations."Social activity and satisfaction by
no means exist merely in the form of immediate communal activity and
• .
.
11160
I
immeidate communal satisfaction.
And Marx objection to Feuerbach her
is specifically that he does not comprehend social relations as made
possible by, and one might also say as "mediated" by, productive activity.
Marx in the Manuscripts even hints at the idea of society as an historica
subject, at least through his references to communist society as the goal
of history.161 On these terms, then, it seems invalid to argue that the
Marx of such texts as the "Theses on Feuerbach" and the German Ideology
differs fundamentally from the doctrine of the Paris Manuscripts, and
that the "communal humanism" of those Manuscripts is merely borrowed
from Feuerbach.
In addition to the above, two further aspects of Marx' critisism of
Feuerbach's doctrine of social relations should be noted. These are,
first, that Marx understands Feuerbach as unable to describe the social
individual adequately as an agent, and second, that Feuerbach's

concept

of the social individual as desiring to overcome his felt limitations
160.

Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, Abt.l,
Bd.3, P• 116.
161.
Cf. Ibid.
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through association with others is an inadequate description of the
phenomenon of needs.
The first of these points may initially seem to be merely a
repetition of the above. But the above argument represented a Marxian
critique of Feuerbach's doctrine of social relations as such. This point
rather reflects a Marxian critique of Feuerbach's attitude towards the
status of the individual as a member of social relations. And it begins
from the text of Marx cited above, stating that, "Social activity and
satisfaction by no means merely exist

in the form of an immediatecommunal

•
activity
and immed iate communa 1 satis f action. 11162 • For F euer b ac h , t h e

experience of community or of social relations is had by the individual
in its most concrete and essential features in diredt interpersonal
relations, in relations of the "I" to the "thou" in Feuerbach's language.
6f such relations, Feuerbach asserts that they directly and immediately
occur, that they are necessary for the individual for reasons cited above,
and that they satisfy. And these assertions are taken by him to describe
such relations essentially.
But given this, what can be said of the individual whose experience
occurs essentially within the context of such relations? Simply that he
so occurs, that he must so occur in order to realize himself as a human
individual, and that he derives necessary satisfation from his direct
occurence within-the interpersonal milieu. This, however, is to omit any
discussion of the individual as a real agent, and it is precisely this
162

• Ibid.

-191omission which Marx seems to find objectionable.
This objection is not one primarily directed at the internal
consistency of Feuerbach's position. It is one directed rather at the
adequacy of his position, its ability to include and account for data
which need to be included and accounted for. The individual's occurence
as an agent in society, rather than simply his occurence itself in social
relations, is one datum which, Marx holds, needs to be described and
explained by any adequate theory of social relations. This means that a
theory of social relations must at least offer some reason to describe
the individual as an agent in society.

163

And Feuerbach's theory of

social relations does not offer this. Feuerbach perhaps could assert the
statements noted above as describing the individual in community, and also
assert that this individual is the subject of actual productive activity.
But this is simply to add concepts together or to lay them side by side,
rather than to theoretically unify them through argument. Because of the
statements he does make concerning the nature of immediate community,
and because he holds that these statements describe social relations
generally in their essential features, Feuerbach is unable to describe
the individual productive agent in society with sufficient theoretical
force. And thus he is even more unable to theoretically comprehend the
statement made by Marx in the Paris Manuscripts, clearly descriptive of
the individual as a productive agent, that, "The expression of his

163

-

Ibid.
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life - even if it does not appear immediately in the form of a communal
expression carried out together with others - is therefore an expression
164.
and assertion of social life."
Finally, a contrast must be made between Marx' notion of "needsn in
relation to the social individual, and Feuerbach's notion of the "desire"
which the individual feels in relation to community. And it will be
seen that on this point, too, Marx levels criticism against Feuerbach's
doctrine of social relations.
For Feuerbach, as noted above, community relates to the desire which
the individual entertains in relation to his own felt limitations. That
desire must be examined in more detail here. We have seen Feuerbach argue
that it is through concrete communal experiences that the individual both
achieves "species consciousness" and discriminates himself as an
individual distinct from others. But this is also to say that through
concrete communal experiences the individual achieves realization of the
perfections of human nature, which are the contents of "species
consciousness," as infinite or absolute, as well as of himself as
individually actualizing those perfections in only a limited fashion.
Dlis latter awareness is had both through the individual's noting in
others the actualization of some human perfections to a greater degree
163
than within himself,
and through his experiencing interpersonal
164

• Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA,
Abt.I, Bd.3, p. 117.
165
• Cf. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 156;
Sammtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 189.
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-193contexts in which certain human perfections are experienced as ends in
166
themselves e.g. love in the context of the sexual relationship.
These
statements point out that, as Feuerbach understands it, communal experine
does not simply relate to that desire which the individual experiences
to overcome his necessary limitations; communal experience is also the
source of that desire. It is in virtue of his being located communally,
then, that the individual experiences that desire which in turn governs
his actions towards the realization and enrichment of interpersonal
relations, and thus, toward·s the satisfaction of the desire itself.
But one can immediately see that, for Marx, this discussion is
inadequate because too abstract. And it is overly abstract both as a
discussion of desire or need itself, and as one of the relation between
desire or need and communal or social relations.
As seen in the first chapter Marx does insist on describing the
individual as subject of desires or needs.

On

the one hand, some discuss!

of needs is necessary in order to make sense of the phenomenon of
activity: activities are undertaken towards the satisfaction of needs.

On the other hand, Marx seems also to hold that heeds themselves can
only be adequately comprehended in relation to the notinn of activity:
a need is itself some felt lack or deficiency which the individual
experiences about himself, and whose resolution or overcoming involves
166.

Cf. Ibid., p. 156; Sammtliche Werke, vol.6, p. 188.

i67.
~'

Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, pp. 325-326;
Abt.I, Bd.3, pp. 160-161.
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his undertaking some relevant activity.

Further, we have seen that for

Marx there is also a necessary relation between the occurence of needs
and social relationships. One of Marx' ways of defining human productive
activity or praxis involves his holding that such activity is based on
and governed by needs of two sorts: "subsistence needs" rooted in the
physiological structure of the organism, and "human needs," which are
developed beyond those involving simply physiological requirements and
responses, and which are the source of activity which can be more
.
170
169
and Marx wou 1d insist creative.
accurately entitled productive,
Marx further insists in this context that human needs are developmental,
and that a need which develops in the experience of the individual agent
develops from activity undertaken for the satisfaction of other needs.

171

Here the relation between the occurence of needs and society or
social relations can be seen. In that newly developed needs arise from
instances of productive activity, the details of these new needs are the
168.

Cf. Ibid., P• 326; MEGA, Abt.l, Bd.3, p. 161.

169.

Cf. Ibid., PP• 292 and 294; MEGA, Abt.l, Bd.3, PP• 86 and 88.
1

170.

Cf. Ibid., P• 294; MEGA, Abt.l, Bd.3, P• 88.

l71. Cf • Marx-Engels, The German I d eology, Pascal, pp. 16-17 ; MEGA,
Abt.l, Bd, 5, p. 18. Marx' most explicit early statement of his idea
in found in this text already cited from The German Ideology. But, as
is argued in my first chapter, all the concepts which Marx takes to be
nedessary for the substantiation of this statement are operative in
those portions of the Paris Manuscripts in which Marx' early theory
of ~an is developed.

.;; 195result of those instances of productive activity from which they
develop.

172

• But in turn the details of that productive activity

available to the individual agent is initially determined by the content
of the social relations in which he is located, in that social relations
constitute a milieu which systematizes the activity of production occuring
173
within it. The social implication of this is that the content of newly
developed needs is the result of the features of the social contextin
which the practical agent, as subject of those needs, is situated.
These statements form the basis for a Marxian critique of Feuerbach
on the point noted above. Feuerbach is able to describe desire as a
feature of the experience of the individual which arises out of his
actual communal relations. And he is further able to offer something of a
desctiption of that desire: it is a desire of the individual to overcome
his necessary limited possession of the perfections of his own nature.
But given the limitations of his own analysis, Feuerbach is unable to
go beyond these statements, His analysis is unable to point out any
feature of the experience of community other than that communal
experience itself involves the direct experience of
relations, And

172
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likew~se,

he is

interpersonal

unable to point out any feature of

• Cf. Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, trans. J. Sturrock,
(London: Johnathan Cape Ltd., 1968) p. 118, for an argument which
supports this statement.
173.
Cf. Marx-Engels, The Berman Ideology, Pascal. p. 18; MEGA, Abt.l.
Bd.5, p. 19. Marx,"Manuscripts of 1844,"
Easton and Guddat, p. 306;
~, Abtl, Bd.3, p. ii6. It is in The German Ideology that Marx
specifically defines society in this fashion. But the definition is
clearly prefigured in the section of the Paris Manuscripts ref ered to
here.

-196this desire of the individual itself, other than that it is the desire
of the individual to fully possess the perfections of his own nature,
reason, love, and will. But this is, on the one hand, to discuss desire
or need abstractly, because even the desire to exercise reason, love, or
will can take on a multiplicity of forms, depending upon the actual
174
social environment within which one is situated.
It is, secondly, to omit a discussion of and an account of a vast
range of needs other than this desire itself of which the individual is
capable of being, and indeed must be, the subject. For one thing, it
omits a discussion of subsistence needs. Feuerbach seems to wish to
discuss something of this sort; he does assert that, "Indeed, even the
stomach of man ••• is not animal but human •••

11175

But his analysis of the

desire of the individual to overcome his limited possession of the
perfections of his nature ultimately collapses all other needs into
simply this desire. Marx, on the other hand, certainly wishes to assert
that subsistence and human needs occur concurrently and are integrated
. genu i ne human praxis,
. 176 bu t h e a 1so wis
. h es t o main
. t ai n a
with in
distinction between"these two sorts of needs,

177

and to develop a theory

11 4 • Cf. Marx, ''Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA,
Abt.l. Bd.3, p. 116. This is clearly implied in Marx' description---orscientific theoretical behavior.
175. Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 69; Scimmtliche
•
Werke, vol.2, p. 31
176.

Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 292; MEGA
Abt.l, Bd.3, P• 86.
177 ~·

Cf. Ibid., pp. 325-326; MEGA, Abt.l, Bd.3, PP• 160-161.
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Finally, Feuerbach is unable on Marx' terms to point out those
specific features bf social relations which result in the development of
needs for the individual. He is simply able to hold that communal
experience is directly had, and that it is the source of desire. But in
that he is unable to point out that about the individual which is the
source of his developing new needs. namely, productive activity, he is
unable also to point out that about society which concretely influences
the development of those needs: society as the systematization of the
productive options available to the individual.
In short, Marx views Feuerbach as unable to accurately describe and
account for the essentially social character of needs, and of the
individual himself, to assert accurately that man is " ••• the ensemble of
social relationships. 11 178 Feuerbach is only able to describe the
individual as the subject of desire in general, to wit the general
desire to fully exercise rationality, affection, and volition, and is onl
able to attain an abstract description of community as the source of this
desire, community as the experience of interpersonaiity immediately had.
He is unable to point out the specific features of the social context
which elicit the development of needs within the individual, or the
concrete character and range of the needs operative within the individual
himself.

178

• Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA,
Abt.l, Bd.5, p. 535.

-198At this point one might pause to note that, given the above, it
appears that the interpretation of Marx' theory of man offered by
Althusser is untenable. Althusser comments that the theory of man offered
by Marx is identical in all but terminology with the doctrine of human
nature developed by Feuerbach, and specifically with Feuerbach's
understanding of man as essentially communal or social. But we have seen
three critical themes, those of the relation of nature and action,
nature and consciousness, and the social dimension of the individual
itself, on which Marx markedly differs from and stands in opposition to
Feuerbach's philosophical doctrine. That opposition is discoverable not
only in certain texts of 1845, such as the "Theses on Feuerbach" and the
German Ideology, as Althusser himself will admit, but also in the
Manuscripts of 1844. Althusser's interpretation then will not hold. One
must rather hold that in the Paris Manuscripts Marx develops a theory of
man that is uniquely his own rather than borrowed from Feuerbach, and
that this theory manifests a continuity with Marx' 1845 texts. 17 9
VI. Humanism and Ideology.
A final point in Althusser's critique of the 'humanism' of the
Paris Manuscripts must however be dealt with. This is Althusser's
comment as to Marx' own criticism of the viability of a theory of
human nature, as expressed in such texts as the "Theses on Feuerbach,"
179. Cf. Louis Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations o!_ Marxism, (New York.

Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc., 1966), P· 121. By the time Marx penned I
the Paris Manuscripts, he had discovered that Feuerbach's " ••• man of fles ·
and blood was no less abstract than Hegel's Idea."

-199the German. Ideology, and the Poverty of Philosophy.As Althusser reads the
texts, Marx in 1845 came to grips with the question of the possibility of
a theory of human nature and rejected this possibility because, "It
implied, as he confronted it, two complimentary postulates defined by
him in the sixth thesis on Feuerbach: 1) that there exists a universal
essence of man; 2) that this essence is the attribute of 'isolated
individuals' who are irs real subjects.

11180

Marx certainly wishes to deny these postulates in the Sixth Thesis.
He asserts there that, " ••• the essence of man is no abstraction inhering
in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social
h.ips.
.
re 1ations
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. f orces t h'is assert i on as a speci.fic
n h e rein

criticism of Feuerbach in the Eighth Thesis, in stating that,
" ••• perceptual materialism," i.e. Feuerbach's doctrine, is one "that does
not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the view of
1s2.
separate individuals in civil society. 11
The questions which pose
themselves here are, what are the details of this criticism offered by
Marx of Feuerbach; is this an implicit criticism by Marx of his own
theory in the Paris Manuscripts; and is there any role for a theory of
man which, given these statements, Marx might understand as valid?
Regarding the first question, Marx' criticism of Feyerbach here may

180. Althusser, .££.· cit., p. 234.
181. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA, Abt.l,
Bd.5, p. 535.
182 • Ibid.

r
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be fruitfully seen in relation to certain of his criticisms of Prudhon
offered in the Poverty of Philosophy. 183 In asserting that Feuerbach's
doctrine is " ••• the view of separate individuals in civil society ••• "
Marx is pointing out that for Feuerbach, the individual is himself and
on his own terms the embodiment of human nature, as possessor of the
perfections of the species, although his experience is also given as
directly interpersonal. And this implies that the desires or 'needs' of
the individual can be accurately deduced from a correct theory of human
nature. But Marx wishes to argue, as pointed out previously, that to
describe the individual concretely as the subject of needs involves the
description of those needs themselves as developing dialectically from
undertaken instances of praxis, and in the face of a social milieu which
systematizes and thus determihes the options for productive activity
available to the individual agent, as well as providing the " ••• material
of ••• act i vity...
.

11184

availab le for

t

h e agents
' use, and t h e possi b i 1 ities

of the imaginative development of new forms of praxis. It is from this
basis that consciousness, as a mode of effectively dealing with the
environemnt, arises as a capacity for the individual. And it is from
this basis alsp that affection and volition arise as available ways of
relating to personal others within the social environment, but not the
183

• Cf. Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx,
(Cambridge: Cambridge Unimsity Press, 1969), p. 71, where it is
suggested that the criticisms of Feuerbach and Prudhon implied here are
identical.

184

• Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton alid Guddat, p. 306, MEGA,
Abt.!, Bd.3, p. 116, for this usage.'-

-201most basic ways of so relating, in that, for Marx, all instances of
interpersonal interaction are founded upon and made possible by that
objectification which results from productive activity itself.

185

It is the context of these notions that Marx wishes to assert against
Feuerbach in the Sixth Thesis that, " ••• the essence of man ••• is the
ensemble of social relationships." It is the specific detail of the socia
environment which governs those f Drms of praxis available to the
individual as options, which forms the contextual basis from which he
may develop new modes of productive activity through creative
imagination. Social relations are thus the necessary context conditioning
the individual's possession of needs, his d.evelopment of new needs, and
his exercise of consciousness, affection, and volition as manners of
relating to and dealing with his natural-social environment. This is to
say that, for Marx,

an~

attempt to eluaidate a theory of man which would

postulate specific predicates such as rationality, affection, and
volition as the perfections of or fundamental needs resident in human
nature, in abstraction from a discussion of these as developing in their
actual and varied manifestations from real productive activity, and
productive activity in turn as conditioned and constituted by exhisting
historical society, is to Marx objectionable. And this is precisely the
objection which he levels against Feuerbach in the Sixth and Eighth
Theses.
185 • Cf. Ibid., p. 305; MEGA, Abt.!, Bd.3, p. llS. Also see Marx,
"Excerpt-Notes of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 281; MEGA, Abt.!. Bd.3,
pp. 546-547.
--
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Feuerbach~

are developed by Marx

in criticisms of Prudhon offered in the Poverty of Philosophy. Their
content may be developed, therefore, by a brief examination of selected
ideas from that work.
Avineri sums up well Marx' criticism of Prudhon, and the unity of
this with his attack on Feuerbach. "Classical materialism ••• reduced human
activity to abstract postulates like 'the essence of man,' making a
discussion of history as man's sekf development impossible on its own
premises. According to Marx·, Prudhon faced the same dilemma when he
started, under the influence of classical political economy, to discuss
human nature per

~,

overlooking the fact that human nature itself is the

ever-changing product of human activity, ie.

of history. 111 86 That this

comment accurately reflects Marx' criticism of Prodhon can be seen from
an exanination of the text.
Marx first accuses Prudhon of a dual error with regard to his
comprehension of needs as the source of individual productive activity,
and of society as the context in which productive activities and
relations of production occur and are developed. According to Marx,
Prudhon erroneously holds first that productive activity is initiated
in virtue of the individual's sensing certain inate needs which cannot be
11187
. fi e d b y If nature ' s spontaneous pro ductiou,
.
satis
and wh ose sat i s f act i on
186 • Avineri,_2E_. cit., p. 71.
187 • Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy,(New York: r:nternationalPublishers,
1963), p. 31; Misere de la Philosophie, (Paris: Editions Sociales,
1946), p. 31.

r
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productive activities more efficient, the individual agrees to cooperate
productively woth others in society who are able to carry out different
.
i c f unctions.
.
188
and var i ous prod uctive-econom

But to propose these theses is to err on two counts. It is, first,
to fail to offer an explanation of the development of those needs which
yield the initiation of productive or "economic" activity. Marx'
implication here is that, because Prudhon is unable to offer such an
explanation, his only way of accounting for the occurence of needs is the
positing of a human essence, in the sense of an essence of the homo
economicus, from which such need- are directly derived. This involves an
error of which, as Althusser notes, Feuerbach is in Marx' eyes equally
guilty, that of supposing, " ••• l) that there exists a universal essence
of man; 2) that this essence is the attribute of 'isolated individuals'
who are its real subjects. 11189 Second, Prudhon is unable to offer an
account of the genesis of social relationships. He simply hypostacizes
society as an existing entity, which as existing can then be the scene
of productive relations towards the enhanced satisfaction of inately
possessed needs. He is unable to account for the genesis of society as
made possible by praxis, or to describe accurately the nature of society
'

188 • Cf. Poverty, pp. 32 and 33; Mis~re, pp. 32 and 33,to note that, as
Marx reads Prudhon, the latter errs on the question of the origin of
exchange value. "'A man' sets out to 'propose' to other men, his
collaborators in various functions, that they establikh exchange, and
make a distinction between ordinary value and exchange value."
189 • Althusser, .£1?.· cit., P• 234.
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fundamentally the systematization of pro?uctive activities. As Marx

puts it," ... M. Prudhon personifies society; he turns it into a
190
person,"
considers it as a person and an entity, rather than as a
system of relations.
Becuase of this dual error, Prudhon, as Marx reads him, falls prey
to further erroneous ideas concerning both man and society. Concerning
society, Prudhon is first unable, I ike Feuerbach, to accurately describe
it as the subject of history. If society is the scene of productive
activities and relations, and if productive activities are undertaken
because of needs which arise out of a universal essence of man, then
neither will these activities, nor society as the scene thereof, undergoe
191
historical change.
Prudhon is unable to describe society as the subject
of history, and thus is further unable to account for historical change,
to note t hat, "T he movement o f h .1 story pro d uces soc .1 a I re I at .1ons • 1 I 192
More germane to our theme, for Marx, Prudhon errs further in
describing man, specifically in his description of human productive
activity and human needs. Because he fails to accurately note the
relation of needs to praxis, he is unable to define human needs as
essentially developmental, or to see the relation between developed needs
and the social milieu of the individual; unable to hold, in short, that,
190 Poverty, p. 91; Misere, pp. 73-74.
191

.
Cf. Poverty, p. 122; Mis~re, pp. 97-98, for Marx' exp I icit reply
to Prudhon on this point.
192
Poverty, p. 106; Mis~re, ~- 86.

r
r
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''Most needs arise directly from production, or from a state of affairs
based on production. 11 193 Because he invalidly posits an essence of the
homo economicus, that is, Prudhon is unable to recognize that the needs
which give rise to praxis, the details of productive activity itself, and
the social relationships occuring between productive agents, change
through history. Again, as Marx puts this in the Povert_y_ of Philosophy,

"¥. Prudhon does not know that all history is nothing but a continuous
transformation of human nature. 11 194
From this, one may see that Marx levels certain conunon objections
against both Feuerbach and Prudhon, concerning the possibility of a
theory of human nature. He objects to a theory of human nature which
would posit given needs, be they "humanistic" or economic," as resident
in the individual simply because of his possession of "human nature;" or,
to any theory of human nature from which given and specific needs amy be
deduced as necessarily occuring for the (ahistorical) individual. He
objects to any theory of human nature which is unable to account for the
development of new needs out of instances of praxis. And he objects to
any theory of human nature which is unable to comprehend the individual
as a productive agent, as one whose experience, in terms of his very
productive activity itself, is concretely governed and conditioned by
his social relationships; and theory of man unable to comprehend that
193. poverty, p. 42 ; M'isere,
'
p. 49 •
194

• Poverty, p.147, see also pp. 166-161;

p. 80.

Mis~re,

p. 115, see also

r
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Given these objections, however, one can see upon comparison that
Marx is not objecting, as Althusser claims he is, to his own theory of
man as developed in the Paris Manuscripts and elsewhere.

And in the

Manuscripts themselves, Marx provides at least the conceptual bases for
the overxoming of these objections.
First, as seen in chapter one, Marx undertakes his description of
the relation of praxis and needs in the Paris Manuscripts, and links
this to his discussion of action and nature already noted in this chapter
For the individual agent, "The objects of his drives ••• exist outside
him as independent, yet they are objects of his need,

essential and

indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his essential capacities. 11 196

The distinction between subsistence needs and human needs

is also drawn in the Manuscripts.197

And most essentially, those con-

cepts which in a Marxian context explain how it is possible that activity
towards the satisfaction of needs may result both in that satisfaction
and in the development of new needs are also laid down therein, as
I show in chapter one, under the headings of transformation, objectification, and self actualization.
l95Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach,"
Bd. 3, p. 535.

In that praxis results in a product

Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA, Abt. 1,

196Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Eastlon and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 3, P• 116.
197cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 292; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 86.

-207which in its "objective" reality embodys the details of that activity of ··
which it is the result, then human praxis is such as to render the natural context in which it necessarily occurs transformed, precisely
because that content now includes some item that is the product not of
nature taken simply, but of the activity of the agent on nature.198
This however is to say that the environment is transformed and thus
is one which offers new possibilities to the subject of praxis.

Further,

in acting towards the satisfaction of a need, the subject of pxaxis
transforms not only his natural environment but also himself: " ••• object
ification also connotes self actualization: by externalizing his inner
life through labor, man labors and creates, in short, brings out of
himself his human potentialities ••• 1119 9

In developing his own capacitie

through praxis, the productive individual develops himself as one capabl
of responding to new possibilities which his transformed environment,
elicits, as one capable of developing and of being the subject of new
needs, and of relating to these needs throush more complex forms of
productivity.

It is in the German Ideology that Marx asserts that

" ••• as soon as a need is satisfied ••• new needs are made; and this
production of new needs is the first historical act. 11 200

But the

concepts which make this statement possible are found in texts as early
198cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, pp. 290-291;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 84.
199Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice. p. 342.
200&rx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Abd. 5, p. 18.

;..208as the Manuscripts of 1844.
Further, in those Manuscripts Marx develops the concepts which enable
him to hold that praxis, and the productive individual, are essentially
social phenomena.

He indicates therein that it is the productive

activity of the individual which makes social relations possible for him,
as well as which determines the specific features of those social relations " ••• the immediate activity of his individuality, is at the same
time his own existence for other men, their existence, and,their existence for him. 11201

He asserts that productive activity, given that its

result is an object in some sense external to its producer and thus
public, is activity which is in principle accessible to others and
therefore social: " ••• what I make from myself, I make for society,
conscious.of my nature as social. 11 202

And he provides in the Manuscripts

conceptual direction towards the specific assertion, made in the German
ideology, that society, as the systematization of the productive activities occuring in it, controls the options for productive activity
available for its members, as well as the foundation upon which new
options might be imaginatively developed: " ••• society itself ••• produces
man as man. 11 203

This willl allow him, also to assert that it is con-

201Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 3, P• 115.
202Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 306, MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 3, p. 116.
203Marx, "Manuscrfpts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 3~ P• 116.

-209cretely wothin the context of social relations that new needs are developed, and that social relations themselves condition the development
of those new needs.

Finally, in virtue of the above, Marx is also

able in the Manuscripts even to initially comprehend society as the

sub~

ject of history, and thus human self-actualization as historical:
" ••• only naturalism is able to comprehend the act of world history •••
History is the true natural history of Mankind. 11 204
One would not wish to, from the above, argue that there is a simple
identity between the Manuscripts of 1844 and succeeding texts such as
the German Ideology or the Poverty of Philosophy, on the theme of the
question of the viability of a theory of human nature, or even on the
complete exposition of the details of that theory.

Certainly these

succeeding texts develop, enrich, and offer new insights into the concepts offered in the Manuscripts themselves.
thesis.

I wish to argue a narrower

Althusser: claims that Marx' criticisms of Feuerbach's theory

of human nature, 'both stated and implied, in the "Theses" on Feuerbach,
represent a break with the theory of man which Marx had appropriated
from Feuerbach and himself outlined in the Paris Manuscripts.

It has

been shown that Althusser' s ... interpretation of the Manuscripts as merely
appropriating Feuerbach'sr doctrine of human nature will not do.

The

theory contained therein is, in crucial features, distinct from Feuerbach's doctrine.

Now, the details againsg Prudhon in the Poverty of

204Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 305,.al!_d p. 327.
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160 and p. 162.

-2iOPhilosophy as to the possibility of a theory of human nature have also
been elucidated, and it has further been shown, I would hold, that these
criticisms are not implicit criticisms of Marx' own 1844 position.
The final question which arises from the above analysis is, given
his objections to Feuerbach and Prudhon, what might Marx take a viable
theory of man to be?

Clearly it cannot be a description of the content

of a "universal human nature: from which one may deduce those needs
and the details of those experiences which will occur for the individual.
This is clear from the above objections.

But to say this is not to yet

deny the possibility of a theory which describes the structural features
of formal features in terms of which human historical experience is had,
and in terms of which it is to be comprehended.

And it is precisely

this role which a theory of man plays for Marx.
Avineri connnents significantly on this idea in his description
~

of Marx' theory of human nature.
Marx' view of history as shaping man who simultaneously
impresses himself on the· world makes it quite impossible to
ascribe to man any ~ priori essence. On the other hand,
man's world shaping function itself becomes the empirical
content of human existence. This process makes man into man,
differentiates him from animals and lies at the bottom of his
ability to create and change the conditions of his life. The
contents of this continual creation, dynamic and changing,
furnish the contents of the historical process. What is not
changing and not modified is historical creation as constant
anthropogenesis, deriving from ~ian's ability to create objects
in which he realizes his subjectivity.205
The point to Avineri's comment is this.

Marx wholly rejects any theory

of human nature which would, for example, allow one to deduce specific
205Avineri, op. cit., p. 85.

r
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needs as ones which

necessa~ily

occur for the individual, because such

a theory would in principle allow one to deduce in general the details
of human experience itself.

This would be to deny both human self-

actualization, and the historical character of that process, two phenomena of which Marx will not permit the denial.

But Marx will permit,

and indeed does develop and presume in the Paris Manuscripts and elsewhere, is a theory of those structural features of human nature which
specify man in terms of rendering historical self actualization, or as
Avineri puts it "anthropogenesis," possible.

For which for Marx, man's

nature "can be conceived only as his historically. created human possibility. 11206 at the same time some theory of the structural features of
human nature is necessary·in orfer·to show how, for man, historical
self actualization is possible, Such a theory enables one to, first,
comprehend the relation between various aspects of the specific character of and the self actualization of the individual, the relations
between productive activity, needs, natural environment, consciousness,
and society.

It provides criteria whereby the possibilities for

productive activity and for
historically and socially

experi~nce

located~

available to the individual

aan be comprehended as such.

Avineri, who in his commentary on Marx is fond of citing the
Grundrisse of 1857-58, might concerning this idea have cited a text
from the "General Introduction" to that work, in which Marx asserts
that, " ••• all stages of production have certain landmarks in common,
206Petrovic, "Marx; Concept of Alienation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1962-63, p. 422.
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common purposes.

PDoduction in general is an abstraction, but it is a

rational abstraction, insofar as it singles out and fixes the common
features, thereby saving us repetition." 207

The elucidation of the

common and structural features of social production enable one to comprehend and relate to one another accurately the concrete
details of historical productive societies.

Even so, the elucidation

of the common and structural details of human nature enable one to
comprehend and to relate to one another accurately the concrete details
of the experience and active self actualization of the historical
individual.

It allows one to comprehend the very possibility of the

historical self-actualizing individual itself.

Such a theory enables

oaa, .. second, to critically evaluate'" certain social conditions as ones
which violate the structural features of human productivity, ones which
for example render the agent unable to appropriate the object of his
activity for the satisfaction of a directly experienced need,208 or
which relegate the producer to action towards the satisfaction of subsistence needs alone, 209 and which thus yield a condition of "alienation"
in terms of productive activity. 210
207Marx, The Grundrisse, trans. McLellan, p. 18; Grundrisse, p. 7.
208cf. Marx, "Manuscripts'of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. SJ.
209 cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 292; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bel. 3, pp. 85-86.
21 0cf. Avineri, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
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theory that is to say, it is one which, in describing the structural
features of human nature, without attempting to provide a descriptive
account of the details of the actual experience of the historical individual, provides criteria or norms which enable one to comprehend
a) the possibility of self-actualizing historical human individuality
itself; b) the correct manner in which the details of the actual experience of the individual, including the concrete occurence for him of
praxis, needs, consciousness, and society, ought to be related to one
another for an accurate comprehension of that experience; and c) the
terms on which given social conditions can violate the structure of
human praxJ.s, yielding "alienation'.'.:.

This sort of normative theory of

human nature is clearly distinct in Marx' own eyes from the theories
of Feuerbach and Prudhon, and is one which he is able to maintain in
the face of his objections to these latter authors.
The purpose of this chapter has been to attain a clearer understanding of Marx' theory of human nature, through evaluating Althusser's.
claim that this theory is, insofar as it is exhibited in the Manuscripts
of 1844, one which Marx appropriates from Feuerbach, and one which he
moves to reject as early as 1845.

I take the analysis done in this

chapter, if successful, to have shown that this interpretat.ion is
erroneous.

On three critical themes, those of the notions of nature

in relation to action, consciousness, and human social relations, Marx
in the theses diverges significantly from Feuerbach, and this divergence
is made possible by concepts enunciated by Marx in the Paris Manuscripts
--

themselves as well as in other texts.

On the themes of the possibility
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and role of a theory of man, Marx' criticisms of Feuerbach, and allied
criticisms of Prudhon, in no way vitiate his 1844 position.

Thus it

cannot be held that the content of Marx' theory of human nature is
borrowed from, and can be understood by comparison to, Feuerbach's
doctr~ne.

If one is to look for the historical inspiration of Marx'

theory of man, it must be

elsewhere~than

the texts of the Essence of

Christianity and the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future.
Two pressing questions stand out, however, at the conclusion of
this analysis.

First, the theory of man which Marx can adopt, and which

accounts for man's historical self-actualization, depends on a proposition noted frequently in chapter one as one to which Marx ascribes:
that within the structure of human nature, praxis is the fundamental
feature of that structure.

But still, no definitive argument, as no

argument which Marx himself might view as definitive, has been exposed.
~

Is there such an argument in the texts, and if so what might it be?
Second, if the content of Marx' theory of man cannot be fruitfully
understood in terms of a positive comparison of it to Feuerbach, what
of Marx' relation to Hegel?

Can it be held that in Hegel are discover-

able those concepts which bear a possible relation to Marx' theory?
I shall argue, in the subsequent two chapters that the response to both
these questions is affirmative, and further that the relation between
Marx and Hegel is critical for two reasons.

First, because those con-

cepts which form the content of Marx' theory of human nature find their
historical and textual sources in Hegel.

And second, because Marx

offers that argument for the fundamentality of human praxis which he

-215himself considers to be definitive in a direct confrontation with
Hegel himself.

·-
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Chapter Three
Marx• Hegelian Sources
Readers of the texts of Marx are familiar with his encomium on Hegel
in the Manuscripts of 1844:
The great thing in Hegel's Phenomenology and its final
result - the dialectic of negativity as the moving and
productive principle - is simply that Hegel grasps the
, self-development of man as a process, objectification
as Joss of the object, as alienation and transcendence
of this alienation; thus he grasps the nature of work
and comprehends objective man, authentic because actual,
as the result of his own work. 1
This statement not only contains warm praise of Hegel, but singles out
several features of Hegel's thought which Marx adopts in his own theory of
man. It seems then that Marx here is giving Hegel credit for comprehending
and developing several concepts which Marx himself further elucidates and
develops in that theory.
But this statement, taken by itself, by no means states the whole
truth concerning the relation between Hegelian and Marxian theories of
man. For in the third of the Paris Manuscripts Marx is also severely
critical of Hegel, and the force of these criticisms is apparently that
Hegel misunderstood and did not properly develop those concepts which, for
Marx, must be operative and properly interrelated within a

theory of

human nature. For instance, Marx criticizes Hegel's view of subjectivity.
"Man is assumed as equivalent to self. But self is only man conceived
1Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, 11 in Easton and Guddat, p. 321; MEGA,
Abt.1, Bd.3, p. 156.
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abstractly, derived through abstraction."

2

Marx also asserts that Hegel if

unable to understand correctly the nature of needs as they function for
man, 3 is unable to grasp properly man's relation to nature,
character and role of consciousness in human experience.

5

4

or the

And finally, in

virtue of these inadequacies, Marx accuses Hegel of being unable to compre·
bend human productive activity or praxis itself.

"The rich, living,

sensuous, concrete activity of self objectification therefore becomes its
mere abstraction, absolute negativity, an

abstract~on

regarded as independent activity, as activity itself.

fixed as such and
116

On first reading, then, the texts reveal that Marx' own attitude
towards his relation to Hegel with regard to his theory of man is far from
unequivocal.

Marx seems to both affirm and deny Hegel's adequate

understanding of the key concepts utilized in that theory.

Here again the

commentaries on Marx fail to answer satisfactorily the problem of the
relation of Marx' thought to that of Hegel.

Althusser insists that

2

MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158, Easton and Guddat, op. cit., p. 322.
3
Cf. MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160, Easton and Guddat, op. cit., p. 325

4
Cf. Ibid.
5
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 163, Easton and Guddat, op. cit., p. 328.
6
~'Abt.

-

1, Bd. 3, p. 168, Easton and Guddat, op. cit., p. 333.
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" ••• the young Marx was never an Hegelian •••

117

But Lefebvre holds that the

basic theory of the Paris Manuscripts, " ••• is still closer to Hegelian
rationalism than to Feuerbachian naturalism. 118

Hyppolite states that the

development of Marx' theory involves his " ••• making novel use of the
!Hegelian dialectic," 9 which remained essential to Marx' theorizing despite
the modifications he makes in his appropriation of it.

Rotenstreich holds

that " ••• Marx' concept of practice is parallel to Hegel's concept of
Spirit, and was developed to replace it; that the relationship between
practice and theory according to Marx is parallel to the relationship
between spirit and reason according to Hegel."

10

And Lobkowicz, going

further, asserts that, " ••• almost everything which Marx says about labor
can be traced back to Hegel."

11

It seems, then, that significant difficulties face the attempt to
determine the relationship between those concepts developed and utilized b)
7

Louis

Alt~usser,

Pour Marx, (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1969), p. 27.

8
Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, trans. John Sturrock,
(London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1968), p. 101. Lefebvre refers here overtly
to Marx' theory of alienation, but he has also the general theory of praxii
in mind.
9

Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and
Basic Books, 1969), p. 95.

Hegel~

tran. O'Neill, (New York:

10
Nathan Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy,
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), p. 41.
11
'
Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, (Notre Dame: The University
"""- of Notre Dame Press, 1967), ·~· 321.
.
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in his theory of human nature, and the philosophy of Hegel.

Be this

as it may, it is nonetheless the case that such an attempt must be made,
for its resolution is critical to a proper understanding of Marx' theory of
man itself.

Iring Fetscher has noted that " ••• the history of the

differing interpretations of the relationship between Marx and Hegel
12
reflects the history of the development of Marxism itself."
Analogously,
the interpretations of various commentaries on the content of Marx' theory
of human nature varied according to their

interpreta~ions

of Marx in rela-

tion to his predecessors, especially Feuerbach and Hegel.

We have already

seen how this happens in the case of Althusser.

Althusser interprets the

'humanistic' Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts to be simply Feuerbachian, and
this effects his understanding of Marx' early 'humanism'.

It leads

Althusser to an interpretation of Marx' theory of man which is,
judgment, erroneous.

But Althusser's case is instructive.

~n

my

From it we

can recognize the importance of an accurate understanding of Marx!
relations to his predecessors.

For, comprehending these relations

accurately will enable us to comprehend more precisely Marx' theory itself.
In this and the following Chapter I shall argue that the basic
operative concepts of Marx' theory of man as analyzed in Chapter One, were
appropriated from.Hegel, though Marx differs from Hegel with respect to thi
precise relationship of consciousness to human praxis.

This implies,

contrary to Althusser, that the young Marx was very much 'an Hegelian,'

12
Iring Fetscher, Marx and Marxism, trans. John Hargreaves, (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1971), p. 40.

... 220that Marx was at the same time a disciple and a radical revisionist of
and that we must understand in detail how Marx
plays both these roles if we are to grasp the distinctive
of Marx' theory of man.

I shall also argue in chapter four that

argument against Hegel's view of the relationship of consciousness
raxis is the same argument which, he would think, justifies his claim tha
of praxis is the most fundamental concept of an adequate theo

In this chapter, I shall limit my discussion to an analysis of those
oncepts discoverable in Hegel which can be seen as one appropriated by
man.

First, I shall exhibit a "pre-phenomenological"

a description of the individual in Hegel.

This is

it justifies discovering in Hegel concepts relating to a
Then I shall discuss the notions of experience, agency, an
in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Finally, I shall discuss

of the essential social dimension of experience, as he
develops that notion in the Philosophy of Right.
Consciousness and the Embodied Individual
It is doubtless the case that ;he Philosophy of Right and the

up to 1844.

Marx' famous Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of

completed in 1843, 13 and Marx used the analyses of that wor

,

13
Cf. Karl Marx, Criti ue of Heel's Philoso h
Malley, (Cambridge: The University Press,
, e itor s
· ix - xiv for a discussion of Narx' ur oses in writin
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the basis of the development of some crucial ideas in his article,

~'Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction. 1114 And,
~n

the Paris Manuscripts, Marx makes explicit reference to the

Phenomenolo~v

of Spirit.

One important feature of these remarks of Marx is

bis recognition that the Phenomenology contains concepts relevant to a
theory of human nature.
~resents

itself:

But if this is so then an innnediate difficulty

Is this a valid recognition, or is Marx' 'recognition' a

distortion of what the Phenomenology contains?

It is well known that Hegel

announced as his task in the phenomenology, " ••• the exposition of knowledge
as a phenomenon. 1115

How can such an exposition result in concepts proper

to a theory of human nature?

Or more precisely, how is it the case that a

science of knowledge, phenomenally taken, or of the experience of
consciousness, can be at the same time a science descriptive of the
individual?
Errol Harris correctly points out that a response to this question may
be most readily had through an examination of selected arguments from the

~hilosophy of Mind, 16 the third volume of Hegel's Encyclopedia of the
14
Cf. MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 1, pp. 607-621; Easton and Guddat, op. cit.,
pp. 249-264.

15
Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, .trans. Baillie, (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931), p. 135; Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, ed.
Johannes Hoffmeister, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952), p. 66.
16
Errol E. Harris, "Hegel's Theory of Feeling," in New Studies in
~egel's Philosophy, ed. Steinkraus, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,

-

1971), pp. 71-91.
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~ection

of that work Hegel

ttempts the transition from philosophy of nature to philosophy of mind
hrough arguing concerning the relationship of mind and individual
I refer to these arguments as Hegel's 'pre-phenomenological'
ustification of a science of the experience of consciousness, in that the
how the location of consciousness as individual experience, and thus
ustify a recognizable sense of the term phenomenon or experience of
consciousness.
Hegel introduces his analyses in the third volume of the Encyclopedia
'th a statement of the general character of the relation of mind to natur
as he conceives that relationship.

"From our point of view mind has for

its presupposition Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason
its absolute prius.

In this its truth Nature is vanished (ist

di~

Natur

erschwunden) and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of
itself."

18

The term 'truth' here is used in typical Hegelian fashion, to

indicate, as Soll points out, the 'truth' of a thing as " ••• its objective
or goal... "19

And Hegel goes on in an addendum to this article of the
how he takes mind to be the 'truth' of nature,

17
Cf. Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, trans. W. Wallace with the
Boumann Zusatze trans. by A.V. Miller, (Oxford: The University Press,
1971).
18
Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, trans. Wallace and Miller, p. 8;
G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopadie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, ed. Nocolin
and Poggeler, (Hamburg: Felix Me.iner Verlag, 1969), p. 313.
19

Ivan Soll, An Introduction to

Metaphysics, (Chicago: The

-223through stating that, " ••• in Nature, the

Ide~

appears in the element of

asunderness, is external not only to mind but also to itself, precisely
because it is external to that actual, self-existent inwardness which
.
20
constitutes the essential nature of ,.nund."
We are here reminded by Hegel first of that tlllderstanding of nature
which marks the beginning of the second volume of the Encyclopedia, that,
" ••• externality constitutes the specific character in which Nature, as
Nature, exi sts.

1121

Nature is

i~ediately characteri~ed

involving externality, parts outside of parts.

by Hegel as

But further, nature is

comprehended as a system, that is, that whose externality involves within
itself a tlllity.

This is seen by theoretical physics, which attempts to

comprehend the system and unity of nature in terms of intrinsic laws.
" ••• it is directed to a knowledge of the tllliversal aspect of
~iversal

natu~e,

a

which is also determined within itself - directed to a knowledge

of forces, laws, and genera, whose content must not be a simple aggregate,
but arranged in orders and classes, must present itself as an organism."
~ut

22

for this comprehension to occur, nature must exhibit itself as

involving such a unity, or as a process within which such a unity develops
out of natural externality, which process will be most fundamentally
(

20
Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, (Wallace, Miller), p. 9.
21
Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, trans. A.V. Miller, (Oxford: The

~larendon Press, 1970), p. 14; Hegel, Enzyklopadie. p. 200.

-

22
Cf. Ibid.;

Enzyklop~die,

pp. 199-200.

-224~omprehended

by philosophy of nature.

23

As Harris comments, for Hegel, "The entire natural process is one in
~hich

the self-externality of the spatio temporal world is progressively

pvercome, as each successive grade of natural being reflects more

~dequately
~

the entire

~ystem. 1124

Nature must be conceived of for Hegel as

process of internally determined development through which its character

pf parts outside of parts is progressively both canceled and preserved, one
through which its externality is maintained while at the same time its
~ntrinsic

unity is exhibited.

~ltimately

It is this which renders a scientific, and

a philosophical comprehension of nature possible.

With this in mind, let us see how for Hegel mind is the 'truth' of
nature.

The 'truth' or goal of nature is the exhibition of its own

intrinsic unity.

And this unity is finally and explicitly exhibited in

that individual organism which is capable of primative mental events
whereby it is aware of, or Hegel would say senses or feels,

25

and which

unifies its own experience; it is an individual capable of those primative
llllental events to which Hegel in the Encyclopedia refers under the heading
Pf 'sou1 1 •

26

Such awareness involves both a unification of experience, anc

23
Cf. Ibid.; Enzyklopadie, pp. 199-200.
24
Harris, op. cit., loc. cit., p. 77.
25
Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, (Wallace, Miller), p. 34;
Enzyklopadie, p. 320.

-225an initial emergence from nature of subjectiyity.
Harris cogently summarizes the point which Hegel wishes to make in
this portion of the Encyclopedia:
The entire natural process is one in which the selfexternality of the spatio temporal world is progressively overcome, as each successive grade of natural
being reflects more adequately the entire system •••
finally, in sentience, the whole of this natural
interconnectedness focused in the animal organism is
'inwardized' in subjectivity.
Mind thus comes( to be both as a product of.nature
and as its sublimation in feeling and awareness;
it is the form in which nature becomes aware of
itself, in a natural organism.27
The natural, sentient organism is capable of awareness, albeit primative
awareness, of its own experience.

At the same time, this organism is a

feature of nature itself, and is thus the realization within nature itself
of nature's 'truth'.
Hegel, as noted above, offers 'soul' as a term descriptive of the
capacity for primative mental events marking the emergence of 'mind' in
nature.

And his abiding conce.rn throughout the first section of the

Philosoohy of Mind remains the description of 'soul' as an actual feature
of the experience of the individual organism.
~e

"The universal soul must not

fixed on as World Soul, as so to speak a subject, for it is only the

individual substance, which has its actual truth only as individual

27
Harris, op. cit., loc. cit.
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1128

Soul's emergence is the implicit goal or 'truth' of the

process of nature, but that goal is realized only through the actual
emergence of individual, natural organisms capable of primative forms of
awareness of experience.
~mergent

For Hegel to describe conscious events as so

from nature is to describe such events as properties of the

!individual.

29

This emphasis is further drawn out by Hegel in the Encyclopedia, as he
~escribes

the capacities of awareness of 'soul' under three headings:

sentience, feeling, and habit.

By sentience or sensation,

30

'Empfindung•, 31 Hegel means to indicate the barest form of organic aware28
Hegel, Enzyklopadie, p. 320, my translation. Cf. Hegel, Philosophy
of Mind, (Wallace, Miller), pp. 35-36, for a translation which is, in my
opinion, deceptive. Cf. also Harris, op. cit., p. 80, for commentary on
the idea offered by Hegel here.
29
Cf. Hegel, Enzykolpadie, pp. 325-326; Hegel, Philosophy of Mind,
(Wallace, Miller), p. 73, for confirmation that Hegel retains this argument
for consciousness as a property of the individual in the context of a
~iscussion of more developed forms of consciousness as well.
30
The former translation of 'Empfindung' is selected by Harris, the
flatter by Wallace. Harris' translation has the advantage of distinguishing
~n translation 'Empfindung' from 'Sinnlicheit', a distinction which Hegel
obviously draws.

31
Cf. Hegel, EnzyklopMdie, p. 325.
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-22732 so primative that the distinction between the object
ness to stimuli,
33 This most primative
and the organism as subject is not drawn therein.
form of awareness, however, itself forms the basis of its subject's
noticing itself as a subject, in the sense of feeling itself to be the
center of those instances of sentient apprehension which are its own.
~egel

entitles soul as capable of this level of awareness "feeling soul"

(fuhlende Seele). 34

He states with regard to "feeling soul" that, " ••• thie

self centered being is not merely a formal factor of sensation (ein
formelles Moment des Empfindenes): the soul· is virtually a reflected
totality of sensation - it feels in itself the total substantiality which
it virtually is - it is a soul which feels. 1135

The "soul which feels,"

the individual capable of distinguishing itself as a subject at least
32
Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, (Wallace, Miller), p. 33;
p. 325.

~nzyklopadie,

33
Cf. Ibid.; Harris, op. cit., p. 86.
34
Hegel, Enzyklopadie., p. 328.
35
Hegel (Wallace, Miller), p. 88;

--

Enzyklop~die.,

p. 328.

-228insofar as it is able to feel itself as the

~enter

of sentient events, is

through this ability capable of realizing itself as subject in a fuller
sense, as distinct from its sensations themselves.

This Hegel refers to

in the Encyclopedia in noting soul's ability of " ••• making itself an
abstract universal being and reducing the particulars of feelings (and of
consciousness ) to a mere f eature o f its b eing ••• 11

36

But the condition of the subject as soul being able to realize itself
in this fashion, i.e. as a conscious subject,

involv~s

its having recog-

nized its sensations as falling into categories or classes.

This felt

categorization of sensations through their repetition enables the subject
to at once recognize typical features of its experience, and also to view
them as features of its experience, rather than simply as its self.
this felt categorization which Hegel entitles "Habit" (Gewohnheit).

It is
37

The

development of Habit has two effects for that subject of the awareness
which Hegel names soul.

It enables the subject to cease preoccupation witl

its own internal sentient experience. 38

And it enables that subject to

attend to other and external features of its experience: " ••• it is at the
same time open to be otherwise occupied and engaged -- say, the feeling
36
Hegel (Wallace, Miller), p. 140; Enzyklop~die., p. 339.
37
Cf. Ibid.
38
Cf. Ibid.
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-229and mental consciousness in general."

39

And this is in turn the ground of

the ability of the subject to differentiate itself from such features of
~ts

experience, to realize itself consciously as a subject.
Two points need to be noted here.

~he

First, that Hegel does argue in

Encyclopedia that conscious experience and the subject of conscious

experience, arise from "soul" as characterized by sentience, feeling, and
~abit.

Hegel notes that "The actual soul with its sensations and its

toncrete self-feeling turned into habit, has implicitly realized the
'ideality' of its qualities ••• In this way it gains the position of thinker
and subject--specially a subject of the judgment in which the ego excludes
from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object, a
~orld

external to it--but with such respect to that object that in it it is

immediately reflected into itself.
ness."

40

Thus soul rises to become conscious-

Sentience, feeling, and habit, mark and describe the development

of the conscious subject as the "truth" of nature.

And second, insofar as

for Hegel the conscious subject emerges in this fashion from "soul," and
insofar as the subject of "soul" is necessarily the embodied subject,
~he

individual, then one can confidently state that for Hegel the conscious

~ubject

is the embodied individual, that conscious experience, the subject

Jllatter of phenomenology, is the experience of the indiyidual.

Hegel

bdicates this in stating that, "The soul, when its corporeity has been
39
Ibid.

40

-

Hegel (Wallace, Miller), p. ·1s1; Enzyklop~die, pp. 343-344.

-230and made thoroughly its own, finds itself there a single subject;
corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate, in being
to which, it is related to itself. ,Al

The conscious subject, the

of whose possibility is "soul" itself, is then also to be
42
by Hegel as the embodied individual.
And Harris, in commentin
emergence of consciousness as the "truth" of nature, confirms the
that consciousness must be here taken to mean for Hegel the experence of the conscious subject as individual.

"For Hegel, then, nature is

process of becoming through which mind is realized ••• In this
true, wide segments of nature are subjectivized, but not in som
ervasive soul-substance for which no evidence is forthcoming, but in the
• felt-experience of actual individuals, for it is as actual individual mind
that the universal idea exists. 1143
The point to these connnents is that Hegel, in discussing the emergenc
consciousness from nature as nature's "truth", insists in the
be understood as the experience of conscious subjects, embodied individuals.

Because of this, a science of the

structures of the experience, phenomenology as Hegel understands that term
41
Hegel (Wallace, Miller), p. 147;
42

Cf. Harris, op. cit., p. 90.

43
Ibid., pp. 77, 81.

Enzyklop~die,

p. 342.
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~ne

44 is at

and the same time a science of the structures of the experience of the

~ndividual.

Thus it is valid to hold, as Marx in at least one text seems

to have held, that we can discover in Hegel's Phenomenology concepts
suitable for a theory of man.
~hat

So if subsequent analysis should discover

certain features of Marx' theory of man seem to have been appropriated

oy him from Hegel, we will have no general reason to suppose that such
~ppropriation

distorts the meaning these concepts have for Hegel.

I now turn to the texts of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the
Philosoohv of Right themselves.
~he

First, consideration should be given to

doctrine of agency elucidated in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

It is

just for the development of a doctrine of agency that Marx pays tribute to
aegel, as the text cited in the opening of this chapter shows.

It seems

appropriate, therefore, to first of all direct attention towards that
doctrine.
II.

Agencv. Selfactualization. and Intersubiectivitv in the Phenomenologv
of Spirit
The first discussion of agency in the Phenomenology which seems

~elevant

to a discussion of the relation of Hegel to Marx appears in the

44
Cf. J.N. Findlay, Hegel: a re-examination, (New York: Collier Books,
[962), pp~ 301, 302 •

.......
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45

However,

preparations for the argument of that passage are made in the
"Introduction" to the Phenomenology of Spirit.

There Hegel makes certain

comments made concerning the relation of consciousness in general to its
object.
Hegel begins this analysis by asserting that consciousness, within its

bwn experience, may recognize its object as something which is both
distinct from itself and related to itself.

"Consciousness, we find,

distinguishes from itself something which it at the same time relates to
itself; or, to use the current expression, there is something for
consciousness ••• ,i4
~elation

6

For an item to be an object is for it to stand in some

to a subject, to occur within the experience of consciousness.

This, Hegel notes, is at once an "abstract1147 and an accurate gen~ral
statement descriptive of the nature of the object as such.

It is not a

statement which militates against the integrity of the object as such.
Rather, it describes Hegel's insistence that for an item to be an object is
for it to be a datum, and thus something which maintains its autonomy, and
at the same time to occur essentially, as an object, within the experience
of consciousness.

In Hegelian terminology, this is to say that for an

45
Cf. Hegel, The Ph~nomenology of Mind, trans. Baillie, p. 218 and
ff.; Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, pp. 133 and ff.

46
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 139; Phanomenologie, p. 70.
47

Cf. Ibid.

-
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nother," for consciousness.

48

Hegel develops and attempts to justify this understanding of
consciousness in relation to its object in the "Introduction" to the

of its object.

Knowledge is initially to be understood as the awarene

consciousness of that specific manner in which the object occurs
its experience: " ••• the determinate form of this process of relatin
r of there being something for a consciousness, is knowledge."

49

That

owledge which consciousness immediately has of its object is its awareess of the details of that relation which the object has to consciousness
in its experience, the perspective, as it were, that the object offers to
consciousness.

50

And within this knowledge itself, consciousness

distinguishes from the object as a content of its own awareness, the objec
"in itself," as occuring autonomously and as offering content to awareness.
48
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 139 and 142; Phanomenologie, pp. 70 and 7
49
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 139; Phanomenologie, p. 70.
50
Cf. Martin Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience, with a section
from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit translated by K.R. Dove, (New York:
Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 57-58, and p. 89, for astute comment on this
understanding of the object as it is had in the immediate knowledge of
consciousness.
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51

being in itself or per

is related to knowledge is likewise distinguished from it, and
as also existing outside this relation; one aspect of being per s
r in itself is called truth.

1152

The object as occurring "per se" or

tself" is taken by consciousness to occur within its experience, but
ame time is "called truth," is taken to be that which provides content to
onsciousness, rather than simply as being that content.
As Hegel goes on to note, this understanding had by consciousness of

relation to its object, and of the nature of the immediate knowledge of
object, allows consciousness to construct from within its own
)

erience criteria whereby the adequacy of its knowledge may be evaluated.
'In consciousness there is one element for another, or, in general,
oI).sciousness implicates the specific character of the moment of knowledge
es habt uberhaupt die Bestinnnheit des Moments des Wissen an ihm).

At the

'other' is not simply.!.£!. it, but also outside this relation
t has a being in itself, i.e. there is a moment of truth.

Thus in what

onsciousness declares inside itself to be the essence of truth we have the
tandard which itself sets up, and by which we are to measure its know51

Cf. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, p. 70. Hegel's text here
es clear that the distinction cited is one made within the experience of
onsciousness itself in its immediate knowledge of the object, rather than
ne drawn by the phenomenological observer: " ••• das auf das Wissen Bezogene
ird ebenso von ihm unterschieden und gesetzt als seiend auch ausser dieser
ziehung ••• "
52
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 139; Phanomenologie, p. 70.
• cit., pp. 88-89.

Cf. also Heidegger

r
-236-

ledge. ,.53

The ob ject occurs for consciousness in terms o f consciousness I

awareness thereof.

But the content of this awareness is derived from the

as existing within the experience of consciousness and simultaneous-

~bject

lly occuring "in itself".

And it is the object in this sense against which

~he adequacyrof knowledge must be measured. 54 Since, however, the object
~s

"in itself" occurs within the experience of consciousness, consciousness

~rom
~f

within its own experience has to construct standards for the evaluatic

its own knowledge.

55

This account of the relation of consciousness and its object, however,
~aises

the question of how consciousness revises its knowledge of its

pbject.

In handling this question Hegel offers a further critical

~escription

of the relation qf consciousness to its object, and of the

nature of the experience of consciousness itself.
~escription

According to the

of consciousness' immediate attitude towards its object just

given, it appears to consciousness that its knowledge is knowledge of the
Object as it stands in relation to consciousness (fur ein anderes), 56 while
at the same time the content of this knowledge is offered by the object as
53
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 140; Phanomenologie, p. 71.

54
Cf. J. Loewenberg, Hegel's Phenomenology, (La Salle: The Open Court
bublishing Co., 1965), p. 14.
55
Cf. Ibid.
56
Cf. Hegel, PhMnomenologie, p. 71

i
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it occurs independently.

Suppose a comparison of the two be made, such

that consciousness discovers that some modification in its knowledge is
necessary.

That is, suppose consciousness compares its "knowledge" of the

object to the latter as it is "in itself" and discovers that its knowledge
is not adequate to the reality of the object, and thus discovers that its
~owledge

must be in some fashion modified or developed.

Should this occur, two results ensue.

First, the awareness of the

object which consciousness entertains is appropriately modified.

"Should

both, when thus compared, not correspond, consciousness seems bound to
alter its knowledge, in order to make it fit the object. 1157
the object itself is now viewed differently by consciousness.

But second,
Previously,

consciousness made the distinction of the object as for another (for
consciousness) and as in itself, but understood the object as in itself
to be the source of its own knowledge of the content of the object, i.e.,
the object as for consciousness.

Thus, while consciousness distinguished

the object as for another and in itself, its concept of the content of
the object belied this distinction, simply because one concept, rather thar
two, was involved.

Consciousness may through some experience of the object

be moved to modify its concept of that object, but this will be a modification of the concept and experience of the object both as it is in relation
to consciousness and as it is in itself, because the latter is understood
!Precisely as the source of the former.

As Hegel puts it, " ••• in the

57
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 142; Phanomenologie, p. 72.
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alteration of knowledge, the object also, in.point of fact, is altered;
for the knowledge which existed was essentially a knowledge of the object;
~ith

change in this knowledge, the object also becomes different, since
58
it belonged essentially to this knowledge."
These statements form for Hegel an explicitation of the statement that

the distinction of the object as in itself and for consciousness is one
~hich

falls within the experience of consciousness itself, and from this

~xplicitation

implications may be drawn concerning tpe general nature of

the experience of consciousness, and concerning the role of consciousness
in its own experience.

If Hegel's analysis is correct, then the descrip-

tion of the object offered through the already noted distinction is
subsumed under a new category, and the object is now understood as being it
itself for consciousness: " ••• consciousness comes now to find
formerly to it was the essence is not what is per

~'

th~t

what

or what was per

~

was only per se for consciousness (ft.fr es an sich), 1159 since consciousness,
upon finding it necessary to modify its knowledge of its object, finds that
" ••• the object likewise fails to hold out ••• 1160
~escribe

the object as that.which is for consciousness is not to deny the

integrity of the object.
58

Ibid.
59

Ibid.
60

~-

--

Hegel insists that to

What is denied, rather is that the object is to
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e simply as a reality in itself, and the negation involved in Hegel's
xpressing a developed concept of the object is a determinate negation
• 1 y: 62
h
rather tan
negat i on tak en s1mp

II

h
h is
• rea1
••• watt

per~

61

i s f or

consciousness is truth: which, however, means that this is the essential

. h consc i ousness h as. 1163
reality, or the obj ect wh 1c
This new description of the object of consciousness in turn leads to
.
64
a description of "experience," which is inherently dialectical,
and
hich understands consciousness as acting towards
bject within its experience.

65

th~

constitution of its

"This dialectic process which conscious-

ess executes on itself--on its knowledge as well as on its object--in the
ense that out of it the new and true object arises, is precisely what is
termed Experience. 1166

61
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 137; Phanomenologie, p. 69.
62

Cf. Hyppolite, Genese et Structure de la Phenomenologie de L'Esprit
e He el, (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1946), p. 20. "Negativity is not then
force which opposes itself to all content, it is imminent in content and
llows its necessary development to be comprehended."

63
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 143; Phanomenologie, p. 73.
64
Cf. A. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, ed. A. Bloom,
trans •. J.H. Nichols, (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 215. Kojeve
"nsists here that, for Hegel, experience is fundamentally dialectical, and
that phenomenology adopts dialecti~ only out of the necessity of offering
description of the structure of experience.
65
Cf.

Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method," in New Studies in
ed. Steinkraus, (New York: Bolt, Rinehart, and Winston

A?c~..._.;:;__.;;..;~;.;..;;;....;;..i;;_h...._,
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First,

Hegel here asserts that the dialectical process, the initial positing of ar
attitude towards the object, the determinate negation of that attitude, anc
the subsuming of that negation under a new apprehension of the object, is
a feature of the experience of consciousness itself.

In fact the realiza-

tion of the necessary connection between the several dialectical phases of
its own experience is not available to naive consciousness; it is only
.

available to the philosophical observer,
••• so to say, behind its back. 1168

67

" ••• to us, who watch the process

But nonetheless, the dialectical process

itself is immanent to the experience of consciousness.

Second, and in

terms of the above, within its experience consciousness plays an active
role in the production of the determinate character of its object.

The

object, that which is "in itself for consciousness," is in its appearance
the result of consciousness's own activity, i.e. its act of revising its
attitude towards its object, such that out of this revision " ••• the new
and true object arises ••• "

69

Hegel's description of the nature of the

experience of consciousness leads him to suggest that within its experiencE
consciousness plays an active role in the production of the definite
67

Cf. Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 15, where, in virtue of the above
comments, Hegel's method is characterized as " ••• experimental. •• " as
" ••• Ge d ank enexperimente
.
••• II
68
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 144; Phanomenologie, p. 74.

69
Ibid.

-241character of its object, or as K.R. Dove suggests in the "constitution" of
.
its ob Ject

70

. 1y b ecause conscious
.
.
precise
exper i ence o f its
obj ect i s

determined by that activity whereby consciousness alligns its knowledge of
the object with the object "in itself".
From the above analysis, Hegel derives two further conclusions
relevant to our purposes, in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology of
St>irit.

First, he asserts that, from the description of "experience" he

has offered, consciousness can be understood as actively constituting not
only the determinate character of its object, but also its self: " ••• since
what at first appeared as object is reduced (herabsinkst), when it passes
into consciousness, to what knowledge takes it to be, and the implicit
nature, the real object, becomes what this entity per

~

is for conscious-

ness; this latter is the new object, whereupon there appears also a new
~de

or embodiment of consciousness, of which the essence is something

other than that of the preceeding mode."

71

Hegel's point here seems based

on the basic statement that consciousness is primarily awareness of
content, and its implication, that the details of its content are identicaJ
~th

the details of specific occurences of consciousness itself.

Now that

content of which consciousness in its experience is aware is its object.
But the definite character which the object assumes in its experience is
the result of consciousness' own activity on the object.
70
Cf. Dove, op. cit., loc. cit.
71

--

Hegel, (Baillie), p. 144; Phanomenologie, p. 74.

Thus the specific

-242details of consciousness' own experience, or of its self, are the result of
~ts

. i ty. 72
own activ

Second, Hegel is already able even in the "Introduction" to the
rhenomenology, to point out that given this description of consciousness,
consciousness must in general be taken as self consciousness.

Conscious-

ness within its experience is aware of content, i.e. of its object.

But

conversely, that content of which consciousness is aware is its own
experience.

If the object as for consciousness is an essential moment of

its own experience, and if consequently its knowledge of its object is
knowledge of its own experience, the consciousness, in knowing its
experience, knows itself as well.

As Hegel puts it, consciousness'

experience of its object is at once "the experience which consciousness haf
•
concerning

1• t

se lf • II 73

Consciousness, in relating to its object at once

relates to itself, i.e. to its own experience, and thus must in principle
be described as self _consciousness.
It is the discussion of self consciousness which Hegel takes as at
least an initial goal towards which the description of the nature of the
object in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology tends.

For it is self

consciousness which in its own experience
apprehends in an initial fashion
I.
72

Cf. Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller, (London: Allen anc
Unwin, 1969), p. 60; G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, ed. Georg
Lasson, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1967), pp. 42-43, wherein Hegel
analogously suggests that the concrete character of consciousness is the
result of its own activity on its object.
73
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 144, Phanomenologie, p. 73.
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the "truth" of consciousness in the "natural attitude," and particularly
the truth of the implications of its own experience of the object.
~s

This

particularly the case regarding Hegel's analysis of consciousness as

~xercising

an active role in relation to its object as well as itself.

!Consciousness in the "natural attitude

1174

takes its object to be an item

simply occuring, essentially independent of any relationship with consciouE
ness itself.

75

Self consciousness, however, recognizes that its object is

an essential feature of its own experience, and that a thing's being a
feature of its own experience is essential to its being an object " ••• that
being 'in itself' and being 'for another' are the same."
~f

76

It is in terms

his discussion of self consciousness as initially the realization of

consciousness' relation to the object itself, that Hegel develops his
notion of agency, in the transition from consciousness to self consciousness of the Phenomenology.
The movement from the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology to that
section of the text describing the transition from consciousness to self
consciousness omits, of course,ra discussion of those phases of Hegel's
~hilosophical

analysis which explicitly treat consciousness itself: the

dialectics of sense certainty, perception, and understanding.

But this

74
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 135, Phanomenologie, p. 74.

75
Cf. for example Hegel's beginning of the dialectic of sense certain·
ty in Hegel, (Baillie), p. 149, Phi:inomenologie,, p. 79.

76
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 218, Phanomenologie, p. 133.
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mission is, Lwould argue, valid for the purposes of my analysis.

The

bases of Hegel's dialectic of consciousness here noted represent his
nitial attempts at a full philosophical justification of the doctrine of
onsciousness' relation to its object already laid down in the
'Introduction."

But the basis of his justification of that doctrine is

iscoverable in the "Introduction" itself, and the transition from
onsciousness to self consciousness in the Phenomenology is, as already
oted, Hegel's attempt at elucidating the "truth" of.consciousness itself.
1177
Hegel initiates his dialectical examination of "self consciousness
reflecting back on the discussion of consciousness in relation to its
bject laid down in the "Introduction."

He begins by reasserting the

ecessity of maintaining some distinction between consciousness and its
To collapse the distinction of self consciousness and

i~s

object

to render unintelligible the notion of self consciousness itself.
Self consciousness minimally but essentially involves consciousness'
experience of a relation to itself.

This can only occur if consciousness

is able both to be aware of itseLf, and to distinguish itself from that
ich it is not.

Without the former, of course, the very concept of self

consciousness would be impossible.

But without the latter, and experience

77

Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 218 and ff.; Hegel, Phanomenologie, pp. 13
and ff.

-245consciousness would likewise be impossible.

78

For consciousness

can only experience itself if it also experiences its other, distinguishes
tself therefrom, and apprehends through this distinction its own
iqueness.

In Hegel's language, when self consciousness 11 ••• distinguishe

nly its self as such from itself, distinction is straightway taken to be
superceeded, in the sense of involving otherness.

The distinction is not,

d self consciousness is only motionless tautology, Ego is Ego, I am I.
en for self consciousness the distinction does not also have the shape
.
1179
.
. is
. not se lf consciousness.
it
b eing,

Any concept of self conscious-

ess, as well as any philosophical analysis of the experience of self
onsciousness, must in some way maintain the distinction between
consciousness and its object as other.
Showing the manner in which this distinction is to be maintained
ccupies Hegel in beginning the dialectic of self consciousness.
ummarizes his point in the following statement:

He

"For self consciousness,

hen, otherness is a fact, it does exist as a distinct moment (das

'

derssein als ein Sein oder als untershciedenes Moment): but the unity of
78

F.G. Weiss, Hegel's Critique of Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind,
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp. 16 and 44, in which it is remarke
n the language of 'nature' and 'mind', that Hegel's note on of 'actuality'
lthough ultimately one which involves the dialectical unification of
hese two concepts, at the same time maintains a distinction between them.
79

Hegel, (Baillie), p. 219, Phanomenologie, p. 134.

-246itself with this difference is also a fact for self consciousness, and a
second distinct moment.

1180

Self consciousness apprehends its object as

that which is other than itself.

At the same time, self consciousness

recognizes "the unity of itself with this difference" and two ideas follow
from the description of this phase of the experience of self consciousness.
Because consciousness recognizes some relation of itself to its
object, it is capable of being self consciousness.

But further, at this

stage of his analysis Hegel implies that the "unity" between consciousness
and its object here is a unity such that the object is consciousness'
experience.

The object of self consciousness is distinct from self

consciousness itself, but it is also that which compromises the experience
thereof.

As such it is essentially related to self consciousness.

the object is distinct, it can provide content for experience.

Because

But if

/

self consciousness realizes its relation to itself through its other, then
this other is essentially its own, a feature of its experience, its self.
Because self

~onsciousness

relates to itself in virtue of relating to its

other, we may not comprehend the terms of this relation as simply occuring
separately.

H~gel

expresses this by describing the experience of self

consciousness as involving two aspects or moments.

"With that first

1n0ment, self consciousness occupies the position of consciousness, and the
whole expanse of the sensible world is conserved as its object, but at the
same time only as related to the second moment, the unity of self
80
Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 219-220, Phanomenologie, p. 134.
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.

.
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consciousness

wi'th

i't se lf • 1181

And this means that the object is here both

distinct from self consciousness, and is its experience, its own.
For Hegel to describe the location of the object in the experience of
self consciousness in this fashion is, as he explicitly states, to assert
that the object is now to be regarded as the "life" of self consciousness,
and is so regarded by the latter itself.

In its initial statement, this

/

concept of life is not t.he developed concept that Hegel expresses in the
·
Science o f Logic,
itself.
~hich

83

82

· sub sequent moments i n t h e Phenomeno 1 ogy
or even in

But it is nonetheless an initial understanding of life, and one

Hegel uses to develop the notions of desire and agency as features

of the experience of self consciousness.
important for my argument.

In this connection, it is

Self consciousness initially views its object

as its '!life" in the following senses: the object (now described by Hegel
as "the whole expanse of the world of sense") is the condition of the
possibility of self consciousness' ·enjoying experience;

84

the object is tha

81
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220, Phanomenologie, p. 134.
82
Cf. Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. Miller, pp. 761-774; Wissenscha t
der Logik, vol. 2, pp. 413-429.
83
Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 221-227, Phanomenologie, pp. 135-140.

84

-

Cf. Hegel, (Baillie),p. 219, Phanomenologie, p. 134. Cf. also Hege],
(Baillie), p. 218, Ph~nomenologie, p. 133. In the latter text, Hegel notes
that in the idalectic of self consciousness, "The abstract conception of
the object gives way before the actual concrete object, or the first
immediate idea is cancelled in the course of experience." This assertion
means for Hegel that the present phase of the dialectic recognizes the
'truth' of the object, to wit, that it is of the nature of the object to
occur in itself for consciousness. But given this, the understanding of
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-248whose own reality involves its being a feature of the experience of self
consciousness;

85

and the otrject is consequently that which makes it

possible for consciousness to relate to itself, to be self consciousness,
Or, the object is the life of consciousness, and thus its own.
86
.
. is
. qua ob.Ject d'istinct
.
f rom consciousness.
.
same time
it

But at the

Thus self

consciousness here experiences its life as both occurring in a unity with
itself and as distinct from itself.
Hegel expresses this idea in two statements, both of which warrant
analysis.

He first says that, given the experience of self consciousness,

" ••• the sensible world is regarded by self consciousness as having a
subsistence which is, however, only appearance, or forms of distinction
from self-consciousness ,,that per ~ has no being. 1187

This statement is not

to be taken to mean that the reality of the object in itself is nothing
more than false appearance within the experience of consciousness, to be
overcome simply through being negated.

Its meaning is rather that the

object taken simply as distinct and as such isolated from any relation to
self consciousness is now seen to be, " ••• only appearance ••• " and that this
the object as necessary for the occurence of experience remains.
85
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 218, Phanomenologie, p. 133.
86

Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 219, Phanomenologie, p. 134. "When for
self-consciousness the distinction does not also have the shape of being,
it is not self-consciousness."
87
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220. Phanomenologie, p. 135.
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-249fact is now recognized by consciousness itself, from within its own
experience, its life, and therefore its own.

Thus, second, "This oppositio

of its appearance and its truth finds its real essence, however, only in
the truth - in the unity of self-consciousness with itself. 1188

Self

consciousness, again, realizes its object as essentially related to itself.
But this relation is not one of simple unity.

89

The object delivers itself

to consciousness as other than and simultaneously as the experience of the
latter.

And "life" itself, in its initial moment, involves the recognition

by self consciousness both of a unity .with itself through its own experience, and of a fundamental differentiation from itself within its own
experience.

"The act of moving to and fro between ••• subject and object

constitutes the very differentia of self consciousness. 1190

Self conscious-

ness recognizes its own object, now its own "life", as both essentially
related to itself and distinct from itself, and indeed self consciousness
is fundamentally this recognition.
All this means that, in Hegel's description, self consciousness
experiences its "life" as both its own and as other than itself.

But this

experience yields the consequent experience of feeling that this disparity
must be

over~ome.

And 'feeling' is meant in its literal sense here.

self consciousness recognizes within its own experience a distinction
88
Ibid.
89
Cf. Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 77.
90
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220, Phanomenologie, p. 135.

Since

-250!between itself and its 'life', it desires to overcome this distinction,
aiming at the goal of self unification.

"This unity," the unity of self

consciousness with its own life, "must become essential to self-conscious~ess,

i.e., self-consciousness is the state of Desire (Begierde) in

1191
genera1 •

It is desire, then, which forms for Hegel the basic category through
!which the experience of the life of self consciousness is to be expliciltated.

Self consciousness finds in its experience a " ••• twofold

.
10b Ject
....• 1192

•••

1193

on the one hand the " ••• whole expanse of the world of sense

as other than it,1:1elf, and on the other, this object as being the

~xperience

that is its own.

Self consciousness thus desires to overcome

the apparently simple otherness of its object in a way that is recognizablE
!It experiences itself as desire, as,
~pposition

"~

•• the process in which this

is removed, and oneness or identity with itself is established." ~4

91

Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220, Phanomenologie, p. 135.
92
Ibid.
93
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220, Phanomenologie, p. 134.

94
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220; Phanomenologie, p. 134. Cf. Hyppolite,
O'Neill, p. 3. Hyppolite, in conunenting on the relation of this
section of Hegel's Phenomenology to the "Jeneser System" notes that, "In
~ts immediate form self-consciousness is desire and the object which it
~onfronts is nothing else than the object of its desire.
Consciousness
~n this case is identical with life, and the creature moved by desire does
not consider the object of its desire as something essentially alien.
~s a living creature he experiences the character of 'being other' only as
a moment within an encounter that is virtually resolved in satisfaction."
But Hyppolite fails to note clearly that, according to Hegel, des,ire
~rans.

-
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consciousness.
ness.

First, it yields a further individuation of self conscious-

"Desire is always revealed as

,nust use the word 'I'. 1195

~

desire, and to reveal desire, one

In that self consciousness experiences it~elf

not only as desire in general, but also as the locus of the specific desirE
to overcome the apparently simple otherness of specific portions of the
range of its experience, self consciousness experiences itself as an
individual.

As a result, Hegel is able to offer an

~ccount

ity more significant and profound than he could have before.

of individualSecond, the

desire of self consciousness when apprehended in relation to the content at
originates as the fundamental feature of immediate self consciousness, in
self consciousness' own recognition that its object or its life is
simultaneously its own and other than itself. Cf. however Hyppolite,
Genese et Structure, p. 153. Here he comments that, for the imm~diate self
consciousness which Hegel describes in the relevant section of the
PhenomenoloS?v, "The worlsf no longer subsists in itself; it only subsists ir
relation to self consciousness which is its truth. The truth of Being is
the Self which possesses it, and possesses it for itself ••• Desire is this
movement of consciousness which respects not being but negation, i.e.,
which possesses being concretely and makes it its own. This desire supposE
the phenomenal character of the world, which is only a means for the self.'
In this comment he recognizes, although I think still too obliquely, that
for Hegel it is self consciousness' recognition that its object is both
its life and not its own which is at the basis of the desire of self
consciousness. Hyppolite's account here is notably superior to that offerE
by Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 14.
Marcuse: simply notes that, "Man has learned that his own self consciousnesf
lies behind the appearances of things. He now sets out to realize this
experience, to prove himself master of his world. Self consciousness thus
finds itself in a 'state of desire' (Begierde): man, awakened to self
consciousness, desires the objects around him, appropriates them and uses
them.
95
Kojeve, op. cit., p. 37 •.
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it is directed, reveals to self consciousness the process whereby it

might be dealt with and overcome.

This process is agency.

It is of the utmost importance to see why, for Hegel, agency is an
essential feature of the experience of self consciousness given the nature
of desire.

And this can be done through noting that, even in the section c ~

the Phenomenology now under consideration, agency takes on for Hegel three
definitely interrelated but yet distinguishable senses.
here the sense of labor or work.

First, agency has

The desire which self consciousness

experiences is directed at '" ••• the whole expanse of the world of sense ••• "c
as its object.

Self consciousness desires to overcome the appearance of

this object as being in no essential relation to consciousness itself.

Anc

the foundation of this appearance is located precisely on the object's
being sensible.

Insofar as an item is a sense item, it seems simply to

contain within itself its own identity, and to offer this identity to
sensation, to consciousness as passive and receptive.

The only way in

which self consciousness can overcome this apparent nature of its object
is to transform it as a sense object, to transform it materially.

And it

is agency as work which enables the self conscious individual to effect
. trans f ormation.
.
97
th is

The nature, then, of that desire which self

consciousness experiences as its self, together with the character of the
object at which that desire is directed, results in self consciousness'
96

Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220, Phanomenologie, p. 135.
97

-

Cf. Kojeve, pp. 37-38.
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-25'3further experiencing itself as an agent, or experiencing agency as work as
a necessary manifestation of the•desire which it is, for, as Hegel
concisely puts it, " ••• labor shapes and transforms the thing. 1198
Several commentators have noted the function of action as work or
labor in Hegel's philosophical analysis of desire.

Kojeve identifies desii

as, " ••• the desire to transform the contemplated thing by an action, to
overcome it in its being that is unrelated to mine and independent of me,
to negate it in its independence ••• For Self Consciousness ••• to exist, then,
there must be in 1iian not only positive, passive contemplation, which mere!)
reveals being, but also negating Desire, and hence Action that transforms
the given being. 1199
lite.101

Analogous comments are made by MarcuselOO and Hyppo-

One might also remark that Hegel's initial understanding of the

object of self consciousness as desire, " ••• the whole expanse of the world
of sense," is in two particulars analogous to that concept of nature which
Marx utilizes to illuminate some initial structural features of praxis.
Nature, as I show in chapter one, is for Marx that external and maleable
environment which is the necessary "material" of praxis, and which is
itself essentially determined as the object of praxis.
98
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 238, Phanomenologie, p. 149.
99
Cf. Kojeve, op. cit., loc. cit.
100
Cf. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, pp. 114-115.
101
Cf. Hyppolite, trans. O'Neill, p. 165.

The object of self

~

--

consciousness as desire, described by Hegel,.is analogous to this, first,
in that it is both other than and essentially related to self consciousness
as the "life" of self consciousness, and second in that it is as such
determined by the labor of the self conscious individua1.

102

102
Cf. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, trans. A.V. Miller, (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 4-5; Enzykolpadie, p. 199. It should not be
surprising to find Hegel speaking of the object of the desire of self
consciousness in a way analogous to Marx' explicitation of the concept of
nature. For in the second volume of the Encyclopedi~ of the Philosophical
Sciences, Hegel himself develops the concept of nature in a way analogous
to Marx. Hegel insists therein, first, that an adequate philosophy of
nature must be one which comprehends nature practically as well as
theoretically, physics being an example of an exclusively theoretical
comprehension of nature. He then goes on, in introducing the second volume
pf the Encyclopedia, to indicate what the comprehension of nature as a
l>ractical object might involve. "In man's practical approach to Nature,
the latter is, for him, something immediate and external; he himself is an
external and therefore sensuous individual, although in relation to
natural objects, he correctly regards himself as an end. A consiµeration
of nature according to this relationship yields the standpoint of a finite
teleology (#205). In this, we find the correct presupposition that nature
does not itself contain the absolute final end (//207-11)." And in an
addendum to this statement, taken from the 1857 Michelet text, Hegel goes
on to indicate how it is that, as a practical object, nature relates
teleologically not to itself but to the human subject confronting it. "The
Practical approach to Nature is, in general, determined by appetite, which
is self-seeking; need impels us to use Nature for our advantage, to wear
ner out, to wear her down, in short, to annihilate her. And here, two
characteristics stand out. (a) The practical approach is concerned only
with individual products of Nature, or with individual aspects of those
products. The necessities and wit of man have found an endless variety of
ways of using and mastering nature ••• (b) The other characteristic of the
Practical approach is that, since it is our end which is paramount, not
natural things themselves, we convert the latter into a means, the destiny
of which is determined by us, not by the things themselves; an· example of
~his is the conversion of food into blood.
(c) What is achieved is our
aatisfaction, our self-feeling, which had been disturbed by a lack of some
kind or another." Hegel then offers an example of these points, highly
!reminiscent of the texts of Marx, especially the Manuscripts of 1844. "The
negation of myself which I suffer within me in hunger, is at the same time
present as an other than myself, as something to be consumed; my act is to
~nnul this contradiction by making this other identical with myself, or by
!restoring my self-unity through sacrificing the thing."

r
r

-255-In elaborating upon agency, Hegel goes on to show how it is that agenc
as work relates to the desire of self consciousness.

r

The result of work

is that self consciousness recognizes its object as its product, and this
in three senses.

First, the object as product is a "transformed" item,

and as transformed it embodies within itself the details of that agency

~hich effected its transformation. 103 Both Marx and Hegel might express
this idea by saying that the product of work "objectifies" the activity of
which it is the result.

Second, specific pieces of individual agency are

This description of the practical significance of nature is highly
analogous to the concept of nature as offered by Marx. Hegel takes nature
here to be that sensuous environment which is both external to and
essentially the correlate of the human subject. He notes that the details
of the relations of the subject to his natural environment are determined
~y needs resident in the experience of the subject.
And he notes that the
details of nature itself are determined by that activity which the subject
undertakes on nature, towards the satisfaction of his needs. One might
also note in passing that Marx and Hegel use the same example to illustrate
the subject of needs in his relation to sensuous nature: hunger.
At the same time, Hegel's description of practical nature clearly
relates itself to his description of the object of the desire of self
consciousness. Both the object of desire and nature are described by Hege]
as correlates of the subject, relative to the desire or need of the subject ,
and that upon which agency, consequent upon desire or need, might be
undertaken. Given these points, it is not surprising that Hegel's
description of the object of the desire of self consciousness, pointing as
it does to his description of practical nature, reminds us of Marx' concep1
of nature as well.

103
This is a direct implication of Hegel's statement in the :
Phenomenology cited above in footnote 98, that " ••• labor shapes and
transforms the thing."
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temporally finite and evanescent.
t~eir

details, involves in its own reality a relative degree of permanence.

~herefore
~hose

But the result of agency, which embodies

the product lends also a degree of permanence to the activity

. emb od"ies. 104
detai·1 s it

And finally, the object as related to and

depending upon itself in a way more profound than was previously conceived.
~d

self consciousness apprehends its own self in its object as product.

"That consciousness that toils and serves accordingly attains by this means
· depen dent b eing
·
as its self.
the direct appre h ension o f t h at in

11105

Consequently, agency as work satisfies the desire of self consciousness,
albeit in a limited fashion, and results in the overcoming·of the apparently simple otherness of the object.

106

104
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 238, Phanomenologie, p. 149.

105
Ibid.

106
Cf. Soll, op. cit., p. 12. It can be seen from the above that Sol] 's
comment on the relation of action to the desire of self consciousness is
inadequate because over simplified. Soll writes: "The action initiated
by desire changes, uses, and possesses the~external world but not merely fc
the benefits ordinarily associated with these activities. The immediate
goals of desire and the behavior implementing it are rather viewed as
manifestations of the basic drive of self-consciousness to negate the
external world and to have only itself for an object ••• All the stages of
self consciousness are to be viewed as different attempts to negate or den)
the reality of the external world." But Hegel explicitly denies that the
reality of the external world can be simply denied or negated, or that
self consciousness desires this. Nor does he hold that self consciousness
desires to have " ••• only itself for an object," in the simple sense of
these terms employed by Soll. Rather, self consciousness desires to
overcome the apparently exclusive otherness and externality of its object,
and aims at the partial achievement of this through work, in the way
outlined above.

So far, we have discussed agency as work in connection with showing
bow, according to Hegel, the self conscious subject of desire must be taker
as an agent.

But two other senses of agency are involved in Hegel's

description of self consciousness at this stage of the Phenomenology, and
these are also worth mentioning.

They involve the notions of intersubjec-

tivity and "self transformation."
The phenomenon of intersubjectivity arises for Hegel in his

examinatic~

of the dialectic whereby self consciousness initially realizes for itself
the truth of its own desire.

The introduction to the dialectic of self

consciousness is entitled by Hegel "The Truth of Self Certainty" (Die
Warheit der Gewissheit seiner selbst), and initially, that self certainty
which self consciousness realizes is that its object is its own in the
107 consciousness
.
.
sense o f b e i ng a f eature o f i ts own experience:
rea1.izes
now what was stated in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology itself,
that the distinction of the object as in itself and for consciousness is
one drawn by consciousness from within its own experience.

108

In terms of

the language of desire, this is to assert that self consciousness recognize;
its object as both its "life" in the senses described above, and as
107
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 218, Phanomenologie, p. 133. Here, Hegel
states this point through discussion of the object of consciousness in
relation to consciousness' knowledge of that object. But a recalling of
the distinction of the relation between consciousness, its object, and its
knowledge of that object offered in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenolosn
makes it clear that self-certainty means that consciousness realizes its
object as a feature of its own experience.
108
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 139, Phanomenologie, p. 70.

-258distinct from itself.

We have already seen that this recognition is itself

the source of self consciousness' desire.

But further, inasmuch as self

consciousness experiences this desire, it is capable of recognizing itself
as the locus of such desire, i.e. capable of recognizing itself as a
personal individual.
Hegel argues that the realization of this capacity for self-recognitic
requires that the self conscious individual occur in an intersubjective
context, or, that the

occurenc~

of intersubjectivity for self consciousnesf

is necessary for the latter to be itself in a full sense.

He offers an

argument to this effect in. what I take to be the following terms.

Self

consciousness relates to its desire to overcome the apparently simple
otherness of its object through agency as work.

As that which transforms

the object, work succeeds in overcoming its mere otherness.

But in the

very success of its work, self consciousness rediscovers the yet remaining
otherness of its object in the latter's perduring externality.

"In this

state of satisfaction, however, it has experience of the independence of
its object. 11109

For it is only as external to self consciousness that the

object can be the object of the former's work, and can be transformed
thereby. 110

Two consequences follow from this.

The first is stated by

109
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 225, Ph&lomenologie, p. 139.
110
Here again is a further parallel between Hegel's concept of the
object of self consciousness and Marx' concept of nature as the object of
praxis. For Marx, as shown in Chapter One, the object of praxis must be
conceived as both external to the subject of praxis, the productive agent,
and maleable or transformable by praxis.

~

-259Hegel through the assertion that,, "Self cOJ;1sciousness is thus unable by its
negative relation to the object to abolish it; because of that relation it
rather produces it again, as well as the desire.

11111

Self consciousness

succeeds in overcoming the apparently simple otherness of its object throug
that work which transforms the latter.
~onsciousness

But the goal of the desire of self

is the overcoming of the distinction between self conscious-

ness and its object as its "life."

Since the occurence of work on the

object itself elicits self consciousness'

recognit~on

of the object's

enduring externality, then the success of work is only partial.
A second consequence is that, "The object desires is, in fact, somethi g
other than self consciousness, :the essence of desire ••• " 112
~ssertion

And this

indicates the nature of self consciousness' comprehension of its

own desire in relation to its self.

Self consciousness necessa!ily

comprehends its desire by comprehending it in its relation to the object at
~hich

it is directed: the object is "the essence of desire ••• "

As long as

hat object is one which retains as its fundamental quality externality,
;elf consciousness recognizes the essential content of its desire as that
~hich

is external to itself.

Thus, self consciousness does not recognize

ts own desire as located within itself, as being its own character and
ndividuality, or its own or its self in proper senses of those terms.

111
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 225; Ph~nomenologie, p. 139.

112
Ibid.

As

-260ffyppolite comments, "In relating to this world, desire must rediscover
itself, but it is unable to recognize itself without passing through the
mediation of this worid.

Thus the self appears to itself as an immediate

~atum of the external world, even at the bare level of life. 11113 In order
~or

the desire of self consciousness to be more adequately satisfied, then

~he

externality of its object must be overcome in some further sense.

In

order for self consciousness to recognize itself as a personal individual,
~o

comprehend its desire as its self or its own, some adequate basis of

~omprehension

~or

must be provided by the object.

And indeed it is necessary

self consciousness to recognize itself as a personal individual in the

6ense noted above, for this is a fundamental feature of the experience of
.
se lf consc i ousness, or o f t h e b eing
t h ereo f • 114
Hegel argues that self consciousness may achieve both a more adequate
satisfaction of its own desire, and the recognition of itself as a personal
~ndividual,

another self consciousness.

A more adequate satisfaction of

the desire of self consciousness, first, would involve the overcoming of
~he

externality of self consciousness' object in a more adequate sense that

~an

be overcome in the object of work, "the whole expanse of the world of

~ense ••• "

For the object of work, externality could be further overcome

Pnly through a radical abolition of the object, which is for Hegel on all
erms impossible.

But the event of self consciousness' being recognized by

113
Hyppolite (O'Neill), p. 162.
114
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 225; Phi:inomenologie, p. 139.

-261externality of its object.

Here the object is the other self consciousness

This other is, for the original self consciousness, its recognition of that
latter.

But this is to say that, in the case of intersubjectivity under

discussion, the object of self consciousness is able to be its self, as
that which is the recognition of

itsel~,

in a way which the object of work

can not be, and in this way more adequate to the satisfaction of the desire
of self consciousness. 11 5
Further, given recognition by the other, or the experience of
intersubjectivity, self consciousness is able to comprehend itself as a
personal individual.

As noted above, self consciousness, as related to its

pbject of work, is not able to so comprehend itself, both because of the
nature and the externality which this object retains, and because its
!object is "the essence of desire", the content of that desire which is
nonetheless self consciousness' own.

But in the case of being recognized

by another, self consciousness is able to see itself in its object, because
dts object here is the recognition of itself.

And moreover, the other as

that object of self consciousness which recognizes it points self
~onsciousness'

comprehension of its own desire away from the mere external-

115
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 225-26; Phanomenologie, p. 139. Hegel
states this idea in a way which interestingly displays his use of the notio
of negativity. "On account of the independence of the object, therefore,
it can only attain satisfaction when this object effectually brings about
negation within itself. The object must per se effect this negation of
11.tself, for it is inherently (an sich) something negative, and must be for
the other what it is."
- --

-262mere externality of its object and back to itself.

Thus in the case of

intersubjectivity, "A self consciousness has before it a self consciousness
Only so and only then is it self consciousness in actual fact; for here
first of all it comes to have the unity of itself in its otherness. 11116
For Hegel, then, intersubjectivity is necessary in order that self
consciousness be itself and this in two related senses: in order that it
adequately relate to its own desire, and in order that it comprehend its
desire as its self, itself as a personal individual.

In order to be

itself, in the sense of realizing features implicit in its own experience,
self consciousness must occur in a context of intersubjectivity.

These

are comments, which, as is clear from the text, do more than merely point
to the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage.

117

They form for Hegel an

initial argument in support of the general conclusion that the context of
experience of the self conscious individual must be an intersubjective one.

116
Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 226-27; Ph~nomenologie, p. 140. Cf. Also
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 229; Phanomenologie, p. 141. "Self-consciousness
exists in itself and for itself in that, and by the fact that it exists fo1
another self-consciusness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledgec
or recognized."
117

-

Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 227; Phanomenologie, p. 140. It is clear·
that Hegel means to do more with his comments on intersubjective recognition than point to the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage, in that his
immediate reference, in the text subsequent to the argument exposed above,
is to the concept of Spirit. "With this we have already before us the
notion of Mind or Spirit. What consciousness has further to become aware
of, is the experience of what mind is - this absolute substance, which is
the unity of different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses,
in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as component
elements of that substance: Ego that is 'we', a plurality of Egos, and
'we' that is a single Ego."

-263Hyppolite seems to see this when, in a single comment of self consciousness
relation to its own satisfaction and self comprehension, he notes that,
" ••• it can only achieve this if it appears in the form of an other Self,
another living self consciousness ••• the existence of the Other is an
ontological condition of my own existence ••• Thus the desire of life
becomes the desire of another desire, or rather, in view of the necessary
reciprocity of the phenomenon, human desire is always desire of the desire
of another."

118

Hegel, then, can hold even at this stage of the

Phenomenologv that self consciousness must necessarily occur in an
intersubjective context, or that the self conscious individual is
necessarily a social individua1.

119

118
Hyppolite, (O'Neill), p. 162.
119
Cf. Findlay, op. cit., p. 94, Soll, op. cit., p. 16-17. Both
Findlay and Soll offer, in my opinion, inadequate connnents on the text of
the Phenomenology under discussion here, in failing to consider the full
detail of the argument offered by Hegel. Findlay comments: "Another self
is, in short, the only adequate mirror of .!!!l. self conscious self; the
subject can only adequately see itself when what it sees is another self
consciousness." But the other is not for self consciousness simply a
'mirror' in which it finds itself reflected. It is rather that object
which 'acts' on self consciousness by recognizing it, and thus makes it
possible for self consciousness to comprehend itself. Soll thinks himself
to offer a corrective to Findlay's comment, but he is misled by an overly
vague appreciation of Hegel's use of 'negation'. He writes: "Desire is
only satisfied by the negation of its object, and, since desire can not
~ring this about through its own action on this object (as Hegel argued
earlier), desire can be satisfied only if this object negates itself ••• If
one were to describe the attainment of life and self-consciousness by the
object of self-consciousness in terms of the mirror metaphor, it would be
~ell to remember that self-consciousness here is expressing itself as the
~esire to destory through action." But to suggest that, for Hegel, self
consciousness seeks 1the abolition of its object is to fly in the face of
the text. Rather, Hegel argues that self consciousness desires the overcoming of the externality of its object in a way recognizable to itself.

-264A final comment needs now to be made

~n

Hegel's arguments concerning

self consciousness and its relation to its object, viz., that self
consciousness in acting on or relating to its object, realizes its own
nature, realizes explicitly possibilities which are located within its own
experience, or actualizes itself.

This comment may be brief, for its

evidence is contained in what has already been claimed.

It will be

remembered, that, in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology, Hegel referre l
to experience as a "dialectical process which consciousness executes on
itself--on its knowledge as well as on its object--in the sense that out of
.
.
120
it t h e new an d true ob Ject
arises...

consciousness
.

. ob.Ject,
acts on its

and this action constitutively affects not only the nature of the object,
but consciousness as well.

This idea is expanded and concretized in Hegel';

description of self consciousness, in three senses.

First, the occurrence

of self consciousness' experiencing its object as an object of desire
introduces into its experience a further moment of individuation.
Kojeve comments, "Desire is always revealed as
desire, one must use the word 'I'.
~s

11121

.!!!l.

As

desire, and to reveal

Second, in relating to its other

that which recognizes itself, self consciousness is able to comprehend

explicitly (Hegel would say is capable of being "for itself 11 )

122

its own

~is is achieved by the object which, while it retains its independence, is
~or

self consciousness the recognition thereof.
120
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 142; Phanomenologie, p. 73.
121
Kojeve, op. cit., p. 37.
122

-

Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 229; Phanomenologie, p. 141.

-265personal individuality.

And finally, in relating to its object as the

result of its agency as work, self consciousness is capable of comprehending both itself as a concrete, practical agent, and its object as the
123
.
.
concrete expression
o f its
own persona1 i n d'ivi'd ua l'ity.

In these three

senses, self consciousness' relation to and activity on its object results
in its own self realization or self actualization.
So far, we have analyzed texts of the Phenomenology in which Hegel
treats the notions of consciousness and self consciousness, for the sake of
getting clear how Hegel develops concepts relevant. to the content of Marx'
theory of human nature.

We have seen how, in introducing the topics of

experience and knowledge, Hegel argues that consciousness must be described
as maintaining an active role in relation to its object.

We have seen how

these introductory remarks point beyond themselves to the examination of
the dialectic of self consciousness.

And in that latter dialectic, we

have seen the how notions of agency, intersubjectivity, and self actualization introduced and developed.
~f

I want next to examine a further section

the Phenomenology, one which Hegel entitles "Das geistige Tierreich und

der Betrug, order die Sache Selbst."
This section of Hegel's text although referred to by one coillill.entator

~s-"an obscurely sketched dialectical phase 11124 of the Phenomenology, is
~f

the highest significance both for the development of the Phenomenology
123
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 238; Phanomenologie, p. 149.

124
Findlay, op. cit., p. 110.

-226subjectivity.
~rocess

1128

Soul's emergence is the implicit goal or 'truth' of the

of nature, but that goal is realized only through the actual

emergence of individual, natural organisms capable of primative forms of
~wareness

of experience.

For Hegel to describe conscious events as so

emergent from nature is to describe such events as properties of the
:individual.

29

This emphasis is further drawn out by Hegel in the Encyclopedia, as he
describes the capacities of awareness of 'soul' under three headings:
sentience, feeling, and habit.

By sentience or sensation,

30

'Empfindung 1 , 31 Hegel means to indicate the barest form of organic aware28
Hegel, Enzyklopadie, p. 320, my translation. Cf. Hegel, Philosophy
pf Mind, (Wallace, Miller), pp. 35-36, for a translation which is, in my
ppinion, deceptive. Cf. also Harris, op. cit., p. 80, for commentary on
the idea offered by Hegel here.
29
Cf. Hegel, Enzykolpadie, pp. 325-326; Hegel, Philosophy of Mind,
(Wallace, Miller), p. 73, for confirmation that Hegel retains this argument
for consciousness as a property of the individual in the context of a
discussion of more developed forms of consciousness as well.
30
The former translation of 'Empfindung' is selected by Harris, the
latter by Wallace. Harris' translation has the advantage of distinguishinE
in translation 'Empfindung' f~om 'Sinnlicheit', a distinction which Hegel
obviously draws.

31
Cf. Hegel, Enzyklopadie, p. 325.

-267In this present section of the Phenomenology, Hegel discusses the experienc e
of the self conscious individual which takes itself to be both an agent
and an individual.

He includes an analysis of the most primitive form

which this experience can take, and the dialectical ramifications thereof.
Initially, the individual's experience of itself is that of, in
Hegel's language, a "result,
as

II

11126

and individuality itself is comprehended

•
•
1 d eterminate
•
an origina
nature ••• 1112 7

By "result" here, Hegel means

that the individual takes itself to be simply a giyen, or simply as one
Whose experience is immediately given, rather than as being the consequence
pf several interacting, intermediating features.
~he

~erm

same meaning in this context.
"determinate".

~nvolving

The term "original" has

This meaning is further refined by the

The individual's experience of itself is that of

definite capacities and possibilities for action.

In. that these

capacities are definite, the individual experiences itself as concrete:
the individual is concretely determined through those capacities for action
which are both definite and its own.

The concrete individual, at this

Drimitive phase of its experience, does not recognize these determinate
capacities as involving negation, i.e. as limiting as well as defining the

~ange of possibilities of its own activities. 128 Rather, the individual
126
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 419; Phanomenologie, p. 285.
127
Ibid.
128
Cf. Ibid.

r

l:

l

-

-268here takes itself simply to be the unity of disparate capacities for actior,
and takes its life to be the process of activities which follows therefrom.
This process of activities in turn enables the individual to realize
the unity between himself and his environment.

The environment is compre-

hended simply as that context wherein life activity itself is comprehended
simply as the life process of the individual.

Hegel offers a lengthy

metaphor to illustrate this point:
We have here something similar to what we find in the
case of indeterminate animal life: this breathes the
breath of life let us say, into water as its element,
or air or earth, and within these again into still
more determinate conditions; every aspect of its life
is affected by the specific element, and yet animal life
still/keeps these aspects within its power and itself
a unity in spite of the limitations of the element, and
remains qua the given particular organization animal
129
life throughout, the same general fact of animal life.
Analogous to animal life, the concrete individual initially comprehends its
own activity as its life process, and its environment as simply that context within which its life process is undertaken.

Thus it comprehends its

environment as occurring in a unity with itself.
This brief examination of the experience of the concrete individual,
although inadequate in its first presentation, has offered a subject matte1
for analysis: the activity itself of the individual.

"This concept of

129
Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 419-420; Phanomenologie pp. 285-286.

-269activity has become essential, and it is this which becomes our object."lJC
The concept of activity is essential here because it is activity which the
concrete individual, from within its own experience, comprehends as funda~ental

to its own life process, and thus to its relation between itself

and its environment.

Because of this, it must now become the object of

philosophical examination.
~

And this examination involves, for Hegel, first

more detailed analysis of activity as an occurence within the experience
\

[of the individual, and second, some connnents on the viability of the
individual's experience of itself as experience of an "original determinate
[of nature ••• "
The analysis of activity begins with an attempt to note within the
experience of action certain unified and yet distinguishable features.
Wirst, concrete activity is experienced by the individual as that which it
~esires

in virtue of definite capacities for action which are the

~ndividual's

own.

Because of this, activity is experienced by one individ-

µal as an intention or purpose.

"To begin with, action is here an object,

an object, too, still belonging to consciousness; it is present as a
ourpose (Zweck), and thus opposed to a given reality.

11131

"Zweck" might

t>e better translated here as "design" rather than "purpose," the term
~aillie

choses; the concrete individual experiences its own capacity for

action as a design to be realized in the context of given environmental
130
Hyppolite, Genese et Structure, p. 286.
131
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 420; Phanomenologie, p. 286.

-

-270circumstances.

But while design (or purpose) is a moment of activity, it

must be accompanied by a second moment, involving the concrete details of
that action whereby design is realized.
entitles "means 11 • 132

This feature of activity Hegel

And finally, activity is experienced by the individuc

as involving the unification of these two prior features in a third, the
result of activity in which design is realized through the details of the
process of action.

"The third moment is, finally, the object, no longer ae

immediately and subjectively presented purpose, bµt as brought to light and
established as something other than and external to the acting subject."

13':

But the unification of design and means in result bears a consequence
for the experience of the acting individual.

The consequence is this: it

is in virtue of being able to comprehend the result of its own activity
that the individual is capable of comprehending in an

objecti~e

and con-

crete fashion the details of its own action (the "means"), as well as the
details of that design resident at the base of the process of activity.
Design and "means" are available to consciousness in an objective sense
only as embodied in the result of activity as that result appears within
the experience of the indvidual.

But design and "means" are respectively

the original nature of and the life process of the individual: its self.
Thus the individual can only concretely comprehend itself in virtue of the
132

Hegel, (Baillie), p. 421; Phanomenologie,_p. 286.
133

Ibid.

~

r

'

l

-271experience of the results of its own activity.
to this idea in the text.

Hegel gives clear expressic

~

"Consciousness must act solely that what it

inherently and explicitly is, may be for it explicitly; or, acting is just
the process of mind coming to be qua consciousness.
therefore, it knows from its actual reality.

What it is implicitly,

Hence it is that an individu< ~

cannot know what he is till he has made himself real by action.

11134

In concluaing his initial examination of the occurence of activity
within the experience of the concrete individual Hegel draws two further
134
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 422; Phanomenologie, p. 287. Parentheticallyi
Hegel notes that there seems to be a paradox concerning the possibility of
the concrete individual's being an agent. Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 42223; Phanomenologie, pp. 287-89. The apparent paradox may be simply
formulated. If the individual must act in order to comprehend himself
concretely, and if action includes design or purpose, a feature of the
"original nature" of the individual, then how can design or purpose be
known by the individual in such a way as to allow him to initiate action?
It would seem that he can not, and that activity is impossible on the
above terms. But Hegel argues that this paradox may be resolved, if it
is realized that by "design" (Zweck) here is not meant purpose in the sensE
of a consciously constructed intention as the result of deliberation or
planning, but simply the individual's experience of himself as responding
to the environment in virtue of specific capacities for action which are
his own, and his experience of this response as involving "interest" in or
a spontaneous tendency towards the active realization of such specific
capacities. It is for this reason that I have prefered to translate "Zwecl '
as 'design' rather than as 'purpose'. 'Purpose' bears the connotation of
planning and deliberation which Hegel is anxious to avoid here. In this
fashion the self comprehension consequent upon 'design' may be seen as
possible for the individual. And indeed, Hegel seems to argue that it
is only given such self comprehension as the result of activity that purposeful activity then becomes possible for the individual.

-272-

consequences from his analysis.

First, as noted above, the individual is

capable of concretely knowing himself, his own "original nature," through
recognizing the results of his own activity.

And this is the case because

the result of activity both unifies the design and the process of activity
itself, and is an objective result, public and capable of being discerned.
If this is so, then it follows that the individual is capable of knowing
not only his own concrete nature through the results of his own activity,
but also of knowing the concrete natures of other individuals through
the results of their own activities.

He is thus capable of comparing

individuals in terms of the range and variety of activities available to
them.

135

This involves, of course, not an ethical comparison; no standardi

for such a comparison have yet been provided from within the experience of
the concrete individual itself. 136

It involves a comparison which is

simply quantitative, one in which consciousness " ••• can, e.g., regard an
individual who is of wider compass in his work as possessing stronger
energy of will or a richer nature, i.e. a nature whose original constituticn
.
1'7
(Bestimmtheit) is less limited; another as a weaker and a poorer nature."
Second, inasmuch as the result of activity unifies in itself design and
"means," and since the "original nature" and life process of the individua
are precisely these, then the individual can apprehend the result of
135
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 424;
136
Cf. Ibid.
137

-

Ibid.

Ph~nomenologie,

p. 289.

-

-273bis activity as proceeding from and crystalizing his own nature, his self,
138
and take satisfaction from it.
But from this point Hegel moves to a critical exposition of the
supposition of the "original nature," asking, " ••• whether its reality

. h t h'is notion.
.
.,139
agrees wit
of intersubjectivity.

This leads him to further develop the theme

The individual agent, conscious of himself as

possessing an "original nature" in the sense defined above, takes itself,
in Hege1 1 s language

II

as such to b ea11 rea l'ity... 11140

Th'is concrete 1y

means that this individual, from within its experience, takes the
environment which it confronts to be simply that milieu in which it may
realize its given capacities through action: the environment is both
external to the individual and that which wholly offers itself as the
context in which the activity or 'life process' of the individual can be
carried on; it is wholly at the service of the individual, and therefore

141
. h h'im i n h'is experience.
.
uni'f'ie d wit

The making of this point was

the purpose of Hegel's description of the life process of the individual
agent through the metaphor of animal lfie.

It has been noted that in

virtue of the results of activity the individual is capable of comprehending the details of his own individual nature, of taking satisfaction in

138
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 425; Phanomenologie, p. 290.
139
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 426;

Ph~nomenologie,

p. 290.

140
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 419; Phltnomenologie, p. 285.

141
Cf. Hyppolite. Genese et Structure, pp. 286-287.

-274its objective embodyment, and of comparing various discretely individual
'original natures.'
But these three possibilities are real possibilities for the individua
agent because the results of his activity are embodyed in his environment
as products external to himself.

142

And this 'objective' character of the

results of the individual's activity renders it possible that others can
relate to his own product.

The individual is capable of experiencing

others through to the results of his own action, but this experience
~egates

in a specific fashion his experience of the 'reality' of his

environment as being essentially in unity with himself.

Others do not

relate to the product of the individual's activity as if it were the
expression within the external environment of their 'natures'.

They relate

to this product rather as a feature of the external environment itself,
within which they must assert their own active capabilities in order to
realize a unity therewith.

As Hegel puts it, "The work is, i.e., it is fot

other individuals, and for them it is an external, alien reality, in whose
place they have to put their own, in order to get by their action conscious
ness of their unity with reality.

In other words, the interest which they

take in that work owing to their original constitution is other than the
~eculiar

interest of this work, which is thereby turned into something

142
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 421; Phanomenologie, p. 286. "The third
moment is, finally, the object no longer as immediately and subjectively
presented purpose, but as brought to light and established as something
other than and external to the acting subject."
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11143

This is to argue that, given the apprehension of his produc

by others, the individual is no longer capable of experiencing the reality
of his environment as simply occuring in unity with, or as a correlate of,
his own activity.
The apprehension of the product of the individual's activity by others
bears a further implication for the experience of the individual.

The

individual agent as described above experiences himself as constituted
through an 'original nature', given and definite capacities for action,
which yield for him the 'interest' of acting out given purposes or designs.
And the interest that this individual has in acting out designs is precise!
this, that the results of such activity will express in an objective
fashion his own 'original nature.'

144

The 'interest' which others take in

the product of the individual's activity is not the same as that taken by
the individual himself.
~expression
~f

For others apprehend his product, not simply as

of the individul's 'nature,' but rather as the realization

some purpose which in itself is worthy of being realized through action.

(For example: the individual comprehends his activity of poetizing and its
result as expressing some definite capacity or talent of his own; others
~pprehend

his result as the result of an activity whose underlying purpose

143
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 427;

Ph~nomenologie,

pp. 291-292.

144
We have seen Hegel assert that it is in virtue of this 'interest'
that the individual takes satisfaction in the product of his activity.
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The individual experiences the product of his

activity as related to by others in this fashion.

The result of this for

the experience of the individual agent may be described under the followinE
.

five h ead ings.

145

First, the individual now experiences his own activity as both
expressive of his self and as realizing an

intrinsically worthy purpose,

but with the latt.er characteristic as the essential one through which
activity is to be comprehended.

Hegel asserts that " ••• what disappears

in the work, is the objective reality •••

11146

The "objective reality of

work has been taken by the agent to be simply this, that activity yields a
result which gives objective expression to its producer's 'original

nature'~

But now the individual experiences the result of his activity as realizing
a purpose generally worthy of being acted upon, and as expressing the
individuality of its producer insofar as this generally worthy purpose is
also his own.
Second, the individual experiences the details of his own activity or
work (werk) 147 as

II

••• trans i tory ••• 11148

This point has two interrelated

145
That five headings are required to explicitate Hegel's argument at
this point illustrates, I think, the typical and torturously slow pace witl
which Hegel's dialectic progresses.
146
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 429; Phanomenologie, p. 293.
147
Cf.

--

Ph~nomenologie,

p. 294.

148
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 430;

Ph~omenologie,

p. 294.
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On the one hand, the general purpose underlying the

activity of the individual is now seen as realizable through any number of
disparate activities, of which his activity, in its concrete details, is
only one instance.

(E.g., doing poetry can, as a general purpose, be

realized through a number of disparate sorts of poetizing acts.)

On the

other hand, the individual's self (or 'nature') might be objectified or
externally expressed

thro~gh

any of these disparate and possible acts.

Thus the activity of the individual in its concrete details is 'transitory'
in the sense of its not being the necessary and only action through which
. d'ivi'dual'ity ob'Ject if'ie d •
purpose may b e reali ze d an d in

149

But thirdly, the individual further experiences the transitory
character of his work or activity overcome precisely to the extent to whic
it is concrete action towards the accomplishment of some generally worthy
purpose.

Hegel entitles the unity of particular activity with the

realization of a general purpose
it the following statement.

II

••• die Sache selbst ••• , 11150

an d mak es o

"This unity, this identity is the true work,

it is the real intent, the fact of the matter (die Sache seblst), which
asserts itself at all costs, and is felt to be the lasting element,
independent of 'fact' which is the accident of an individual action as sue
149
Cf. Ibid. Hegel sums up the points made here in the following
statement. "On the contrary, the opposition and negativity manifested in •
the case of work then affects not only the content of the work E.!. the
content of consciousness as well, but the reality as such, and hence affec
the opposition present merely in virtue of that reality and in it, and the
disappearance of the work."
150
Phanomenologie, p. 294.

-278the accident of circumstances, means, and activity. 11151

In virtue of its

being the realization of a generally worthy purpose, 152 particular activity
achieves a worth and permanence that it does not simply in itself bear.

153

And this permanence involves precisely concrete activity's being the
realization of a general purpose, and thus holding that general purpose
within its own particular details. 154
An implication of this is that the 'reality' of the environment may no

longer be taken to be simply that of a milieu within which the individual
agent gives expression to his own 'original nature;' it must be taken as
151
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 430; Phanomenologie, p. 294.
152
It is interesting to note here that'. Hegel offers no criteria whereby 'generally worthy purpose' might be a priori determined. I suspect he
would hold that the 'worthiness' of general purpose must be determined
socially and historically. Evidence in support of this suggestion will
be offered subsequently.
153
Cf. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, (Oxford: The
University Press, 1967), p. 238, addendum to paragraph #270. "Actuality
is always the unity of universal and particular, the universal dismembered
into the particulars which seem to be self-subsistent, although they really
are upheld and contained only in the whole. Where this unity is not
present, a thing is not actual even though it may have acquired existence."
l'his definition of actuality is clearly relevant to Hegel's description of
~ctivity at this point.
154
Cf. Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 171. Loewenberg errs in seeing the
IUility of concrete activity and general purpose as an operative principle
in the beginning of this dialectic. Contrary to this, Hegel holds that
~his principle can be an operative one only when the experience of the
~ndividual agent is articulated to the point at which he can comprehend
~he relation which the product of his activity has to himself, and notice
~he effects of the apprehension of his product by others on his own
experience

-
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details and the interest in the realization of a general purpose may be
undertaken.

It is in taking the environment as a correlate of activity

of this sort that the individual agent realizes the fundamental possibility
which that environment offers to him as an agent, its 'truth' in Hegel's
sense of that term.

I will take up this point subsequently.

Fourth, the adequacy of describing the individual agent as endowed
With an 'original nature' is now called into question.

Hegel notes that,

'Objective reality, however, is a moment which itself has no longer
~ndependent

truth in this mode of consciousness; it (i.e. the truth)

consists solely in the unity of this consciousness with action (tun), and
~he

true work (das wahre Werk) is only that unity of action and existence,

of willing and performance. 11155
~efers
~o

'Objective reality' in this statement

to that 'original nature' in terms of which the agent took himself

be constituted as an individual, and in relation to which his

~ent

was experienced simply as a correlate.

e;.~viron

Activity was taken by the

Lndividual to be simply an expression of this 'original nature'.
But the experience of others relating to the results of his activity
las forces the agent to revise his attitude towards that activity itself.
\nd in virtue of this, his attitude towards his own individuality must
ilso be revised.

The individual continues to comprehend himself as an

ndividual who acts.

But now he comprehends his own activity as containing

155
Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 429-430; Phanomenologie, pp. 293-294.
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purpose is both a general one and the individual's own.

This

But more, it is

one which the individual makes his own through acting upon it.
This is the case in two senses.

First, it is through acting on a

general purpose that that purpose is incorporated into the experience of
the individual as a 'design' of his own.

The individual becomes one who,

as an individual, has specific 'designs' precisely through incorporating
general purposes into his own behavior.

(E.g., it is not the case that one

is first a poet, and then proceeds to do poetry.

Rather, one does poetry,

and through this action becomes an individual poet.)

Second, the result

of action 'objectifies,' i.e. embodies in a definite product which is
external to the individual activity itself, and thus enables the individual
to know concretely both his activity and himself.
this.

I have already noted

But activity itself is now comprehended by the individual as concret

action holding within its particularity the aim of realizing a general
purpose.

The product of action, then, embodies both the concrete details

of this activity and the above mentioned aim as the agent has incorporated
it into his own individuality.

Thus the individual is capable of knowing

the details of his adoption of a generally worthy purpose through his
relation to the result of his activity, which embodies in itself those
details.

On this basis, of course, the individual is now capable of

revising the details of his own design, and of engaging in further and more
sophisticated activities in virtue of that revision.
With these observations in mind, let us return to a consideration of
~egel's

text.

The individual agent may no longer be described, and no

~

-281longer comprehends himself from within his own experience, as being constituted as both an agent and as an individual through possessing a
definite, 'original nature.'

The 'original nature,' as Hegel puts it,

" ••• has no longer independent truth in this mode of consciousness ••• 11156
Rather, those capacities for action and designs which are the individual's
own, and through which the agent as an individual is to be described, in
their definite forms are consequences of the individual's actions, through
which designs are adopted by the individual and specified as his own in
their details: " ••• it (i.e. the truth) consists solely in the unity of this
. ••• 1115 7
. h action
consc i ousness wit

This is to say that the 'nature' or

concrete individuality of the agent, that unity of capacities and designs
which is his own and thus his self, is the result of, or is constituted
by, that action of his own which unifies particular details of activity
and general purpose.

One might say for Hegel that the individual nature of

the agent is 'acut~lized' by his own activity.

It is a proposition with

which Marx would heartily agree.
A final implication of the product of the individual's activity being
related to others may now be noted.

It is essential to the nature of

activity, as pointed out above, .that it involve the unification of particular details with a general purpose.

Hegel points out that in virtue of

156
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 429; Phanomenologie, p. 293.
157
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 429-430; Phanomenologie, p. 294.
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rather than mere transitoriness.

158

But when his product is apprehended by

others, the individual notices, first, that the general purpose which is
incorporated into his activity is not his alone, but is shared by others.

15

Indeed a defining feature of 'general purpose' is its ability to be
incorporated by several individual agents into the details of the particular actions of each.

And further, the individual must now experience and

comprehend the 'reality' of his environment as

tha~

context within which

the activities towards the realization of general purposes, and thus
communal activities, may be undertaken.
It is with this comprehension that the "geistige Tierreich" is
tovercome.

Society is a "community of animals" when individual agents

~xperience

and comprehend themselves as simply giving active expression to

~heir

own, immediate, 'original' natures, and experience the environment

pnly as a correlate of activity towards this expression.
possibilities implicit within the experience of the

But given the

individual agent

nimself, this form of self comprehension, and thus this description of the
nature of the agent, will not do.

Hegel now argues that agency is that

through which the individual achieves self actualization, and that means
through which he "objectifies himself in his environment.

The environment,

in turn, is and is experienced by the individual as that milieu within
158
Cf. the definition of 'actuality' noted in foot note #153.
159
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 437; Ph&nomenologie,, p. 300.-

I
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Mhich social as well as individual action occurs, and a milieu whose detail
are produced through social activity.

And, finally, agency brings the

individual into the context of a society of agents, which context
profoundly affects both the nature of individual action and the individual'
experience of his own action.

The individual is now seen as essentially a

member of a society of agents.
When the individual attains this comprehension of himself, when he
understands himself to be a participant in a society of agents in virtue of
the very structure of his experience as an agent, consciousness achieves
its realization as Spirit.

This notion was heralded earlier in the

Phenornenologv, in the dialectic of self consciousness, where Spirit was
uescribed as, " ••• the unity of the different self related and self existent
self consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and independence of their
ppposition as component elements of that substance: Ego that
plurality of Egos, and 'we' that is a single Ego·. nlGO

The description of

~he

dialectic of the experience of the individual agent has both described

~he

nature of individual agent itself, and reached consciousness of itself

as Spirit.
~ctivity,

~nd

Precisely in realizing himself as an individual through his own
the agent notes that his experience both affirms his individualit ,

points beyond it towards the experience of being a participant in a

?ociety of individuals.
~f

As Hyppolite admirably notes, through an examinati1 n

the structure of the experience of the agent as an individual, Hegel

160
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 227; Phanomenologie, p. 140.
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others; it is not only subjective, it is also a datum (une chose), an
objective manifestation ••• This is the world of spirit, this world which
is spirit, which will finally be the thing itself (i.e. die Sache selbst),
and this world demands the consideration not of individuality alone but of
11161
.
.
.
1 ay b etween in
. d.ivi. dua l'ities.
.
interaction,
o f t h e interp

It is to Hegel'

examination of those features of the experience of the individual that are
~oth

soical and are fundamental to the experience of the individual qua

individual that we must next analyze.
III.

Agency and society in the Philosophy of Right.
In taking up this issue I shift my analysis from the text of the

~henomenologv
~he

of Spirit to that of the Philosophy of Right.

For it is in

Philosophy of Right that Hegel offers concise analysis of the question

of, in Hyppolite's language, "the interplay of individualities," the question which, as shown above, arises for Hegel out of his examination of the
structures of the experience of the concrete individual agent.

I turn to

the Philosophy of Right rather than to the Phenomenology for Hegel's
analysis of the social nature of individual experience because, while
Hegel treats this question in the text of the Phenomenology,

161
Hyppolite, Genese et Structure, pp. 299 and 300.
162
Cf. Ibid., pp. 311-313.

162

his primary

-285concern there is the explicitating of the development of the notion of
Spirit,

163

whereas the Philosophy of Right directs attention specifically

to the questions of the nature of society, especially political society,
and of the relation between society and the individual.

Also the latter

1 4
.
. d attention.
.
text is,
as i s we 11 known, one to whi c h Ma rx d.irecte d sustaine
In Hegel's philosophical description of the experience of self
consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the individual as person is
one whose activity externalizes himself, bringing him into relations with
pthers.

In introducing the Philosophy of Right, an analogous description

pf the nature of the individual subject is offered, through an explicitatio
pf the concept of "will."

It is this concept which must first be

~onsidered.

Will is described by Hegel under three interrelated headings, which
are further unified into a concrete description of will itself, and of the
~ndividual

.
165
as its subJect.

The first heading is that of will as abstrac •

163

Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 457-461; Phanomenologie, pp. 313-316.
164
It will not be my purpose to develop a thoroughgoing interpretation
pf Hegel's Philosophy of Right here. This would divert attention from the
overall question which I am attempting to handle. Nor will my emphasis be
on the content and development of Hegel's political theory, and Marx'
Critique of it. Rather, I see as my task here the isolating of those
~rguments in the Philosophy of Right relevant to Marx' theory of man, most
t>articularly those arguments in which Hegel considers the social features
of individual experience, as well as the nature of social relationships
""hemselves.

-

165
One might note here that Hegel does not first attempt to demonstrat
hat will is 'free will', and then proceed to a descriptive analysis of the
atter. Rather, he attempts to describe the nature of 'will' systematical! ,

-286"The will contains (a) the element of pure _indeterminacy or that pure
indeterminacy or that pure reflection of the ego into itself which involves
the dissipation of every restriction and every content either immediately
presented by nature, by needs, desires, and impulses, or given by any
means whatever. 11166
offered in the text.

Aid in understanding this difficult statement is
Following the statement cited, Hegel refers to will

in this sense as "the pure thought of oneself."

167

He goes on to comment

that "will" in this sense involves a "unrestricted possibility of abstraction from any determinate state of mind which I may find in myself or which
[ may have, set up in myself, my flight from every content as a restric-

~ion.11168 And finally he notes that the exercise of will in this sense,
'imagines that it is willing some positive state of affairs, such as
!Universal equality or universal religious life ••• 11169
~d

to demonstrate freedom of will, i.e. the ability of the individual to
himself through choice, within the context of this systematic
~escription.
This is in keeping with Hegel's understanding of philosophica
method. See the "Preface" to the Phenomenology of Spirit in Kaufman, Hegel
~exts and Commentary, (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966), p. 28; Phanomenologie, p. 19, Hegel asserts that a philosophical position is such that it,
' ••• must justify itself by the presentation of the system ••• " He reiterate
~his idea with explicit reference to the question of the nature of will in
rhe Philosophy of Right, trans. Knox, p. 21; Grundlinien der Philosophie
des Rechts, (Hamburg: Felix Meinie, 1955), p. 29. "The proof that the will
is free and the proof of the nature of the will and of freedom can be
established only as a link in the whole chain (of philosophy)."
~etermine

166
Hegel (Knox), p. 21; Grundlinien, p. 30.
167
Hegel, (Knox), p. 21; Grundlinien, p. 30.
168
Hegel, (Knox), p. 22; Grundlinien, p. 30.
169
Ibid.
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means the ability of the self conscious individual to determine himself
through comprehending himself as one who chooses allegiance to some universal principle, such as political equality, religiosity, etc.

It is, first,

a "pure thought of oneself," an act of self comprehension, and thus of
self determination. 170

Will in this sense involves "pure indeterminacy"

in that the self comprehension here described is one which abstracts from
particular or determinate content, e.g. determinate forms of religious
ritual, political action, etc.

It invovles individual self comprehension

through a principle which is exclusively universal.
Insofar as this exercise of will is abstract, it is also one sided,
and is so precisely because it is an exercise which abstracts from "any
determinate state of mind which I may find in myself or which I may have
. myse lf ••• , 11171 f rom determinate situations an d experiences o f
set up in
will which occur for the individual either circumstantially or through
choice.

A description of will which is abstract in this sense is inadequat e

to the experience of the individual and.must be supplemented.

Thus Hegel

notes that, "At the same time, the ego is also the transition from
undifferentiated indeterminacy to the differentiation, determination, and
positing of a determinacy as a content and object.

Now further, this

170
It is for this reason that I describe will here as a capacity of
the self conscious individual.
171
Hegel, (Knox), p. 22; Grundlinien, p. 30.

-
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Through this positing of itself as something determinate, the ego in
. . 1 e steps into
.
d eterminate
.
.
.. 112
princip
existence.

Hegel's discussion of determinate content as "given by nature" within
the experience of the individual subject of will is particularly revealing:
and may be dwelt upon briefly.

In connnenting on the Kantian moral positiot

in the Phenomenology, Hegel asserts that:
••• nature is not merely this completely free external
mode in which, as a bare and pure object, consciousness
has to realize its purpose. Consciousness is per se
essentially something for which this other detached
reality exists, i.e. it is itself something contingent
and natural. This nature, which is properly its own,
is sensibility (Sinnlichkeit], which, taking the form
of volition, in the shape of Impulses and Inclinations,
has by itself a determinate essential being of its
own, i.e. has specific single purposes (einzelne
Zwecke), and thus is opposed to pure will with its pure
purpose.173
The individual, Hegel here insists must be described as a concrete
individual, and as such one whose experience necessarily brings him in
relation to the concrete details of an external environment.

This

environment or "nature" in turn, is not to be understood as merely externaJ ,
but in a way with which we are already familiar from the dialectic of "selJ
consciousness," is to be understood as externality which occurs as
172

Hegel, (Knox), p. 22; Grundlinien, p. 31.
173
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 618; Phanomenologie, p. 427. For conunentary
on this text see W.H. Walsh, Hegelian Ethics, (London: Macmillian Co. Ltd.i
1969), pp. 29-31.
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essentially within the experience of the in.dividual, as "for" the individua
''impulses" and "inclinations", impulses or drives felt by the individual
in relation to his environment, and thus manners in which will manifest
~tself

in determinate fashions, in relation to determinate objects.

Three implications follow.

First, it is in virtue of the experience

of "specific, single purposes (einzelne Zwecke) 11174 of specific impulses
and drives through which will is manifested in a determinate
the individual experiences himself as an individual.

fas~ion,

that

In virtue of that

relationship to concrete nature which Hegel calls "sensibility"
(Sinnlichkeit), the individual experiences himself as a concrete, particu~ar

individual.

As Hegel notes in the Philosophy of Right, it is this

experience of will which represents "the finitude or particularization of
the egot. 11175
Second, a consequence of this is that a further and more adequate
description of will itself is required.

Thus Hegel goes on in the

Philosoohy of Right to hold that, "The will is the unity of both these
moments.

It is particularity reflected into itself, and so brought back to

174
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 618; PhHnomenologie, p. 427.
175
Hegel, (Knox), p. 22; Grundlinien, p. 31.
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The act of will of the fully

concrete individual is an act which wills a particular object (e.g. assents
to some determinate impulse or drive), and wills a universal purpose throug
this relationship to a particular (e.g. will political equality through
relating itself itself to specific established democratic processes).
act of will fully described, then, is one in which the particular
the universal are held together in a single act.

The

and

This is of course

analogous to the description of the individual agent offered in the
Phenomenolo~v

of Spirit, where the individual is pictured as one whose

action involved the realization of a concrete "design", and hence also
action towards the realization of a general purpose.

For Hegel here, this

tunity of particular impulse and universal purpose in the single act of
~11

is necessary in order that the essential possibilities of particular

impulses themselves be realized for the individual.
~egel •••

As Reyburn notes, "For

the fixity and incoherence of natural impulses is only a first

appearance and not the final truth.

The practical attitude, of which they

are the crude manifestation, is capable of higher things; and in
rationalizing its content and building it into a consistent aim of life as
a whole it is developing the intrinsic nature of impulse itself. 11177

When

determinate impulses are unified with universal purpose in a single act of
~ill,

these impulses achieve a degree of integration, consistency, and
176
Hegel, (Knox), p. 23; Grundlinien, p. 32.

-

177
Hugh A. Reyburn, The Ethical Theory of Hegel, (Oxford: Clarendon
0
ress, 1921), p. 133.
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Another and more significant implication follows from this.

The

activity of will in the fuller sense described above involves self
determination.

After initially describing will in the more adequate sense,

Hegel goes on to note that, "It is the self-determination of the ego, whicImeans that at one and the same time the ego posits itself as its own
negative, i.e. as restricted and determinate, and yet remains by itself,
i.e. in its self-identity and universality.

It determines itself and yet

.
b'ind s itse
.
lf toget h er wi t h i tse lf • 11179
at t h e same time

The detai·1 s o f

this statement concerning self determination are critical.
Hegel refers to the "restricted and determinate" as the "negative" of
the "ego", the individual conscious subject.

By "restricted and determinat

~"

is meant the particular. impulses and drives which the individual experience ,
in relation to his natural environment, as well as their particular object.
Such particular impulses and drives are the "negative" of, or other than tl e
ego in that the individual conscious subject is capable of comprehending
himself through universal principles or purposes, i.e. is capable of
"willing" in the first sense described by Hegel.

But as noted above, the

experience of the individual also necessarily includes particular impulses
in relation to particular objects, "the impulses, desires, inclinations,
180
whereby the will finds itself determined in the course of nature."
178
Cf. also Hegel, (Knox), pp. 24-25; Grundlinien, p. 34.
179
Hegel, (Knox), p. 23; Grundlinien, p. 32.

-

l80H~~~1

(Knn~). n. 25~ Grundlinien. n. 35.

-292Because such impulses are necessary features of the experience of the
individual, they are his own.

But in themselves they occur disparately anc

in an ununified fashion, " ••• as a medly and multiplicity of impulses, each
of which is merely 'my desire,' but exists alongside other desires which
are likewise all 'mine' ••• aimed at all kinds of objects and satiable in
all kinds of ways.

11181

Such impulses then must be integrated and given

direction within the experience of the individual, and this is effected
through an act of will in which they are unified with some universal

purpo~

1

At the same time, that act of will through which the self conscious
subject comprehends himself in relation to some universal purpose is also
by itself inadequate, because universal purpose needs to be embodied in
some specific content, to be related to a determinate object, in order to
~e

actualized within individual experience.

The description of.will in

general which Hegel finally accepts is a description of one in which the
~niversal

and the determinate are unified and held together in a single act

But his means that the act of will is that through which the subject unifie
elements which are at once initially disparate and implicitly unifiable
within his own experience.

This is one sense in which Hegel asserts that

will involves self determination.

The act of will effects this unification

of elements within the experience of the individual, which unification in
turn is necessary for the realization of individuality itself.
180
Hegel, (Knox), p. 25; Grundlinien, p. 35.
181
Hegel, (Knox), p. 26; Grundlinien, pp. 35-36.
182
r.f. Jfoot:>l

(Knnv:)

n

?1• r.r11ntlliniPn

n
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-293Furthermore, the integration of impulses in themselves disparate
through the act of will requires that the objects of those impulses also
be transformed so that they conform to the will of the individual.

This

is necessary because, given integration and direction, such impulses are
directed at particular external objects, and because it is only by

~till

being brought i.n relation to particular and determinate objects that
universal purpose can itself be actualized for the subject of will.

Thus

for the subject of will, the external environment is not simply external,
but is that which occurs "for" the subject, that in which will can be
~mbodied.

Bernard Bourgeois comments on this point •
••• that which is willed and in which the Self discovers
itself is opposed to that which this same self
represents as the external world, and this is why the
liberty realized in the identity of the willing Self
is not a real liberty. This (i.e., real liberty)
requires the overcoming of the otherness of the
objective world through relation to that which is
willed. Spirit then is the effort to pose in objective
being that which is willed, that is, the identity of
the willed and willing, freedom, and through this
enterprise of the objectification of freedom, it becomes
objective spirit ••. 183
Hegel's description of will leads to the view that the subject of will
experiences 'nature' or the external environment as that which may be
brought into conformity with his will, that which may be transformed in

183
Bernard Bourgeois, La Pensee Politigue de Hegel, (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1969), p. 114. The author goes on in this
text to note that Hegel's arguments concerning 'objective spirit' essential y
include descriptions of the necessarily social character of the experience
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-294such a fashion that his will is embodied in it.

Indeed, this understandinE

of 'nature' as the correlate of will, as that objective context in which
will may be embodied, is essential to the notion of will itself, as this
is described above.

For the specific impulses as integrated, and thus the

will itself, are directed towards particular external objects which are
themselves not merely external, but are those contexts in which will may
be concretely realized.

I shall show presently that Hegel's additional

descriptions of the individual subject of will are based on this view and
employ particularly the idea that 'will' itself requires embodyment in the
external environment, this leads him to the conclusion that the experience
of the individual is necessarily social.
In the beginning of the Philosophy of Right proper, Hegel, under the
heading of "Abstract Right," describes will in terms of its most basic
manifestations as " ••• the inherently single will of a subject,"
as its most basic forms of embodiment in externality.

184

as well

Will is described as

involving, " ••• a content consisting of determinate aims and, as exclusive
individuality, it has this content as an external world directly confrontir g
it." 185

Will involves initially those particular impulses and needs

186

which the individual experiences as his own, as well as the external items
to which the individual stands in relation in virtue of the former.

184
Hegel, (Knox), p. 37; Grundlinien, p. 51.

185

~·
186

-

Cf. Ibid., article 35.
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-295will even at this stage cannot be described simply as the particular

impul~

>s

and needs of the individual, because it is at the same time that in virtue
of which the individual embodies or objectifies himself in the external
environment.

Hegel's general purpose here is to describe systematically

" ••• the constitutive principles through which mind, as will or practical
reason, embodies itself in an outer element, and is recognized by others
as a free and objective self. 11187
The most basic form of such embodiment is property, and Hegel's
discussion of this includes comments relevant to the question of the
relation of his position to Marx.

He first notes that the 'right' of the

individual to property arises from the fact that non-personal items occur
within the experience of the individual as essentially in relation to
.
1ve d in
. h.is own wi·11 • 188
himse lf , i .e. to t h e nee d s an d i mpu1 ses invo

Thus,

"A person has as his substantive end the right of putting his will into any
and every thing, and thereby making it his, because it has no such end in
itself and derives its destinI and soul from his will.
right of appropriation which man has over all 'things•.

This is the absolut
11189

Three senses in which an item may be possessed as property are
187
Reyburn, op. cit., p. 115.
188
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 40; Grundlinien, p. 55. "What is innnediately
different from free mind is that which, both for mind and in itself, is the
external pure and simple, a thing, something not free, not personal, withou
rights."
189
Hegel, (Knox), p. 41; Grundlinien, p. 57.

~

-296distinguishable: " ••• (a) by directly grasping it physically, (b) by forming

.
.
190
it, and (c) by merely marking it as ours."

Interestingly, Hegel notes

bf the second of these senses that, "When I impose a form on something, the
thing's determinate character as mine acquires an independent externality

... ,,191

I take him to mean that the taking possession of an item through

forming it involves the transformation of some item in the external world
such that the item becomes appropriate to the satisfying of a determinate
peed involved in the 'will' of the individual, through embodying within
itself the details of the individual's activity on it.

Hegel here makes th

same point as does Marx in ?is analysis of needs in relation to praxis.
~his

can be vividly seen from the examples which Hegel utilizes here:

~, •••

the tilling of the soil, the cultivation of plants, the taming and

~eeding

of animals, the preservation of game, as well as contrivances for

Utilizing raw materials or forces of nature and processes for making one
192
Jna.terial produce effects on another, and so forth."
The idea of the relation between the property item and the determinate
need of the individual is developed by Hegel in his discussion of the 'use'

pf property.

He says that, " ••• my need, as the particular aspect of a

190
Hegel, (Knox), p. 46; Grundlinien, p. 64.
191
Hegel, (Knox), p. 47; Grundlinien, p. 65.
192
Ibid.
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-297ingle will, is the positive element which finds satisfaction, and the
hing, as something negative in itself, exists only for my need and is at
ts service.

The use of a thing is my need being externally realized

hrough the change, consumption, and destruction of the thing. 111 9 3

In the

se of property, the item utilized becomes for the individual an external
orrelate of his particular need, and this need is in turn externalized
nd embodied in the item being used.
But Hegel wishes to develop the concept of property, and the
elation between property and will, beyond the points already noted, and
e does so through apparently de-emphasizing the notion of need.

In an

ddendum to article Forty-one, the first article under which the Philosophy
f Right discusses property in general, Hegel notes that, "The rationale
f property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but.in in the
upersession of the pure subjectivity of personality.
erson exists for the first time as reason.

11194

In his property a

And in the context of

he same discussion, he notes further that, "The particular aspect of the
atter, the fact that I make something my own as a result of my natural
eed, impulse, and caprice, is the particular impulse satisfied by
ossession.

But I as free will am an object to myself in what I possess

nd thereby also for the first time am an actual will, and this is the
spect which constitutes the category of property, the true and right factor
193
Hegel, (Knox), p. 49; Grundlinien, p. 67.
194
Hegel, (Knox), pp. 235-36.
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195
in possession."
p~rticular

While the relation between the item of property and

need cited above is a feature of the relation between property

and will, it is not the exclusive feature of this relation.

Thus a

statement of this feature is not an adequate or sufficient description of
this relation itself.

It must be unified with the further statement that

property is the externalization and objectification of individual will.
This further description of the relation of property and will is
indicated in the texts above.

In fact its argumentative basis is containec

in the previous description of the relation of property item to need.

In

the property item, need is embodied as need for a particular, external
item.

But this is to imply that, insofar as need is for a particular

external item, then the individual person is capable of recognizing the
item as his own, his object, and thus is further capable of comprehending,
through the details of the object, the details of that need to which the
object stands in relation. . Thus he is capable, through the property item,
of comprehending in a "objective" fashion, i.e. through the details of an
external object, the details of his own will, and therefore of his own self
Hegel concisely states that, through my relations to items of property I
am "an object to myself in what I possess ••• 11196
One might recall here the discussion of will, in general, according to

195
Hegel, (Knox), p. 42; Grundlinien, p. 58.
196
Ibid.
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-299hich the exercise of will involves necessarily the embodiment of will in
external objects and the unification of universal purpose with particular
impulses and needs through this embodiment.

Here Hegel is describing the

relation to the individual to external items as his property as the most
asic and primitive form of this embodiment.

Through his relation to

roperty, the individual is at least capable of comprehending the particul
etails of his own will.

197

One final but essential feature of the relation of individual will
to property must now be noted.
appropriation

198

This involves Hegel's assertion that the

of property necessarily brings the individual into

relationships with others.

This point is made by Hegel first in his

iscussion of property in general.

"Since property is the embodiment

personality, my inward idea and will that something is to be
ne is not enough to make it my property; to secure this end occupancy is
requisite.

The embodiment my willing thereby attains involves its

recognizability by others."

199

The claim made here is that the full

197
Cf. Reyburn, p. 125. "Property is the realization of a selfconscious will in an external thing. Since mind is essentially a selfrevealing system, it must give itself an outward existence and maintain its
freedom in a world of things."
198
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 236, addendum /126 to paragraph /144. " ••• 'to
appropriate' means at bottom to manifest the pre-eminence of my will over
the thing, and to prove that it is not absolute, is not an end in itself.
his is made manifest when I endow the thing with some purpose not direct!
its own."
199
Hegel, (Knox), p. 45; Grundlinien, p. 62.

-300actualization of the property relation, of the individual's appropriation
of rights over an external item of property, requires that this relation
be recognized as such by others.

Abstracting from the specific question

of occupancy, an argument for this general claim is indicated by Hegel
in an addendum to the above text: "The inner act of will which consists in
saying that something is mine must also become recognizable by others.

If

I make a thing mine, I give to it a predicate, 'mine,' which must appear
in it in external form, and must not simply remain _in my inner will.

11200

I take the argument which Hegel suggests here to be as follows.

The

individual is capable of comprehending concretely the details of his own
will insofar as those details are made manifest in an object, i.e. in
something external to himself.

For the individual comprehends the details

of his own needs through the details of objects relevant to

tho~e

needs.

But the property item is not simply an item relevant to some need of the
individual.

It is also an item in which the will of the individual has

been embodied through his appropriation of it, i.e. through his taking
possession of it in some way such that it is an item which has its role
or purpose, in the experience of the individual, not in virtue simply of
its own characters and properties, but in virtue of its relation to the
individual himself, to his need.

201

Now this feature of the property item 3

200
Hegel, (Knox), p. 237.
201
Cf. footnote number

19~

for this sense of 'appropriation'.

r
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individual and his appropriation of it, must be recognized by the individuc
so that he can fully recognize himself as the item's "owner," or the item
itself as one within which his will is embodied, so that he can say of the
item, it is "mine."
But this recognition in turn requires a fotmdation in that environment
which is both the context of the individual and external to him, because,
again, it is through the details of his will being externalized that the
individual is capable of comprehending those details concretely and
adequately.

And the external basis for the individual's recognition of

himself as "owner," as one whose will is embodied in an item, is precisely
the recognition of this relation between himself and the item in question
by others.

Thus the individual's relation to property necessarily brings

him into relations with others.
It must be noted here that Hegel is not involved in deducing the
presence of others from the details of the property relationship.

202

Such

202
Hegel has been accused of such a method. Cf. V.R. Mehta, Hegel anc
the Modern State, (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1968), p. 41.
"What is wrong with Hegel is that he connects this perfectly legitimate
way of raising problems and resolving them with a deductive method based
on self-evident principles. If we have to base our conclusions on the
analysis of experience, then certainly, at the same time we cannot start
with self-evident principles, for every principle according to the first
criterion is contingent and must correspond to some objective physical
reality." But it is clear that 'deduction' in the sense used here is not
a part of Hegel's analysis at this point.

-

-302an enterprise would fly in the face of Hegel's understanding of
philosophical method.

Rather, he is inquiring into those conditions

requisite for the full realization of the property relation.

One such

condition is that the relation of the individual to his items of property
be recognized by others.
The formalization of this recognition is contract.

The general

understanding of contract is asserted in the Philosophy of Right.

Property

is, " ••• an existent as an embodiment of the will (Dasein des Willens), and
from this point of view the 'other' for which it exists can only be the
will of another person.

This relation of will to will is the true and

proper ground in which freedom is existent.

The sphere of contract is

made up of this mediation whereby I hold property not merely by means of a
thing and my subjective will, but by means of another person's will as
well, and so hold it in virtue of my participation in a common will."

203

It is unnecessary here to consider the full and detailed development of
Hegel's discussion of contract, as it is offered in the Philosophy of Right
However, it is worth mentioning three features of the notion of contract as
summarized in the text just cited.

First, the partners to contract compre204
hend themselves as "independent property owners,"
as private individuals
~ith

the discrete relations of owners to their own property.
203
Hegel, (Knox), p. 57; Grundlinien, p. 78.
204
Hegel (Knox), p. 58; Grundlinein, p. 79.
205

-

Cf. also Reyburn, p. 139.

205

Second,

tr~

-303formalization of contract involves not simply the agreement of two or more
!Private individuals as to the right of each, but also the "relation of will
to will," in the sense of the establishment of common agreement that the
rights of each be maintained.

In this sense the establishment of contract

involves the establishment of "a common will" of which the individual is
.

a part i cipant.

206

Finally, that contract which yields the establishment oj

a common will is· itself the formalization of that recognition by others of
the individual's relation to his
the property relationship itself.

prop~rty

which is a necessary feature of

This it is a formalization of that

feature of the individual's experience in virtue of which he is, as a
property owner in the full sense, necessarily a social individual, a
participant in society.

As Hegel notes in an addendum to his general

description of contract, " ••• in contract my will still has the character
'this,' though it has it in community with another will. 11207
It is the task of explicitating the character of this "connnon will,"
and its relationship to the individual, which at this point becomes the
major focus of the Philosophy of Right.

Hegel's approach to this task

involves his deriving a premise from the previous discussion, and constructing two arguments on the basis of this premise.

The premise which

Hegel derives from the above discussion is that the individual who
exercises his will, has this will itself as the objective of this exercise
206
Cf. Above, footnote number 203; Reyburn, pp. 138-139, and p. 141.
207
Hegel, (Knox), p. 242, addendum to paragraph #71.

-304or that, given the individual which exercises will, "Its personality ••• it
now has for its object ••• "

208

There are two necessarily related senses in which this statement can
be seen as derived from the above offered discussion.

The first harkens

back to Hegel's comments on needs and appropriation.

And will, as already

noted, includes the particular impulses and needs experienced by the
individual.

The individual in turn relates to such needs through the

"appropriation" of property, i.e., through the taking possession of an
external item in a way such that

the item comes to have, as its essential

purpose within the experience of the individual, its relation to his will,
to his need.

209

But to hold this is to hold that the act of appropriation

has as its objective or goal the handling of that need which is resident
within the will of hte individual.

And appropriation itself is a feature

of the exercise of individual will.

Thus the individual will have itself

as its objective or goal of its own exercise.
Second, the exercise of individual will results in its externalizatio1 ,
its embodiment in an external object.

But it is in virtue of this

externalization that the individual is capable of comprehending the detail
of his will, and thus himself as a concrete individual.

Thus the exercise

of will is at the service of the individual subject of will, or has this
individual subject himself as its objective.
These two senses in which the exercise of will has itself as its

208
Hegel, (Knox), p. 74; Grundlinien, p. 100.

-

209
Cf. a2ain He2el's definition of 'aovropriation' at footnote #203.

-305object are unified by Hegel.

The exercise.of will has itself for its

own object in that it at once brings the individual into relation objects
relevant to his needs, and enables him to comprehend himself concretely
through through the details of these objects.

Indeed, it is in virtue of

the exercise of will in this fashion that the individual is not simply
. h ts, 210 b ut in
. an a dequate sense o f t h e term
a person, one wh o can bear rig
a "subject", one who can comprehend the details of his own experience,
and himself in relation thereto: " ••• this reflection of the will into
itself and its explicit awareness of its identity makes the person into
the subject." 211

But at the same time this individual subject of will

bears a relation to others and to a common will as a seemingly essential
feature of its individuality.

The question which now arises for Hegel

is, can the individual who is the subject of will, whose exercise of will
has will itself as the object of that exercise, be validly described as
simply an individual, or must such a subject be described as one whose
experience is essentially social?

The proceedure of the Philosophy of

Right involves, I think, the construction of two sustained arguments, one
in support of the conclusion that it is paradoxical to describe the subjec
of will simply as an individual, and a second in support of the conclusion
210
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 37; Grundlinien, p. 52. "Personality
essentially involves the capacity for rights and constitutes the concept
and the basis (itself abstract) of the system of abstract and therefore
formal right."
211
Hegel, (Knox), p. 75; Grundlinien, p. 101.
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whose experience is essentailly social.

I take this latter point to be

adequately summarized by Reyburn in the comment that, for Hegel, "Men
reach individuality in social groups."

212

Both of these arguments are highly complex, and are presented in
lengthy fashions in the Philosophy of Right.

The first can be understood

as comprising the entire section of the text which Hegel entitles
"Morality."

And elements of the second are dispersed throughout the

final division of this work, "Ethical Society."

However, for purposes of

efficiency, both these arguments may be presented in a briefer and more
integrated manner.

And, as I hope the following will bear out, textual

analysis itself warrants this briefer presentation.
Hegel begins the first argument with the question: what criterion migl
there be whereby this individual can determine those actions which he ough1
to do, as opposed to those which he ought to avoid.

It would seem that

there are two possible responses to this question: individual interest or

213
.
i ndivi.d ua1 h appiness
or we lf are.

But i t may read.l
i y b e seen t h at t h e

first of itself collapses into the second, for that which interests the
individual subject is precisely that which will contribute to his

welfare.~ ~ 4

Thus individual welfare or happiness might initially seem to be the criter·
ion on the basis of which the subject of will might select his actions.

212
Reyburn, p. 201.

213
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 83; Grundlinien, p. 111.

--

214

Ibid.
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that all action result in individual welfare.

Indeed, some activity

may have a definitely pejorative effect on the experience of the individuaJ
Hegel notes that, "What the subject is, is the series of his actions.

If

these are a series of worthless productions, then the subjectivity of
his willing is just as worthless.

But if the series of his deeds is of

a substantive nature, then the same is true of the individual's inner
will."

215

Since activity may or may not effect the welfare of the individt =i.l,

some further criterion is required, on the basis of which the individual
subject of will may decide through which activities his welfare will be
achieved, and thus on the basis of which he may select activities themselv1 >.
And for the simply individual subject of will this criterion can only be
the good as such or in itself.

If he selects his actions according to thiE

criterion, the individual will necessarily achieve his own welfare, and
thus for the iwll of this individual, " ••• the end to which it devotes
itself must have absolute worth and be desirable in and for itself.

11216

Hegel insists, then, that the subject of will taken simply as an
individual must have as the object of its will the good: "The good is the
217
Idea as the unity of the concept of the will with the particular will."
Since the good as such is the object of the will of the individual subject
it must be the basis upon which he selects activities: " ••• since the good

215
Hegel, (Knox), p. 83; Grundlinien, p. 112.

216

-

217

Reyburn, p. 172.
Hegel. (Knox). p. 86: Grundlinien. o. 116.
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-308must of necessity be actualized through the particular will, it is at
the same time its substance, it has absolute

right in contrast with the

abstract right of property and the particular aims of welfare.

If either

of these moments becomes distinguished from the good, it has validity
on1y in so far as it accords with the good and is subordinated to it.

"218

Since the good as such functions as a criterion for the selection of
actions, then the individual subject has both the right to will that which
219
he conceives of as being in accord with the good, . and is obliged to do
so. 220

And finally, reminiscent of Kant as has been this whole discussion

the good as such must be taken as that which will promote boht one's own
welfare and welfare as such, and is then determinable as that which will
promote the welfare of all.

Thus, " ••• what is my duty?

As

nothing is so far available except: (a) to do the right, and

an answer
(~)

to

strive after welfare, one's own welfare, and welfare in universal terms,
the welfare of others."

221

At this point in the Philosophy of Right,. as I understand the text,
Hegel proceeds in the development of the present argument through the
construction of three subsidiary arguments, each of which leads to the
218
Hegel, (Knox), p. 87; Grundlinien, p./ 116.
219

ef.

Hegel, (Knox), p. 87; Grundlinien, p. 117.

220
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 89; Grundlinien, p. 119.
221
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 89; Grundlinien, p. 120.
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-309conclusion that it is paradoxical to describe the subject of will having a1
his object the Good in the sense taken above.
First, the concept of the good, as utilized above, abstracts from any
determinate content, and is determinable only as that which might promote
.
ally. 222
we lf are un1vers
horned dilemma.

But if this is so, then one is faced with a two

For on the one hand, if the good abstracts from all

determinate content, then no specific action may be considered good in
itself.

223

And on the other hand, in abstraction from determinate

reference to situation, any act may be comprehended as following from a
maxim which is universalizable. 224

For these reasons, Hegel argues that,

" ••• if duty is to be willed simply for duty's sake and not for the sake
of some content, it is only a formal identity whose nature it is to exclud1
c

all content and specification.

..

225

Second, the good in relation to the individual subject is meant to
function as an objective standard whereby actions which ought to be done
may be selected, and those which ought to be avoided may be recognized as
such.

That through which the individual might recognize the good, and

might utilize it is as such a standard, is a particular faculty of his

222
/
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 89-90; Grundlinien, pp. 120-121.
tinsurprisingly, makes specific reference to Kant at this point.
223
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 90; Grundlinien, p. 120.
pp. 59-60.
224
Cf. W.H. Walsh, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

-

225

He2el. (Knox), p. 90; Grundlinien. n. 121.

Hegel,

Also see Reyburn,
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own, his conscience (Gewissen).

226

Consci~nce

is inherently individual, as

the certainty of the individual as to what does and what does not accord
!With the good, " ••• the self certainty of this subject. 11227

But if this is

the case, then the good is available to the individual only in terms of
his own insights and awareness, which are inherently subjective.

The

good itself, then, is inherently subjective for the individual, and thus
cannot function for him as theobjective standard which he takes· it to be.
Hegel argues here that, "Conscience is therefore

s~bject

to the judgment

of its truth or falsity, and when it appeals only to itself for a decision,
it is directly at variance with what it wishes to be, namely the rule for
a mode of conduct which is rational, absolutely valid, and universal.

11228

Finally, the good as such abstracts from all determinate content, and
is determinable only as that which might promote welfare universally.

The

duty of the individual subject of will is to conform to the good in this
sense.

But if duty consists simply in this, it is consistent for the

individual subject to will each act in such a way as to promote his own
!Welfare privately, or, as Hegel puts it, the individual is capable, " ••• of
elevating above the universal the self

~11

of private particularity ••• 1122 S

226
Ibid.
227
Hegel, (Knox), p. 91; Grundlinien, p. 122.
228
I'Hid.
229
Hegel, (Knox), p. 92; Grundlinien, p. 124.
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standard whereby specific actions might be determined as necessarily
yielding universal welfare.

And it directly opens the possibility of

"evil," i.e., the dominance of a will" ••• which can draw its content only
from the determinate content of natural will, from desire, impulse,
.
. t ion,
e t c. 11230
i nc1 ina

And it further opens the possibility of hypocracy,

i.e., the conviction of acting at once according to a universal norm, and
from individual impulse and desire.

231

For these reasons then, it is paradoxical to conceive of the subject
of will as having as its object the good as such.

But as noted above,

Hegel argues that the good as such must be conceived of as the object of
the will of the subject taken simply an an individual, for it is only in
taking this as the object of his will that this subject can conceive of
a standard whereby actions towards the promotion of his own welfare might
be determined.

Thus it is further paradoxical to conceive of the subject

of will as an individual taken simply.
This represents, as I see it, the argument underlying the second
division of the Philosophy of Right.

It is the first of the two arguments

referred to previously concerning the subject of will.

It is integral to

Hegel's text, but must now be complemented with a second argument, towards
the conclusion that the subject of will is an individual whose experience
is essentially social.

230
231

-

cf.

Hegel, (Knox), p. 93; Grundlinien, pp. 124-215.

cf.

Hegel, (Knox), p. 94; Grundlinien,- p. 126.
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recalling the discussion of "conscience."

Conscious involves the

particular awareness and insights of the individual as to the "good."
As such, conscience is inadequate for the individual because conscience

seeks some objective standard whereby the individual may evaluate his
own activities, thus integrating and unifying them into a single life,
but necessarily relies on the subjective insights of the individual.
"Conscience turns away from the objective unity of its elements, and
presents only a sub.]ective one. 11232

Conscience is thus inadequate, but

the individual still requires some objective standard for the evaluation
of his actions, and this standard must arise out of and be intrinsic to
will

itself, because the individual is here the subject of will, i.e.,

one who has will itself as his object, one who has as the purpose of his
exercise of will this exercise itself, and the self determination it
effects.

233

The individual subject of will requires some standard which

arises intrinsically out of will itself, but which is not <fependent on
the caprice of his merely individual inclinations and insights.

But

society, as the living construct of customs, norms, mores, and laws, is

232 Reyburn, p. 178.
233

cf. Ibid., p. 172. "The freedom of the will and the absolute worth
of its own end can be reconciled only if in the last resort the two are
identical, or at least are aspects of a single whole. The end at which
will aims is that which it seeks to overcome, it is the declared essence
of the wi17. And hence the end of free will is realized freedom." This
is Reyburn s commentary on articles 127 and 128 of the Ph.l
h
f
Right H 1 ( r
·
i osop y o
, ege , 1'.nox, pp. 85-86; Grundlinien, pp. 114-115.
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-313precisely that which can provide such a standard to the individual.

Social

customs, mores, and laws, as belonging to the group, are beyond individual
caprice, and they simultaneously arise out of will itself, in that they
are the embodiments of personal action in the objective world.

Thus

society can provide the individual with the standard he requires, and
thus the individual subject of will must relate as such to society, or is
necessarily social.
I wish to make three observations concerning this argument.
Hegel is not here asking the question:
society.
~ssumption

First,

does the individual occur in

He assumes that the individual does so occur, and takes this
to be based on ordinary experience, as well as on the analysis

bf certain experiences, e.g., property.

Hegel's question rather is,given

the fact that the individual occurs in a social context, what is the
~elation between his experience of himself as a particular individual and

""s
an
~

i·n d l.Vl.
· · d ua1

.
·
· soci a 1?. 2 34
wh ose experience
is

Second, the essential features of Hegel's description of society are
~hat society involves public customs, laws, and norms, that these are

hemselves the expression of will, in that they arise out of the activity
>f personal subjects, and that, as public, they are the embodiments of

234

cf. Reyburn, p. 200. Reyburn seems to err slightly on this point.
He writes: "It is needless to insist here on the dependence of the individual on society; so much may be taken for granted. Not only the
developed life, but even bare existence would fail for man apart from
society; and there is nothing in the whole round of his being which is
not mediated by social powers. The most private and secret functions of
the mind are shot through with the influences of the common life." But it
does not seem that Hegel wishes to take this point for granted. Rather,
such a description of the relation of the experience of the individual to
l,i., sor;,,1 nri;urence js one which Hegel would wish rn ""'O'''"' fnr

-314will in the objective world.

In introducing the third main division of

the Philosophy of Right, Hegel asserts that "The ethical substance and
its laws and powers are on the one hand an object over against the
subject, and from his point of view they are--'are' in the highest sense
of self-subsistent being. 11235

By the "ethical substance" is meant

society in the sense indicated here.

And abstracting momentarily from

the question of the relation of society to the individual, one point here
is simply that society is existence of will as objectified in the world
through customs and laws.
Third, Hegel explicitly argues that society provides the individual
subject of will with the standard which he, as such a subject, requires.
In making the transition from "Morality" to "Ethical life," Hegel notes
that, "For the good as the substantial universal of freedom, but as
something still abstract, there are therefore required determinate
characters of some sort and the principle for determining them through
a principle identical with the good itself. 11236

The individual subject

of will requires some standard which is ·capable of providing determinate
content, and which involves also an adequate "principle," i.e., which
arises itself out of the nature of will.

The customs and laws of society

are such a standard and thus are precisely what the individual requires.
To be fully a subject of will, then, the individual must derive the
content of his will from society.

If so, some comments on the relation

235ttegel, (Knox), pp. 105-106; Grundlinien, p. 134.
236Hegel, (Knox), p. 103; Grundlinien, pp. 139-140.

-315of the individual to society may now be made.

Hegel's most concise

statement of this relation occurs in the Phenomenology, in his assertion
that society " ••• is spirit which is £or itself, since it maintains
itself by being reflected in the minds of the component individuals; and
which is in itself or substance, since it preserves them within
i tse lf •

11237

Society is distinct and separate from the individual,

because it is that which provides the objective expression of will
individual will may be realized.

whereb~

At the same time, the individual is

necessary for society, in that the social expression of will can only
exist through embodiment in individual consciousness.

Thus the individuaJ

both depends on society and is required for the occurence of the latter.
Statements analogous to these are made in the Philosophy of Right.

Two such may be noted.

Hegel asserts that, " ••• the ethical order is

freedom or the absolute will as what is objective, a circle of necessity
whose moments are the ethical powers which regulate the life of
individuals.

To these powers individuals are related as accidents to

substance, and it is in individuals that these powers are represented,
have the shape of appearance, and become actualized. 11238

The individual

is dependent on society, in order to fully realize himself as a subject
of will.

237

At the same time, society as the objective realization of will

Hegel, (Baillie), p. 467; Phanomenologie, p. 319.
23R.._
-Hegel,
(Knox), p. 105; Grundlinien, pp. 142-143.

-
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239

Thus social customs and laws "are not something alien to the subject.

On

the contrary, his spirit bears witness to them as to its own essence, the
essence in which he has a feeling of his selfhood ••• 11240
)

The individual

derives the content of his will, and thus the content of his own
experience of himself from society.

He is thus identified with society,

not in the sense that, as a member of society, his individuality is
cancelled, but rather in the sense that it is in virtue of his social
.
experience that he.can realize his individua1 ity as a subJect
o f wi·11 • 241
Hegel's developments of the argument concerning the essentially
social nature of the individual subject of will are lengthy and detailed
in the Philosophy of Right.

Indeed, these developments can be seen as

the purpose of the whole remainder of this text, culminating in Eegel's
doctrine of the State.

I shall illustrate these developments by analyzing

selected arguments from Hegel's discussion of the family, and of civil

239
Cf. Hegel (Knox), p. 259, addendum 94 to paragraph# 145. Hegel's
way of presenting this point is ackward. "Whether the individual exists
or not is all one to the objective ethical order. It alone is permanent,
and is the power regulating the life of individuals." The point here
seems to be that society as the objectification of will occurs irregardles:
of the existence of this or that individual, but this is not to deny that
the existence of individuals is necessary to the occurence of society.
240
Hegel, (Knox), p. 106; Grundlinien, p. 143.
241
"
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 106; Grundlinien, p. 144, where Hegel summarizes these points. "As substantive in character, these laws and
institutions are binding on the will of the individual because as
subjective, as inherently undetermined, or determined ~s particular
he distinguishes himself from them and hence stands related to them' as
to the substance of his own being."

-
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-317society as a system of needs, the former because of its interest as
illustrative of Hegel's point, the latter because of this and because of
certain striking analogies between it and the texts of Marx.
The family, Hegel argues, is at once the most fundamental and basic
mode of the

occur~ence

of society as an "ethical order," for within the

family, members experience themselves as members of the unit rather than
primarily as discrete individuals, and at the same time this unit is
capable of informing or providing content for the will of the individual.
He states that, " ••• in a family, one's frame of mind is to have self
consciousness of one's own individuality within this unity as the absolute
essence of oneself, with the result that one is in it not as an independen
person but as a member. 11242

The family provides an initial and immediate

context in which the individual may experience himself as a member of a
group, and of a group having specific customs and rules which provide
content for his will.

243

This is the case for the family considered as

partners in a marriage, and especially in monogamous marriage each
individual may experience his (her) individuality concretely insofar as
he (she) is recognized as an individual by the other 244 while

242
243

Hegel, (Knox), p. 110; Grundlinien, p. 149.

cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 112-113; Grundlinien, p. 152. "The identification of personality, whereby the family becomes one person and its
members become its accidents (though substance is in essence the relation
of accidents to itself), is the ethical mind." Also see Reyburn, p. 207.
"A family has habits, capabilities, an atmosphere, as specially marked as
those of individuals. No two homes are quite alike, and the difference is
not a mere series of particulars but resides in an attitude of things as
a whole."
244
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 115; Grundlinien, p. 155.

-318simultaneously participating in an emotionally founded
and will.

246

245

common interest

This is even more the case for children, who depend on the

family not only for initial and necessary emotional support, ·but also for
concrete subsistence

247

and education. 248

The family, then provides the individual with an immediate and
emotionally founded context wherein he or she may experience himself
(herself) as an individual the content of whose experience is derived
from participation in a common life, and the content of whose will is
derived from the rules and customs regulating that common life.

But in

its function as educator, the role of the family is a double edged one.
It is first to instill in the individual a sense of the unity between his
will and the common life in which he participates.

249

But it is secondly,

to develop within the individual the capacity of being a subject of will,
and of experiencing his own will individually:

" ••• this education has

the negative aim of raising children out of the instinctive, physical

~evel on which they are originally, to self-subsistence and freedom of
personality and so to the level on which they have the power to leave the

~atural unity of the family. 11250 One function of familial education is to
245c£. Hegel, (Knox), p. 110; Grundlinien, p.
149.
246Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 115; Grundlinien,
p. 155.
247Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 117; Grundlinien,
p. 158.
248Cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 117-118;
Grundlinien, p. 158.
249cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 117; Grundlinien, p.
158.
250Cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 117-118; Grundlinien, p.
158.

-319allow the child to relate to a common life so as to develop a will that
is individually his own.

Thus the individual becomes capable of

experiencing his will as involving desires and needs which transcend the
boundaries of the familial common life and are his own.
This development is necessary in order that the individual become in
an adequate sense a subject of will, one who comprehends the exercise of
will as involving its own object.

The development of this comprehension

must occur in the context of a common life, so that will is objectified
sufficiently for the individual to develop his own will.

But the details

of this immediate common life must also be transcended by the individual,
so that he may come to comprehend his will as his own.
The individual who has realized this self comprehension is, Hegel
tells us, a member of "Civil Society."

And "Civil Society" itself, he

tells us, must be analyzed from two points of view.

"The concrete

person, who is himself the object of his particular aims, is, as a
totality of wants and a mixture of caprice and physical necessity, one
principle of civil society.

But the particular person is essentially so

related to other particular persons that each establishes himself and
finds satisfaction by means of the others, and at the same time purely and
lit y, t h e secon d princip
. . 1 e h ere. 2 51
.
Simp 1 y b y means o f th e f orm o f universa
Civil society involves the individual, who is an individual because of
private aims and needs, who is at the same time, and precisely as such
an individual, a participant in social life.

I make no attempt here to

offer a full account of Hegel's understanding of "CiiYil Society."

-

251

cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 122-123; Grundlinien. o. 165
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individual which Hegel develops in his discussion of civil society as "A
System of Needs."

This section is important both in exhibiting the basis

of the relation between the developed individual subject and society,
and, for my purposes, in containing a number of assertions which Marx
might well have lauded.
Given Hegel's discription of the individual, his " ••• aim here is
. ••• , 252 o f th ose nee ds an d
the satisfaction of subjective part i cu1 arity
desires which are his own.

The means available to the individual for

the satisfaction of such needs is work.

"The means of acquiring and

preparing the particularized means appropriate to our similarly
particularized needs is work (Arbeit).

Through work the raw material

directly supplied by nature is specifically adapted to these numerous
ends by all sorts of different processes." 253

Nature offers the context

in which needs can be satisfied, but it is essentially the products of
work upon nature which can become items relevant to needs. 254

And just

as items have value in terms of their ability to satisfy needs, it is
work which endows them with such value:

252

" ••• this formative change

Hegel, (Knox), p. 120; Grundlinien, p. 170.

253
Hegel, (Knox), pp. 128-129; Grundlinien, p. 173.
254

Cf. Hegel, (Knox) ,p. 269, addendum 125 to paragraph II 196. "There
is hardly any raw material which does not need to be worked on before
use. Even air has to be worked for because we have to warm it. Water
is perhaps the only exception, because we can drink it as we find it.
It i~ by the sweat of his brow and the toil of his hands that man
obtains the means to satisfy his needs."

-

-321confers value of means and gives them utility, and hence man in what he
consumes is
· main
· 1y concerne d with th e pro d uc t s of men. 11255
But an additional and essential character of the individual, personal
subject is that needs develop and complexify within his experience, as wel
as simply occur within his experience.
senses.

This is the case in at least two

First, work, as the means towards satisfying needs, is capable

of becoming increasingly subtle and more complex.

But then the

experience of the agent becomes also more subtle and more complex, and
thus toq his needs.

256

And second, as the means towards the satisfaction

of needs become more complex, the means themselves may divide and
qualitatively change,

257

as the need for food results in needs for

agricultural implements, land, livestock, etc.
to be

~on-developmental,

Indeed some needs appear

those relevant to the subsistence of the

individual, but even these are experienced by the individual as qualified
by the natural environment he confronts, and the specific work which he
. f action.
.
258
un der t a k es as means toward s t h e i r satis

Thus needs are

concretely experienced and develop in terms of the specific work
undertaken towards their satisfaction.
But just as needs and work specify the experience of the individual,
these features of his experience also bring him essentially into social
relations.

As I read the text, Hegel offers three reasons why he takes

255Hegel, (Knox), p. 129; Grundlinien, p. 175.
25

-

6iiegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171
257
cf. Ibid.
258Hegel, (Knox), p. 268, addendum 119 to paragraph# 187.

-322this to be .the case.

First, Hegel states that it is in virtue of the

multiplication of needs that the individual becomes an individual person
in the full sense; of the term:

" ••• this is the first time, and indeed

properly the only time, to speak

of~

in this sense."

259

Hegel's

reasons for this statement, offered in an addendum to the cited text, are
that the multiplication of needs requires the individual to actively and
intelligently plan his work, to exercise conscious self restraint so
that his more significant rather than simply his most immediate needs will
be handled, and that this exercise of intelligence on his own experience
further qualifies the individual's experience both of his needs and of
himself.

260

But then just as the individual is capable of experiencing

himself in full concreteness here, he is also capable of being experienced
and recognized by others with a measure of concre'teness also depending
upon the development of needs.

261

Thus the individual is now capable of

being a member of society with a degree of concreteness heretofore
unrealized.
But further, just as needs are in their details experienced according
to the work undertaken for their satisfaction, work itself, i.e., the work
of the individual, is undertaken in a context in which other working
agents occur, and thus is conditioned and modified by the work of
262
Pthers.
The fact of common work affects the conditions under which the

259Hegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171
260Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 2 69.
26lcf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171. Cf. also Hegel,
50 to paragraph # 192.
Cf. G.A. Kelly, Idealism. Politics, and History, Sources of Hegelian

(Kn~~~' p. 355, translator's note
rhnt•~l,f-
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-323individual does labor, and, " ••• the conditions of labor create new
tendencies, and each phase of the vast social machinery, constituted
originally as a means, invades the realm of private ends, instituting
customs and opinions 'Which in time demand fresh satisfaction.

11263

Out

of the details of common work, needs arise, which the individual then
experiences as his own. 2 64
Finally, Hegel argues, common labor in society yields divisions of
labor, or as he puts it divisions of classes (Untershiede der Stande).

265

As needs and the means to their fulfillment multiply within society,
these means, various forms of work, are severally undertaken by disparate
groups and persons within society, according to their interests and
skills. 266

As a consequence, the individual agent and subject of needs

is more closely drawn into social relations, and this for three reasons.
First, because he is now aware that his work may yield the satisfaction
of his own needs and of those of others as well. 267

Second, because the

individual is now also aware of his dependence on the work of others for
needs of his own. 268

And third, because division of labor or classes

introduces further modifications into that work productive of social

263Reyburn, p. 217.
264

cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 127-128; Grundlinien, pp. 171-172.

265 cr. Grundlinien, # 201, p. 175.
266cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 129; Grundlinien, pp. 173-174.
267cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 129-130; Grundlinien, p. 174.
268cf. Ibid.

-324needs which the individual may then experience privately.

269

Hegel also

notes that social labor produces conventions and fashions which influence
.
270
the individual I s private nee d s an d experience.

Of the three above arguments, the latter two are more significant
here for they lead to the conclusion that the individual member of civil
society is necessarily a social individual.

He is one whose experience

is fundamentally social rather than simply individual and private.

The

concrete individual subject of needs is one who experiences needs as
particular and his own, and whose basic purpose is activity or work which
aims at the satisfaction of those needs.

But the needs which the

individual experiences as his own are themselves also socially produced.
If the individual's experience of himself is most basically his
experience of his needs, and if these needs are derived from society,
then the individual's experience of himself includes a fundamental social
dimension.

It is the experience of himself as a member of society.

Put

more simply, the concrete individual subject is as such essentially social
These comments on Hegel's descriptions of the family and civil
society as a system of needs develop and concretize Hegel's claim that
the individual subject of will is necessarily a social individual.
Much more is done by Hegel in the sections of the Philosophy of Right
which my analysis has touched upon than was revealed here.

In his section

on the family, for example, Hegel discusses such specific questions as

269

cf. Reyburn, p. 217.

270Cf. Hege 1 , ( Knox ) , p. 269, addendum 123 to paragraph # 192.
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272
familial ownership of property 271 and inheritance.

In his section on

civil society, Hegel describes how such society organizes and facilitates
social experience through law,

273

the courts,

274

.
275 an d t h e econo mi c corpora t'ion. 276
aut h ority,

.
public police
But although I have

omitted a great deal, I take myself to have analyzed the claim which is
both fundamental to this section of the Philosophy of Right, and which
most clearly sets Hegel into relation with Marx, namely, that the concrete
individual is necessarily a social individual, a member of society, one
whose experience is necessarily social experience.
I do not take as necessary to my task the explanation of that
doctrine of the state with which the Philosophy of Right concludes.

To

do so would not yield material relevant to the relation of Marx to Hegel
on the question of the theory of man.

I shall only point out that, for

Hegel, the state is the necessary objective expression of the fundamental
social dimension of individual experience.

277

In introducing the notion,

Hegel asserts that, "The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea.
is ethical mind qua substantial will manifest and revealed to itself,

271

272

Cf. Hegel, ( Knox), pp. 116-117; Grundlinien, pp. 156-157.

Hegel, (Knox), p. 219; Grundlinien, p. 260.

273
cf. ____!_.,pp.
Ib d
134-141; Grundlinien, pp. 180-189.
274
cf. Hege 1 , (Knox) , pp. 140-145; Grundlinien, pp. 189-195.
275Cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp.
146-152; Grundlinien, pp. 197-203.
276cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp.
152-155; Grundlinien, pp. 203-207.
277Cf • G. A. Kelly, pp. 324-326.
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-326knowing and thinking itself,
knows it. 11278

accomplishin~

what it knows insofar as it

The state is the objective expression of that social unity

which is implicit in civil society.

Because of this, the state

objectively manifests to its individuals as its citizens the essential
social dimension of that experience which is their own.

Moreover, the

state is not only the expression of the implicit social unity of civil
society, but it is also necessary to divil society, in that it is
ultimately the objectification of social will,

279

_which will, as has been

shown above, comprise the identity of society and is necessary for the
full self realization of its individual members.

And because of this,

Hegel argues, the state exists with absolute right.

280

But in abstraction from the question of the state, the major
components of the doctrine of the Philosophy of Right relevant.to the
content of Marx' theory of man have been, I think, considered in this
chapter.

And with this, I have completed what I set out to do in this

chapter, namely, to offer an analysis of those elements of Hegel's
philosophical doctrine, as expressed in the Phenomenology of Spirit and
the Philosophy of Right which are relevant to Marx' theory of man.

These

themes of Hegel may be summarized as follows:
In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel argues that the self conscious
individual is one who experiences his own object as his "life."

278

-

This

Hegel, (Knox), p. 155; Grundlinien, pp. 207-208.

279
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 155-156; Grundlinien, p. 208, Cf. also
Bourgeois, pp. 123-125, Reyburn, p. 233.
280
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 155; Grundlinien, p. 208.

-327experience engenders the desire to overcome the apparent externality of
the object, and this desire in turn constitutes the individual as an
agent.

Agency here is initially understood as work, which transforms the

material environment of the agent.

The product of such work objectifies

its details, and makes possible individual self actualization.
The activity of the individual makes possible his objective self
comprehension, and in turn brings the individual to participate in a
society of agents.

Such social experience is necessary in order that the

individual be constituted as a self conscious individual through
recognition, and in order that the individual be an agent in the full or
actual sense of that term.

And given this social experience, the

environment is, and is comprehended as, the context of the activity of a
society of agents.
Themes such as these are repeated and developed in the Philosophy of
RiQht, in which Hegel examines the experience of the individual subject
~f will.

This subject necessarily acts to embody its will in external

objects, in the external environment.
embodiment is property.

The most primitive form of such

The property item occurs for the individual as

essentially relevant to some need of his, and the appropriation of
property necessarily brings the individual into relationships with others.
The individual subject of will cannot be taken as an isolated
individual, but must be described as an individual whose experience is
essentially social.

It is the family which provides the immediate social

context in which the subject of will can develop as an individual, and

r
as one who can enter civil society.

The individual as a member of civil

society experiences private needs whose satisfaction he attempts to
achieve through work.

Such needs of the individual are both experienced

in terms of and develop or multiply in terms of his work.
But although needs here are viewed as private, the experience of
this individual is itself essentially social.
him into relations with others.
by connnon social labor.

His work necessarily brings

The details of his work are conditioned

He recognizes himself as depending for the

satisfaction of his needs on the work of others, and they on his work.
And the needs which he experiences as his own, and thus as his self, are
at once his own and products of society.
This summarizes the portions of Hegel's philosophical doctrine which
have been examined in this chapter.

What next needs to be considered

is the relation of these themes in Hegel to the content of Marx' theory
of man.

r
Chapter Four
Marx' Appropriation of Hegel
The attempt to clarify Marx' theory of man leads naturally to the
question of Marx' relations to his predecessors, particularly Feuerbach
and Hegel. Marx' theory of man itself, as well as the arguments exp! icit
or imp! icit which support and specify it, occur in texts which are
largely polemical in character, and which are largely devoted to Marx'
critical evaluations of others. Consequently, a discussion of Marx•
relation to Feuerbach and Hegel seems an appropriate way of comprehending
Marx• anthropology.
Althusser 1 s interpretation of Marx is instructive in this respect.
For he believes that those texts of Marx in which a theory of man is
developed are dominated by Feuerbach 1 s influence. Marx• theory of man,
consequently, is thought to be thoroughly Feuerbachian in content. This
interpretation is at the basis of his claim that the mature Marx is a
theorist of economic society for whom

11

humanism11 of a Feuerbachian sort

and of any sort, has been overcome and classified as ideology,
inadmissable within any theory of society or history which is val idly
11

scientific. 11 I have attempted to show, in my second chapter, that the

basis of Althusser's claim is erroneous, that the content of Marx' theory
of man is clearly and consciously at variance with the Feuerbachian
anthropology with which Marx was familiar. But the question of Marx'
relation to Hegel remains to be handled.
I shall now argue that, on the basis of the analyses of the
preceeding chapter, Marx' theory of man can be understood as essentially
related in its content not to the E?hilosophicaJ doctrine of Feuerbach,
-329-

-330but to that of Hegel.

To do this, I shall defend two major claims.

First, the notions of praxis and society contained in Marx' theory of
man essentially reflect the analyses of those notions already made by
Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right.

And

second, in the Paris Manuscripts, Marx develops his argument in support
of the conclusion that praxis is a more fundamental category than
consciousness in an adequate theory of man, through a critical dialogue
with Hegel.

Thus it will be shown both that Marx is indebted to Hegel

for a major portion of his anthropology, and that Marx constructs an
argument in support of the distinctiveness of his own position through
a critique of Hegel.

In short, it is in terms of its relation to Hegel,

rather than to Feuerbach, that Marx' theory of man is both positively
and negatively defined.
I.

Marx' Indebetedness to Hegel.
The first of the points I wish to make has to do with Marx'

statements on praxis and society, and their relation to Hegel's
doctrine.

I shall proceed by recalling the formulation of those state-

ments in chapter one, and by comparing them to the analyses of chapter
three.

I shall not attempt to show that the development of Marx' theory

on these points is systematically parallel to Hegel's.
they are.

I doubt that

But I will show that the content of Marx' theory is identical

with or relevantly similar to statements for which Hegel argues at
various places in the texts.
As seen in chapter one, Marx begins his discussion of praxis or
productive activity by describing nature as the necessary

correlate

.;;331of praxis, and this in two senses. 1

First, Marx insists that the

occurence of productive activity requires the presence of an external,
maleable environment. 2

And second, nature itself, Marx argues, is to

be understood not merely as the external environment, but as that whose
own reality is such as to occur essentially for the productive agent,
and as that which receives its essential determinations from the activity
of this agent. 3
by Hegel.

These statements clearly reflect the position argued

4

Hegel argues, first, in the transition from "Consciousness"
.
to "Self Consciousness" in the Phenomenology of Spirit, that it is in

.

virtue of the self conscious subject's experience of its object, its
"life, 115 as both essentially in relation to itself and as other than
itself, 6 that this subject experiences itself in turn as the desire7 to

1cf. Chapter One, pp. 2 and the following.
2cf. Marx, "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and
Guddat, MEGA; 1, 3, 384.
3cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160 •. - This idea is, as seen in chapter one, an
implication of Marx' notion that nature occurs for the productive agent
as his "object" in that i t can be determined by his own activity in
such a way as to become appropriate for the satisfaction of his needs.
4cf. footnote number 104, chapter three, for a more detailed
discussion of the content of Hegel's theory of nature in relation to
Marx.
5 cf. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie, (London:

Geo. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931, p. 220. Hegel, Phenomenologie des
Geistes, ed. Hoffmeister, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952),
p. 135.
6

Cf. Ibid.

7Cf. Ibid.

-332overcome this distinction between its life and itself, and consequently
upon this desire is an agent.

Moreover, since the object which the self

conscious subject experiences as both its own and other than itself is
" ••• the whole expanse of the world of sense ••• , 118 that agency which is
appropriate to the desire of this subject is productive agency,
literally, owrk. 9

Hegel here argues, in brief, that it is in virtue of

nature as sensuous externality that the subject experiences productive
agency as appropriate to the desire which is its own.
Furthermore, in that section of the Phenomenology which he
entitles "Das Geistige Tierreich und der Betrug, oder die Sache Selbet,"
Hegel notes that the concrete agent experiences his external environment
fundamentally as that context within which his activities may be carried
out.

10

This means that, for the concrete agent, nature is both

experienced as the essential correlate of his activities, and, as the
scene of those activities, receives its basic determination from them.
This idea is both repeated and developed in the Philosophy of Right, in
his discussion of the productive agent as the subject of needs.

There

he notes both that the satisfaction of needs requires that the productive
agent relate himself to nature, 11 and that to be appropriable as an

8Cf. Ibid.

9cf. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, ed. Allan Bloom,
trans. J. H. Nichols, (New York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. 37-38, for
commentary on this point.
lOHegel, (Baillie), p. 419; Ph~nomenologie, p. 285.
1

-

~egel, 1be Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox, (Oxford:
University Press, 1967), p. 269, addendum 125 to paragraph #196.

The

r
object of need, must nature, receive its basic determinations from
.

.

.

pro d uc t ive activity.

12

Thus with respect to the basic description of

the relation of praxis to nature, Marx' doctrine can be seen as
essentially Hegelian.
The import of this relation becomes more pronounced when one turns
to a consideration of Marx' concept of objectification.
shown in chapter one (see

pp.4f~

As I have

the concept of objectification is

essential to Marx' theory of praxis in several related ways.

In

the Manuscripts of 1844 Marx first describes the product or result of
praxis as " ••• only the resume of activity, of production.

1113

Since a

product is by definition the result of productive activity, than it
embodies within itself, or is in itself determined by, the details of
that activity of which it is the result.
is the realization of labor,

1114

This implies that the product

of productive activity.

For the

product renders the details of praxis public and observable, "objective,"
and enduring in a way which transcends the transient character of
activity itself.

Marx sums these ideas up in the simple statement

12 cf. Hegel, (Knox), op. cit., loc. cit.
13Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 291; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, P• 85.
14Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83.
15 cf. Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 341-342.

The

5
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that, "The product of labor is labor embodied and made objective in a
.

t h ing.

1116

The notion of objectification as included in Marx' theory of
praxis, further implies the concepts of "self actualization," in one
of the two uses of this term which may be attributed to Marx,
self satisfaction. 18

17

and

It is through engaging in productive activity

that the agent at once makes a product, and realizes himself as an
agent of a specific sort.

(It is through writing, for example, that

he realizes both definite results, and himself as a writer).

This

realization in turn involves a further sort of self actualization, one
involving self satisfaction.

Since the product is the embodiment or

"resume" of the det"ails of that activity of which it is the result, the
agent, in recognizing his product, is capable of comprehending his own
activity in a definite and objective form, and thus himself as well.
And the agent can further take satisfaction in his product as the

17Marx' •tuee of 'self actualization' in the context of his developed
theory of needs will be discussed subsequently in this chapter in terms
of its relation to Hegel.
18

c£. Lobkowicz, op. cit., loc. cit. Regarding the first point
Lobkowlicz correctly conunents that for Marx the productive agent,
" ••• confers his life on objects. However, this externalization must
not be taken to be a translation of pre-existing ideas into reality.
Rather, the inner life conferred to outer objects must be viewed as
a potentiality which becomes actual in and for man by becoming the
form of a reality outside man. Accordingly, obj,ectification also
connotes self-actualization ••• "

l

-335detailed and externalized result of his own activity, and thus of his
own self.

19

Each of these points is also discernable in Hegel.

In the

dialectic of Self-Consciousness in the Phenomenology, Hegel argues that,
as a result of labor or work, the object is transformed in that it is
determined by the details of that activity of which it is a result.
Work overcomes the apparently simple externality of the object.

And the

reason this externality is overcome is identical to the first component
of Marx' concept of objectification, namely, that the object as product
contains within itself or is a "resume" of the details of productive
activity.

It receives its essential determinations from productive

activity, rather than simply containing them within itself.

° Further,

2

Hegel notes, as Marx does, that the 'objectification' of productive
activity in its results overcomes the transient character of that
activity itself, lending it a degree of permanence.

Productive activity,

" ••• passes into the form of the object, into something that is permanent
and remains ••• 1121

19cf. Marx,
MEGA, 1, 3, p.
objectified my
object I would
personality as

"Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 281;
546. As Marx puts this, "In my production I would have
individuality and its particularity ••• in viewing the
have experienced the individual joy of knowing my
an objective, sensuously perceptible, indubitable power."

20cf. Hegel, (baillie), p. 238; Ph~nomenologie, p. 149.
21 Ibid.

-336The way in which Marx sees self actualization as involved in
objectification is also discoverable in Hegel.

Hegel's dialectic of

"Lordship and Bondage" in the Phenomenology is the place in which he
first elaborates his notion of agency as work.

22

There he argues that,

through specific productive activities, the specific determinations of,
or the " ••• proper being ••• " of the agent is actualized.

23

The product

is the concrete realization of productive activity, and thus of the
productive agent himself.

It is his own productive activity crystalized

and brought to term. 24
These notions are again repeated and developed by Hegel in his
later description of the agent as a concrete individual in the
Phenomenology.

There, as seen in chapter three (see pp.267), Hegel

initially posits and then argues against the position that the concrete
individual agent is possessed of an "original nature," a set of
possibilities and capacities which are, for Hegel, determinate and given.
He argues first, that a possibility of 'design' for action becomes the
individual's own precisely through his acting upon it; the individual
incorporates such a possibility into his own experience through his own
25
. .
ac t 1v1ty.
Second, it is through acting out his specific possibility

-------

22The complete explicitation of the argument at this point would require
an exposition of Hegel's description of the relation between bondsman
and master. However, I feel that the text justifies an abstraction
from this description, in that Hegel's essential assertions concern
the effects of the productive activity of the bondsman upon himself.
23Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 239; Phanomenolo8ie, P•

149.

24Cf. Hegel, 02. cit., loc. cit.
25cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 429-430; Phanomenologie, PP• 293-294.

or 'design' that the individual realizes it in detail for himself, and
thus realizes himself as one whose experience involves a given possibilit
or 'design' in concrete detai1. 26

And finally, it is on this basis that

the individual is capable of revising the details of his own possibilitie
for action, and of engaging in further and more sophisticated forms of
action.

Thus the concrete individual agent cannot be comprehended as one

possessed of an 'original nature,' but rather is who 'actualizes' himself
as a result of his own activity. 27
The major components of Marx' concept of objectification, then,
are discoverable in the texts of Hege1. 28
also the case

fo~
\

This, I shall now argue, is

Marx' discussion of needs, as that discussion is

located in his doctrine of praxis.

The discussion of needs, as was shown

in chapter one, (see pp.19ff)is equally important for Marx' doctrine of
praxis as 'is his concept of objectification.

That analysis may be

26

Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 438; Pha'.nomenologie, p. 300. "The real inthereby ceases to stand in the relation of a predicate, loses its
characteristic of lifeless abstracted universality; it is substance
peremated by individuality ••• "
t~nt

27Again, Hegel brings in the notion of society at this point.
postponed an analysis of this aspect of Hegel's discussion.

I have

28 cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 238 and 425; Ph~nomenologie, pp. 149 and
290. I note briefly here that, in each of the phases of Hegel's argument
cited above, 'self actualization' is related to self satisfaction as a
result of productive activity. In the dialectic of self consciousness,
Hegel observes that agency as work is. appropriate to the desire of the
self conscious individual, and notes further that the individual agent
takes satisfaction in recognizing its own activity, and thus a feature
of its own self, as objectified in its product. "The consciousness that
toils and serves accordingly attains by this means the direct apprehensio
of that independent being as its self." This point is reiterated in the
analysis of "Das geistige Tierreich und der Betrug;" the concrete agent
apprehends his result as proceeding from and crystalizing his own activit ,

summarized as follows:

-338for Marx, a) all praxis or productive activity

is rooted in the agents experience of needs; 29 b) needs require productive activity on nature for their satisfaction; 30 c) the human
productive agent acts both out of 'subsistence' needs, needs which arise
from the physiological structure of and whose satisfaction is required
for the life maintenance of the organism, and 'human' needs, that is
needs developed beyond the literal subsistence of the individual;3l d)
human activity which aims at the satisfaction of a need may result both
in the satisfaction of that need and the 'production' of some new need,
thus involving the 'self actualization' of the agent in a further sense
of that term. 32

Just as my discussion of these claims in chapter one

showed that Marx' concept of needs is essential to his theory of praxis,
I want now to show that the basic components of that concept are found
in Hegel.

29Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; ~'
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 160-161.
30cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325, MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 160~161. Cf. Also Marx, Capital, trans. Moore an-d~
Aveling, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), vol. 1, p. 42,
Marx, in Marx-Engels, Works, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag,
), vol. 23, p.
57. This edition of the works of Marx will henceforth be referred to as

MEW.
31Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88.
32Marx, The German Ideology, trans. R. Pascal, (New York: International Publishers, 1947), pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 18.

""'"33'9In the Phenomenology, Hegel claims that the individual is an agent
in virtue of an ontologically founded desire, 33 which in turn requires
activity (and activity as, among other forms, literal work) on the
external environment.

In the Philosophy of Right, in his description of

the individual as a member of civil society, Hegel goes even further.
There, he describes the individual as one whose, " ••• aim here is the
satisfaction of subjective particularity ••• 1134 and he goes on to assert
that, "The means of acquiring and preparing the particularized means
appropriate to our similarly particularized needs (partikularisierten
Bedurfnissen) is work. 1135

This reveals to two sides of the concept of

needs already noted in Marx.

Needs are those features of the experience

of the individual which render him a productive agent.

And further,

productive activity as 'work' is required for the satisfaction of needs.
Hegel implies this through stating that, "It is the products of human
effort which man consumes, 1136 'consumption' here meaning the final stage

33cf. J. O'Malley, "History and Nature in Marx," The Review of
Politics, 1966, 28, (4), pp. 521-527, in which it is persuavely argued
that for Marx needs may be considered ontological features of the
experience of the productive agent.
34

Hegel, (Knox), p. 26; G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie
des Rechts, ed. Hoffmeister, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1955),
P• 170.
35Hegel, (Knox), p. 128; Grundlinien, p. 173.
36

Hegel, (Knox), p. 129; Grundlinien, p. 173.

-.J40of that activity through which needs are satisfied. 37
Furthermore as noted in chapter three, (see p.320) Hegel makes a
distinction between two classes of needs analogous to that made by Marx,
and considers this distinction to be critical.

This is revealed in a

single text.
An animal's needs and its ways of satisfying them are
both alike restricted in scope. Though man is subject
to this restriction too, yet at the same time he
evinces his transcendence of it and his universality,
first by the multiplication of needs and means of
satisfying them, and secondly by the differentiation
and division of concrete need into single parts and
aspects which in turn become different needs,
particularized and so more abstract.38
Needs, here, are first classified as those proper to the "animal," i.e.,
as restricted to

thos~

arising from the physicological structure of the

organism. 39 and needs which are not so limited, and thus capable of
developing or "multiplying."

The numan productive agent is described as

capable of acting from needs of both sorts, and the language of that

37cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 269, addendum 125 to paragraph 193. Hegel
supplements these statements with an addendum, illustrating even more
concretely the relation between his doctrine and that of Marx. He states
that, "There is hardly any raw material which does not need to be worked
on before use ••• It is by the sweat of his brow and the toil of his hands
that man obtains the means to satisfy his needs." This indicates first
that the activity to which Hegel refers as initiated by needs is external
activity, activity on nature. Second, it clearly reveals that the
activity under consideration here is productive activity. And third,
productive activity is required for the satisfaction of needs; nature
must be 'transformed' or 'worked up into shape' in order to yield items
appropriate to the needs of ind!viduals.
3 8 Hegel, (Knox), p. 217; Grundlinien, pp. 170-171.
39For confirmation of this point cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 268-269,
addendum 121 to paragraph #190.

·.-341distinction recalls Marx' statement that, " ••• the animal produces only
what is immediately necessary for itself or its young.

It produces in

a one-sided fashion, while man produces universally." 40
Further, the explanation offered by Marx and Hegel respectively
of the development or "multiplication" of needs are related in content.
This is the case, I suggest, on two counts.

Marx hold the position

that needs develop in virtue of productive activity undertaken towards
the satisfaction of previously experienced needs.

Productive activity

transforms the environment such that it may both elicit new needs in
the agent, and support activity which aims at the satisfaction of such
needs.

Through productive activity, the agent realizes himself as a

specific agent, rendering himself capable of experiencing new needs, and
of undertaking new and more subtle forms of activity aiming at their
satisfaction. 41

Now Hegel seems to suggest an analogous argument in

speaking of " ••• the differentiation and division of concrete need into
single parts and aspects which in turn become different needs,
particularized and so_more abstract." 42

Needs for Hegel require 'work'

40Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88.
41 cf. Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, (Indianapolis
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 19657 pp. 34-35; Lefebvre, Dialectical
Materialism, trans. John Sturreck, (London: Johnathan Cape Ltd., 1968),
p. 118.
42Hegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171.

-342as their mode of attaining satisfaction.
the environment which is its object.

'Work' in turn transforms

But this means that the

environment now becomes more complex, and thus capable of offering
possibilities for supporting more complex and differentiated forms of
work.

In turn the individual who has 'worked on' this environment is

thereby capable of different and more complex activities.

As a result

the needs of the individual are rendered more complex relative to the
new forms of work which he may now undertake.
This brings us to still another similarity.

In chapter one (see

pp.82ff) I argued that, for Marx, consciousness is an essential feature
of the structure of praxis because, only given this can we explain the
phenomenon of a developed need as the basis for productive activity.
Three reasons were offered for this.

First, the agent must apprehend

his environment consciously in order for that environment to elicit a
developed need within his experience.

An environment to which the

individual enjoys no conscious relation can only elicit 'subsistence',
species specific needs for that individual.

Second, the individual

must enjoy conscious awareness of his own experience in order to
recognize developed needs as occuring in it.

Only the experience of

'subsistence' or species specific needs, based on the physiological
structure of the individual, do not require such awareness.

And third,

the individual must enjoy conscious awareness of his environment so
that he may comprehend possibilities it promises for productive
activity.

Only if he is

con~cious

of his environment is he capable of

acting towards the satisfaction of the need in question.

·-343-

t

take these reasons to underly Marx' position that consciousness

is an essential feature of human praxis.

But an analogy may be seen

between these reasons and a position which Hegel takes on a similar
question.

Hegel notes that, "The need of shelter and clothing, the

necessity of cooking his food to make it fit to eat and to overcome its
natural rawness, both mean that man has less natural comfort than the
animal, and indeed, as mind, he ought to have less.

Intelligence, with

its grasp of distinctions, multiplies human needs, and since taste and
utility become criteria of judgment, even the needs themselves are
affected thereby. 1143

Hegel is making at least two assertions here.

First, that human action towards the satisfaction of needs such as those
for shelter and food yields the development or 'multiplication' of needs.
And second, this is possible in virtue of "intelligence" or "mind":
mind as capable of a) distinguishing among various features of an
environment, and b) distinguishing the component features of needs
themsleves.

Thus needs can develop only in terms of their being

consciously noticed, and indeed this noticing alters the character of
needs themselves.

Marx will offer later a critical argument against

what he takes to be Hegel's position on the location of consciousness
within the experience of the individual, but there is here at least
an analogy between the positions of Marx and Hegel on the question of
the relationships between productive activity, consciousness, and the
development of needs.
Finally, it was noted above (see chapter one, p •• 29 ) that for
43Hegel, (Knox), p. 269, addendum 121 to paragraph # 190.

.:344Marx the notion of needs as developmental introduces a further sense of
'self actulaization' into his doctrine of praxis.

As needs develop, the

individual agent is capable of enjoying ever more subtle and complex
productive relations with his environment, as well as more diversified
forms of experience, in terms of the needs which are his own.

It seems

that Hegel has the conceptual foundation to make this same assertion,
although he does not do so specifically.

Hegel too argues that

developing needs yields consistently complexifying forms of "work" and
thus the actualization of both the environment and 'the individual agent.
A final point of relation between Marx' doctrine of praxis and
Hegel has to dd with the concept of appropriation.
in Marx' analysis as follows.

This concept arises

(See chapter one, pp.6ff).

First, since

productive activity is 'objectified' in its natural result, nature is,
as product, transformed according to the details of praxis. 44

The

productive agent thus brings nature into definite relations to himself,
or appropriates 45 nature, through his activity.

Second, productive

activity is determined concretely by the needs of the agent.

46

Since

the product of activity embodies the details of productive activity, and
since that activity

i~

undertaken for the sake of satisfying definite

4 4cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 291; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 85.
45 cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 290; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 84: " ••• der Arbeiter sich die Assenwelt, die sinnliche
Natur, durch seine Arbeit aneignet."
46cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3,pp. 160-161. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans.
Pascal, pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, pp. 17-18. Marx, Capital trans.
-~!9._or~ a1!._c!_Ayeling, p. 42; MEW vol. 23,
• 57.

-345needs, the product is capable of being appropriated or taken up by the
agent for the purpose of such satisfaction.47
A strong parallel between Marx' concept of appropriation and Hegel
is found in the Philosophy of Right, 48 again in Hegel's description of

47cf. The Grundrisse, trans. David Mclellan, (New York: Harper and
Row, 1971), pp. 24-25; Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen
Okonomie, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), pp. 12-13. Marx most clearly
demonstrates this idea in this text of the Grundrisse, by showing that
consumption is an integral feature of, and indeed the culmination of,
the activity of production.
48 cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 238; Phanomenologie, p. 149. An argument
in Hegel's treatment of the dialectic of Self Consciousness in the
Phenomenology also points up how Marx is related to Hegel on the concept
of appropriation. For Hegel, the self conscious subject is an agent in
virtue of 'desire'; this agency involves work in that, as directed at
the object, " ••• labor shapes and transforms the thing." This is to say
that work or productive agency oversomes the apparently simple
externality of nature through causing its object to involve within itself
labor's own determinations. Productive activity then involves
'objectification' in Marx' sense of that term. And then, through this
activity, the agent brings his object into some definite relation with
himself, or 'appropriates' that object. In turn, productive activity is
undertaken towards the fulfillment of a need, in this case the desire
of the subject to overcome the apparently simple externality of that
object which he recognizes as both other than himself and as essentially
related to himself as his own 'life.' The 'appropriated' object is
capable of satisfying, albeit partially, this desire.
There is an analogy between this argument in Hegel and 'appropriatio '
in Marx. But the analogy limps on two points. First, Marx seems to
discuss appropriation in terms of definite needs (Bedurfnisse), whereas
the desire (Begierde) which Hegel describes here is a generalized desire.
Second, Hegel argues that both this desire and the activity consequent
upon it have their source in the conscious experience of the subject,
whereas Marx wishes to argue in general that conscious experience derives
from the practical relations of agent to environment, praxis, while
simultaneously being an essential structural feature of praxis.

-346the individual as a member of civil society.

Individuals act out of

determinate aims or needs, 49 and the experience of these determinate
needs results in the individual's undertaking productive agency or
work. 50

The effect of this activity is the transformation of the

natural environment, 51 yielding products which may be 'consumed' , 52
that is, which may be taken up or 'appropriated' by the individual
towards the satisfaction of needs. 53

Hegel here discusses the relation-

ships between needs, productive activity, and 'consumption' or
appropriation in a way more clearly resembling Marx' use of
'appropriation'.

For Hegel means to argue here that the individual

undertakes productive activity in virtue of the experience of definite
needs, that literal productive activity must be undertaken towards the
satisfaction of these, and that the final feature of this activity is
the using or appropriating of products.
This brief analysis shows, I think, the positive relationships
between the key concepts of Marx' theory of praxis and parts of Hegel's
thought.

Both describe nature in relation to productive activity in a

49Hegel, (Knox), p. 122-126; Grundlinien, pp. 165 and 169-170.
socf. Hegel, (Knox), PP• 128-129; Grundlinien, p. 173.
51
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 129; Grundlinien, p. 173. See also Hegel,
(Knox), p. 269, addendum 125 to paragraph fl 196.
s2cf. Hegel, (Knox), P• 129; Grundlinien, P· 173.
53cf. Hegel, (Knox), P• 269, addendum 125 to paragraph fl 196.

-347way that is generally similar. Those concepts which comprise Marx• notion
of 'objectification• are discoverable in Hegel. There is a strong
similarity between Marx and Hegel in terms of the function of needs in
experience of the productive agent, and an analogy between Marx• concept
of •appropriation' and Hegel's comments on the relation between product
and need.
I consider next the relation of Marx to Hegel on the question of
society and the relation of the individual to society. It will be more
difficult to bring out this. connection, since the· relationships on this
point are not as clear cut as those obtaining on the question of praxis.
But I shall try to show that, in spite of critical differences, some
strong similarity obtains between Marx and Hegel on the question of the
productive agent as social.
We saw in chapter one (pp. 40-44) that, for Marx, praxis renders
social relationships possible. Marx' argument for this statement was
twofold. First, insofar as the appropriable product resulting from
productive activity is external to the producer, then it can be taken up
54
for use both by that producer and by others.
Thus the product intoduces
into the environment of the individual the possibility of his activity's
being related to by others.

55

And second, since the product is the

54 Cf. Marx, 11 Manuscripts of 1844, 11 in Easton and Guddat, p. 290; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd.3, p. 84.
55
Cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp. 17-18; MEGA,
Abt.1, Bd.5, pp. 18-1'9,"

-
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I

by those definite needs which he experiences as his own, and since another
who appropriates this product does so in virtue of his experience of
relevantly similar needs, it follows that productive activity makes
possible interaction between concrete individuals.

"In your satisfaction

and your use of my product I would have had the direct and conscious
satisfaction that my work satisfied a human need; ••• that it created an
object appropriate to the need of another human being. 1156
Concepts analogous to those employed by Marx in arguing that the
structure of praxis renders social relationships possible are found in
Hegel's analysis of the concrete individual agent, in "Das Geistige
Tierreich und der Betrug."

In his initial description of agency here,

Hegel asserts that concrete agency involves as its result some external
object or product.

And this product embodies within itself some feature

of the concrete nature of the agent, the " ••• subjectively presented
purpose ••• " (Zweck) 57 ±n virtue of which the details of his activity are
determined.58
Hegel goes on to argue that it is in virtue of the externality of
the product or object of the concrete agent that this agent comes into

56Marx, "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 291; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 546.
5 7cf. Hegel, Phanomenologie, p. 286.
58cf. also Hegel, {Baillie), p. 426; Phanomenologie, p. 290.
work produced is the reality which consciousness gives itself."

"The

-349relationships with others. 59

The object of activity externalizes the

details of that activity of which it is a result.

But insofar as the

object is external, persons other than its producer are capable of
relating to it.

In this sense, to say that, "the work is ••• " is to say

that " ••• it is for other individuals ••• 1160

And since the product is in

itself determined by the details of the activity of which it is a result,
and thus some features of its producers own self, those others who relate
themselves

to

the agent's own product also relate themselves to the

agent's self.

Thus concrete activity yields interaction between concrete

individuals.
There
and Marx'

~re

both points of similarity and differences between Hegel's

a~guments.

But both would claim that the event of concrete

agency implies social relationships, and Marx would agree with Hegel's
subsequent argument that the concrete agent is necessarily a social

59cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 426; Ph~nomenologie, p. 291. This point is
shown in a single text, one couched in the language of Hegel's analysis
of this phase of the Phenomenology. "The work is thus thrown out into a
subsisting fmrm where the specific character of the original nature does
in fact come out as against other determinate natures, encroaches on them,
just as these in their turn encroach on it, and is lost as a vanishing
moment in this general process."
60uegel, (Baillie), p. 426; Phanomenologie, p. 291.
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61

61 rn passing, let me note some points of difference. Hegel begins his
analysis of the experience of the concrete agent with an analysis of the
individual's experience of himself as possessed of ap "original nature."
Marx does not analyze this concept in arguing that social relationships
are engendered through praxis, although the analysis of Marx' position
vis a vis Prudhon in chapter two shown that he would agree with Hegel's
position that this concept is not viable. Cf. Marx, The Poverty of
Philosophy, (New York: International Publishers, 1963, p. 32; Marx,
Misere de la Philosophie, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1946), pp. 31-32.
Marx here argues t~at the concept of 'homo economicus' which comprehends
the individual in society as one who undertakes productive activity in
virtue of certain innate and definite needs will not do. One might hold
here that Marx argues against the concept of the agent as possessed of
an "original nature" in Hegel's sense of that term.
Further, Marx does not distinguish or analyze the distinction
between specific "design" and general purpose, the analysis of which,
as pointed out in chapter three, is crucial to Hegel's description of the
experience of the concrete agent.
And finally, it seems that Hegel would consider the argument
concerning the necessary sociality of the individual found in his
introduction to the dialectic of Self Consciousness to be more fundamental
than the argument exhibited here, because in that latter dialectic it is
argued that interpersonality is necessary in order that the self conscious
subject be itself fully, i.e., in order that the desire which constitutes
the experience of that subject be adequately handled from within its own
experience. Marx makes no analysis of general desire, and thus no such
argument is available to him. Cf. O'Malley, Review of Politics, 1966,
p. 524. O'Malley notes that even the need for a 'human' society, i.e.,
one in which those economic factors responsible for alienation are
overcome, is the result of definite developments in the interacting
forces and relations of production. Nonetheless, Marx and Hegel do agree
concerning the limited question of the relation between productive activit)
and social experience.

Mar~
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of praxis, the concrete productive activities of individuals, occuring
within it.

In the context of Marx' arguments, the meaning of this

statement was seen to be twofold.

First, as the systematization of

productive activities, society offers such activities in definite forms
as options to its members. 62

And second, individual activity itself both

utilizes materials which are socially provided, and provides an

"
externalized result which is capable of being further determined by the
social milieu into which it is introduced. 63

Here the details of

productive activity are influenced by the fact that, " ••• what I make
from myself I make for society, conscious of my nature as social.

1164

Hegel in the Philosophy of Right def ends this same point in his
analysis of needs.

He first describes the multiplication of needs as

arising from " ••• the differentiation and division of concrete need into
single parts and aspects which in turn become different needs, particularized and so more abstract. 1165

As the means for the satisfaction of

concrete needs become more complex, those needs themselves differentiate
and become particularized.

In Hegel's language, such needs become

62cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 18; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 19, where Marx describes society as such a system,
and then notes that society " ••• is itself a 'productive force'."
63cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 116, where Marx introduces this point through the
example of scientific activity.
64 Ibid.
65Hegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171.

=352"abstract, 1166 i.e., become the differentiated and particular elements of
a need which is yet single, and in which they are included.
These differentiated needs, or elements of needs, however, now
enable their subject to relate concretely to the productive activity
of others.

For the activity or work of others may relate itself to those

differentiated needs which the individual experiences as his own.

As

Hegel puts it, "Needs and means, as things existent realiter, become
something which has being for others, by whose needs and work satisfactio
for all alike is conditions. 1167

If, to take a basic example, the

individual's need for food differentiates itself into the needs for land,
seed, livestock, and agricultural implements, then he may be dependent
on the productive activity of others for the last two, or perhaps three,
materials required for his own productive activity.
Three implications follow from this analysis, each of which
approaches the conclusion that the productive activity of the individual
is conditioned by the socially systematized milieu of productive
activities within which he is located.

First the differentiated needs

which the individual as an individual experiences are in their content
influenced by the details of the activity of others as that activity
relates to these needs. 68

For example, the individual's need for

66 rbid., (# 191).
67rhid., (# 192).
68 Cf. Ibid. "The abstract characteristic, universality, is the
characteristic of being recognized and in the moment which makes concrete
i.e., social, the isolated and abstract needs and their ways and means
of satisfaction."
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specific sort, in virtue of the activity of others which renders these
concretely available to'him.

Second, the concrete activity of the

individual is in turn conditioned by the activity of others, as is the
activity of others conditioned by the individual's own work. 69

This is

the case because, on the one hand, the details of individual's work
derives from those differentiated needs which are influenced in their
content, and, on the other hand, the activity of others is here
undertaken in response to the needs of the individual whose content his
own work manifests.

70

These two implications alone support the conclusion that the
productive activity of the individual is conditioned by the social milieu,
that the activity of the productive individual is conditioned by his
specific relations to the actions of others.

This conclusion is further

strengthened by the fact that, for the human productive agent, needs are
experienced as arising out of his social context.

Hegel notes that in

virtue of the two points just discussed it can be said that, "This
social moment thus becomes a particular end--determinant (Zweckbestimmug)
for means in themselves and their acquisition, as well as for the manner
in which needs are satisfied. 1171

Since the content of the differentiated

particular needs of the individual are contentually influenced by his
~

·'Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 298, addendum 120 to paragraph # 189, Hegel
recognizes this point in this text.
70 cf. Reyburn, The Ethical Theory of Hefel, (Oxford: The Clarendon
gress 1 1921), 2· 217. ReyRurn recogn1zeshat social production yields
••• division or labour ••• , but does not analyze the argument for this
which I take to be implicit in Hegel's text.
71

... ~54actual relations to the productive activity of others, the content of
these more generic needs of which the noted differentiations are
particular elements is also influenced by these relations, as are the
active means available to the individual for the satisfaction of these
more generic needs.
The general conclusion that follows is that, for Hegel, the options
for productive activity available to the individual are essentially
conditioned and constituted by the individual's relations to the
productive activity of others, i.e., by his social relations.

This

conclusion is thoroughly amenable to Marx' doctrine of the relation of
individual and society, although Marx does not offer a single and unified
argWll2Ilt for it, such as can be found in the texts of Hegel.

Both

authors share an insistence that society comprises a systematization of
productive activities, and that this systematization essentially
influences the productive acts of society's individual members; both are
capable in this sense of asserting that " ••• society itself produces

~

as man ••• 1172
From this we can see further points of similarity between the
positions of Marx and Hegel regarding the essentially social nature of
the experience of the productive individual.
reference to Marx' concept of "totalization."

The first involves a
It was seen in chapter one

(see pp. 60ff) that, for Marx the subject of praxis, as social, is in
principle capable of "totalization," i.e., of self actualization in a

72

Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 116.

-355consistently developing fashion.

For society, as the systematization of

various forms of productive activities offers these various forms of
activities to the individual as real options, thus expanding the horizons
of his options for praxis.

In addition, society itself is the source of

needs which the individual as social may experience as his own, and thus
may operationalize in his productive activity.

Hegel seems to recognize

at least the second of these two influences of society on the individual
clearly.

In the point we were just considering, Hegel claims that the

differentiated, particular needs of the individual are influenced in thei
content by the individual's relations to the activities of others.

One

implication of this is that the needs of the individual differentiate and
specifically particularize themselves precisely in terms of these
relations.

It is in virtue of this differentiation that the individual

is capable of engaging in ever more complex forms of productive activity.
So if these differentiations are to be comprehended in terms of the individual's relations to others, then it is in virtue of these relations
that his actuality as an agent consistently develops, and that he becomes
a more 'total' subject of praxis. 73

73 Cf. Reyburn, op. cit., p. 217. Also cf. Hegel, (Knox) pp. 129 and
128; Grundlinien, pp. 173 and 172. Hegel's language in the Philosophy
of Right is ambiguous concerning this point. Reyburn notes that, "The
very division of labour which springs up in the economic world in order
to satisfy needs begets new ones ••• " This would seem consistent with the
statements discussed above. But unhappily, Hegel's own language
concerning "division of labor" (Teilung der Arbeiten) is equivocal. At
one point he asserts that, "By this division, the work of the individual
becomes less complex, and consequently his skill at the section of the
job increases, like his output." This comment would for Marx describe
the 'fragmentation' rather than the 'totalization' of the individual.
But, as I hope my argument above shows, Hegel's texts .La down the

-356One fihal analogy between Marx' doctrine of the essentially social
nature of the productive individual and Hegel involves the position
expressed in Marx' assertion that, "To be objective, natural, sentient
and at the same time to have an object, nature, or sense outside oneself
or be oneself object, nature, and sense for a third person is one and
the same

.

t h ing.

1174

It was seen in chapter one (see pp.67ff) that this

statement means that insofar as the individual agent enjoys real
relations of praxis with his environment, he is describable both as a
subject, in this case a subject of needs, and as an object, one whose
experience is capable of being determined by the actions of others. 75
The full determination of the experience of the individual involves the
individual's being the object of the acts of others, as well as being the
subject of his own needs and activities.

It is the social environment

which allows the individual to be such an object, and thus society which
determines his experience with necessary concreteness.

premisses upon which he might discuss "division of labor" in a more
general fashion, thus arriving at a sense of Reyburn's comment, then, is
not fundamentally in error. And Hegel does at least assert, with regard
to the experience of needs, that, " ••• this social moment has in it the
aspect of liberation, i.e., the strict natural necessity of need is
obscured, and man is concerned with his own opinion, indeed with an
opinion that is universal, and with a necessity of his own making
alone ••• " This means that the social individual is capable, in virtue of
his social nature, of experiencing and acting upon a broader range of
needs than the hypothesized a-social agent might be capable of enjoying.
7

~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, op. cit., p. 325;

!'!_EGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 161.
75 c£. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 326; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 161. A being which is not itself an object for a third
being has no being for its object, that is, is not related objectively,
its being is not objective."
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conclusion.

For Hegel, the individual human agent must be described as

one for whom needs "multiply" or develop.

76

One necessary form of this

"multiplication" of needs is the differentiation of more generic needs
into their particular components or elements.

77

This differentiation

in its details occurs in terms of the individual subject's relations to
the activity of others. 78

But this means that the concrete individual is

the object of the activities of others, as well as the subject of his
own needs and activities.

In fact he must be such an object in order to

be a concrete individual agent in an adequate sense.

Thus for Hegel as

for Marx, the concrete agent is one who must be described as the object
of the activities of others, as well as the subject of his own activities
and needs.
II

Marx' Critique of Hegel

To this point I have considered analogies between the positions of
Marx and Hegel with regard to the questions of the nature of productive
activity, and the essentially social nature of the productive agent.
Regarding the latter question we have seen that both Marx and Hegel
claim that, a) productive activity renders possible social relations
between concrete individuals; b) society conditions the details of such
activity available to its individual members; c) society renders possible

76cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171.
77 cf. Ibid.
78cf. Ibid. , ( 192).

-358the 'totalization' of the agent; d) society allows the individual to be
determined as the object of the activities of others, as well as the subject of his own activities and needs.
But at this point there is a divergence between the positions of
Marx and Hegel, one whose ramifications will be critical for the
remainder of my argument.

Both Marx and Hegel argue that the individual

is essentially social, but the contents of their respective arguments
for this assertion point up significant differences between them.
attempts to show that society and praxis imply one another.

All

genuinely productive ·activity results in "objectification."

This

objectification involves the externalization of the agent.

As

Marx

so

externalized, the individual is in principle capable of entering into
social relationships.

Conversely~

the experience of the individual

includes determinations introduced therein by others, and these are
determinations df the individual as an agent.

In his active relationships

with the external world, the individual utilizes materials and productive
options which are constituted by society, and his needs themselves are
socially as well as individually constituted.

The argumentative details

of these assertions were exposed in chapter one, and need not be repeated
here.

But the conclusion to be drawn is that, for Marx, to say that the

individual is necessarily social is to say that society and praxis imply
each other.
Hegel also argues that the individual must be described as necessarily and essentially social.

At certain junctures in his thought he

also maintains that concrete social relations arise out of productive

-

-359activity, as well as that society essentially conditions productive
activity.

But it does not seem to be the case that Hegel's basic

argument concerning the essentially social nature of the individual leads
to the same specific conclusion as Marx' arguments.

The two arguments

most basic to Hegel's conc·lusion that the individual is necessarily a
social individual are those involving his analyses of the subject of will
in the Philosophy of Right, and the subject of self consciousness in the
Phenomenology of Spirit.

I shall mention the first briefly, and analyze

the second in more detail.
In the Philosophy of Right it is the individual subject of will who
must occur as a social individual.
consciousness of

the~

for his activities. 79

The subject of will is one who require1

" ••• desirable in and for itself ••• " as a standard
But if this subject is taken simply as an

individual, an examination of its experience reveals a number of
anamolies.

First, since the good as object of the individual's will

abstracts from all determinate content, it offers no adequate standard
for the evaluation of a specific action as good.

80

Second, as an

individual, the subject of will is thrown back upon a dependence on the
caprice of his own conscience.for awareness of "the good" and thus cannot
be said to possess the objective ethical standard which he requires.

81

And third, the individual is forced to constitute his own experience as
a standard for his acts, and again is denied an ethical standard which
is objective. 82

~Reyburn, p. 172, Cf. also.Hegel, (K.~ox), p. 87, Grundlinien, p. 116.
8 0cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 90; Grundlinien, p. 121.
81cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 91; Grundlinien, p. 122.
82cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 92; Grundlinien, p. 124.
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adequately comprehended as a mere individual, he may be adequately
comprehended as an individual whose experience is essentially social, as
an individual participating the life of society.

For society is the

product of will, as the embodiment of personal activities in the concrete
world. 83

It is at the same time a system of customs and norms which is

both objective, as transcending the caprice of individual experience
. 1 y, and d eterminate
.
. content. 84
tak en simp
in

If the individual subject

of will is described as participating the life of society, then society
can be described as providing that determinate and objective ethical
standard which the individual requires.

Thus the individual subject as

will, in order to be an adequate subject, must be, and must be
comprehended

as, one who participates the life of society, or one whose

experience is essentially social.
The above merely restates briefly an argument developed in greater
detail in chapter three.

But this restatement calls attention to a

notable contrast between the positions of Marx and Hegel.

Both Marx

and Hegel argue that the individual is essentially social, but differ in
respect of the arguments which each offers in its support.

For Marx, to

say that the individual is essentially social means that society and
praxis are mutually implicative.

For Hegel, this claim means that the
I

conscious subject must be social in order that he be an adequate subject
of will, who requires social life.

And for Hegel, the social life in

which this subject participates is the life of ethical mind embodied in
83cf. Bernard Bourgeoisl La Pensee Politique de Hegel, (Paris:
Universitaires de France, 969), p. 114.
84
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the world or in being, of mind as "objective."
The contrast between the positions of Marx and Hegel is heightened
when one turns to an analysis of Hegel's argument for this position in
his introduction to the dialectic of Self Consciousness in the
Phenomenology of Spirit.

There, we may recall, Hegel argues that the

self conscious subject must experience relationships with others, must
be recognized by others, in order that the desire which initially
constitutes self

con~ciousness

may be adequately explained, and in order

that the self conscious subject may comprehend himself as a personal
individual.

This point may be briefly resumed.

The self conscious subject is constituted through a desire to
overcome that contradiction in its object through which that object appear
as both its own, its 'life,' and as other than itself.as

In virtue of

this desire, the self conscious subject is an agent who works to transfor
its object.aG

But agency as work is not a fully adequate manner in

which the self conscious subject may relate to its own desire, and this
for two reasons.

First, although work transforms the object, the

externality and independence of this object from its subject still remains
and the object continues to be experienced by the subject as external and
a7
independent.
And second, the subject comprehends its own desire in
terms of the details of the object at which this desire is directed.as

85

Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220; Phanomenologie, p. 135.

86 cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 23a; Phanomenologie, p. 149.
87cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 225; Phanomenologie, p. 139.
Sacf. Ibid.

-362If this object is experienced as fundamentally external to the subject,
the subject experiences the content of his desire as other than and
external to himself.

This means that the self conscious subject here does

not and can not comprehend itself as a personal individua1. 89
But this subject may more adequately relate to its desire, and may
comprehend itself as a personal individual, if it is recognized as such b
another self consciousness, if its experience is intersubjective.

For

here, first, the other is the object of the original self consciousness,
and is at the same time its self, as the recognition of itself.

Thus

here the externality of the object is more thoroughly overcome than is
possible when the object is the object of work. 90

And second, in that

the object of the self conscious subject is, for that subject, the
recognition of itself, then this object provides the subject with an
adequate basis on which to comprehend itself as a personal indi~idua1.9l
Moreover, the self conscious subject must comprehend itself as a personal
'
individual. For this subject to be adequately a self conscious subject,
it must not only exist as the source and locus of its own desire, but mus
also comprehend itself as such.

Thus the full constitution of the self

conscious subject requires that this subject be recognized by another
self consciousness, that it occur in a context which is intersubjective
or, broadly speaking, social.

89cf. Hypolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel, trans. John O'Neill,
(New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 162.
90cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp.· 225-226; Ph~nomenologie, p. 139.
9lcf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 226-227, and 229; PhMnamoneologie, pp.
140 and • 141.

-363It was important to recall this argument, in order to see its bearin
on Hegel's conclusion that the individual is necessarily social.

As was

the case in the previous argument, it is here the conscious subject whose
experience includes, and must include, a social dimension.

Further, this

subject requires some social dimension in order that its experience be
adequately realized as a conscious subject.

In this case, the subject is

the self conscious subject of experience, and a social dimension to its
experience, recognition by another, is requisite in order that the subject
comprehend itself as a personal individual.

And finally, the 'society'

or 'intersubjective' milieu which Hegel describes here is essentially a
series of relationships between individuals who are to be described
primarily as conscious subjects.
I consider this argument from the Phenomenology of Spirit more
fundamental than the argument found in the Philosophy of Right.

The latte

is devoted to arguing that certain conditions are necessary in order that
the personal individual be an adequate subject of will, whereas the former
argues that certain conditions are necessary in order that the subject be
a personal individual at all, i.e., comprehend itself as such.

But in

both arguments the general issue is the same, for in both social relations
are described as necessary for the.adequate co~stitution of the conscious
subject, and in both 'society' is described as a system of relations
between conscious subjects.
Marx' description of society, and of the individual in relation to
society, differs from this description of Hegel's.

Several texts, among

them the Paris Manuscripts and the German Ideology illustrate this.

-364First, society for Marx, is to be understood as a system of productive
relations, or as a series of relations between productive individuals.
When in the Paris Manuscripts Marx asserts that, " ••• what I make from
myself I make for society, conscious of my nature as social,

1192

the

import of this statement is that the individual's " ••• nature as social"
derives from the fact that productive activity is that which brings the
individual into social relations:

" ••• I.make for society ••• "

Social

relations then are to be described most fundamentally as productive
relations.

93

Second, Marx insists on describing the individual who is
essentially social as the productive individual or subject of praxis, the
agent.

The texts cited above from the Manuscripts of 1844 indicates that

for Marx it is productive activity or praxis which brings the individual
concretely into social relations.

And in the German Ideology as well,

men, that is, social beings, distinguish themselves essentially through
which " ••• they begin to produce their means of subsistence ••• "

94

9 2Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 1, p. 116.

93 Cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 18; MEGA,
1, 5, p. 19. This is also implied in the German Ideology_, in Marx'
statement that, "By social we understand the cooperation of several
individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to wha~
end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production or industrial
stage, is always combined with a certain mode of cooperation, and that
this mode of cooperation is itself a 'productive force'."
/

94Marx-Engcls, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 7; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 10.

. -365Marx' descriptions of society and of the social individual, then,
differ from Hegel's description of those notions.
must be added as well.

Two further points

Marx not only differs in his description of

society and the social individual from Hegel, he objects to the Hegelian
description.

Marx insists on describing society, the subject of the

process of history, 95 as essentially constituted through productive relations.

Hegel and the Young Hegelians were unable to comprehend history

adequately in Marx' opinion because they did not comprehend the subject
of the historical process, society, in this fashion. 96

Further, Marx'

basis for holding that society is fundamentally a system of productive
relations is his position that man is fundamentally a productive agent,
a subject of praxis.

For Marx, it is the structure of praxis which

renders social relations possible.

Also, society is described as a

system of productive relations because it is taken by Marx to be a system
of relationships between productive agents.

97

It would seem then that

Marx' quarrel with Hegel's description of social relationships rests on
a basic objection to certain aspects of Hegel's description of the social
individual.

95 cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 18; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 5,p. 19. "Further that multitude of productive forms
accessible to men determines the nature of society, and hence that the
'history of humanity' must always be studied and treated in relation to
the history of industry and exchange."

~6Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 4; ~' Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, p. 8.
97Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 17; ~' Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, P• 19.

-366It is a.t this point that the question of Marx' att:J..tude to Hegel's
description of the individual and of productive activity comes to the
fore.

I have shown that Marx' doctrines of society and praxis bear

strong analogy to certain concepts found in Hegel's texts.

Lobkowicz

goes so far as to assert that, " ••• almost everything which Marx says
about labor can be traced back to Hegel."
be generally aware of this.

98

And Marx himself seems to

Marx gives Hegel credit for grasping " •••

the nature of work, ••• " and comprehending " ••• objective Itlan, authentic
.
99
because actual, as the result of his own work."
This :indicates, I
suggest, Marx' recognit:i_on that those categories required to describe
"work" or praxis adequately are to be found in Hegel.

But Lobkowicz is

also correct in noting that on this point, Marx," ••• dissociates himself
. ••• , "100 for much of the portion o f t h e Paris
from Hegel easily

Manuscripts devoted to Hegel is comprised of a number of sustained
arguments against Hegel's view of the individual in relation to his own
praxis (or 'work').
I shall devote the remainder of this chapter to showing that,
while Marx recognizes his debt to Hegel for those concepts which he
utilizes to describe the nature of praxis, he nonetheless levels a
critical argument against what he takes to be Hegel's description of
human nature.

The kernel of this argument is that, for Marx, Hegel's

description of the human individual as a conscious subject renders it
98Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice p. 321.
99Marx, "Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, P• 321;
~, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 156.
lOOLobkowicz, op. cit~, loc. cit.

-367impossible for him to theoretically describe the individual as an agent,
a subject of praxis.

This means that Marx' main quarrel with Hegel

pertains to the relationship of the categories of consciousness and praxis
in an adequate theory of human nature.
this out generally.

Several commentators have pointed

Lobkowicz, for example, notes that, " ••• the

difference consists in Hegel viewing the transformation effected by
bodily labor as a premisse and a subordinate form of the ultimate,
reconciling transfiguration achieved by speculative thought, while Marx
is and increasingly will be induced to see all theoretical activities
as only an epiphenomenon of labor and practice in general."

101

But then

Lobkowicz goes on to say that the basis of Marx' objection to Hegel on
this point is that Marx, " ••• accuses Hegel of camauflaging man's
.. 102
.
.
a 1 ienation •••

Marx does indeed assert this, 103 but his objection

to Hegel is something more fundamental.

Calvez points out that Marx

objects to Hegel's doctrine of consciousness on two specific points:
that Hegel can only account for specific phases of conscious experience
in terms of their pointing beyond themselves to some succeeding phase,

104

lOllbid., p. 340.
l0 2Ibid., p. 341.
l03cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 321; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bel. 3, p. 257. "provisionally, let us say this much in advance:
Hegel's standpoint is that of modern political economy. He views labor
as the essence, the self confirming essence of man he sees only the
positive side of labor, not its negative side~"
104cf. Calvez, La Pens~e de Karl Marx, (Paris:
1956), p. 355.

Editions du Seuil,

. -368and that Hegel can only account for the development of conscious
experience as a whole in terms of this development's pointing beyond
itself to the achievement of absolute knowledge.

105

I shall consider these of Marx' objections to Hegel subsequently,
but in the context of showing that they depend on the more fundamental
objection that Hegel, in describing the individual as essentially a
conscious subject, is unable to proceed from this to a description of
the individual as a productive agent.

This argument is critical for

Marx, because it leads him to conclude that the individual must be
described as fundamentally a productive agent, because such a description
of the individual can proceed to a further description of him as a
conscious subject.

It is in the sense brought out in this argument

which Marx constructs against Hegel that Marx holds praxis to be the
fundamental category of an adequate theory of human nature, and the
category in terms of which''co~scio¥sness' is to be understood.
Marx' argument against Hegel's description of the individual as
essentially a conscious subject focuses initially on Hegel's correlative
description of the nature of the object in relation to the conscious
subject.

And the point to which Marx calls attention in his criticism

of Hegel involves an interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
from the standpoint of its last chapter.

Given Hegel's doctrine of

absolute knowledge, what are the implications of that doctrine for a
concept of the "object" in general?

105 Cf. Ibid., p.

355.

Marx' response to this question is

r
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than self-consciousness, or that the object is only objectified self
consciousness, self consciousness as object.

106

There are of course

implications in this statement concerning the meaning of self
consciousness as well as concerning the meaning of the object as such.
But it is with the latter that Marx finds his primary interest.
meaning, for Marx, amounts to this:

And that

that an object is an object in virtue

of some determination which it receives from the subject to which it is
related, and that, for Hegel, the determination which an object receives
from its subject is that of the object's "being for" the subject as
conscious subject.

Or, for Hegel, as Marx reads the texts, the subject

which determines the object as object, which 'constitutes' the object as
such, is only a conscious subject.

Therefore that determination which

is constitutive of the object is exclusively a mental, Marx would say
'spiritual' (geistige) determination.
two unfortunate implications.

And this doctrine has, for Marx,

First, it implies that the human subject

can only be validly understood to be a conscious, or better, a selfconscious,

subject.~

consciousness. 11107

For Hegel, human nature, man, is equivalent to self
And second, the object as conceived by Hegel can be

106 Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 322;
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 157.

~'

l0 7Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, P•' 323; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158.
---:::::.:

.-370exhaustively described through a description of those conceptual or
'spiritual' determinations through which it is constituted by the
subject.

108

Marx justifies this critical interpretation of Hegel's doctrine
of the object by a series of statements, which he draws from the last
chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and which he takes to accurately
describe Hegel's understanding of the relationship between the object of
consciousness and consciousness itself.

First, " ••• the object as such

.
. h.ing. ,.109
presents i tse lf to consciousness
as somethi ng vanis
an item is

conside~ed

Insofar as

to be simply an isolated datum with no definite

relation to a subject, then such an item cannot be referred to as an
'object' in the proper sense of the term.

Or, insofar as an item is

described simply in terns of those characteristics which are proper to
it as an isolated entity, simply as it occurs "in itself," then there is
no way in which one can, from that description alone, determine the
nature of that item in terms of its being located in the range of
experience of a subject.

And thus such an item cannot be ref erred to as

an object, because to be an object means to be located in the range of
experience of a subject, in some determinable fashion.

This point calls

to mind Hegel's description of the supposed object of "sense certainty"

l08cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, op. cit.,
p. 324; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 159. "Totality of its aspects gives the
object implicitly a spiritual nature, and it truly becomes this nature fo
consciousness through the apprehension of every one of these aspects as
belonging to the self or through what was earlier called the spiritual
relation to them.-..~-

lO~rx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 323; MEGA,
Abt. l, Bd. 3, p. 158; Hegel, (Baillie), p. 789; PhMnomenologie, p:-549.

-371-

towards its "object," namely that its object is an isolated datum
containing all its determinations in itself, then it cannot be validly
described as an object; the only thing which can be said of the item is
that, " ••• the thing is; and it is merely because it is.

It is - this is

the essential point for sense knowledge, and that bare fact of being,
. 1 e imme
.
d.iacy, constitutes
.
.
t h at simp
its
trut h • .. 110

This description of

the object is the ultimate implication of that attitude of consciousness
towards its object and towards itself which Hegel in the "Introduction"
to the Phenomenology entitles the "natural standpoint. 11111

And the virtu

.of this attitude is found in its being overcome through the describable
development of consciousness itself.
The description of an item as isolated and simply intrinsically
determined, then, will not do as a description of the object qua object
of consciousness.

And it will not do because, as noted above, from such

a description alone no determination can be made of the location of the
object in the range of experience of the subject.

In order to surmount

this difficulty, some description must be offered which shows the object
to receive an essential determination from the subject, from
consciousness.

And this is the case because only from such a description

of the object can it be shown that the object counts necessarily in the
range of experience of the subject.

It is for this reason that Hegel,

according to Marx' restatement of his position, now asserts that,

llOHegel, (Baillie), p. 150; Phanomenologie, p. 80.
111 cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 135; PhHnomenologie, p. 67.
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" ••• it is the externalization of self consciousness which establishes
thinghood." 112
Great care must be taken in the interpretation of this text.

Marx

is not, I think, accusing Hegel of maintaining that the distinction of
consciousness and its object is the result of some original bifurcating
act of the ego, a position which Hegel himself in the Phenomenology
refers to as " ••• a onesided, unsound idealism ••• 11113

Rather, I take Marx

at this phase of 1 ~he Manuscripts to be attributing to Hegel a more subtle
doctrine of the relation of consciousness and object, involving several
claims.

"Thinghood" or objectivity involves an item's being "for another

as well as involving simply intrinsic determinations, and that its being
for another, for consciousness, is a real and essential determination of
the thing, not merely a further determination added on to those which
it might already involve.

Three features of this statement must be noted

A formal definition of the object is, on the one hand, being offered
here.

An item is an object in virtue of its being for another.

The

successful elucidation of this definition would surmount the difficulties
consequent upon describing the object as an isolated datum.

Further,

the object's being for another is an integral aspect of the constitution
of the object, not simply in general but in its specificity.

That means

that, insofar as an object is determined as being for another, this
determination interacts with other determinations of the thing to
ll 2Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 323; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 789; Phlinomenologie, p. 549.
ll3Hegel, (Baillie), p. 276; Ph~nomenologie, p. 278.

-373constitute the specific character of the object, or as Hegel would say to
"work it up into shape."
Marx does not interpret Hegel as asserting that an item might, as
it were, enter the range of the experience of a subject as determined
in an essentially complete fashion, and then receive the additional
determination of being for another, from consciousness, as if this were
merely a further determination superimposed upon the already constituted
datum.

Determinations are not added to the object the way items are

added to a list.

Rather, as the dialectic of thing and property in the

c

Phenomenolo gy showi;, any determination of a given object interacts with
1

its other determinations to constitute the total character of the
object.

114

Finally, just as being

f~r

another is a determination of the object,

it is a determination of the object.

That item which is determined as

for another possesses this feature as integrated with other features
pertaining to it, such that this is an essential moment of the specific
object as such or in itself; a determination of the object itself; a
determination of the object itself, albeit one received.

It is necessary

to stipulate this in order to avoid the implication that, given Hegel's
doctrine, the distinction between subject and object ultimately collapses
in favor of a view which would naively understand the object as a mere
"externalization" of consciousness, a determination by consciousness of
itself as other, to be ultimately and dialectically overcome.

This would

be a version of that Idealism which Hegel takes to be "onesided" and
"unsound."

Rather, Hegel attempts to maintain the integrity of the obj ec

-374through arguing that its being for another is an essential moment of its
own character, and Marx, I would suggest, recognizes this.

What Marx

does recognize as collapsing, and this will be a crucial point in a later
stage of his argument, is the distinction of an object's being for another
and its being for itself.

He recognizes Hegel to assert that, insofar as

being for another is a feature which the object itself possesses, it woul
make no concrete sense to speak of the object as it might be, or to ask
what it might be, without this feature.
integral aspect of the object as such.

Being for another is simply an
And the texts of Hegel seem to

. correct in
. t h.is recognition.
. .
115
revea1 t h at Ma rx is
I offer these comments as an explanation of Marx' claim that, for
Hegel, " ••• it is the externalization of self consciousness that establish··
thinghood."

116

Two other points immediately follow.

First, that in

virtue of which an object is an object, its being for another," is a
determination which the object receives from a source other than itself
taken simply.

It is received from the subject to which it is present.

And this is to say that it is received from consciousness, for it is

115 cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 175; Phanomenologie, pp. 99-100. As early
as the end of the dialectic of perception in the Phenomenology, Hegel
asserts the dialectic to have shown that any suggestion, " ••• which separated self existence and existence for another, drops away all together.
The object is really in one and the same respect the opposite (Gegenteil)
of itself - for itself 'so far as' it is for another, and for another
'so far as' it is for itself. It is for self, reflected into self, one;
but all this is asserted along with its opposite with its being for
another.
ll6cf. footnote number 12~.

--=
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consciousness that can realize an object as both other than itself and
present to itself.

If this is so, then it is also the case that for a

thing to be an object is equivalent to its being for consciousness,
capable of being realized or known by that consciousness to which it is
present.

There is, then, a fundamental equation between objectivity and

intelligibility.

And second, the determination of the object is somethin

that consciousness does.

It involves the act of consciousness'

"externalizing" itself, relating itself to that which is other than itsel
Thus consciousness is itself active in its relation to the object, rather
than being simply a passive recipient of the content of the object.
Consciousness

know~

the object, and thus knows that which it has actively

determined.
These observations concerning the nature of the object and its
relation to consciousness are observations made in the abstract.
questions which immediately pose themselves are:

The

What are the details of

that determination through which an object is for another as well as is
itself?

How is it that this determination is integrated with other

features so as to preserve the autonomy of the object?

And what are the

details of that activity through which consciousness effects a
determination in the object?

Unfortunately, answers to these questions

cannot be given here, but the reason for this is that, ultimately, the
satisfactory answer to these questions for Hegel is the Phenomenology of
Spirit.

Hegel would argue that it is only through the dialectical

exposition of the experience of consciousness in its several interrelated
moments that the full detail of the nature of the object as concretely

II
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revealed.

And Marx hopes to offer an account of the relation of the

object consciousness, realizing that in Hegel's own eyes only the detailed
development of the Phenomenology itself offers the ultimate description
and justification of that structure.

However, Marx feels that if the

structural features of Hegel's understanding of objectivity can be
isolated and revealed, fruitful critical reflection may ensue.
Moving ahead in his analysis of this structure, Marx asserts that
the understanding of consciousness as active in determining the object
has implications for both a doctrine of consciousness and a further
description of the object as well, " ••• that this externalization has not
only a negative significance but a positive significance as well. 11117
The positive signficance, that which relates to a doctrine of the object,
is stated by Marx in a fortuously complex assertion taken from the
Phenomenology:
••• for self consciousness, the negative of the object or
its self transcendence has a positive significance--self
consciousness thus knows this negative of the object-since self consciousness externalizes itself and in this
externalization establishes itself as object, or establishes
the object as itself on behalf of the indivisible unity of
being for itself.118
This text holds crucial importance for Marx' understanding of Hegel'
doctrine of the object.

It refers, first of all, to the object as "the

117Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 323; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 789; Phanomenologie,--P:--549.
llSibid., fmGA, pp. 158-159).
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This is again to assert the real otherness

of the object in relation to consciousness itself.

But still, to say

that an item is an object in virtue of consciousness' "self significance"
concerning the nature of the object.

For the object is as such

constituted through some activity involving the "externalization" of
consciousness relates itself to the object as its own other.

And this

activity is one through which, Marx states, consciousness " ••• establishes
itself as object or establishes the object as itself •••
How can this be?

11119

If it is the case that there is a real distinctio

between consciousness and its object, how can there nonetheless be an
identity between them?

The response to this question contains, I think,

the key to Marx' critique of Hegel's doctrine of the object.

The object

is, as has already been said, constituted through some activity whereby
consciousness "externalizes" itself.

Now this means that while it is

distinct from consciousness, the object is determined in such a fashion
as to be available to consciousness.

It is for another.

And what must

an object be, in order for it to be in a valid sense of the term "for
consciousness"?

Marx' response in a word would be, Intelligible.

Consciousness is that which apprehends the intelligible.

An item must

be inte;ligible in order for it to be an object for consciousness.
an item is determined as intelligible through some activity whereby
consciousness "externalizes" itself, relates itself to that which is
other, and brings that other into relation to itself.

ll9cf. Ibid.

And
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the object implies the assertion that there is an identity between
consciousness and its object, an identity that is not numerical but, as
it were, specific.
as intelligible.
consciousness.

Consciousness is rational, and determines its object
The object, in turn, is intelligible, that is, is for

It is in this sense that consciousness "externalizes

itself" with regard to its object and establishes the object "as such."
Consciousness establishes " ••• the object as itself ••• 11120 by bringing
the object in relation to itself, determines it as intelligible,
constitutes it as something which consciousness can relate to and
apprehend in virtue of its intelligibility.

It is in this sense that the

object is the "self transcendence 11121 of consciousness;

it is that which

is constituted by consciousness as intelligible.
To complete an examination of the text at hand, we need to consider
two other statements made in it.

One is that " ••• self consciousness thus

h
.
knows t h e negativity
of t h e ob.Ject ••• ; 11122 t h e oth er tat
t h e obj ect i s
established "on behalf of the indivisible unity of being-for-self •••

11123

For in these statements the development of the discussion up to this
point culminates.

That through which an item is determined as an object

120 cf. Ibid.
12lcf. Ibid., (MEGA, p. 158).
122 cf. Ibid.
123cf. Ibid., (MEGA, p. 159).
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essential feature to the identity of the specific object.

Now we have

seen that, in Marx' critical exposition of Hegel's doctrine, for an item
to be an object is for it to stand in relation to consciousness in virtue
of its being intelligible.

And it is the integral nature of this

determination that Marx wishes to stress at this point.
Intellibility is not a feature that is added to an item in virtue
of its standing in relation to consciousness.

An object is not

intelligible and other things as well, for example sweet, white, a cube,
etc.

Rather, an item is an object in virtue of its contents being

intelligible contents, capable of being apprehended by consciousness.
But this is to say that the object is and only is its intelligible
contents, that its identity is exhausted by its intelligible contents,
that the complete description of the intelligible contents of a given
object would be a complete and exhaustive description of that object
itself.

Nothing eise could or would be said of it.

This is the significance of Marx' observing that the object is
established in terms of "the indivisible unity of being-for-self."

The

term "being-for-self" is used in a way typical of the early chapters of
the Phenomenology:

a thing is for itself if it is a unity of differences

For an item to be sweet, white, a cube, is for it to contain differences
within itself.

But qua <Object, an item is "for itself" in that it

contains these differences within itself as a unity, and these contents
are intelligible contents.

And again, the point of cardinal importance

in Marx' eyes is that this unity of different, intelligible contents is

L:::::4f:=========================================ff====
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unity of being-for-self. 11124

Thus the access that consciousness has to

its object is expressed in the statement that " ••• self-consciousness thus
.
..125
knows t hi s negat i vity o f t h e ob Ject....
object as distinct from itself.

Consciousness recognizes its

But simultaneously consciousness has

access to the object in that it "knows 11 its object.

The object is that

which, given its character, is capable of being known by consciousness.
Consciousness relates to the object through knowing the object, and this
relation is the only

access~which

consciousness has to the object because,

Marx holds, Hegel's position leads him to the conclusion that the object
is only a unity of disparate intelligible contents, and thus is only
accessible in terms of the knowing activity of consciousness itself.
This analysis I take to reflect the "positive significance" of
Hegel's doctrine of objectivity as understood by Marx, the implications
of that doctrine as they bear on a fuller description of the nature of
the object itself.

But Marx also tells us that this doctrine contains

a "negative significance," implications that lead to a fuller description
of the nature of the conscious subject.

And these implications are statec

in a text that once again refers to the "externalizing" activity of
consciousness:

" ••• there is also present this other moment in the

process, that self consciousness has transcended and reabsorbed into
itself this externalization, this objectivity, and is thus at one with

1 24 cf. Ibid.
125cf. Ibid., (MEGA, p. 158).

r
-381itself in its other being as such. 11 1 26
Of prime importance in this statement is the implication that,
given the role of consciousness in relation to its object, then
consciousness is capable of grasping itself as self consciousness.

Since

the object is determined as such through an initial activity of
consciousness, then consciousness, in knowing its object, knows both that
which is other than itself and that for which it is responsible.

This

is the sense in which consciousness "reabsorbes" into itself its own
activity of "externalization":

consciousness knows that which is both

its other and that which is constituted through its own activity.

Put

otherwise, in knowing its object consciousness enjoys a relation both to
the object and to itself.

Consciousness relates to itself in virtue of

that which it knows as other being the result of its own determining
activity.
result.

Consciousness relates to its own activity in knowing this
.
127
Thus it is, " ••• one with itself in its other being as such."

Or, given the terms of the above relation, consciousness can validly be
described as self consciousness, as well as consciousness taken simply.
The dialectic of the general structure of consciousness in relation to
its object reveals that consciousness relates to its object and to itself
within this structure.
A point of methodological importance underlies this phase of Marx'
analysis, and it is one which he takes to have accurately borrowed from
Hegel.

It is that, on the one hand, a description of subjectivity can

..

126Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, PP• 323-324; .:...;.;;.;..;;
MEG.
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 159. Cf. Hegel, (Baillie); pp. 789-790; Phanomenologie
p. 549.
]2~·lbitl-r:;:~-=====================================================:tt=======

-382be obtained from an analysis of the structure of the relation of subject
to object, and that, on the other hand, only those statements which can be
obtained from this analysis are ones which can validly be taken to
describe the nature of the subject.

To speak of the subject at all is to

speak of that which occurs in definite relations, in relations to objects.
The subjects occurence is its occurence as one term in this relation.
Thus it is an analysis of this relation which, in the first place, must
be undertaken in order to understand what the subject is as one term in
this relation.
Furthermore the occurence of the subject is not simply found in,
but also exhausted in, being a term in this relation.

Thus to describe

what the subject is in this relation is to describe it exhaustively.

Or,

a full analysis of the structure of the relation of subject to object
provides the only theoretical context from which statements descriptive
of the nature of subjectivity itself can be validly drawn.

Hegel is able,

for example, to analyze this structure in such a fashion as to describe
subjectivity as involving self consciousness, and this because self
consciousnes~

is a. feature of the subject contained within, and therefore

revealed by an analysis of, the relationship of consciousness to its
object.

An analysis of the nature of the object, then, allows him to

make certain assertions concerning the nature of the object as well.

But

only such assertions as are grounded in an analysis of this sort will be
valid and acceptable.
This point is stressed by Marx through two subsequent statements
which all but conclude his interpretive exposition of Hegel's doctrine of

the object.

-383First, the structure of the relation of consciousness as

subject to its object is such that this structure, " ••• is the movement
of consciousness, and consciousness is therefore the totality of its
phases. 11128

The nature of consciousness is wholly contained in the

structure of its relation to the object as described above, and is wholly
described in the doctrine which is a description of that structure.
Consciousness is that which "externalizes" itself, actively relates to
that which is other than itself, determines that other as an object,
knows this object, and in knowing the object relates to itself as well,
is self consciousness.

Nothing more need or may be said of consciousness

or of the subject, for nothing more is derivable from the above analysis.
Correspondingly, the above analysis must be taken as offering an
exhaustive description of the nature of the object as well:

II

consciousness must similarly have related itself to the object in all of
its aspects and have grasp~d the object in terms of each of them. 11129
Just as the subject is that which occurs only in its relation to the
object, the object is that which occurs only in its relation to the
subject.

Thus all "aspects" of the object, so Marx reads Hegel, are

discoverable in terms of the above analysis.

The object is in general

that which is other than consciousness and is determined as being for its

l2~L

-Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, in Easton and Guddat, p. 324; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 159. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 790, Phanomenologie, pp.
549-550.
1 29cf. Marx, Ibid.

Hegel, (Baillie), p. 790, Phgnomenologie, p. 550.
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within itself as an integral element of its own unity.
In fine, Marx holds that this description of the nature of the
object reveals a description of the subject as well as a description that
is for Hegel both adequate and complete.

It is adequate in that it

contains all that is necessary for a fundamental understanding of the
nature of the object, and of the subject in relation to it.

It is

complete insofar as it is an analysis of the source and the only source
of information from which a doctrine of the object and a description of
the subject in relation to the object can be derived.

Thus this relation,

Marx asserts both in reference to Hegel and through Hegel's terminology,
is significant both " ••• for self consciousness itself ••• " and " ••• for
us ••• nl30

For self consciousness, the structure of the relation

described above is the structure of its experience of its object and
itself.

For us, for the philosophical analyst, this structure is that

and that alone which must be described in order that an adequate understanding of the object, and consequently of the subject also, might be
developed.
Adequate, that is to say, for Hegel.

But is this theory actually

complete and adequate description of the nature of the object?

Marx'

response to this is negative, but it is a response based not on insights
concerning the consistency of the position which he outlines and
attributes to Hegel.

Marx' objection is rather that, given the internal

consistency of the above position, it becomes impossible for Hegel to
l3~rx, "Hanascripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 323; MEGA,

r

-385speak of the object as object of agency, or of the subject as agent.

In

Marx' eyes, Hegel's position is incapable of including a crucial and
experienced phenomenon, that of agency.

On this ground it is an

inadequate view of man.
The details of Marx' objection must be outlined here, and this can
be done briefly given the exposition already seen.

First, Marx takes the

above description of the object in general to be one which Hegel views
as essentially complete in all its phases.

And in particular he

emphasizes that for an item to be an object is for it to be for another,
for consciousness.

An item is determined as an object by consciousness,

consciousness brings items as objects into some relation with itself,
and that relation at its basis involves the thing's being intelligible.

An item is an object if it stands in some relation to consciousness
whereby it can be known.
But this means that it would be superfluous for Hegel to go on to
assert that the object is also something which receives determinations
from the subject as an agent.

And more than superfluous; to assert this

would be for Hegel to violate the consistency of his own position.

To

be sure, Hegel does speak of consciousness as "acting" on its object in
an extended sense of that term.

But this is activity only on a cognitive

level, and distinct from "real" activity, for which Marx' model is
physical action which would yield some actual and productive
transformation of an einvironment.

Hegel is unable to speak of agency

in this latter sense in relation to the object, because he has already
argued that for a thing to be an object is for it to be an intelligible

-386item for consciousness.

No ingredient of "real" agency is necessary in

order for a thing to be so determined.

And if the details of Hegel's

description of the object as an intelligible item for consciousness form
an essential and complete description of the object, then he would be
inconsistent to go on to assert that the object is this and also that
which the subject can further determine through actual and transformative
agency:

There is thus no way in which Hegel can speak of the object as

object of agency at all.
This phase of Marx' objection alone seems to him damning enough.
But he goes on in the Manuscripts to develop a further implication of
Hegel's position which he takes to be even more critical.

Because Hegel

is on his own terms unable to speak of the object as object of agency,
he is also unable to describe the subject or self as agent.
This implication is drawn by Marx from considerations already seen.
The subject is nothing more (or less) than that for which objects occur.
A description of what the subject is as it stands in relation to objects
that are "for it" will be an exhaustive description of the subject.

Now

for the Hegel of Marx' exposition, three descriptive assertions can be
made concerning the nature of the subject.

First, since to be an object

is to be an intelligible item for a subject, the subject by
consciousness itself, the subject must be capable of activity on the leve
of cognition.

And third, consciousness is self consciousness; it knows

its object as the result of its own activity.

But these statements, Marx

holds, exhaust the assertions which Hegel can validly make towards a
description of the nature of the subject.

-

And they in no way either

---·--·-J!-387mention or necessarily imply that the subject is an agent in what Marx
would take to be an actual sense of the term:

an individual who acts on

a real and external environment in such a way as to transform it and
produce within it.

Hegel is unable to describe the subject as agent,

and is thus unable to include in his theory of subjectivity a crucial
and experienced feature of selfhood.
Marx' critique of Hegel's doctrine of objectivity, then, is twofold.
First, Hegel is capable of describing the object only as the intelligible
131
.
obj ect f or consciousness.

Second, and in view of this,- it becomes

further impossible for Hegel to describe the subject as anything other
than active self consciousness:

" ••• the self is only man conceived

abstractly ••• For Hegel, human nature, man, is equivalent to self
.
11132
consciousness.
Hegel, then, whom Marx priases as the only one of his predecessors
to have grasped " ••• the nature of work ••• 11133 and to have comprehended
" ••• objective man, authentic because of his own work,

11134

is ultimately

condemned by Marx as unable to account for agency in a concrete sense,
as being able only to describe action as the "labor of the concept."

In

1'31 Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 324;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 159.
132

cf • Marx, "Manuscripts
'
of 1844," i n Ea ston and
323; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158.

Gu dd at,

pp. 322 , and

l33Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 321; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 156.
l34Ibid.
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And that because his underpinning doctrine of the object in relation to
consciousness allows him only to describe the subject as active self
consciousness.
In view of these difficulties, a new doctrine must be developed, a

" ••• consistent naturalism or humanism ••• ," one " ••• distinct from Idealism
and materialism as well, and at the same time unifying the truth of
both. 11136

Such a doctrine would describe objects as objects of the

subject's " ••• drives ••• " which " ••• exist outside of him as independent •••
as " ••• objects of his need, essential and indispensable to the exercise
and confirmation of his essential capacities. 11137

It would at the same

time describe the subject as concrete agent, asserting that, "Self
consciousness is rather a quality of human nature ••• ," and not that,
" ••• human nature is a quality of self consciousness. 11138
Three general comments may now be made concerning the above critical
argument which Marx levels against Hegel.

First, Marx' argument is

directed specifically at Hegel's description of the conscious, or better
the self conscious subject, and one conclusion he derives from this

135Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 322; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 257. "Die Arbeit weoche Hegel allein kennt und
anerkennt, ist die abstrakt geistige."
136
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160.
137 Ibid.

13~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 323; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158.
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proceed to a description of the individual subject as a real agent.

Thus

Lobkowicz is correct in his claim that, at issue between Marx and Hegel
is, in Marx' eyes, the question of the relationship of consciousness and
praxis as categories within a theory of human nature. 139
Second, the criticism which Marx levels against Hegel here may not
be taken as "Feuerbachian" in content.

Marx in the Paris Manuscripts does

credit Feuerbach with leveling three accurate criticisms against Hegel.
Feuerbach had corrected Hegel in holding that the individual must be
described through the totality of his determinations rather than simply
those which pertain to him as a self conscious subject. 140

He had

defended this statement by refuting Hegel's employment of the dialectical
. re1 ation
.
.
141
meth od in
to sense consciousness.

And Feuerbach had insisted

that, of those concrete determinations of the individual which must be
descriptively and argumentatively located in a theory of human nature,
. d"iv id ua 1 • 142
one essential such determination is t h e socia 1 ity of t h e in
Now the first of these seems identical with that criticism of Hegel made
in the argument we have just considered.
case.

But this is not in fact the

For Feuerbach's criticism is that Hegel is unable to comprehend

l39cf. Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, p. 340.
140 cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 316;
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152.

~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 317; ~'
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152.
14

142Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 316; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152.
===..- ._
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object of perception as completely determined. 143

And Marx himself, as

shown in chapter two, goes on to criticize Feuerbach as capable of
describing " ••• the object, actuality, sensuousness ••• conceived only in
the form of the object or perception (Anschauung), but not as sensuous
human activity, practice (Praxis), not subjectively. 11144
Marx, it seems, might go on to construct an argument against
Feuerbach's position strongly analogous to the argument outlined above
against Hegel, concluding that

F~uerbach

is capable of describing the

object only as object of perception and imagination, and thus is also
incapable of validly describing the individual as an agent or subject of
praxis.

Mclellan is incorrect in holding that, in the Paris Manuscripts,

Feuerbach's concept of the relation of the individual subject to its
object is " ••• taken over and elaborated by Marx, being at the root of his
conception of the relationship of man and nature. 11145

Marx does credit

Feuerbach for an improvement on Hegel's concept of the object in his
realization that the object needs to be described as sunsuous.

But

ultimately Feuerbach is unable, given his theoretical foundation, to
adequately describe this object as the object of praxis, or the individual
as a concrete agent.

This is of course precisely the question at issue

143Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, trans. Vogel,
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966), p. 51; Fauerbach, Samtliche
Werke, ed. Bolin and Jodl, (Stuttgart: Fr. Fronnnans Verlag, 1904), vol.
2, p. 296.
144Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 400; MEGA,

Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 533.
145McLcllan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, (New York:
A. Praeger, 1969), p. 108.
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identical with Feuerbach's, or as Feuerbachian in content.
The third general comment to be made is that, it is in virtue of
this argument that Marx finds justification for holding that praxis must
be taken as the fundamental category in a theory of human nature, or that
man must be described as fundamentally a productive agent.
this is offered in the text.

Evidence for

Immediately after his formulation of the

argument outlined above, and after having noted that Hegel is capable of
comprehending the object only as intelligible object and the subject as
self conscious subject,

146

Marx goes on to assert that, "An objective

being acts objectively, and would not act objectively if objectivity did
not lie in its essential nature.

It creates and establishes only

objects, because it is fundamentally part of nature. 11147

Th"is i s to say

that the individual must be conceived both as one who enjoys concrete
relations to "nature" if it is to be taken as actual, or as an "objective
being," and that these relations must be taken as ones in which the
individual is understood to "act objectively," i.e., in which his action
is taken as both directed at his external environment and governed by
his needs.

148

146 cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, "1 in Easton and Guddat, p. 324; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 159.
147Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160.

~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA,
Abt. 2, Bd. 3, p. 161.
14
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does, this assertion shows that., in Marx' eyes, his argument against Hege
is also his justification for the position that productive action or
praxis is the fundamental category through which human nature is to be
comprehended.

In Marxian terms this justification may be stated as

follows.
A position which defines the individual as essentially a conscious
subject, as one whose essential relations to his own experience are
conscious relations, is unable also to account for the individual as a
productive agent.

However a position which describes the individual as

fundamentally a subject of praxis or a productive agent can, and indeed
must, proceed to a description of the individual as a conscious subject.
It can be shown, as seen in chapter one, that consciousness is itself a
feature of the structure of praxis
it.

149 in fact a necessary feature of

Now inasmuch as a theory of man which takes the individual as

•

fundamentally an agent can also and indeed must also describe the
individual as a conscious subject, and since a theory of man which takes
the individual as essentially a conscious subject cannot also describe
the individual as a productive agent, then the former theory is more
adequate than and preferable to the latter.

Furthermore, the latter

theory is able to adequately describe. the individual's social relations,
and the effects of society of the individual, phenomena which an
adequate theory of man must describe and explain.

Thus Marx'

justification for a theory of man which asserts the fundamentality of
149cf. Harx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 294-295;
MEGA Abt. 1 Bd_._3, p. 88.====================tl=====

r
-393praxis.
It may be noted here that this criticism which Marx levels against
Hegel is a theoretical, philosophical criticism.

Marcuse, at one point

in Reason and Revolution, suggests that Marx' critique of Hegel is
basically a social critique, based on the notion that Hegel's doctrine
of the relation of the individual to society is unable to account for
the alienation and suffering of the prolitariate.
is an error.

150

This, I suggest,

Marx may indeed be able to make this criticism, 151 but

the argument outlined above is one which criticizes Hegel not on the
bases of the relevance of his position to social experience, but on the
theoretical

ad~quacy

of that position.

I have argued that it is in virtue of the argument discussed above
that Marx feels justified in holding that the category of praxis is the
most fundamental concept in an adequate theory of man.

I have also

claimed that this argument represents Marx' most basic criticism of
Hegel.

I shall now support this claim by considering three further

criticisms of Hegel offered by Marx in the Manuscripts of 1844, and by
showing that. each of these criticisms depends on the above argument.
Two of these criticisms are noted by Calvez.

Calvez observes first

that Marx criticizes Hegel for the latter's method of analyzing the
experience of consciousness, and his use of "sublation," "Aufheben,"

150Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, (Boston:

Beacon Press, 1960), p. 2

l5lrf, e.g., he were to respond to Hegel's formulation of the notion
of "division of labor."
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Hegel can analyze any given phase of conscious

experience only in terms of that phase's pointing beyond itself to some
succeeding phase.

This is to say, however, that the function of

consciousness is to point beyond itself to some more sophisticated form
of consciousness, and that consciousness does not exercise a significant
function of itself within the material experience of the individua1.
Marx does make such a criticism of Hegel.

152

In the Paris Manuscripts, he

asserts that, for Hegel, "Since abstract consciousness,--the form in
which the object is conceived--is in itself only a moment of distinction
in self consciousness, the result of the movement is the identity of
self consciousness with consciousness (abstract knowledge) or the
movement of· abstract thought no longer directed outward but proceeding
only within itself.
the result."

153

That is to say, the dialectic of pure thought is

This means that for Hegel, specific phases of conscious

experience make sense only in terms of their succeeding phases, or that
his position results in a "dialectic of pure thought ••• "

But why might

this result be objectionable?
It is objectionable for Marx because, first, it fails to account for
specif~c

phases of conscious experience as enjoying a function within the
;

experience of the individual of themselves, and second, because that
position which results in describing conscious experience as a "dialectic
of pure thought" is one which describes the individual as essentially a

152Cf. Calvez, p. 344.
15 3Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 321; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 156.
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description of the individual as a productive agent.

But then both forms

of this criticism are based on the argument outlined above.

For, first

it is because of that argument that Marx is able to insist that the
individual both needs to be described as a subject and praxis, and needs
to be described fundamentally as such.

And second, as shown in chapter

one, it is in virtue of Marx' doctrine of the fundamentality of praxis
that he is able to assert that conscious experience plays an essential
role in relation to specific "material" experiences of

~.he

individual,

i.e., specific experiences of the individual as an agent, rather than
simply a role in relation to succeeding phases of conscious life itself.
Calvez also notes that Marx criticizes Hegel for being able to
analyze specific phases of conscious experience only in terms of their
relation to abstract knowledge. 154

The texts of Marx again illustrate

that this is a criticism which he levels against Hegel.

"Since Hegel's

Encyclopedia begins with logic, with pure speculative thought, and ends
with abstract knowledge--with self-consciousness, self-comprehending or
abstract act, that is, superhuman, abstract mind [Geist]--it is
altogether nothing but the expanded essence of philosophical mind, its
1

11155
·
· f 1cat1on.
·
·
se lf -ob Ject1

Ma rx er i ticizes
. .
Hege 1 f or b e i ng a bl e t o ma k e

sense of specific phases of conscious experience only through showing
their necessary relation to "abstract knowledge," to a phase of conscious

154 Calvez, p. 345.
155Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, P• 318-319;
MEGA, pp. 153-154.

-396experience which comprehends all previous phases of consciousness, and
integrates them within itself.
But again, why might this be objecfionable?

It is objectionable

only if one can show that the primary function of conscious experience is
not to yield some all-comprehending form of consciousness, but to
comprehend, or to render possible, some other dimension of the experience
of the individual subject of consciousness.

For Marx, the demoµstration

of this depends on the position that praxis is more fundamental than
consciousness in the experience of the individual, because it is only
given this that he is able to go on to argue that the function of
consciousness is to enable the individual to comprehend his own
productive activity and to render him a possible subject of praxis.
j

Marx

does argue that consciousness plays this role, as shown in chapter one.
But the position on which this argument depends, that man is fundamental!
a subject of praxis, emerges clearly in the argument against Hegel
sketched above.
Finally, Marx in the Paris Manuscripts criticizes Hegel for being
unable to adequately comprehend the genesis of human history.

He asserts

that Hegel, " ••• found only the abstract, logical, speculative expression
of the movement of history, not the actual history of man as a given
subject ••• 11156

Now to understand this criticism, we must remember that

for Marx, human history 'is ·essentially the history of man as a productive
agent.

157

Why is Hegel unable to comprehend history in this fashion?

l.56Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat," p. 317; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152-153.
157cf. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 7; MEGA
Ab~ 1 2 Bd. 5, p_._l_O~.
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adequately to comprehend man as a productive individual.

Hegel is only

capable of comprehending man as a conscious subject, and for this reason
he is only capable of comprehending the historical process in its
" ••• ~bstract, logical speculative expression ••• "

Here again Marx'

criticism is derived from his justification of the fundamental role of
praxis.
Since the other criticisms Marx makes against Hegel's description
of the individual as essentially a conscious subject are justified by the
assumption that praxis is the fundamental category in an adequate theory
of man, it follows that Marx' argument in support of this claim
constitutes his most basic complaint against Hegel.
But what are the implications of this for Marx' theory of man?
These implications are twofold.

First, in virtue of this argument Marx

feels driven by theoretical necessity to describe the individual as
fundamentally a productive agent.

But second, this for Marx involves

the taking of those concepts which Hegel himself employs to describe
human agency, and locating them at the basis of his own theory of human
nature.

At the end of chapter one I raised two questions:

How does Marx

justify a theory of human nature which involves praxis as its fundamental
category?

And:

What are the relations of Marx' theory of man to the

doctrines of Hegel and Feuerbach?
answered.

Both of these questions have now been

Marx justifies praxis as the fundamental category in his

theory of human nature through his argument against Hegel's description
of the conscious subject in relation to its object.

While Marx endorses
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in a general fashion certain Feuerbachian criticisms of Hegel, his own
theory of man leads to a rejection of Feuerbachian anthropology.

Marx'

own anthropology involves concepts which are, on the questions of praxis
and society, in the main imported from Hegel's texts.

Thus Marx' theory

of man, as revealed in the Paris Manuscripts and allied texts, is in no
sense a "Feuerbachian humanism."

Rather, Marx' theory of man is defined,

positively and negatively, in relation to Hegel.

r
Chapter Five
The Role of Marx' Anthropology
In the Introduction, as wel 1 as in the second chapter, I have
mentioned an hypothesis concerning the function of Marx' theory of man
within his larger theoretical framework. In the Introduction, I described
Marx' theory of man as 'normative', that is, as one which provides Marx
with principles or norms enabling him to comment on other topics such as
alienation an.d the economic details of productive activity. In the
second chapter, I noted that from Marx' theory of man principles follow
through which the possibility of the genesis of history
comprehended.

1

In this final chapter

itself can be

shall elaborate these statements

and give some indications of how Marx' theory of man functions as a
'normative' theory, one from which principles or norms follow which
enable him to comprehend the possibility of human history, as well as to
describe and evaluate specific human historical situations, such as the
alienation of the worker in capitalist society, and the economic
condition of the wage laborer.

2

lcf. Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx,
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1968), p. 85.
2My use of 'normative' here is an extended, but I do not think
illegitimate use of that term. I understand a norm to be a principle
through which phenomena not directly refered to by th~ principle
itself may nonetheless be adequately comprehended, as well as a principle
through which such phenomena may be evaluated. Marx' theory of man
functions for him as 'normative' in both of these senses, that is, it is
for his broader theory a principle in both of these senses.
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_I_. The Comprehension of History
Marx' understanding of history seems to include at least .three
assertions, whose formulations occur in various texts. The first is the
assertion that history originates from human productive activity:
11 • • •

life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation

clothing, and many other things. The first historical act is thus the
prod~ction

of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material

life itself ... The second fundamental point is that as soon as a need is
satisfied, (which implies the action of satisfying; and the acquisition of
an instrument), new needs are made, and thts production of new needs is
3
the first historical act. 11 Second, history is to be taken as the history
of human self actualization:

11

•••

the entire so called world history is

only the creation of man through human labor, and the development of
4

nature for man ..• 11

And finally, history is to be understood as· a process
5
whbse subject is society, society itself providing the context in which
the historical process can occur, and in terms of which the historical
process can be explained. Marx' most concise formulation of the content
3 Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, pp. 17-18. The seeming contrsdiction in these statements wil I be
subsequently discussed and resolved.
4 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, 11 Easton and Guddat, p. 314; MEGA, Abt.1,
Bd. 3, p . 125.

5 Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 18; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, p. 19. That society is the subject of the historical process is,
as I see it, an imp I ication of the text at this point.

'\
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materialism' in the famous "Preface" to the 1859 Critique of Political
Economy.
In the social production of their existence, men
inevitably enter into definite social relations, which
are independent of their will, namely relations of
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The
totality of these relations of production constitutes
the economic structure of society, the real foundation,
on which arises a legal and political superstructure,
and to which correspond definite forms of social
consciousness ••• At a certain stage of development, the
material productive forces of society come into
conflict with the existing relations of production •••
From forms of development of the productive forces
these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins
an era of social revolution. The changes in the
economic foundation lead sooner or later to the
transformation of the whole immense superstructure.6
Here Marx notes that society is the subject of the historical process, and
describes those interacting features within society in terms of which
history occurs.
How are these three statements related?

I suggest that the first

statement is, in part, a response to the question, how is human history
as a process possible?
history.

The data

~hich

This is .a_necessary question for a theory of
it tries to explain is the data of a process,

and therefore we must ask the question, how is one to make sense of there
being such a process at all?

Moreover Marx' statements seem to insist

6~1arx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans.
S. W. Ryazanskaya, ed. Maurice Dobb, (New York: International Publishers, 1970), pp. 20-21; Marx Engels, Werke, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag,
1961-1971), vol. 13, pp. 8-9. This edition of the works of Marx will
hereafter be noted as MEW.
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this question be specified so as to ask, how can one make sense out

of human history as a process, and as a specifically human process?
~istory

7

If

is to be explained, it must be explained as a process which is

specifically human, in order that history be distinguished from and
iescribed in distinction from other processes of development, for
example processes implicit in nature. 8

l

The first of the assertions listed above is a response to this

ruestion.

Marx' doctrine of praxis supplies him with an account of the

oossibility of man's being involved in a process which is at once
~pecifically

~or

this.

hum.an and distinctly historical.

There are three reasons

First, praxis itself is a constant process in which man

7cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of-History, (New York:

Oxford Uni~ersity Press, 1956), pp. 210-217.
Marx is not alone in this assumption.
Collingwood, in the text cited, explicitly argues that a theory of history,
~unctioning as the basis of an historiography, must be one which
~dequately distinguishes human historical affairs from the mere process
of natural events. For a gloss on Collingwood's arguments see also
~ackenheim, Metaphysics and Historicity, (Milwaukee:
Marquette University
Press, 1969), pp. 17-19.
8 But cf. Engels, "Introduction" to The Dialectics of Nature, in Marx
and Engels, Selected Works, (New York: International Publishers, 1968),
op. 342-357; MEW, vol. 20, pp. 311-327, in which Engels seems to collapse
this distinction. Marx, as I hope subsequent comments will show, would
argue that this dist.inction must be maintained if human history is to
oe adequately described.
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It involves his productive activity on nature, and his necessar)

transformation of nature towards the satisfaction of needs.
But second, and more significantly, praxis is also that process in
virute of which man is specifically distinguished.

On the one hand, it is

in virtue of the structure of human praxis that man overcomes the 'species
. ,l-0 wh"ic h c h aracterizes
.
.
speci"f"icity
t h e re 1 ation
o f non- h uman f orms o f l"f
1 e
to their environment, and is able, in Marx' language, to produce
"universally.-" 11

Human productive activity transforms the environment so

that the environment can elecit new needs within the experience of the
agent.

Such activity also 'actualizes' the agent so that he can be the

subject of new needs.

Consequently he can also be an agent who may act in

more complex and diverse fashions on the environment, rather than in a

9cf. Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,
"Preface to the First Edition, 1844," in Marx-Engels, Selected Works
(New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 455; MEW, vol. 21, pp.
27-28. "According to the materialist conception, the determining factor
in history is, in the last resort, the production and reproduction of
immediate life. But this itself is of a twofold character. On the one
hand, the prodhction of the means of subsistence, of 'food, clothing and
shelter, and the tools requisite therefore; on the other hand, the
production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species."
Petrovic's gloss on this text, in Petrovic, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth
Century, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 97-99, and pp. 112-113,
is that, for Marx and Engels, praxis is that process in which man both
universally engages, and which distinguishes man specifically.
lOcf. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, (New
York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 47.
llcf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88.
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12

Marx insists that praxis,

as characterized by 'universality' is this fashion, specifically
distinguishes the human agent.

13

On the other hand, praxis also

structurally requires the occurence of consciousness as a feature or
'moment' of itself.

Marx himself asserts this in the Paris Manuscripts, 14

and in chapter one I suggest an argument towards this assertion, concludinE
that only if consciousness is an essential feature of praxis can the
development of needs in relation to productive activity be accounted for.
In order for developed needs to be experienced.by the agent as functional
bases for his activity, he must be capable of relating both to this
environment and ,to himself in a way which transcends the instinctua1

15

or

species specific relation of self to invironment enjoyed by the animal.
And this relation can only be a conscious relation.

But the development

of needs itself is essential to the structure of human praxis.

Therefore,

the occurence of consciousness is an essential feature of human praxis.
Praxis, then, is a process in which man necessary engages, and one
through which he is specifically differentiated.

But, it is also a

12

Cf. Berger and Luckmann, op. cit., pp. 47-48, for further explicitation of this concept.
13cf. Marx, op. cit., loc. cit.
l4cf. Marx, Ibid. "Conscious life activity (bewusste Lebenstatigkeit)
distinguishes man immediately from the life activity of the animal."
15 cf. :t1acmurray, Persons in Relation, (London: Farber and Farber Ltd.,
1961), p. 48, in which "instinct" is defined in a way consistent with
this argument, as " ••• a specific adaptation to environment which does
not require to be learned."

r
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By this I mean that

praxis is a process which is not merely repetative or cyclic.

No process

of change which is merely repetative or cyclyc deserves to be entitled
historicai. 16

Rather, an historical process must be one of the

development of some subject through differentiated and internally
distinguishable phases.

And human praxis itself is such a process, in

virtue 9f its involving the development and proliferation of needs.

This

is the point to Marx' assertion, cited above, that the " ••• production of
new needs is the first historical act. 1117
in needs,

Productive activity is rooted

18 and needs are those experienced occurences in virtue of which

productive activity is undertaken.

The details of specific instances of

praxis are selected in relation to the content of those needs at whose
satisfaction they aim.

But Marx also argues that human praxis

structurally involves both activity towards the satisfaction of needs, and
the development out of that activity of new needs which may function as
bases for new forms of activity.

This means that human praxis itself is

not a mere cyclic or repetative process, not simply consistent repetition

16 cf. Engels, "Introduction" to The Dialectics of Nature, loc. cit.,
pp. 345-346; MEW, vol. 20, pp. 311-312. Even Engels, in spite of the
1

ambiguities of this text, argues that history cannot be comprehended as
a mere cyclic process of change, and must be comprehended as a process
involving the development of some subject, through distinguishable
phases.
17

Cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 17; MEGA, Abt. 1,

Bd. 5, p. 18.
18 cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844" in Easton and Guddat, p. 325, ~'
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160.
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Rather, praxis involves a

development through successive and inter-distinguishable phases, as those
needs which function as the bases of productive activity themselves develoI
and undergo differentiation.

And these comments show too why Marx, in

the texts from The German Ideology cited above, refers to both " ••• the
production of material life ••• " and the "production of new needs ••• " as
".,.the first historical act •••

1119

It is the same productive act, through.

which subsistence needs are handled by the human agent, and from which
new needs develop for that ag·ent, and thus it is this single act which is
initially historical.
These comments suffice to show that it is in virtue of his doctrine
of praxis that Marx can assert, in broad terms, that man is historical.
For it is in virtue of his doctrine of praxis, that Marx can assert that
~an

engages in a process which is both specifically human and distinctly

historical.

Parenthetically, we should note that the doctrine of praxis

also provides Marx with a broad orientation for the doing of history, to
~it

that orientation which comprehends human history as the history of

human productive activity, upon which Marx insists in The German Ideology.
One may note also that it is through his doctrine of praxis as
located in his theory of man that Marx is able to assert, as he does in
the Paris Manuscripts,
actualization.

20

that history is the history of human self

For self actualization is also an intrinsic feature of

the exercise of human productive activity.

·-

The productive agent

19cf. Marx-Engels, The Germ~n Ideology, Pascal, pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1,
Bd. 5, pp. 17-18.
20cf. footnote four.

-407'actualizes' himself, as shown in chapter one, both through realizing
himself as an agent who has engaged in and brought to term some specific
instance of activity, through the objectification of his labor in a
product, and through the development of those needs which arise out of
his activity itself, and which enable him to be an agent in a fuller and
more diversified sense.

That process in virtue of which Marx can say that

man is historical is the same process which allows him to assert a
doctrine of human self actualization.
It is also the doctrine of praxis, one may argue, which allows Marx
to

h~ld

that history is necessarily social history, or that the subject

of the historical process is society.

Marx asserts this in a passage in

the "Preface" to the 1859 Critique of Political Economy cited above.

The

\

basis of that assertion is, I think, contained in the analysis I made in
chapter one concerning the relation of praxis and society, in Marx' theory
of man.

(See pp.37ff).

That theory involved, first, the claim that social

relationships are to be understood as possible in virtue of praxis.
Productive activity results in a product which is both appropriable
towards the satisfaction of a need, and, because objectification is a
feature of praxis, em.bodies the details of the agent's activity in externaJ
form. 21

But insofar as relevantly similar needs are shared by individuals,

then some individual other than the producer is capable of appropriating
the product towards the satisfaction of some need of his own.

Since the

product objectifies the details of the activity of its producer, then

2lcf. Marx, "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, op. cit.,
p. 281; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 546.

-408that other, in appropriating the product, relates himself not only to the
product but also to its producer.

22

Finally, it is the individual's

product which introduces into his experience (or environment) the
possibility of his being a subject of interaction.

For interaction

requires that some feature of the individual be externalized, in order
that it be acted upon, and it is the product which renders such
externalization actual.

Thus social relationships are to be understood as

most .basically productive relationships, and praxis in turn is to be
understood as that which renders social relationships possible.
The first point to be notices here is that, for Marx, it is the
same process through which man can be described as historical, and through
which man can be described as in principle social, a possible subject of
social relationships or member of society.

This offers an initial

indication that, for Marx, the historical process is also a social
process.

In addition, one finds a second assertion concerning the

relationship of praxis and society in Marx' theory of man, in the statemen
that the actual details of the productive activity of the individual are
conditioned by the individual's actual social relationships.

The general

argument already seen for this statement begins from the notion that
society is to be understood most basically as a system of productive
activities in relation.

As such a system, society is itself a "productive

22Marx, "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 281; MEGA
Abt., 1, Bd. 3, pp. 546-547.
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23

in two senses.

~ociety as the system of

interrelated productive activities, offers those activities as options to
its members.
activity.
technical

Society also offers is members 24 "material" for productive

By "materials" Marx means things such as the scientif or
ca~egories,

language, and technical instruments through which

.
. .
. carrie
. d out. 25
productive
activity
is

It is as a "productive force"

which offers options for productive activity to its members as well as
the "materia'ls" which specify the details of that activity, that society
conditions and systematizes the details of praxis occuring within it.
Praxis, then, is that which proceeds in virtue of which man is
historical, in virtue of which he is social, and one whose concrete
realization is conditioned by actual society.

It is this last point, the

expression given it by Marx is the Grundrisse, which is critical for my
present argument.
In the "General Introduction" to the Grundrisse, Marx notes that
society conditions and controls the productive options available to its
members, in that society involves, " ••• first, a distribution of the means
of production, and secondly, which is another determination of the same
relationship, it is a distribution of the members of society among various
kinds of production (the subjection of individuals to certain relationship:

23Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 18, MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5,
p. 19.
24Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, P• 116.
25cf. Ibid.
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of production)."

Four points concerning this assertion are worth noting.

First this assertion reiterates the idea that society offers productive
options to its members, in stating that society "distributes" "means of
production ••• "

Second, as an obvious corollary of the first, this

"distribution" conditions the productive options available to the individual members of society.

But third, the content of these options

!must lna.terially depend on the concrete "means of production" actually
available within a given social context.

And fourth, the realized

productive options available to individuals as members of society are
also their most fundamental social relationships, as "relationships of
production."

This means that society, which is made possible through

praxis, is, at the same time, made up of definite relations of its members
to those productive possibilities presented to them as available options
by society itself.
I suggest that Marx' assertion that society conditions the details
of productive activity, may in part be rewritten to read, society is
comprised at its basis of relations of production.

I say in part,

because in this rewriting the question of society as providing "materials"
for productive activity is, for the moment, set aside.

But given this

qualification, it can be seen that the statement "society is comprised
at its basis of relations of production" is a partial development of the
second proposition noted in that portion of my outline of Marx' theory of

26Marx, The Grundrisse, trans. D. McLellan, (New York: Harper and Row,
1971), p. 30; Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen-Okonomie,
(Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 17.

-411man in which the relationship of praxis and society is described.

To

state that society at its basis involves, or. that social relationships
are to be comprehended most basically as relations of production, is to
state, as Marx does in the Grundrisse, that society involves a distribution of the members of society among the various kinds of production. 27
But this in turn is to state that society conditions and controls the
productive possibilities available to its members.
From this point, I shall argue that Marx' assertion in the "Pref ace"
to the 1859 Critique of Political Economy to the effect that society is
the history is both based on and finds its justification in Marx' theory
of man.

I take this to be the case for two reasons.

First, Marx'

description of the "economic structure of society" 28 involves a restate~ent

and partial development of the two propositions concerning the

relation of society and praxis found in his theory of man which I have
considered here.

Marx describes this economic structure as composed of

"the material productive forces of society" in interaction with "the
existing relations of production" operative within the social system. 29
By "material forces of production" I take Marx to mean the actual
productive activities undertaken in society, along with the techniques
and technical instruments through which those activities are undertaken.

27 Ibid.
28

Marx, Critique of Political Economy, ed. Dobb, p. 20; MEW, vol. 13,

p. 8.
29Marx, Critique of Polotical Economy, ed. Dobb, p. 21; MEW, vol. 13
PP• 8-9.
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these because he has previously argued that social relationships are in
~eneral
~ctual

rendered possible through praxis.

Thus he must also comprehend

soceity as fundamentally involving those concrete productive

activities through which society itself is realized.

And of course

~oncrete productive activity cannot be considered in abstraction from the

techniques and instruments through which production is undertaken; these
latter are integral features of the act of production.

Marx' comment

concerning society as involving productive relations is also a restatement,
and here a development, of a proposition contained within his theory of
inan.

Society must involve at its basis both forces of and relations of

production, because society is both rendered possible by and also condition
the concrete productive activities undertaken by its members.

Marx'

comment on "relations of production" is a comment on a manner in which
society exercises this latter role.
Second, in the Preface of the Critique of Political Economy Marx
goes on to describe how it is the case that society is the subject of the
listorical process.)

Society undergoes history in virtue of forces of

lroduction outstripping existing productive relations.

"At a certain

;tage of development, the material productive forces of society come into
~onflict

with the existing relations of production ••• From forms of

~evelopment of the productive forces these relations turn into their

~etters.

D.

Then begins an era of social revolution. 1130

Developments of

30Marx, Critique of Political Economy, ed. Dobb, p. 21; MEW, vol. 13,
9.

r
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instruments and techniques, render the social distribution of labor among
members of society outmoded.

These productive relations must then

themselves change and develop, in order to become adequate to developed
productive forces.

Thus the "economic structure of society" undergoes

transition, and thus society undergoes history.
Now the question here is, how is it possible for forces of
production to undergo the development which Marx indicates?

If society

"distributes" productive activity among its members, and systematizes it
thereby, might one not assume that society thus renders productive
activity static, capable of cyclic, i.e., nonhistorical, repetition, but
not of real developmental change?

The response to this question drawn

from the content of Marx' theory of man, is that praxis structurally
involves the possibility of its own development, through yielding both
transformations of the environment upon which it is exercised, and the
development of those needs on which it is based.
The environment as transformed by praxis is thereby capable of being
the scene of new and more diversified forms of productive activity.

The

agent, as the subject of new needs, is capable of engaging in new and more
complex forms of praxis.

The actual productive force residing at the

basis of society is thus itself capable of undergoing real development.
Because of this, it is capable of developing from phase to phase such
that those social relations appropriate to the earlier phase become
outmoded in the latter, and require revision.

It is because of praxis as

structurally involves the possibility of its own development that the

-414economic basis of society is capable of a transformation which can be
validly entitled historical.

And thus Marx' notion of society as the

subject of the historical process is both explained and specified in terms
of concepts initially laid down in his theory of man.
These observations concerning the relationship of Marx' theory of
man and his understanding of history may now be exhibited in a unified
fashion.

I have suggested that Marx' comprehension of history is based

on his theory of man, and that this understanding includes the assertions
that history is the history of human productive activity, that history
involves human self actualization, and that society is the subject of the
historical process.

Regarding the first of these statements, I have

pointed out that it is in virtue of his being a subject of praxis that
man can be described as historical, because praxis itself is a process
which is both distinctly historical and specifically human.
is also that process from which social relationships result.

But praxis
The process

!which renders man historical is the same as that which renders him social;
this in general implies an identification of human with social history.
Further, Marx' description of society as involving productive forces
and relations is a restatement of and a partial development of the view
of the relationship of society and praxis initially asserted in his theory
of man.

·The justification for Marx' assertion that social productive

forces develop in such a fashion as to outmode prior productive relations
is also found

a~ong

Marx' theory of man.

those concepts through which praxis of defined in
Finally, "it is also through concepts found in his

theory of man that Marx can describe history as the history of human self

-415actualization. Thus Marx' comprehension of history is both explained and
justified by concepts initially laid down in his theory of man. It is
through his theory of man that Marx can both comprehend the possibility
of and describe the structural outlines of human history.
This last statement is a statement of one function which the theory
of man exercises within Marx' broader theoretical schema. It allows us
to assert that Marx' theory of man is 'normative' in the sense that it
provides principles through which other phenomena~ here history, may be
comprehended. But Marx' theory of man is also •normative' in the sense
that it provides principles or norms in terms of which specific historical
phenomena may be comprehended and critically evaluated. It is to this
theme that I now turn, and to an examination of Marx' descriptions and
critical evaluations of alienation as a social phenomenon, and of the
condition of the wage laborer in capitalist society.
_l_I. The Problem of Alienation.

Marx gives his most thorough elicidation of his renouned concept of
alienation in the Paris Manuscripts, in the manuscript entitled
"Alienated Labor. 11 He there identifies the alienated individual as the
producer located in a society characterized by "the division between
capital and labor, 11

31

indicating, as Garaudy points out, that for Marx

31 Marx, "Manuscripts
.
of 1844, 11 in Easton and Guddat, p. 288; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 81.

-416alienation, "has its objective base in the actual living conditions of
the worker."
~nder

32

Marx goins on to describe the condition of alienation

four interrelated headings, the first two of which, I suggest, are

the more significant for my analysis. 33

And he expresses the first of

these headings, "alienation from the product of labor," by the statement,
" ••• the worker is related to the product of his labor (Produkt seiner
IArbeit) as to an alien object (fremden Gegenstand). 1134
The meaning of this statement must first be indicated.
itself offers two clues towards determining this meaning.

And the text

Marx first

asserts that, "The externalization35 of the worker in his product means
not

o~ly

that his work becomes an object, an external existence, but also

that it exists outside him independently, alien, an autonomous power,
opposed to him. 1136

Marx also states that, "So much does the appropriation

32 Garaudy, Karl Marx, The Evolution of his Thought, trans. Nan
IApotheker, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 58.
33 But cf. Gajo Petrovic, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, p. 84.
~etrovic considers the second and third of the expressions which Marx
gives to the concept of alienation to be the more fundamental, holding
that the first and fourth are derived from these. While it is not my
purpose to offer a total analysis of 'alienation' in Marx, I resist this
$uggestion. I shall of fer reasons in the body of my text for holding that
the first and the second of Marx' expressions of the concept of alienation
~re the more fundamental, from which the third and the fourth are derived'
through reference to the theory of man.
34Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA,
IAbt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83.
35 1 Externalization' must here not be taken in the more generic sense in
~hich Marx uses the term, but in its narrower sense, as a feature of
~roductive activity occuring under conditions of alienation.
36Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 389; MEGA,
~bt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 83-84.

-417of the object appear as alienation that the more objects the worker
produces, the fewer he can own, and the more he falls under the domination
of his product, of capital. 113 7
These statements, taken in conjunction, indicate the meaning of
"alienation from the product of labor" for Marx.

Under conditions of the

"division between capital and labor 1138 the worker is a productive agent,
_/

but is so in such a way that the results of his activity are produced in
order to be handed over to, or appropriated by, another, the possessor
of "capital."

It is of the essence of capital that products immediately

belong, not to their producers, but to those who control the means of
production.

One might assert here that, under the conditions to which

Marx refers, the worker's product is essentially and directly appropriable
not towards the satisfaction of his own needs, but towards the satisfaction of the (economic) needs of another.
As essentially appropriable by another rather than by its producer,
the product bears no direct relationship to its producer himself, and to
those needs in virtue of which he is a concrete agent.

This is the

meaning of Marx' statement that the product in relation to its producer
"exists outside him, independently ••• "

When Marx says that the worker

"falls under the domination of his product ••• " he means that the product
is produced, not for the purpose of some direct relation to its producer

37 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83.
38Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 288; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, P• 81.
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Production

ere is controlled, in other words, not by the concrete needs of the worker
or productive agent himself, but by the demands of the product, and the
determination of those demands through the requirements of the possessors
of capital.

Marx sums up this point by noting that 'alienation from the

oroduct of labor' involves the worker's " ••• loss of and subservience to
the object ••• 1139

It is a loss in that,the product bears no relation to

the concrete experience of its producer, and a subservience in that the
producer, as a worker, is dominated not by concrete needs of his own but
by standards and requirements which he apprehends as determined

b~

the

product in itself. 40
The quest.ton which arises now however is, how Marx justifies the
description of the above conditions as 'alienated'?
~rx

A condition which

describes as 'alienated' must be one which he comprehends as

problematic, 41 a state of affairs deleterious to the individual which must
be overcome.

But why might a state of affairs in which the product bears

39Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 389; MEGA,
A.bt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83.
40 cf. Garaudy, op. cit., p. 59. "Hence the creator finds himself separated from the product of his labor, which no longer belongs to him but
~o the ovmer of the means of production, i.e., slave master, or feudal
lord, or capitalist boss. His labor is thus no longer the fulfillment
)f his own goals, his personal projects; it fulfills the goals of someone
else."
4lcf. Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, (Indianapolis:
rhe Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), pp. 144-161. Rotenstreich shows that,
~istorically, 'alienation' does not consistently bear this broad
:onnotation, but that it must connote some intrinsically problematic
:ondition for Marx.
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experien~e

or needs of its producer,

and in which production is controlled by the relation of the product
itself to the other for whom it is appropriable, be considered problematic
or deleterious, and thus one involving alienation?
I suggest that Marx' justification for entitling the above condition
'alienated' is discoverable in his theory of man.

There, Marx develops

concepts concerning man as a productive agent in relation to the object
or product .of his activity.

He claims that, a) productive activity yields

(

a transformation of 'nature' or the external environment upon which it is
exercised; b) the result of such activity is an external product; c) the
product is related to its producer in that it is appropriable by him for
the satisfaction of some need of his own; d) the activity of the
individual is rooted in some need concretely occuring within his
experience.

It seems that these assertions, developed in Marx theory

of man, are now used by him as norms through which he might comprehend and
critically evaluate the condition of the productive individual in a system
involving " ••• the division between capital and labor ••• , " and through
which he might be justified in entitling that condition 'alienated.'
Within this system, first, the result of the individual's activity
is an external product.

But further, this product is, in its details,

essentially non-appropriable by him.

And third, to repeat the preceding

statement in different terms, the product in its details relates not to
the need of its producer, but to the needs of another.

Given this, then

the structural relation between agent and product which Marx describes
in his theory of man is violated.

The structure of praxis itself, as

r
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which the productive individual is located.

And it is because of this

structural violation of praxis under given social conditions that Marx is
able to entitle the relation of agent to product under those conditions
'alienated'.~

Marx, then, utilizes the concepts concerning the relation of agent
to product to evaluate a given historical relation of agent to product
pejoratively.

More specifically, he holds that the absense of a direct

relationship of the product to its producer violates that principle which
describes theproduce as appropriable by its producer.

And he holds that

the determination of the details of the product by the requirements of
another violates the principle through which praxis is described as
rootE!d in need, and concretely selected in terms of the needs of the
individual agent.

It is because the given relation obtaining between

producer and product involves these violations that Marx comprehends it
as problematic.

And it is because of these violations that this relation

of producer .to product is deleterious to the former.

Since the agent

by reason of the social division of labor and capital is unable to
apprehend his product as in its details related to himself, and is unable
to act according to standards derived from needs of his own, then he is
unable to be an agent in the full and adeuqate sense of that term offered
by Marx' theory of man. 42 ' Thus it is in terms of principles laid down in

4 2cf. Garaudy, op. cit., loc. cit. "Man in his work ceases to be a
man, i.e., a human being who determines his own ends, and becomes a means,
a moment in the objective process of production, a means for producing
commodities and surplus values."

-421that theory that Marx justifies comprehending and evaluating the specific
ocelation of producer to product in the capitalist mode of production as
~ne

alienated.
Parenthetically, one may note that the responsibility for that

~elation

of producer to product which Marx entitles "alienated" rests with

the social division of labor and capital, i.e., with social conditions.
It is consistent with Marx' theory of man for him to assert that social
conditions yield this alienated relationship, because of the second
proposition concerning the relationship of praxis and society in my
outline cf that theory.

In that praxis is conditioned by society through

social "distribution" of the members of society among various forms of
productive activity, this social distribution can occur so as to result
in a relation of agent to product which Marx evaluates pejoratively.
I have claimed that Marx' analysis of "alienation from the product
of labor" is based on his theory of man.

The same claim may be made for

his analysis of "alienation from the process of labor."

These two

discussions of alienation are intimately related, and the concepts employee
in the first will also be found in the second.
Marx begins his discussion of this aspect of "alienated labor" by
asserting that "alienation from the process of labor" is a necessary
feature of alienation from the product.

He supports this through a

familiar statement concerning objectification.

"How could the worker

stand in an alien relationship to the product of his activity if he did
not alienate himself from _himself in the very act of production?

After
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or at most in his shelter and finery, while in his human

functions he feels only like an animal. 1147

To sum up these points, the

production of an "alien" product is itself a process of activity whose
details are controlled by some one other than the agent, a process which
aims only indirectly at the satisfaction of his needs, and one in which
the individual is unable to comprehend himself and his action out of the
conjunctio~

of his own subsistence and human needs.

But again the question arises, why does Marx conceive of a process
of activity bearing these characteristics as "alienated," i.e., as a
process which is problematic and deleterious to its subject?

Why is it

not proper for processes of activity to be controlled by someone other
than the agent?

Why is that activity which aims only indirectly at the

satisfaction of need deleterious?

And finally, why might at least some

processes of activity be not undertaken towards the satisfaction of
subsistence needs exclusively?
Marx, as I read the texts, offers two responses to these questions,
both based on the content of his theory of man.

His first response is

that activity as described above occurs in violation of certain features
of the nature of praxis, and of man's nature as an agent.

In the context

of this response, the question of the relation of praxis and needs again
comes to the fore.

And the above description of activity aimed only

indirectly at the satisfaction of needs must be stated more accurately
here.

By this, Marx does not mean action which is apprehended in its

details as instrumental towards the satisfaction of a need (e.g., the act

-

47 Ibid.

-423pf assembly\ line manufacture which, because of its resulting compensation,
enables the worker to purchase food).

It is this latter sort of

productive process from which the agent is alienated, because, in principle
productive activity is rooted in needs, and is performed because of the
relevance of the details of a given instance of productive action to the
needs which the agent concretely experiences.

When the agent can apprehend

no relationship between the actual details of his activity and the content
of his own needs, then this activity may, Marx holds, be liegitmately
described as a process from which the agent is "alienated."

Again, it is

the content of his theory of man which enables Marx to comprehend a given
phenomenon as involving alienation; here, the process of action is
alienated in that it violates a feature of praxis described in that theory.
As a result, one may also ~ee why, for Marx, that activity whose

details are controlled not by the agent, but by another, is activity from
~hich

the agent is alienated.

In principle concrete action is selected

by the agent in terms of its relevance to his needs.
"controls" his own activity.

The individual thus

To say that the details of action are

controlled by another, is to say that while this activity has relevance to
the requirements or needs of another,

48

the agent is not able to experience

4 8cf. Garaudy, op. cit., pp. 59-60. "In all systems of private
ownership of the means of production, the worker is not only estranged
from the product of his labor, but from the very act of his labor. His
boss not only dictates the aims but also the means-and methods of his
work ••• They are predetermined, designed in a vacuum, in an entirely
dehumanized form and to rhythms of tools and machines that of ten become
hallucinating ••• Here alienation is depersonalization."

-424or apprehend his concrete activity as "his own," as having discernable
relevance to his experience. 49
"It belongs to another.

Again he is "alienated" from his activity:

It is the loss cf his own self.

(Verlust seiner

selbst. 11 ) 50
Finally, Marx seems to hold in this context that, while it is
through human productive activity that the satisfaction of subsistence and
numan needs is conjoined, in that the very production of means of
~ubsistence,

the "first historical act" as Marx puts it in the German

Ideologv, results in the development of.new needs, the agent who is
alienated from the process of his activity is, because of this alienation,
unable to experience this conjunction as a feature of his action.
this, in turn, is itself a further source of alienation.

And

51

It is clear that Marx' theory of man provides him with principles
whose normative employment allows him to speak of "alienation from the
process of labor."

It is the theory of man which allows Marx to evaluate

a given condition of activity as involving "alienation."

But .there is also

a second manner in which Marx describes activity not related to the needs
of ·the agent and controlled in its details by another.

This involves the

49cf. Marx, op. cit., lac. cft. Thus Marx' statement, " ••• the external
nature of work for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own
but another person's, that in work he does not belong to himself but to
someone else."
SO Ibid.
Slcf. Ibid.
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"Self actualization" is taken by Marx as a structural feature of
praxis, in two senses.

First the agent, in engaging in productive activity

actualizes himself as a definite agent.

Second, the agent, through his

action, realizes for himself new needs, which may in turn function as the
Dasis of new and more diversified forms of action.

But if the individual

tis not able to apprehend his action as "his own," in the sense described
above, then he is not able to apprehend his activity as his own, since it
is controlled by another, nor can his activity be a relevant source for
the development of new needs for him, since the action is not relevant to
~is

needs initially, but to those of another.

Thus, given productive actio

under these conditions, self actualization is denied to the agent.

Another

treason from the theory of man for entitling such action "alienated" is
provided by Marx.
The above discussion presents an identification of Marx' meanings
for, and the justifications for his descriptions of alienation from the
product and the process of labor.

In the text of the Paris Manuscripts,

Marx moves from the unification of these two descriptions to a discussion
of alienation under a third heading:
oeing."

man's alienation from his "species

.
.
53
I turn my attent
i on now to t h at d1scuss1on.
<

In chapter one, (see pp.12ft), I differed from Lobkowicz'

general interpretation of Marx' doctrine of •species being'.
52cf. Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, (Notre Dame: The University of
Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 344-345, 349-51. Lobkowicz hints at this
idea, but does not thoroughly develop it from the text.
53 cf. Marx, op. cit., loc. cit.
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in terms of his comments on the alienation of man from his species

lbeing, it is the question of the "universality" of human praxis which is
uppermost in the texts of Marx.
A single citation illustrates this point.

Marx states in the Paris

!Manuscripts that, "By degrading free spontaneous activity to the level of
~

means, alienated labor makes the species life of man a means of his

..60
. 1 existence.
.
physica
~iscussion

In this statement, Marx first refers back to his

of alienation from the process of labor.

Such activity is a

"means" towards the satisfaction of needs, but an "indirect" one, i.e.,
one whose details bear no discernable relation to the actual needs of the
agent.

Using this notion as a basis for his present analysis, Marx' point

here is twofold.

First because the agent is unable to experience his

activity and its results as relevant to his needs, he is unable to
experience his own relation as an agent to nature as actual, i.e., as one
through which nature is transformed through activity of his own, towards
the satisfaction of needs of his own.

And second, because of this, the

agent is also unable to realize himself as one who produces universally.
For "universal" production depends upon the agent's becoming the subject
of new needs, whicb in turn depends upon his realizing himself as one who
has acted towards the satisfaction of prior needs of his own.

Since this

latter possibility is unavailable to the agent alienated from the product
and process of alienation, then the former is unavailable to him also.
Thus this individual is unable to experience his productive relation to

60cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA,
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 89.

-427nature as "actual," in the sense noted above, and is unable to produce
"universally."

He is thus, Marx holds, alienated from his "species

being. 1161
Here again Marx' discussion of alienation is directly related to his
theory of man.

That theory shows the structure of human productive

activity to involve the possibility of man's being a "species being."
~s

It

the vitiating of that possibility that Marx here refers to as

~lienation. 62
Marx finally discusses alienation in the Manuscripts as alienation of

~an from his fellows. 63 Marx' discussion of this is both brief and
oblique, and is summed up in the following statement.

"What holds true of

nian's relationship to his work, to the product of his work, and to himself,
also holds truP. of man's relationship to other men, to their labor, and
_6lcf.. Petrovic, op. cit., p. 83. " ••• by alienating his own activity
himself, man in fact alienates his essence from himself and himself
[rom his essence. Man is in essence a creative, practical being, and when
~e alienates his creative activity from himself, he alienates his human
~ssence from himself."
In this comment 'creative' and 'universal' may be
~kaen as synnonyms.
62 0ne might note here that Marx' critique of alienation also essentially
~rom

lnvolves those concepts describing praxis which are discoverable in Hegel.
µf. L. Easton, "Alienation and History in the Early Marx," Philosophy and
rhenomenological Research, 1961-62, vol. 22, no. 2, p. 194. Easton,
commenting on the relation of Marx' notion of alienation to Hegel, notes
~hat, the part of the Phenomenology of Spirit which seems to have attracted
t-Iarx most is the section, " ••• which concentrates on 'wealth' and 'state
power,' namely, 'Spirit in Self-Estrangement,' The Discipline of Culture
~nd Civilization." He holds (p. 194) that the image of Rameau's Nephew
(Diderot) in this section is the source of Marx' concept of alienation.
~ut Marx' explicit critique of alienation involves more fundamentally those
~oncepts involved in his doctrine of praxis which Marx derives from Hegel.
63

\
Cf. Garaudy, op. cit., p. 59.
"his heading.

Garaudy, curiously, omits reference to

r

-428and to the object of their labor. 1164 . The claim implicit in this statement
seems to be as follows.

The individual is an actual agent in virtue of

his ability to produce products universally towards the satisfaction of
his needs.

Under conditions of alienation, this ability is vitiated.

But

the individual also experiences relations with others most fundamentally
in virtue of his agency, of praxis.

If then the individual is alienated

from his own activity and its results, he will also be alienated from his
relationships with others.

He is unable to experience his activity as

actually his own, and thus is further unable to experience those others
IWho relate themselves to his activity as relating actually to himself.
!This heading under which Marx describes alienation, then, is derived from
the first two headings described above.
It has been seen then, that Marx' descriptions of "alienation" in
~he

Paris Manuscripts are both based on and justified by his theory of man.

trhis illustrates another function of Marx' theory of man, in addition to
~ts

enabling him to comprehend the possibility of and the general structure

pf history.
~ble

Marx' theory of man provides principles through which he is

to comprehend specific historical phenomena and evaluate them as

li.nvolving alienation.

It is a "normative" theory in this sense.

Parenthetically, comment might be made on a statement of Lobkowicz
~oncerning

the relation of the theory of human nature to the notion of

alienation in Marx.

In Theory and Practice, Lobkowicz states that

' ••• neither Hegel nor Marx measures man's 'alienated state' against either

64cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA,
1. Bd. ]_ n_ RQ_

~bt.

-429a trans-historical human nature or against a 'logically predetermined' fut
ure.

Rather, they measure it against a human potentiality revealed by

the phenomenon of alienation--against a human potentiality which, though
at first it emerges in an alienated state, allows one to envisage a
previously unknown possibility of ultimate human self-actualization. 1165
Some correction needs to be made of this statement.

Certainly Marx does

object to a "transhistorical theory of human nature" in one sense, as
seen in chapter two (see pp.{Pff) in comments on Marx' relation to
Feuerbach and Prudhon.

Marx would not allow a concept of alienation which

asserted that human nature universally and transhistorically involved
some definite need (e.g., that man be agricultural) whose denial (e.g.,
by technology and urbanization) yields a deleterious effect to the denied
subject.

But Marx' notion of alienation is based on his theory of man,

and there is one significant sense in which that theory is transhistorical
It is a theory which describes the structural outlines in terms of which
all human historical possibilities are realized.

Man is, for Marx,

capable of realizing historical possibilities because he is a universal
productive agent, because his agency necessarily results in social
relationships, and so forth.

And it is specific historical frustrations

of these structural human possibilities which Marx in the Paris Manuscript
identifies as alienation.

To be sure, specific human possibilities and

needs are realized historically and must be comprehended empirically.
But such realizations occur in virtue of the structure of man's nature
as a conscious, social productive agent.
6

This nature is intelligible

5Lobkowic~, Theorv and Practice, p. 315.

-430and can be described in a theory.
We have seen that Marx• theory of man has a 'normative• use when
included in his analysis of alienation. We shall now see this also to be
the case in Marx• analysis of wage labor in capital ism.

ill· The Cr it igue of Wage Labor.
A summary of Marx• critique of the condition of the wage laborer is
66
found in his Wage Labor and Capital,
first presented in Marx in lecture
form in Burssels in 1847, 67 and re-edited by Engels for publication in
68
This essay is both remarkably consistent wlth portions of
1891.
69
CaoitaJ,
and offers in a brief and unified form Marx• economic
~escription

and critique of the question at hand.

Marx opens this essay by describing the apparent relationship of
labor power and wages within the capitalist system of production. The
Wage laborer is defined as one possessed of labor power, that is, the
~apacity

to actively produce for definable periods of time. It is his

labor power, as so defined, which the wage laborer sells to the capitalist,
Cf. Marx, "Wage Labor and Capital," 11 lntroduction 11 by Engels, in
~arx-Engels, Selected Works, pp. 64-94; MEW, vol.6, pp.397-423, 593-599.
67
Cf. Engels' "Introduction" to "Wage Labor and Capita_J, 11 Joe. cit.,
p. 64; MEW, voJ.6, p. 593.
68
Cf. Ibid., p. 71; MEW, vol. 6, p. 599.
69
Cf. especially Capital, vol. 1, pp. 167-176, "The Buying and Selling
of Labor Power;" MEW, vol. 23, pp. 181-191.

-431the owner(s) of the means of production, in the marketplace. 70

Through

the selling of labor power, the wage laborer receives definite
compensation.
Thus the initial condition of the wage laborer is determined in
that, " ••• what they sell to the capitalist is their labor power.

The

capitalist buys this labour power for a day, a week, a month, etc.

And

after he has bought it, he uses it by having the workers work for a
stipulated period of time. 1171
~irst,

Two features of this statement may be noted.

inasmuch as the wage laborer sells or exchanges his labor power in

the market place, he relates to his own labor as to a commodity, 72 that
.
. 1 ent va 1ue. 73
i s, an 1•t em exc h angea bl e f or some oth er item
o f equiva

And

wages are simply that compensation which the wage laborer realizes in the
sale or exchange of his labor power.

"The exchange value of a commodity,

reckoned in money, is what is called price.

Wages are only a special name

70 cf. Engels' "Introduction" to "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p.
68; MEW, vol. 6, p. 597. Engels shows that it must be 'labor power' ratherj,
than actual labor which the wage laborer exchanges for compensation. "Wha~j
the economists had regarded as the cost of production of 'labour' was the
cost of production not of labour but of the living worker himself. • •• At
the most, he might sell his future labour, that is, undertake to perform
a certain amount of work in a definite time. In so doing, however, he doe
not sell labour (which would first have to be performed) but puts his labo1'
power at the disposal of the capitalist for a definite time (in the case
of time-work) or for the purpose of a definite output (in the case of piec
work) in return for a definite payment; he hires out, or sells, his labour
power." Cf. also Capital, vol. 1, (Moore and Aveling), p. 539; MEW, vol.
23, p. 559.

j'

71 cf. Marx, "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 73; MEW, vol. 6,
P• 399.
72 cf. Ibid.
73cf. Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, p. 55; MEW, vol. 23, p. 70

r
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price of this peculiar commodity which has no other repository than human
flesh and blood.

1174

The wage laborer, then, is one who exchanges his labot

power as a commodity, in return for wages, the price of this commodity.
The question which Marx raises at this point is, how are wages, the
price of labor power, determined in definite forms?

But this question

cannot be handled by itself; a more fundamental question must be raised.
Since labor power functions as a commodity, its price and value must be
determined in relation to th.e price and value of commodities in general.
Therefore, in order to comprehend definite wages in relation to labor
power one must treat the question, how is price and value in relation to
commodities in general determined?
The characteristic feature of a commodity is that, " ••• it is
directly exchangeable with other commodities. 1175

This means that

commodities, in spite of their disparate characteristics as utility items,
involve severally a relationship to some common denominator in terms of
which their exchangeability may be measured.

76

And that to which

commodities commonly relate is the generalized labor of which they are
products.

Commodities are, " ••• the products of social activity, the resul

of expended energy, materialized labour.

As objectifications of social

labour, all commodities are crystalizations of the same substance."

77

74Marx, "Wage Labor and Capital~' loc. cit., P• 74; MEW, vol. 6' P• 399.
75Marx, Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, P· 55; MEW, vol. 23, P• 70.
76 cf. Marx, Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, p. 57; MEW, vol. 23,
11.
77Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, ed. Dobb,
p. 29; NEW, voo. 13, p. 16-17.

Ip.
~

.
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-433One speaks of general or "abstract 1178 labor here because, as commodities,
products have in common not that they are the detailed results of concrete
instances of relevantly similar productive activities, but that they are
generally the results of definite amounts of expended labor time; " ••• as
exchange values they represent the same homogeneous labour, i.e., labour
in which the individual characteristics of the workers are obliterated.
Labour which creates exchange value is thus abstract general labour.

1179

The value of a commodity, then, is constituted and determined in virtue of
its embodying expended labor power.

In Capital, Marx notes that the

definite values of commodities are constituted in virtue of the commodities
embodying definite amounts of labor power,

80

and that the values of

commodities vis a vis others are determined by the respective amounts of
"socially necessary" labor time they respectively embody, that is, the
time, " ••• required to produce an item under normal conditions of
production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent
at the time. 1181
In Wage Labor and Capital, Marx relates the above comments to the
question of the price of the commodity, through noting that the basic pricE

78cf. Marx, Political Econo~, ed. Dobb, p. 29; MEW, vol. 13, p. 17.
79Marx, Political Economy, ed. Dobb, p. 29, MEW, vol. 13, p. 17. Cf.
also Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, p. 45; MEW, vol. 23, p. 60.
80cf. Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, pp. 38-39; MEW, vol. 23, P• 5' •
8lrbid. Also, "Commodities, therefore, in which equal quantities of
labour-are embodied, or which can be produced in the same time, have the
same value."

-
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Cost of

oroduction is the sum of the costs of materials and instruments, plus

~xpended labor power, 83 which the capitalist must realize through price in
the:-exchange of his commodity, in order to realize the value of that
commodity. 84

The basic price of a commodity, then, abstracting from the

~luctuations of profit and loss attributable to variations or competition8 5
and supply and demand 86 in the economic market, is equivalent to that
amount of labor power expended in the production of the item both directly,
in terms of direct expenditure of labor time, and indirectly, in terms of
the labor time expended in the creation of those materials and instruments
necessary for productive activity.

This price is also equivalent to the

. l"ist. 87
.
cos t o f t h e pro duction
o f t h e i tern accrued by t h e capita

On the terms of the above, labor power, that which is exchanged by
the wage laborer for compensation, must have a price and a value.

However

an anomoly is apparent here, in that labor power must both have a value,
if it can be exchanged by the wage laborer as a commodity, and also be the

82cf. Marx, "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., PP• 77-79; MEW, vol.
6, pp. 403-405.
83cf. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., P• 79; MEW, vol. 6, p. 405.
84cf. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., P• 77-78; MEW, vol. 6, pp.
403-404.
ascf. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 76; MEW, vol. 6, P• 402.
86cf. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 77; MEW, vol.. 6, p. 403.
87cf. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., P• 79; MEW, vol. 6, P• 405.
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-435source of the values of all other commodities, 88 as that which all products
as commodities share in common.

How then can the definite value and

price of labor power be determined?

Marx' way of answering this question

is to re-phrase it, to ask, "What, then, is the cost of production of
labor power 11 ?89

Since there is a relation of equivalence between the

value, price, and cost of a commodity, then the price and value of labor
power as a commodity may be determinable if the cost of its production is
determinable.

And this latter feature of labor power is, Marx argues,

determinable as, " ••• the cost required for maintaining the worker as a
worker, and develooing him into a worker ••• The price of his labor will,
therefore, be determined by the price of the necessary means of
subsistence. 1190

The value, and therefore the basic price of any

commodity, is equivalent to its cost of production.

But the cost of the

production of labor power is that necessary for the worker's subsistence.
Thus the price of labor power is that compensation which the worker must
receive in order to maintain his subsistence.

And in that the cost in

question here is socially determinable in a definite form, then the value
and basic price of labor power is also definitely determinable in society.
These assertions are subject to two qualifications.

In referring to

the cost of_ the production of labor power as that cost necessary for the
subsistence of the worker, Marx does not mean here to refer to the minimal

88cf. Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, P• 537; MEW, vol. 23, p. 557
Marx notes the anamoly referred to at this point.
8911 Wage Labor and Capital'! loc. cit., p. 79; MEW, vol. 6, p. 406
90"Wage Labor and

-=

Capital~'

loc. cit., p. 80; MEW, vol. 6, p. 406.

-436subsistence of the individual worker.

For one thing, that which is

necessary for the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production is not
simply the individual worker, but rather the consistent supply of labor
power.

Thus the cost of the production of labor power is not equivalent

to that necessary for the subsistence of the individual worker, but
rather that necess&ry for the maintenance of that class of persons who
exchange their labor power for wages.

The " ••• wage minimum, like the

determination of the price of connnodities by the cost of production in
general, does not hold good for the single individual, but for the
species. 1191

Thus the individual worker must, for example, receive in

compensation wages adequate for his own subsistence and that of his
family.

And second, Marx means to refer here not to bare subsistence, but

to socially tolerable subsistence, that is to a level of subsistence
minimally adequate to the aspirations and needs acquired by the working
class from the concrete social environment in which that class is located.< 2
It is not, then, necessary for Marx to argue that a characteristic of that
class which exchanges its labor power for wages is impoverishment.
But given these qualifications, Marx feels it legitimate to hold
that the situation of the wage laborer in capitalist society is
characterized by his exchanging his labor power for wages equivalent to
the cost of his 'production, that is equivalent to the socially tolerable

9lnwage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 80; MEW, vol. 6, pp. 406-407.
9 2c£. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., pp. 84-85; MEW, vol. 6, p.

412.

-437or adequate subsistence of the class of wage laborers in society, and for
Marx this is to further explain and defend the assertion that the wage
laborer relates to his own labor power as a commodity, that is as an item
bearing a definite exchange value in the social economic market.
It is of this situation of the wage laborer that Marx wishes to offe1
a critique.

And this critique is expressed by Marx in two ways, the first

of which depends upon the second, and the second of which, I shall propose 1
is dependent upon the .content of Marx' theory of man.
Marx first asserts that, "within the relation of capital and wage
labor, the interests of capital and the interests of wage labor are
diametrically opposed. 1193
justifications:

For this statement itself Marx offers two

a) the relation of rise in wages to rise in profits is

necessarily an inverse relation, because profit is measured by that price
received for a commodity in excess of the cost paid out by the capitalist
for the labor power expended in the commodity's production;

94

b) it is the

necessary interest of the capitalist to maintain a class of wage laborers,
for it is only in virtue of a class of persons who exchange their labor
.
95
power for wages that the production of commodities may be maintained.
But the first of these reasons is not sufficient to support Marx'
assertion that the interests of the capitalist and working classes are
necessarily antagonistic or "diametrically opposed."

Given that wages

9311 Wage Labor and Capital" loc. cit.,
P• 88; MEW, vol. 6, P• 415.
94cf. "Wage Labor and Capit;al" loc. cit., PP• 86-87; MEW, vol. 6, pp.
413-414.
95cf. "Wage Labor and Capital,." loc. cit., P• 83;

~'

vol. 6, p. 410.

-438ay maintain.the working class at a socially tolerable, or perhaps even
acceptable, level of subsistence, then the 'interest' of this class need
ot necessarily be antagonistic to that of the capitalist class; it may
simply differ from the interests of this latter class.
suppo~t

Thus in order to

his assertion that the interests of the capitalist and working

classes are necessarily antagonistic, Marx if forced to fall back on the
second of the two reasons noted above.

But how would the interest of the

capitalist class in maintaining the existence of the 'working class'
indicate a necessary conflict of interests or antagonism between these
two classes?

This could be the case only if it were necessarily in the

interest of the 'working class' not to be maintained as such, that is not
to maintain itself as a class of persons which exchanges its labor power
for wages.
It is this last expression which leads to the second of Marx'
expressions of his critique of the condition of the wage laborer in
capitalist society.

The interests of wage labor and capital can, in Marx'

view, be considered necessarily antagonistic only if it is necessarily
against the interest of wage labor to relate to its own labor power as a
commodity, i.e., to exchange this labor power for wages.

But this is to

say that there must be some inherent and demonstrable problematic feature
or features to the situation of relating to one's own labor power as a
commodity.

How might Marx show this to be the case?

Early in the text of Wage Labor and Capital, Marx asserts that,
" ••• the exercise of labour power, labour, is the worker's own life
activity, the manifestation of his own life.

.And this life activity he

-439$ells to another person in order to secure the necessary means of
$ubsistence.
to exist.
~

Thus his life activity is for him only a means to enable him

He works in order to live.

He does not even reckon labour as

part of his life, it is rather a sacrifice of his life.

couunodity whdch he has made over to another.

It is a

Hence also, the product of

nis activity is not the object of his activity. 1196

This statement contains

I suggest, two arguments whose conclusion is that the situation of the
~age

laborer in relating to his own labor power as a couunodity is

inherently problematic.

Both of these arguments depend on the content of

Marx' theory of man, and both, perhaps unsurprisingly, bear similarities
to Marx 1 analysis of alienation.
First, insofar as the wage laborer exchanges his labor pwoer for
wages, he then expends that labor power in a fashion indifferent as to
what the results of his activity might be.

To paraphrase an example

offered by Marx,97 the individual's activity might produce one quarter of
corn or two ounces of gold, and yet receive the same item in exchange for
his expended labor power, wages in a definite amount.

But this means that

the direct relation of the individual to his activity is not a relation to
the determinate result of his activity, but to the compensation received
in the exchange.

And on the basis of Marx' theory of man, this situation

is problematic on two counts.
The individual first is here unable to experience the result of his

96cf. "Wage Labor and Capit.al," loc. cit., p. 75; MEW, vol. 6, p. 400.
97 cf. Capital, Moore and Aveli~g, vol. 1, pp. 62-63; MEW, vol. 23, pp.

rn-1s.
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the purpose of his action is not the production of some definite product,
out the realization of wages.

It is wages, not the product, which, as it

were, crystalize the activity of the individual.

This is the meaning of

!Marx' assertion that, for the wage laborer, " ••• the product of his
is not the object of his activity. 1198

activit~

For the wage laborer the product

does not objectify his activity because, for him, his activity directly
realizes not the product itself but wages. 99
Second, the activity of the wage laborer is not a direct but rather
a problematically indirect means towards the satisfaction of needs.

The

details of the laborer's activity do not correspond to a definite need of
~is

own:

~hich

~rx

His labor power is expended for the purpose of realizing wages,

then may be utilized for the handling and satisfying of needs.

Thus

asserts that the wage laborer's " ••• life activity is for him only a

means to enable him to exist."lOO
The wage laborer, then, does not experience his product as the
objectification of his own activity, and does not experience his activity
and its result as relevant to his own needs, that is, as 'his own'.

This

situation, given Marx' theory of man, is problematic and deleterious to
the individual.

And the reason for this is the same as that cited above

in the discussion of Marx' concept of alienation.

Given this situation,

the structure of praxis is violated, and the individual is unable to be an
98 cf. "Wage Labor and. Ca_pital," loc. cit., p. 75; MEW, vol. 6, p. 400.
99cf. Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 3, pp. 821-823; MEW, vol. 25,
pp. 828-829.
lOO"Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 75; MEW, vol. 6, p. 400.

-441agent in an adequate sense of that term, one who experiences his product
as the concrete objectification of his own activity, and as appropriable
in some sense relevant to needs of his own.
~ound

Marx here utilizes concepts

in his theory of man concerning the product as involving

pbjectification and appropriability to evaluate the condition of the wage
laborer in capitalist society.
Furthermore, that activity from which commodity value results is
' ••• abstract, general labor ••• , 101 that is, a measurable quantity of labor
related to a labor in general.

The wage laborer, in exchanging his labor

oower for wages, then, exchanges his capacity to expend labor power in
general, in whatever way in which_the corresponding member of the exchange
111ay see fit.

That is, the wage laborer exchanges here his capacity to

produce commodities, and thus his labor power is for him " ••• abstract,
:?eneral labour ••• "

He exchanges, within the limits of his talents,

abilities, and skills, his capacity simply to produce whatever commodities
might be at the moment required.

~oes

Marx expresses this by saying that, "He

not even reckon labor as part of his life ••• 11102
The meaning of this can. now be shown.

In that the wage laborer

exchanges essentially his capacity simply to produce the commodities
~equired

at the moment, whose character is their value based on labor which

ls 'abstract', the individual's relation to his own activity is an 'abstrac '
relation.

He relates to his own activity here as the general means whereby

lOl~farx, Political Economy, ed. Dobb, p. 29; ~' vol. 13, p. 17.
l0 2"Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 75; MEW, vol. 6,

p.

400.
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vitiated for the wage laborer.
The text cited above from Marx in part may now be cited fully.

"He

does not even reckon labor as a part of his li.fe, it is rather a sacrifice
of his life. 11103

Since the wage laborer does not relate directly but only

abstractly to the details of his own activity, he fails to achieve self
actualization through that activity.

This is a " ••• sacrifice of his life,'

because, as seen in Marx' theory of man, the possibility of self
actualization is one integral to the human subject of praxis.

The situatic

which vitiates this possibility, then, violates the nature of man as an
agent.

Thus again Marx evaluates negatively the situation of the wage

laborer, and again this evaluation is based on and justified by the
content of Marx' theory of man.
We have seen then, that Marx' theory of man is given a noarmative
employment within his larger theoretical framework.

It enables Marx to

comprehend and evaluate the phenomenon of alienation, the condition of
the wage laborer in capitalist society, and furnishes him with principles
through which he comprehends the possibility of as well as the structure
in general of human history.

I take this to indicate not simply that ther1

occurs a theory of man within the texts of Marx, but also that that theory
plays an integral role in his overall thought.

If the brief analysis of

Marx' normative employment of his theory of man is correct, then it must
be held that that theory enjoys an integral and basic location within the
larger theoretical doctrine wqich Marx' texts ex.hibit.

-

l0 3 Ibid.
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I

offer this under the following five brief headings.
First, I have argued that a theory of man is validly discoverable
in the early texts of Marx.

The contra! text in which this theory is

found is the "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844."

My method of

determining the content of this theory has been textual analysis.

From

the Paris Manuscripts and allied texts, I isolated the main assertions
comprising Marx' theory of man.

The arguments which Harx takes to

justify and elucidate those propositions were exposed.

When an argument

for a proposition contained in Marx' theory of man was implicit in the
text rather than explicit, my test for its utilization was a twofold one.
I have, in my exposition of Marx' theory of man, utilized only those
implicit arguments germane to that theory which are consistent with other
propositions in that theory and consistent with explicit arguments
offered by Marx in support of those other propositions.
The content of Marx' theory of man involves sets of propositions
concerning productive activity or praxis, social relationships, and
consciousness.

Marx argues that man's fundamental relationships to nature

and to himself must be understood as productive relationships or
relationships of praxis.

The individual himself must be understood

fundamentally as a subject of praxis, a productive agent.

Praxis itself

involves the transforniation of nature, objectification, and appropriation.
The human agent is, for Marx, ·one who acts in virtue of both subsistence
and human needs, and whose activity is 'universal' rather than 'species

-

specific'.

On this basis, Marx argues that the human agent is one who

-444experiences self actualization through praxis.
Moreover, praxis both renders possible and is conditioned concretely
by the individual's social relationships.

Productive activity is in

principle social, and as such enables the individual to experience
'totalization' and to be determined as an object through the activities
of others as well as through his own activity as a subject of praxis.
Marx argues that consciousness is a feature of and an essential feature
of praxis.

Consciousness is a feature of praxis in that it is a relation

of the individual to his environment and to himself founded on the more
fundamental productive relationship.

But it is also an essential feature

thereof, because only given this can another essential feature of the
structure of praxis be legitimately explained, namely, the development of
human -needs.

The individual subject of praxis must then be described as

a conscious agent.
Second, Marx' theory of man can not be validly described as
'Feuerbachian' in its content.

Marx in the Paris Manuscripts does credit

Feuerbach with making certain legitimate objections against Hegel.

But

Marx, within the context of his theory of man, objects to the content of
Feuerbach's anthropology with respect to the relation of praxis to nature
as its object, the nature of consciousness, including sense consciousness,
in relation to its object, and man as one who enjoys concrete social
relationships.

For Marx, Feuerbach's view of nature does not allow him to

give an adequate account of nature as the object of praxis.

Correlative

to this, Feuerbach is unable to describe the object of consciousness as
one which receives its fundamental determinations from praxis.

Thus he

-445is unable to describe consciousness as an essential feature of praxis.
Consequently, he is only able to describe the individual as a conscious
subject, not as a conscious agent.

Marx also argues that Feuerbach is able

to describe social relationships only abstractly.

Feuerbach asserts that

man is essentially communal, but he is unable to describe social relations
as actual or concrete relationships between agents, and he is also unable
to account for the social character of human needs.
The content of Marx' theory of man cannot therefore be described as
'Feuerbachian'.

Althusser's position with regard to the interpretation of

Marx' theory of man will not stand.

Althusser suggests, a) that the theory

of man discoverable in the early texts of Marx is contentually a repetitioTI
of Feuerbachian 'humanism', and b) that this theory must be judged as
irrelevant to those mature texts in which Marx develops communism as a
science, for in those texts Marx rejects Feuerbach's anthropology and
classifies it as ideology.

I have attempted to refute the first of these

two suggestions, showing that Marx' theory of man as revealed in his early
texts is no repetition of, but rather involves at its basis critical
objections to, the anthropology with which Marx was familiar from the texte
of Feuerbach.

Although I have not dealt directly with the second of

Althusser's suggestions; I feel that my manner of dealing with the first
calls the second strongly into question.
Third, I have argued that, on the question of the relation of Marx'
theory of man to Marx' predecessors, that relation which is critical for
the formation of, and for contemporary comprehension of the theory of man,
is Marx' relationship to Hegel.

This is the case for two reasons.

First, j
i

-446there are strong analogies between Marx' concept of praxis and arguments
concerning agency in Hegel's texts, and analogies as well between Marx
and Hegel on the question of the individual as necessarily social, or as
one whose experience essentially involves social relationships.

Thus

Marx' doctrine of praxis can be at its main points comprehended as a
restatement of those arguments employed in Hegel's texts concerning the
individual as an agent.
But second, Marx finds the chief justification of his claim that
praxis as the fundamental category through which human experience is to be
described, and upon which a valid theory of man must be based, in an
argument which he constructs against his understanding of Hegel's position
on the relationship of consciousness to its object.
for two reasons.

This is significant

First, this argument does not involve Marx' rejecting

the Hegelian concepts through which agency is described.

Rather, it

involves his insistence that those concepts be maintained as descriptive
of agency or praxis, but also that praxis itself be located differently
in a theory of man than Hegel's position allows.

Second, it is this-

argument which provides Marx with justification for holding that man is
essentially an agent, a subject of praxis, and that, within a theory of
llllan, praxis must be taken as the fundamental category.
critical to Marx' overall position.

And this is

Marx must be able to hold this in

order to hold that man's fundamental relationships to himself and to nature
are productive, that it is in virtue of his being an agent that he
achieves self actualization, that it is in virtue of his being an agent
that man both enjoys social relationships and is essentially social, and

-447that consciousness, while an essential and necessary feature of the
structure of productive activity, is yet a feature thereof.

These features

of Marx' theory of man are essential to it, and Marx can only hold them if
he can also hold the position that man is fundamentally a productive agent.
But Marx finds justification for holding that position through the
argument, exhibited in chapter four, which he directs against Hegel.
Thus the content and structure of Marx' theory of man, both
positively and negatively, can best be understood in terms of his
relationship to Hegel.

On the one hand, those concepts employed by Marx

to describe productive agency are discoverable in Hegel.

Indeed, for the

most part, the concepts utilized by Marx to describe social relationships
are also exhibited in Hegel's texts.

On

the other hand, Marx develops a

central and crucial argument in his theory of man, through the
construction of an argument directed against Hegel.
Fourth, I have tried to show in this chapter how Marx' theory of man
is integrally located within his larger theoretical framework.

It is

this theory of man which allows Marx to comprehend the human historical
process because it is, on the one hand, through his doctrine of praxis
that Marx is able to describe man as historical, and on the other hand,
through his doctrine of the relation of praxis and society that Marx can
go on to describe society as the subject of the historical process, and
justify that description.

Furthermore, Marx employs principles taken from

his theory of man to comprehend and evaluate historical phenomena such as
alienation, and the condition of the wage laborer in capitalist society.
':rhe theory of man, then, is not simply found in Marx' texts; it plays an

===tt::::====================================================;ft====-=

-448integral and essential role in Marx' total theoretical schema.
Finally, it might be suggested here that Marx' theory of man is not
for him 'ideological', as Althusser claims it to be.

The theory of man

as outlined above is not, for Marx, the expression of the experience of a
given society, or a given class within society.

It is rather for Marx a

theory which exposes the possibility and the structure of human historical
development, and which allows us to
accurately.

As

com~rehend

given historical experiencei

such, Marx' theory of man does not fall prey to his own

condemnations of humanisms as ideologies, seen for instance in his
condemnations of the Young Hegelians as ideologists in the German
Ideology, but is rather able to play a role both integral to and
consistent with Marx' mature aims.
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